☐ *Urban Life and Urban Landscape Series*

FOR THE CITY AS A WHOLE

Planning, Politics, and the Public Interest in Dallas, Texas, 1900–1965

ROBERT B. FAIRBANKS

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For my wife, Emily,
and my children,
Amy, Julia, and Carolyn

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Introduction

Doug J. Swanson, Dallas's popular crime novelist, contends that while Dallas lacks a "stunning natural backdrop"—no ocean, no forest, no desert, no mountains—it nonetheless possesses an "outsized quality" that distinguishes it from other cities. As Swanson observes, everyone has "some idea" or image of Dallas: "It might be the city that killed Kennedy, it might be the TV show, it might be the Dallas Cowboys. But [people] have heard about it."[1]

For some, Dallas is notable for its politics and civic leadership. Journalists and other commentators, for instance, made much of the city's far-right politics and oligarchical Dallas Citizens Council at the time of the Kennedy assassination. In 1912, the city won acclaim for its energetic boosterism and reform tradition. Others, meanwhile, have condemned Dallas's rabid anti-union tradition. "Big D" 's rejection of federal urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s has been cited at times to further support arguments about the city's distinctiveness by underscoring its fierce independence. To local citizens, of course, Dallas has always been unique: many like to believe that Dallas had no natural reason to exist, and credit the city's spectacular growth and prosperity to the "Dallas Spirit."

Although I acknowledge that Dallas has some unique characteristics and experiences, I have started this book from a different assumption. I am interested in "using" Dallas to understand better the changing nature of politics and planning in urban America during the twentieth century. Dallas is hardly typical of all cities, but it is closely tied to dominant business leadership and the "good government" and planning movements characteristic of that era.[2] Southern and western cities often enthusiastically and selectively embraced aspects of both these movements as strategies to help them develop still faster. Dallas also participated in the larger public discourse about cities characteristic of the time. Indeed, this work builds on the

scholarship of able historians like Roy Lubove and M. Christine Boyer, who have discovered a marked agreement at particular times about the nature of the municipality that appeared to know no geographical bounds. These shared assumptions did not mean unanimity about dealing with specific needs of cities, or the end to partisan politics. Rather, a broad-based agreement on the nature of the city provided a context for real disagreements, since both sides started from a common perception of the nature of reality.[3]

This book stems from my interest in understanding how changing conceptions of the city—what it was or could be—relate to different urban policies and programs over time. Although the literature of urban history has expanded at an impressive rate in recent decades, much of it has centered on issues of race, class, and gender in explaining the development of the city. Historians also pay special attention to the role of social forces in shaping urban development, as well as their influences on the thoughts and actions of the historical actors.[4] These are all valuable contributions, but such efforts have largely discouraged scholars from investigating the city from a more humanistic approach, emphasizing not social forces but human perception.[5] Studies examining the development of urban policy have stressed the importance of real events in shaping responses and have neglected to investigate the relationship between the perception of reality that city builders brought to the city and its problems and the actual response to those urban problems. Little effort has been made to examine the writings of city builders or the structure of their organizations in order to understand their basic assumptions about the nature of the city.

One reason for the neglect of city leaders' public writings and statements is the historian's suspicion that true motives cannot be drawn from such material. This is true at some level. However, to dismiss the public discourse that these leaders participate in, or to neglect the committees they work through, is a grievous error that makes it difficult for us to understand important assumptions about the city and its needs. When this neglect is combined with the search for villains in the story of urban development, the result is bad history. Civic leaders are often portrayed as being motivated only by greed, and their involvement in urban affairs as nothing but a way to attain selfish goals. Structural innovation, if it redistributes power or influence in a way that adversely affects minorities or the poor, is dismissed as nothing more than a conspiracy to deprive citizens of their due.[6] Little effort is made to relate these actions to the urban context in which they occurred. By *context,* I mean the basic assumptions about the way the city worked, and the notions about what cities should become.[7]

On one level, the absence of this urban context is not surprising because we live in a time in which the city is not often thought of as a true social/cultural unit. Cities are seen today as part of larger, fragmented metropolitan areas and seem to provide little more than settings for various groups and neighborhoods to pursue their own needs and concerns. There appears to be little thought given to the needs of the city as a whole. As a result, we take this idea of the city into our scholarship, and we fail to understand that in earlier times the city really was seen as a unit, and urban citizenship emphasized not just rights but also responsibilities to the city. Ideas about the nature of the city change just as clearly as the physical form of the city changes, although the relationship between the two is not always clear-cut, as some have supposed. Traditionally, historians have suggested that urban changes influence conceptions about the city,[8] but this book starts from the opposite premise—that the way we think about the city ultimately affects the way we respond to its reality.

For the City as a Whole, then, is an attempt to understand the actions of urban problem solvers by linking their definition of and responses to those problems to their perception of what the city was or could become. In it, I argue that for much of the first half of the century, civic leaders and government officials, among others, conceptualized the city as an important physical, economic, social, and cultural unit affecting individual behavior, and thus they employed a strategy that emphasized the precedence of the needs of the city as a whole over the wants of particular populations, neighborhoods, or other special interest groups.[9]

We now live in a drastically different urban world. Few embrace the notion that one's place determines one's actions and identity. And today, representation of the diverse urban constituency is deemed more important than government efficiency, businesslike government, and professional expertise, goals characteristic of the earlier period. Indeed, the latter qualities now are viewed with suspicion, even disdain. Urban politicians today seem much more concerned with promoting programs to address the needs of minorities, neighborhoods, or special interest groups than developing policy for the city as a whole. One modern commentator has even questioned whether there is such a thing as an urban agenda today.[10]

This book, then, focuses on an era between 1900 and 1955, when public discourse emphasized the city as a whole as opposed to the "needs" of its individual inhabitants. It attempts to understand better a past that seems impossibly different from our own era's stress on rights and privileges. This study should not be misunderstood as a nostalgic look back at a "golden era" of government and community in urban America, for the first half of

the twentieth century clearly was not that. Despite a rhetoric that constantly referred to the city as a whole, not all urban citizens received equal treatment: blacks, Mexicans, and the poor in Dallas did not benefit from local government to the same degree that downtown businessmen did. And efficiency and coordination, two catchwords of the era, did not resolve all urban problems. What this study attempts to do is explore the era on its own terms. I argue that changing assumptions about what the city is, or should be, affect how problems are defined and how solutions are devised and responded to by civic leaders. If one conceptualizes the city as a real civic entity of inextricably linked parts, functions, and residents, one will respond to its problems differently than if one defines the city as nothing more than a setting for individuals to pursue their wants and desires. My contention is that changing priorities in public policy can best be understood by linking them to changing definitions of the city.

Toward this end, *For the City as a Whole* explores the fluid patterns of response to cities in the twentieth century. The book focuses on the words and activities of white business and professional civic leaders in Dallas, with special emphasis on the period between 1919 and 1955, when a new involvement in comprehensive planning and council-manager government suggested a different way of thinking about the city and urban problem solving than what had been practiced before or after this era. By the 1960s both movements were on the defensive as definitions of good planning, good government, and the public interest changed. The book also examines an earlier city-as-a-whole approach from around the turn of the century that lacked the comprehensiveness of the later period.

Traditional interpretations of council-manager government and comprehensive planning emphasize how they grew out of a search for order by the emerging business and professional classes in response to an industrializing urban society, and how they shortchanged much of the city's population owing to their failure to provide adequate representation of the citizens' viewpoints in governing and planning the city.[11] I offer an alternative to this explanation by suggesting that changing ideas about the nature of the city helped shape a response to the city that resulted in comprehensive planning and council-manager government, while later notions about the nature of cities aided the decline of council-manager government and comprehensive planning. Evidence of this transformation can be found not only in the changing public discourse about cities but in the varying organizational structure of civic improvement bodies. In my view, a public discourse that goes from emphasizing the needs of the city to the needs of the city's resi-

dents helps explain the loss of popularity of these forms of planning and governmental structure. In addition, I wish to explore how civic leaders used the rhetoric of "the city as a whole" to maintain support for their agenda of city building during the twentieth century. This book, then, sets out to examine the public discourse and actions of civic leaders in order to explore shifting definitions of the basic needs of the city and metropolis. It seeks to reveal how these perceptions influenced public behavior and helped shape the way leaders defined problems. As a result, this study closely examines the organizational structures of planning and good-government efforts, and pays special attention to the words of civic leaders and their newspapers, to understand better how they mirrored certain assumptions about Dallas as a social system.

At a time when it is unfashionable to study the actions of elite leaders, this book may be perceived as a curious relic of past historical interest. But since the words and actions of the city's business-civic leadership largely shaped the public discourse, a study of public discourse demands that one examine the public statements of the civic elite. They owned the leading newspapers, chaired the major civic committees, and held the largest financial stake in the cities. My attention to them in this book should not be seen as an attempt to defend their actions; rather, it is my effort to understand them by placing them in context. Interpretations that simply dismiss them as selfish and "bad" do not do justice to the historical record. Like their nineteenth-century counterparts, the business leaders I write about in this book saw themselves as city builders as well as businessmen and found little conflict between the two roles. Indeed, social scientist Stephen L. Elkin, who has written about the Dallas power elite, has argued that those leaders were not for "political arrangements that would further their particular interests on an individual basis." Rather, they wanted to establish "a set of rules, within which city growth would occur," for Dallas businessmen clearly understood that such growth would benefit their economic concerns too.[12] Blaine Brownell has gone even further than a simple economic interpretation of urban leadership. After studying the civic-commercial elite in Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans, he concluded, "To attribute the conceptions of the urban commercial community held by this elite solely to economic concerns or to the defense of free enterprise capitalism would be a grievous error."[13]

The "outsized" quality of Dallas made it an inviting choice for my study of a city's civic leadership, for Dallas reflects in exaggerated form some important tendencies of twentieth-century urban America. Also, when I began

this study no scholarly treatment of Dallas's twentieth-century history existed, and I thought this often-discussed city needed one. Finally, as a Yankee outsider, I discovered that Dallas at some level shared much with Cincinnati, a northern industrial city about which I had just written. The similarities made me question Dallas's so-called uniqueness and helped shape the conceptual framework of this book.

Founded in 1841, Dallas did not enter its period of rapid and significant urban growth until the twentieth century. Because of its newness, unlike more established urban centers in the East, Dallas seemed less rooted in tradition and probably more open to current movements—particularly if they were seen as a means for promoting additional growth and stability. This study in "symptomatic history" acknowledges the uniqueness of the Dallas experience, but uses it to understand broader trends in the urban Southwest and the United States in general, trends that I see more closely tied to the timing of urbanization rather than regional influence.[14]

Indeed, this book takes exception to scholars who argue that regions like the South leave such an indelible mark on their cities that they create a unique typology of urban form, unable to meet the claims generally associated with urbanization.[15] It is true that Dallas's southern setting, with its cotton crop and racist notions, clearly proved influential in the city's development. But what distinguished the city's most prominent city builders was their commitment to do just that—create a great city—and their decisions and actions were made in that context rather than simply in the context of their geographic setting. It was mostly the culture of urban boosterism, then, rather than southern culture, that shaped the actions of the city's civic leaders, which helps explain, for instance, why such leaders—not only in Dallas but also in Atlanta, Richmond, and other southern cities—demonstrated more flexibility on the race issue than the majority of southerners during this time.[16] This also helps clarify why some of the most vocal criticism of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s came from white southern urban leaders. They understood that the Klan's message of intolerance and hate threatened the welfare of the city as a whole, not just African Americans or Roman Catholics. The culture of urban boosterism also explains the tendency of southern city leaders to turn to the federal government for help for social problems more often than their rural counterparts. Not that southern urban leaders were free from racism or political conservatism, but their urban aspirations shaped the nature of that conservatism and racism surely as much as their southernness shaped the nature of their cities. To divorce southern civic leaders from their commitment to promote urban development does a disservice to the historical record. Key decisions in Dallas about how to pro-

mote that growth were as much influenced by the national discourse on cities—from better government to planning—as they were influenced by the southern setting.

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The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces readers to Dallas at the turn of the century and traces the first effort to improve the city through planning and governmental reform. It focuses on the development of the Kessler Plan and the city commission government to show how these solutions reflect a special notion of the city that emphasizes a particular relation of the city's parts to its whole. Chapter 2 explains how the earlier planning and governmental reforms became discredited and were replaced by an approach emphasizing new ideas about the nature of the city as a whole. Special attention is given to the movements leading to the Ulrickson Report and council-manager government.

Chapter 3 evaluates the early years of government under the new council-manager structure and assesses the impact that the Citizens Charter Association (CCA) had on the functioning of that new government. In addition, it demonstrates how the CCA reflected a new emphasis on the need for public officials to focus on the city as a whole. The chapter also examines the campaign rhetoric of the CCA to reveal the good government group's explanation of why it promoted the best approach for governing the city as a whole. Chapter 4 traces problems faced by the reform government, explores the reasons for the defeat of the CCA in both 1935 and 1937, and evaluates the government that then took over. In addition, it discusses the city's actions during its giant Centennial Exposition for the state of Texas. Chapter 5 traces the reuniting of the city's business leadership under the Dallas Citizens Council and examines that group's early programs for the city as a whole. It gives special attention to the Master Plan of 1943–45 and to the civic leadership's response to the opportunities offered to the city during World War II.

The book's sixth chapter looks at the impact of the civic leadership's city-as-a-whole vision on African Americans, Mexican Americans, and labor in the city. The chapter also recounts how civic leaders addressed the city's black housing crisis during the 1930s and documents the significance of the Progressive Voters League, a black voting organization formed in that decade. Finally, the chapter analyzes the way that the city-as-a-whole strategy limited the civic leadership's response to the real problems faced by Dallas labor. Chapter 7 traces postwar problems and the political activities associated with those difficulties. It surveys not only the selling of CCA candidates but also the successful city bond campaigns during these years. Additional

emphasis is given to the postwar black housing crisis in South Dallas and the comprehensive response to it. The chapter also examines the controversy over the future of Love Airport. The eighth and final chapter investigates the changing public discourse in the 1950s, tracing this development by looking at the transformation of politics and planning in Dallas between 1955 and 1965. Finally, an epilogue explores how the new urban discourse helped radically change the nature of council-manager government and city planning in Dallas.

This book is written at a time when Dallas and other major cities are experiencing great turmoil and political unrest. Older citizens of Dallas used to the "Dallas Spirit" of cooperation and unity shudder over the apparent breakdown and fragmentation of government and the confrontational public discourse. The politics of race and neighborhood have replaced the politics of "the city as a whole," not only in Dallas but throughout metropolitan America. The system of government and planning that helped energize the city's rapid growth and development has been condemned for its failures and abuses. Public demonstrations and protests have replaced the traditional Dallas methods of behind-the-scenes negotiation. The answers that seemed so right in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s now are condemned by many as horribly wrong—indeed, even the questions now are different.

Unfortunately, while the particulars of Dallas's experience may be unique, Big D exhibits patterns that are all too familiar to those versed in contemporary urban America. This book hopes to contribute new historical perspective to allow the reader to discern how we got to where we are today by suggesting the role played by changing intellectual constructs of the city and the public interest. Although this book will not solve the problems of today, it seeks to produce a better understanding between the various conflicting factions and to remind all its readers that urban problem solving is closely tied to how we perceive the nature of the city. It also attempts to resurrect interest in the city-as-a-whole approach to urban problem solving, fully cognizant that the city is only truly healthy when all citizens are provided opportunity to develop their skills and pursue their dreams. If the book does anything to promote dialogue that results in a new citywide perspective on the problems of our cities, then it will have proved a success.

The First City-as-a-Whole Strategy: Dallas at the Turn of the Century

Dallas leaders at the turn of this century identified and responded to urban problems in much the same way that leaders from other cities—much larger cities—approached their problems. Even though the Dallas population in 1900 of 42,638 resembled the size of New York City in the 1790s, New Orleans in the late 1820s, or Louisville in the 1850s, Dallas leaders' response to urban problems in 1900 imitated the approach taken by these cities in 1900, not the approach they took when they were the size of Dallas. An interest in a more ordered environment, as well as an effective and responsive government, typified the new concerns of urban leaders around 1900, no matter if their cities contained 40,000 or 400,000 residents.

This North Texas city, situated amid rich cotton land along the meandering Trinity River, wanted to become more than merely a major cotton processor. By 1900 the city had emerged as a commercial, financial, and transportation center with visions of rapid industrialization. The city's hinterland clearly influenced the nature of its manufacturers, who produced harnesses and saddles for horses and clothing for farmers and ranchers, and provided packing houses, a flour mill, and a cotton gin for nearby farmers. The city also boasted a piano factory and a brewery. The third-largest city in Texas at the time, Dallas had become the business, agricultural, and entertainment hub of a 250,000-square mile region including North and West Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. That was not enough for Dallas boosters, who had visions of making their city the metropolis of the entire Southwest.[1]

The city's physical appearance in 1900 did not suggest that grand vision, however. A ten-block stretch of downtown's Main Street provided the city's only asphalt-paved thoroughfare, although it did have twenty miles of macadamized streets and a little more than twelve miles of bois d'arc–blocked roads. Downtown streets, laid out in a crazy-quilt pattern, snarled traffic.[2] The depression of the 1890s had stalled the erection of taller downtown buildings, and the city's insufficient housing supply resulted in some Dallasites living in tents. The muddy and foul-smelling Trinity River bottoms bordering the city's west end remained a sanctuary for wildlife, with vicious animals still appearing in the city at night. Recent annexations during the previous decade had allowed the city to expand to 9¼ square miles, but an effort in 1899 to take in the flourishing suburb of Oak Cliff, on the west side of the Trinity River, failed by sixty votes. That decision would be reversed four years later when Oak Cliff finally agreed to merge with its larger neighbor (see map 1).[3]

Dallas became preoccupied during this time with the need for strong and effective governmental leadership and an ability to "get things done" for the entire city. In addition, civic leaders seemed particularly concerned about



Map 1 Dallas in 1900 and 1915

improving the city's physical environment. Much has been written about this focus on order and efficiency in urban America at this time, but students of government and planning have done little to explain the common assumptions about the city and its needs. Indeed, few historians of these two movements have linked them to the turn-of-the-century perception of the city as a system.[4]

Urban activists during this era focused on a variety of problems adversely affecting the city. Tenement housing, inadequate play spaces for children, corrupt government, and insufficient physical infrastructure represent just

some of the problems they identified. These problems, the argument went, affected the welfare of the entire city and needed special attention from those capable of solving the specific problem. As a result, turn-of-the-century civic improvement treated the city as a system of functionally differentiated parts and needs. These parts and needs were interdependent in the sense that the malfunction of one disrupted the whole, but such a malfunction did not necessarily adversely affect the other parts. Nor were the needs or parts of the city equal. People argued over which parts ranked as more important than others. In addition, these parts were of two kinds. Some of them were seen as systems (sewers, parkways, and parks) that consisted of differentiated elements. The parts within a system were seen as interrelated in the above fashion (treatable separately) and the systems were seen as interrelated in the same way.

There was a concern for coordination in the treatment of these systems for the city as a whole, however, something that seemed to be missing at the time. The first "comprehensive" plans associated with the city beautiful movement dealt with a variety of public projects and attempted to coordinate them so that the park plan, for example, would not conflict with the street plan or the public transportation plan. The city commission form of government popular in the early twentieth century also reflects this emphasis on a systems approach to problem solving by structuring government in a way that produced commissioners of finance, water, public improvements, streets and bridges, and sanitation.

The growing emphasis on a more coordinated and effective treatment of urban problems fueled discontent in cities that failed to see such coordination under way. In Dallas, the local government's lack of attention to the city's physical needs, particularly its streets, resulted in a movement to change the structure of its governing body, which ultimately produced commission government. It also led to the city's first "comprehensive" planning movement, one that focused only on developing and coordinating public projects. Although the city's Kessler Plan and city commission government appeared as responses to the turn-of-the-century perception of problems, such solutions would be viewed as inadequate by the end of World War I, when civic leaders embraced a new type of comprehensive approach to the city.[5]

□ 1

Managing the City

Dallas in the 1890s, like cities throughout the United States at this time, had neither effective administrative nor adequate planning capabilities. Civic leaders in Dallas, having come to identify these shortcomings as problems threatening the welfare of the city, set out to improve the very structure of local government. Critics of civic government particularly emphasized the city's fragmented nature and the inability of its officials to get things done: no one seemed to be in charge, and local government appeared unable to meet the needs of the city as a whole. Civic activists also argued over who should rule and debated the virtues of direct election, as opposed to appointment, of government officials.

During the 1890s Dallas citizens made regular trips to Austin to secure new city charters, or to revise the one currently in force. Unhappy with the charter of 1889, civic leaders sought a new city charter in 1897.[1] Under the old charter Dallas was governed by a twenty-four-member, ward-elected city council (each ward being represented by two members) and a weak mayor, along with a popularly elected chief of police, assessor, tax collector, and city judge. The new charter modified both the structure of the government and the ability of that government to act. Written when Dallas was still feeling the damaging effects of the Panic of 1893, the charter decreased the pay of government officials and reduced the city's borrowing ability. Concerned with the need for more effective leadership on the school board, the new charter also provided for a popularly elected president of that body, and it gave the city more power to regulate and control public utilities.[2]

Despite these changes, civic leaders sought and secured still another city charter two years later. The Charter of 1899 provided for a twelve-member city council—eight aldermen elected on a ward basis and four selected at large (although these four had to live in separate districts). As had previous charters, the 1899 charter identified the mayor as the chief executive of the

city but limited his administrative powers. The mayor did have a veto that could be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of council, but the charter gave council the management and control of the city's finances as well as appointive powers. In addition to council, the mayor also shared power with nine other elected officials.[3]

The addition of a board of commissioners made up of the mayor and two governor appointees—a police commissioner and a fire commissioner—proved the most important as well as most controversial aspect of the 1899 charter. The charter also designated the mayor as commissioner of public improvements. Together, the three commissioners would control and supervise the police and fire departments of Dallas; they would also oversee all public improvements over $500 and have the final say in the granting of franchises. Council could override the actions of the board of commissioners only by a two-thirds vote.[4] In reality such a commission, although created to bring more responsive government to the city, simply added another layer of government to one already made up of several "semi-independent" departments. The result, according to the *Dallas Morning News,* was a system wherein each of these departments "makes [its] own rules and regulations, [its] budgets and expenditures, engages [its] own employees and does all presumably without much concern as to the doings of the other departments or as to any general policy for the well-being of the city as a whole."[5]

Despite the three-man commission's special powers over fire and police protection and public improvements, widespread dissatisfaction with the ill-equipped, poorly administered fire and police departments joined the dismay over the city's horrible streets as the major impetus for charter reform. Such dissatisfaction with city government was felt throughout the nation at this time, resulting in the formation of the National Municipal League in 1894, an organization that traced its origins to the National Conference for Good City Government, held in Philadelphia on January 25 and 26, 1894. The league proposed to better cities by calling attention to their needs, promoting good government organizations, and encouraging the election of men of "trained ability and proved integrity for all municipal positions." In addition, the league promised to "promote the thorough investigation and discussion of the conditions and details of civic administration, and of methods for selecting and appointing officials in American cities, and of laws and ordinances relating to such subjects." Finally, the league planned to hold conferences and provide literature "to advance the cause of Good City Government."[6]

Although the turn-of-the-century government reform movement is traditionally portrayed as an attempt by upper-class professional and business

groups to take political power from lower classes and assert more control over municipal government, the motives for charter reform were more complex than this. It was not only wealthy capitalists who expressed unhappiness with Dallas's government at that time.[7] The city's most prominent socialist, George Clifton Edwards, believed the charter of 1899 prevented Dallas from addressing important civic needs such as adequate water and sewage service. Others disapproved of the existing charter because they claimed it fostered local patronage and enhanced the special influence of land developers and utilities on city council.[8]

As early as 1902, at the urging of Charles G. Morgan, alderman from the Sixth Ward, Mayor Ben Cabell appointed a committee to examine charter reform that would place government "upon a proper business basis to be conducted solely as a proper business institution." The *News* reported that the sentiment for charter reform "appeared unanimous in council." Morgan proposed that the city adopt the experimental commission form of government employed by Galveston shortly after a hurricane and tidal wave hit the island in 1900. That government consisted of four commissioners and a mayor, and these five officials were delegated both legislative and executive powers. Commissioners of finance, waterworks, public works, and police would "direct, control, manage and supervise all matters pertaining to the operation, maintenance, repair, improvement and management of their departments." The mayor would "control and manage all matters not under the control of the four commissioners." Under the new system, subordinate officials would be appointed by commissioners, rather than being elected by the public, and commissioners could fire those officials if they failed to fulfill their duties. This approach to government, with clear lines of accountability, would produce a government developed along "business principles," according to Morgan, who further claimed that "the dire lack of a system in the city government and the woeful disregard of all business principles caused a waste in the expenditures of public money of at least $100,000 per annum."[9]

Several days later Henry D. Lindsley, a prominent civic leader, voiced support for the commission form of government, arguing that it would provide an "economical, progressive and strictly business administration." He continued: "It is not necessary for one to be a part of our government to realize *the bulky and unwieldy methods* [italics mine] which now encumber our administration and the serious handicaps which they occasion." Lindsley warned that the officials should be well selected and "required to give their entire time and thought to the interests of Dallas."[10]

The city's leading business organization, the Commercial Club, also

endorsed charter reform and established its own committee to investigate revisions. The organization, founded in 1893, called on its members to participate in municipal affairs and promote urban development rather than merely their own business interests. As a result, club members regularly selected candidates to run for council and often saw them elected. The club's three-member charter committee suggested that, unlike in Galveston's charter, all five commissioners in Dallas be elected, although that idea did not meet with the approval of the club's general membership.[11] Those who proposed that the governor should appoint some of the city commissioners believed that such a government would be able and willing to address the city's most immediate needs more effectively than a popularly elected commission. All Commercial Club members, however, shared a desire for better local government. At a December meeting with city council, they heard Alderman Morgan echo this same concern. Morgan warned that city government desperately needed more money, especially to improve its streets, which were only getting "worse and worse." But in order to secure money, Morgan argued, the city needed "to increase the confidence in the official family." The public questioned the current government's effectiveness not because of its personnel but because of a government structure that "shifted responsibility . . . around in four or five different channels, and made it very difficult to assign accountability." City council and the Commercial Club worked together to establish four subcommittees that would investigate a variety of possible charter issues, including "a system for improving the streets and sidewalks" of Dallas, school betterment, annexation procedures, and debt limit, as well as government structure.[12]

The city suffered from too many unpaved streets and from serious drainage problems as well. Dallas had far fewer paved streets than other cities in part because of judicial decisions on the homestead provision found in the state constitution. Until 1897, the costs of paving streets had been shared between the city and the residents whose land would be improved. Property owners paid two-thirds of the cost, while the city contributed the remaining third. When a majority of citizens in a block agreed to pay for the paving of the street, the city would proceed to pay its share of the costs of macadamizing the street.[13] However, a state court ruled in 1897 that assessments were not taxes within the meaning of the state constitution, and because the homestead provision declared homes exempt from forced sale for payment of debts except for taxes due,[14] the court found that the city could not proceed with the forced sale of residential property if that household failed to pay its assessment. As a result, the situation obligated the city either to pay

for the entire costs of street improvements or to rely on the good faith of city residents to fulfill their obligations. Either way, this limited the number of streets that could be completed.[15] Citizens of course could have approved bonds for better streets, but as Morgan argued, limited public confidence in local government prevented this. The homestead clause thus created an additional burden for local government, perhaps explaining why citizens turned to governmental reform to improve their streets. Only after the creation of a more trustworthy government would Dallas taxpayers approve the necessary bond package for paved streets.

Toward that end, the *News,* another proponent of improving the city's streets and physical appearance, ran a series of articles, beginning on August 21, 1903, on the commission form of government in Galveston. According to the *News,* Galveston's government before the natural disaster had been politicized, inefficient, and lacking in "definiteness of responsibility." In just two years, the new government had changed all that, bringing the city businesslike, efficient government that practiced fiscal responsibility.[16]

Since the constitutionality of that government remained in doubt—particularly the provision that the governor appoint several of the commissioners—civic leaders in Dallas decided not to proceed further with the idea until the court ruled on the legality of Galveston's government. Promoters of commission government in Dallas wanted to include the appointive aspect of the Galveston commission in their own new charter.[17] During this delay, enthusiasm for the commission form of government seemed to wane. Former mayor John H. Taylor, who warned against such a radical changeover to the commission form of government, asked, "Is not there more danger in tinkering with the charter?"[18] The ruling of the state's criminal court on March 25, 1903, further dampened enthusiasm for commission government. The court denied the constitutionality of the Galveston government because the governor had appointed several of the commissioners—the very thing that had made the Galveston charter particularly attractive to numerous business leaders in Dallas. Meanwhile, local officials' involvement in annexing nearby Oak Cliff, a large suburban enclave just southwest of Dallas across the Trinity River, became the primary focus of government at this time (see map 1).[19]

Dallas government continued, then, to function under a council-mayor system of government that relied on committees. By 1905 council divided responsibilities among those committees, with the five most important being finance, water, public improvements, streets and bridges, and sanitation.[20] According to the *News,* "The bulk of the actual business is done in commit-

tee work and it is here that the councilman earns his $10 per month and wins whatever prestige he may have."[21] When demands for committee work surpassed the time necessary to deal with these needs, council turned to independent bodies for help.

One such instance occurred on April 26, 1905, when Dallas officials secured a new charter amendment creating a board of park commissioners to oversee the operation of the city's underdeveloped park system.[22] The amendment allowed the mayor to appoint four members to two-year terms and to serve as the fifth member and president of the board. Because managing the city's two parks had become too time-consuming, the council turned this responsibility over to the new board, which devised its own budget and developed and administered an agenda independent of council, although council did allocate funds for an annual budget. Just as they did in creating the Board of Commissioners, state legislators here responded to local demands for a more effective government; but the act of establishing a new, virtually independent body to manage the city's parks further diffused local officials' power and responsibility to manage the *whole* city.[23]

Enthusiasm for the city commission form of government reappeared in Dallas after one of the city's chief rivals, Houston, adopted that form of government in 1905. The revived interest eventually led local officials to hold a referendum on whether Dallas should adopt the commission form of government. Improving the city's streets continued as a primary impetus for the good government movement. The *News* questioned 288 businessmen at the end of 1905 about what they viewed as most necessary for the city's advancement. Overwhelmingly, the respondents singled out the need for improved streets and sidewalks. Several days after the *News* printed the results of those interviews, it called for "a complete reorganization of municipal government" as a first step in improving the city's streets and sidewalks." Local government had failed to adequately address these needs, the *News* speculated, because of a "defect in the system," including "conflict in authority and diffusion of responsibility" leading to "avoidance of responsibility." As a result, "None save for an officer of marked force of character can accomplish much," the *News* concluded in dismay, adding that "there is a convenient refuge for the officer who does nothing."[24]

The city commission form of government would remedy this problem, the *News* prophesied, providing a charter "strong in authority, with powers centralized and plainly defined, and with responsibility so clearly fixed that there shall be no escape from it." Under the commission form of government, "every citizen will know exactly which commissioner is responsible

for any failure in the government and can hold him accountable, which of course will lessen the probability of failures." The *Dallas Times Herald* also endorsed the movement, calling the commission form of government a "people's government, run on business principles."[25]

Shortly before the referendum on April 3, 1906, the *News* reported on the commission government in Galveston and Houston. Houstonians quoted in these articles emphasized how the new government labored "for the city," as opposed to the old aldermanic form of government where elected officials "worked for their respective wards."[26] Dallas citizens who bothered to vote agreed with the call for commission government. Although only 3,660 citizens of the 7,000 voters who turned out for the municipal election even voted on the proposal to change the city's government, those who did vote endorsed it by more than 2 to 1.[27]

After the referendum, council agreed by a vote of 6 to 5 to have a citizens' charter convention, and it called for the election of delegates from the city's wards to attend the meeting. The creation of the charter convention became controversial with the election of Harvard-educated Socialist George Clifton Edwards from the Seventh Ward. Several council members refused to participate in the convention because of Edward's presence. Others objected to some of the proposals coming out of the convention. Although delegates used the recently created Houston commission charter as its model, they made modifications to it and adopted provisions for the recall of commissioners. They also required that each of the four commissioners should come from the four different sections of the city. These provisions, supported by delegates with ties to neighborhood improvement associations, displeased the *News* and much of the business community. As a result, city council decided to write its own charter, and on November 20, 1906, met with the Dallas Commercial Club to begin work on the new document. Though council claimed there was no conflict or rivalry with the charter convention, its actions of allowing only the Commercial Club to participate in its meetings suggested otherwise.[28]

For the next several months, both bodies wrote a charter to submit to the state legislature for passage. On March 4, 1907, many of the city's most powerful civic leaders formed the Citizens Association of Dallas to lobby for the council's version of the charter and to select the "right" type of commissioners once the state approved the charter. Unhappy about the influence of the Dallas Trades Assembly and about the socialist Edwards in the charter convention, the city's business community formed this new organization in hopes of having their own charter adopted. About 1,000 businessmen (most

of them conservative) attended the association's first public meeting on March 8. They heard Lindsley caution that the concentration of power necessary to make the commission government work demanded the selection of men "who had reputations to sustain and were willing to sacrifice."[29] This organization clearly wanted to determine who served as commissioners, no matter what version of the charter state legislators adopted. Meanwhile, the document from the citizens' charter convention included a recall provision, something the *News* labeled as a "socialistic fad." It also mandated an eight-hour workday for city employees and called for franchises to be limited to twenty years instead of the businessmen's proposal of fifty years.[30]

Both groups took their charter proposals to the state legislature in Austin. There, lawmakers adopted a compromise document that included the eight-hour provision and provided for a referendum on the recall, but which also reflected the concerns of the business community. Of its 133 pages, the charter devoted 35 to street and sidewalk paving. Other provisions of the document gave the city better control over public utilities and saloons.

Of course, commission government proved to be the most publicized aspect of the new charter. On paper, this document appeared to respond to the needs of the entire city. Section 1 of article 3 specified the focus of power in the new government when it declared, "All powers conferred on the city shall, unless otherwise provided in this charter, be exercised by a Mayor and four Commissioners, who together shall be known and designated as the Board of Commissioners, all of whom shall be elected by qualified voters of the city at large and shall devote their entire time to the service of the city."[31] After the election, the commission would designate specific assignments to its members. One would become police and fire commissioner; another would be named commissioner of streets and public property; a third would serve as waterworks and sewage commissioner; while the fourth would be known as commissioner of finance and revenue. The mayor, who would be paid $4,000 per year (compared to the other commissioners' salaries of $3,000), acted as ex officio president of the board of commissioners and became the chief executive officer of the city. He nominated all appointive officers to the city except the auditor. The charter specifically charged the mayor with overseeing the fulfillment of franchise requirements and all contracts. The mayor also had power to suspend acts of the board of commissioners for seven days by veto, including a line veto on appropriations ordinances, but it could be overridden after the seven days by a majority vote of the commission.

Unlike some commission forms of government, the Dallas plan did pro-

vide for a relatively strong mayor. But unlike the aldermanic form of government Dallas had been working under, the new charter assigned specific responsibility over discrete administrative functions of the city to each commissioner. According to the charter, "Said Commissioners shall perform all of the executive duties of the respective departments to which they may be designed, as above provided, but said board, *as a whole,* shall have supervision of and be responsible for the administration of each of said departments [italics mine]." Coupled with the commission's responsibility to legislate, the city appeared to have a government capable of managing the needs of the city.[32]

In many ways Dallas's adoption of the city commission form of government marks the culmination in the city's search for accountability and centralized authority.[33] As growing expectations about the obligations of government occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, the old ways of governing no longer seemed appropriate.[34] In response to the need for more decisive government, officials created new governing bodies. Dallas saw the establishment of commissions to deal with water needs, parks, public safety, public works, and utilities. These were piecemeal responses, however. Not until 1907, when the state legislature approved Dallas's city commission government, did the city gain a structure allowing officials to govern the city as a whole.

Even though the immediate issue responsible for the change may have been the inability of the government to respond adequately to the demand for improved infrastructure and city services, assumptions about the nature of the city also appeared to influence the decision. Implicit in these notions about the city was the suggestion that the health of the city rested with the health of its parts. If not adequately treated, a dysfunctional part (or function) could adversely affect the entire city. The old government, according to this view, failed to meet the needs of this urban system because of the limitations in the ward-based, aldermanic–weak-mayor form of government. Such a government encouraged parochialism and promoted administrative confusion, according to commission supporters, the very barriers to continued rapid urban growth. Although the charter of 1899 was an attempt to remedy these administrative shortcomings, it had failed. Only a government able to respond to the needs of the city and willing to delegate specific administrative responsibilities would provide the necessary government for an ambitious city. Incumbent alderman C. A. Gill, acknowledging the shortcomings of the old system, concluded, "The people have had enough of the alderman system of government. It must be one entire city."[35]

Structural change alone did not satisfy the city's business leaders. They also wanted better men to fill the new government posts. As a result, the Citizens Association (CA) continued to function in Dallas—now as a body to select the "right kind of men." During its first public meeting on March 8, 1907, CA president Henry D. Lindsley promised the CA slate would bring "efficiency and economy to city government and promote good streets, an adequate water supply, efficient police and fire services while more closely supervising expenditures." Such rhetoric helped secure support from much of the business community as well as the middle class and enabled the CA to sweep the city's initial commission election on May 22, 1907.[36]

Civic leaders during this time not only worked to change a diffused government to a more centralized one, but they also seemed intent on coordinating the city's physical development through centralized planning. The city had experimented with piecemeal planning since 1899 when local citizens established the Cleaner Dallas League to improve surface sanitation. Several years later civic leaders created the Civic Improvement League, affiliated with the American League for Civic Improvement. It focused on bettering the city's streets and adding more parks, in addition to promoting libraries, museums, sanitation, trees, streets and sidewalks, and other means "to make Dallas a beautiful place to live." "Cleanliness and order" occupied much of the Civic Improvement League's agenda.[37] These groups, dominated by downtown business men, practiced some level of planning, as did the city's neighborhood improvement societies. There were eleven of these associations in Dallas by the first decade of the twentieth century, one such being the East Dallas Improvement Association, established by residents in 1906. The association focused on ways of improving that neighborhood by securing better streets, sidewalks, and streetcar service. Other neighborhood associations pursued similar agendas and provided a primitive planning function for their neighborhoods.[38]

By 1910 these fragmented and uncoordinated efforts at planning appeared inadequate, and a new movement emerged to develop more centralized planning. Newspaperman George B. Dealey of the *Dallas Morning News,* whom planner John Nolen would later call "the father of planning in the southwest," led the movement. He convinced the chamber of commerce to organize the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League and throw its support to city planning. George Dealey and the *News* had also played a critical role in the city commission movement. Dealey clearly stands as one of the most remarkable civic leaders in Dallas history.

Born in 1859 in Manchester, England, George Bannerman Dealey immigrated to Galveston, Texas, with his parents at age eleven. Four years later,

Dealey started working for the *Galveston News* as an office boy. He arrived in Dallas in 1885 as the business manager of the *Dallas News,* established as a branch of the *Galveston News.* From that position in 1899, he initiated a movement to improve the city's filthy conditions and helped form the Cleaner Dallas League. Soon, Dealey emerged as a "dynamic city leader" in Dallas. By 1902 he also wielded even more power with the *News,* including control of the editorial page, having been promoted to "Manager of All Departments." Four years later he assumed the vice presidency of the *News.*[39]

Dealey's paper played a major role in the commission government campaign after he decided officials under the current structure simply could not meet the physical needs of the city. His role in the city's planning movement, another strategy to better manage the city, was even stronger. Just as he had wanted a "cohesive" government that would recognize the welfare of all people in the community, he now wanted planning to promote a more cohesive physical city. Toward that end, Dealey corresponded with J. Horace McFarland, head of the American Civic Association, and became versed in the importance of city planning. By 1910 he initiated an all-out campaign for city planning in Dallas using the *News* and the newly formed chamber of commerce. During January of that year he started reprinting in the *News* articles about planning from *American City* and *Survey* magazines. He also converted Chamber of Commerce president L. O. Daniel and secretary John R. Babcock into planning enthusiasts.[40] A day after the chamber officials had asked J. Horace McFarland to come to Dallas to speak about planning, the *News* editorialized, "It is evident that the idea of planning . . . has taken root in the minds of the progressive people of the town." For the *News,* planning was "in effect merely a matter of getting the most out of our civic energies."[41] And that seemed important for this ambitious southern city. According to one Dallasite, the city had failed to keep up with Memphis, Nashville, Atlanta, or Birmingham when it came to street paving, sewers, or waterworks. Planning offered a way for a city to get its money's worth while developing its infrastructure.[42]

McFarland spoke at a gathering organized by the chamber on February 25, 1910. In his speech, entitled "A Crusade Against Ugliness," he argued that the city beautiful was the city practical and suggested that planning would bring about better streets and better homes. At that meeting, chamber president L. O. Daniel appointed thirty-eight "prominent" citizens to a new organization called the Dallas City Plan and Improvement Committee (DCPIC). He asked that committee to "obtain for the city of Dallas a comprehensive and thorough city plan."[43] Toward that end, the committee invited one of the nation's leading planners, George Kessler, to come and

speak to civic leaders. It also organized itself into nine subcommittees that would gather information and provide publicity for the planning movement.[44] Cooperating with the city commissioners and the park board, the DCPIC became a major actor in the city's planning movement.

Dallas civic leaders like Dealey had not acted in a vacuum; they turned to planning as that movement gained increased visibility in the early twentieth century. Although there are several different interpretations for the emergence of planning at this time, the important point is that leaders like Dealey looked outside the city for help in responding to the city's perceived needs. At an early stage, Dealey had turned to McFarland and the American Civic Association for assistance. That group, according to City Beautiful authority William H. Wilson, "gave organizational expression to the City Beautiful movement and served as an important clearinghouse for planning and other city beautiful measures."[45] It convinced leaders that city planning rightly concentrated attention on the needs of the city and provided a more effective way of meeting those needs than before. The *News* best reflected that sentiment when it commented, "The mere existence of such a plan, the mere fixing of purposes will generate an energy and enthusiasm that will make the work to be done by the citizens quicker and easier than they image."[46]

The DCPIC's push for planning culminated on May 25, 1910, when the city commissioners announced they had agreed to pay George Kessler $5,000 for one year to develop a city plan for Dallas. In typical booster fashion the *News* called the decision to hire Kessler an "epochal event" in the city's history.[47] Born in Frankenhausen, Germany, in 1862, Kessler came to America with his parents shortly after the end of the Civil War. Although he spent part of his youth in Dallas, Kessler was hardly a local boy, having studied landscape design in Europe and briefly working in New York City before moving to Kansas City, where he developed a park system for that city in 1893. In 1904, St. Louis officials appointed him landscape architect of the St. Louis World's Fair, a position that eventually led him to move his offices to that city in 1911. By the time Dallas officials contacted him he held a reputation as one of the nation's best planners.[48]

City officials published his forty-page *City Plan for Dallas* in February of 1912. It, like other plans of its era, focused exclusively on public works and contained a general list of nine proposed improvements, including a levee system for the Trinity River and reclamation of nearby land; a belt railroad system; a Union Railroad passenger station; a freight terminal; a civic center; elimination of grade crossings in the downtown district; openings of downtown streets; a comprehensive system of parks, parkways, and boulevards; and the building of additional playgrounds. The rest of the plan provided a more detailed description of recommended improvements.[49] For the

first time in the city's history, a single document addressed what civic leaders viewed as the city's most important needs and problems. Indeed many of the projects Kessler proposed had been discussed before, but now these were grouped together in one document developed by an outside city planning expert. The plan now defined these as city problems rather than neighborhood or downtown problems and suggested that if left untreated they would adversely affect the development of the entire city.

Although the plan's brief introduction hinted at the interrelatedness of the city's problems when it discussed the challenge of "harmonizing the old and the new," it generally treated the city's needs as a series of discrete problems requiring discrete solutions.[50] The plan was "comprehensive" in ways that earlier planning efforts were not in that it attempted to tie Dallas together into a whole, but it did not imply that the problems were so interrelated that it would be impossible to treat them separately. Nor was the plan balanced. Kessler devoted twenty-two pages of the plan to street openings and his special interests of parks and parkway development, while the other seven components of the plan were covered in only eleven pages. Most of Kessler's attention centered on the development of streets and parkways to make the center more accessible, and to provide easier access to all parts of the city. Dallas suffered the consequences of having several grids converging on the downtown in different angles that particularly affected northward and southward mobility. Much of the downtown's development had been limited to three east–west streets—Main, Commerce, and Elm—that connected the Trinity River to the Houston & Central Texas Railroad. Because of these street arrangements, Dallas lacked adequate through streets. As a result, Kessler noted, Dallas lacked "direct lines of comfortable communication between different residence districts and in turn between these districts and the business city." He proposed to correct this by opening and expanding fifteen streets in the downtown area.[51]

Kessler also wanted to better tie the rest of the city together through a system of parks connected by boulevards and parkways, which he designed as "two distinct but related systems." One, the inner park system, would take care of the immediate needs of Dallas, while the outer system would be reserved "for future requirements and to give proper direction to growth and development of each section of the city."[52] The park-and-boulevard system also promised a "new basis for development," Kessler predicted, "and will enable the residents in the older sections to materially better the physical conditions of properties through which the boulevards pass."[53]

In addition to street development, the plan advocated the straightening and leveeing of the Trinity River. Such an undertaking would accomplish several goals. First, it would protect Dallas from the Trinity River during the

spring rains, a very real concern for the city after the devastating flood of 1908. Second, it would help accelerate the canalization of the Trinity River, something Dallas leaders badly wanted. Third, it would better link the Dallas community of Oak Cliff, on the west side of the Trinity, with the rest of Dallas, located on the east side of the river.[54]

Proposals to fuse the separate parts of Dallas together and order the parts more coherently, then, proved central to the plan. The belt railroad lines, one loop around Dallas and the other around Oak Cliff, would connect in the Trinity River bottoms, allowing all railroads entering Dallas to have "perfect inter-communication." The beltline railroads would now permit the construction of freight terminals that would facilitate the handling of local freight. And this, according to the plan, would draw industrial and warehouse properties now existing along the various tracks entering Dallas to the more accessible freight yards and prevent the "intrusion into residential districts of factories and warehouses." The belt railroad would also allow the construction of a Union passenger station that could accommodate all passenger trains entering the city.[55]

Kessler also called for the elimination of grade crossings to ensure the "proper growth of the retail section" and proposed the removal of the Texas & Pacific Railroad tracks on Pacific Avenue and the Houston & Texas Central tracks just east of downtown. Such activity would make the downtown area more attractive and accessible from all parts of the city. Ease of access to and through downtown was the main consideration that led Kessler not only to recommend a variety of street openings in that city's core but to promote street platting and building lines for the city. Such centralized control, something previously missing from the city, would guarantee the city's orderly development, Kessler predicted.[56] Finally, the plan recommended the additional construction of playgrounds. Together, such planning efforts, according to Kessler, would "immensely enhance the attractiveness of the city and . . . give impetus and stability to its commercial life."[57]

As Professor William Wilson has observed, "The Plan was comprehensive in the sense that it addressed city wide problems and offered city wide solutions—but rarely paused to explain how they might be related."[58] Nor did Kessler offer any way to carry out the plans through a coordinated program. He discussed financing for his plan in a single paragraph. Kessler warned against relying too much on bonds and called for special assessments and local improvement districts to fund most of his suggestions. As a result, even though the city now had a type of "comprehensive" plan, officials attempted to carry it out in a piecemeal fashion.[59] Some projects—such as the Union Railroad Station, which opened in 1916—rallied citywide ap-

proval, while others, including the levee/reclamation project, languished because of the lack of such support. Without a clear vision of how to proceed, enthusiasm for citywide planning died, exemplified by the disbandment of the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League during World War I.[60]

Dallas's early foray into zoning in 1915 also suggests a particular vision of how the city worked.[61] Unlike later comprehensive zoning ordinances that identified and treated a variety of functions and covered all of the territory within the corporate limits, the city's first tentative venture into zoning took a different approach, focusing exclusively on the problem of business establishments in residential neighborhoods. As a result, it prohibited the construction of "any business house, or a place for the barter and sale of goods, wares and merchandise of any description or character, or for the conduct therein of any business within any residential portion of the city." If there were more residences than business houses within a 300-foot radius of the proposed commercial building, then the law would forbid the erection of additional business dwellings. Council granted exceptions only if three-fourths of the property owners in the area to be affected would sign a petition allowing the business to locate in their neighborhood.[62] The ordinance provided a citywide solution to one problem, but did not attempt to tie the solution of "zoning" to other land-use problems nor designate land uses for the entire city. The Texas Supreme Court eventually invalidated that law in *Spann v. the City of Dallas* (1921), but the law nevertheless demonstrates the city's approach to zoning in 1915.[63]

The next year, council passed still another zoning ordinance, one attempting to segregate Dallas's black and white populations. The initiation of racial zoning came not from the city commission but from the Deere Park Improvement League of South Dallas. When the Commission refused to agree to amend the city's home rule charter to permit racial zoning, the league's president, George K. Butcher, undertook a petition campaign to get his proposal for racial zoning on the ballot. The league secured the required 14,000 signatures on the petitions and saw Dallas citizens approve a racial zoning ordinance by a vote of 7,613 to 4,693, despite the opposition of the influential *Dallas Morning News*. In attempting to preserve the status quo and block the expansion of blacks into white neighborhoods, the law stipulated three classifications: white, black, and open blocks. *Blocks* here referred to both sides of a street between intersecting streets. If only whites lived on a block, the city could designate it a white block and blacks would be forbidden to own property or reside there. If only blacks lived on the block, it was designated a black block and the law forbade whites from owning property or residing on the block. Open blocks were in fact already

occupied by whites and blacks and under the ordinance remained open to joint occupancy.[64] Even though the United States Supreme Court overturned a racial zoning ordinance from Louisville, Kentucky, in *Buchanan v. Warley* (1917), Dallas enforced its law until the Spann case. After that ruling, the Commission experimented with other forms of racial zoning and passed a new law that borrowed from the racial covenant idea. Under this zoning plan, written consent of occupants in a block would allow the Board of Appeals to designate a block either white or black. The racial composition could then only be altered on application of three-quarters of the block's property owners. During the next eight years, city commissioners passed seven additional ordinances dealing with racial zoning issues.[65]

Both zoning laws reflect the turn-of-the-century notion of the city as a system of differentiated parts and functions that are interdependent but treatable separately. For instance, the invasion of businesses into residential areas created a problem that was perceived to threaten the welfare of the entire city, and commissioners responded to that problem by forbidding the erection of business houses in residential areas. That same approach of treating a single problem applied to racial zoning. Blacks moving into white neighborhoods posed for some a citywide threat affecting real estate values and promoting civil unrest among whites. The city commissioners responded by passing a narrow type of zoning law, focusing on only one element of the land-use problems. Soon, however, such piecemeal zoning would be replaced by a different comprehensive zoning effort that approached the city as a system of systems so interrelated that defects in one part not only affected the entire city but also disrupted all the other parts in the system as well as the working of the whole.

Despite the implementation of the city commission government, and the nearly complete domination of the Citizens Association slate for the next eleven years, supporters of "good government" criticized both the form and the personnel. As early as 1918, K. K. Hooper, planning writer for the *News*, complained to Dealey about Dallas's slow progress in regards to completing the Kessler Plan. "It is my candid opinion," the newspaperman wrote, "that with two bit politicians in authority in city hall we never will get anywhere. With real big men at the head of the government we ought to be able to accomplish really big things. I am convinced that the city hall crowd has no conception of the importance of city planning and I do not believe that they have the mental caliber to ever appreciate it. I am in favor of ousting the whole bunch and putting in a city manager under the direction of some of the big men of our city."[66]

Although Hooper's attack focused on governmental officials, his frustra-

tion also stemmed from the politicization of a government structure based on administrative function. Instead of looking out for the city as a whole, commissioners were usually too busy protecting their turf. Instead of focusing on long-term projects, commissioners got caught up in the day-to-day grind of administering their departments and taking care of their workers. Even the Citizens Association fragmented in 1917 after many original members of the group left and formed the Good Government Association.[67]

Meanwhile, planning suffered the same type of paralysis. City government implemented several proposals from the Kessler Plan, including the Union Station, but others languished because of costs and rivalry between the city's different sections. Officials also failed to promote a long-term bond program to carry out the Kessler Plan. Businessmen and neighborhood improvement leagues focused on specific programs that would benefit their sections while failing to rally behind those that did not. Indeed, a whole new series of improvement organizations appeared in the second decade of the twentieth century to promote specific agendas. Planning, then, paralleled city government's problems at this time. The city commission form of government had centralized government in Dallas, in contrast to the fragmented aldermanic form previously experienced. Yet its functionally divided treatment of the whole proved unsatisfactory to a growing number of people by 1920, because it appeared not to be working the way supporters had hoped. Commissioners seemed more intent on looking after their own departments than governing the city as a whole. City planning also had centralized and coordinated efforts at public improvement, but it too failed to bring the results originally anticipated and encouraged a new type of fragmentation that inhibited the carrying out of the plan.

Controversy over Kessler Plan priorities resulted in the formation of two new planning organizations after World War I. George Dealey, now a member of the Governing Board of the National Conference on City Planning, initiated a movement to complete the Kessler Plan affecting the property between Akard Street and the Trinity River, the original site of old Dallas.[68] His newspaper building, located in this deteriorating western part of downtown, appeared threatened by the district's increasing blight. Dealey saw leveeing the Trinity River and the reclamation of its flooded bottoms as the key to revitalizing that part of town. Toward this end, he joined with others who owned property in the west end of downtown Dallas and helped form the Dallas Property Owner's Association (DPOA) in March of 1919 to undertake "intensive city planning in one section." Although the *News* reported that the DPOA had been organized to encourage the "symmetrical development of the city with special attention to the downtown district,"

the group really focused on the west end of downtown. The twenty participants at the first meeting also wanted to better accommodate their end of downtown to the automobile through street openings such as the Lamar Street extension, as well as to secure the levee/reclamation project for the Trinity River bottoms.

One association member envisioned the DPOA as Dallas's version of the Fifth Avenue Association of New York City, an organization to combat encroachment of industries and commerce in that city's retail district in order to prevent its further deterioration. Not by accident, members of the association elected Charles L. Sanger, nephew of department store magnate Alex Sanger, the first president of the association. Sanger's department store stood in the downtown's western section. Under Sanger, membership in the DPOA swelled to 100, and it used part of each recruit's dues of $200 to employ George Kessler as an engineer and allow him to revise his original plan, particularly in regard to the western portion of downtown. Kessler paid particular attention to accommodating the automobile and to improving his proposed levee/reclamation project.[69] For instance, Kessler's revised street plan for the west end resulted in the widening of Lamar Street from fifty to seventy-five feet between Pacific and McKinney Avenues. This provided better access to the west end from the north and increased real estate values in that area.[70]

Shortly after organizers formed the DPOA, uptown businessmen created their own organization, the Central Improvement Association (CIA) in April of 1919. Headed by realtor Clayton Browne, this organization promoted Kessler Plan improvements for the uptown (east) section of the city's core. The CIA focused on making its area more accessible to the automobile through street widenings and by extending Harwood and St. Paul Streets into the east end. Some members of this organization opposed public financing for the reclamation of the Trinity River bottoms area because they felt it disproportionately helped the city's western section. The two groups saw very little accomplished but did manage to stir up sectional animosity and prejudices. Other improvement organizations also embraced piecemeal planning at this time. For instance, the Pacific Avenue Improvement Association, a group of landowners along that avenue, played a critical role in having the Texas & Pacific Railroad remove its tracks from their downtown street, another recommendation of Kessler's *City Plan*.[71]

These groups, like the Kessler Plan, reflected a certain type of approach to "comprehensive" planning that suggested a city composed of discrete parts, connected yet individually treatable. That approach paralleled the approach to governmental reform associated with the city commission movement.

Just as the turn-of-the-century planning movement treated the city as an assortment of individually treatable parts tied together as a whole, the commission movement approached the city as a series of discrete functions clearly related but individually managed. Both planning and governmental reform brought some order out of the administrative chaos associated with the late nineteenth century, but it also faced growing criticism by the end of this century's second decade for not effectively helping the city as a whole. New developments in both planning and government after World War I would alter that, however, and reflect new notions about the relationship of the city's parts and needs to the whole.

II

Dallas during the Second City-as-a-Whole Era

The 1920s proved a tumultuous time for Dallas and the nation. During this period the city experienced unprecedented growth and expansion. It had taken about seventy years since the city's founding in 1841 for Dallas to reach its first 100,000 in population. During the twenties the city added another 100,000. It also nearly doubled its physical size from 23.4 square miles to 45.09 square miles (see map 2). Moreover, between 1920 and 1926 Dallas contractors erected more than $150 million worth of buildings, an unparalleled feat in the city's history. The Dallas skyline dramatically changed that decade when workers completed the thirty-one-story Magnolia building. Other new skyscrapers such as the Southland Life Building and the Medical Arts Building also graced the skyline.[1]

Both the building boom and the population explosion resulted from the city's economic prosperity in the years following World War I. Located in the blackland prairie region of North Texas on the eastern bank of the Trinity River, some of the most fertile land in the nation surrounded the city. Indeed, almost half of Texas's four million cotton acres lay within a 100-mile radius of Dallas. This fact, combined with the city's good rail connections, helps explain why it developed into the largest inland cotton exchange in the country at the turn of the century. Its close economic ties to St. Louis also assisted the city's successful quest to become a leading supplier of farm machinery to the region. Indeed, aided by the aggressive actions of civic boosters, Dallas captured the wholesale and retail trade in North Texas by 1920. The city also emerged as the region's leading banking, finance, and insurance center, a development helped considerably when local boosters acquired a branch of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1914. Finally, Dallas engaged in textile manufacturing, and in 1925 enlarged its nascent automobile-manufacturing efforts when the Ford Motor Company built a new factory on East Grand Avenue.

Ford's expansion whetted the city's appetite for more industry, and that led the chamber of commerce and other booster organizations to attract even more manufacturing. In 1927 the Dallas Chamber of Commerce engaged Lockwood, Greene and Company to undertake an industrial survey for the city. Based on that effort, the chamber initiated a three-year "Industrial Dallas" movement in 1928. The $500,000 advertising campaign published seven reports about the Dallas area and placed full-page ads in the *Saturday Evening Post, Nation's Business,* and *Literary Digest* promoting the area to industrialists. The campaign secured 126 new manufacturing plants for the city and gave Dallas unprecedented national publicity.[2]

The success of such growth ventures, however, resulted in enormous demands for city services in a place run more like a small town than a booming



Map 2 Dallas Expands, 1841–1943. Redrawn from the Bartholomew Plan for Dallas.

metropolis. The city's infrastructure, particularly its sewers and paved roads, failed to keep up with the rapid growth. As late as the 1920s, some downtown streets remained unpaved while many older subdivisions faced spring floods due to the lack of storm sewers. Even worse, the city's rapid growth had left the primitive sanitary system obsolete. The rapid physical expansion of the city created real challenges since the original sewer plan had failed to anticipate such growth, and the city's main sewers were completely inadequate to handle the increase in usage from new subdivisions. In addition, the city had no sewage treatment plant and discharged its untreated waste into the Trinity River.[3]

Prior to the "Industrial Dallas" campaign, the National Fire Protection Association found serious problems with the city's fire record. Its survey of twenty-five of the nation's cities showed that Dallas experienced the highest per capita loss of all cities examined for the five-year period between 1922 and 1926. Dallas fire losses averaged $8.45 per capita compared to Los Angeles's fire losses of $1.66 per capita. And in 1927 Dallas experienced a horrendous crime wave, aggravated by the city's spatial expansion. Only Oak Cliff had a police station outside of the central headquarters, and the delay in police response had the community in an uproar. So did the meager 240-man force, which meant 1 policeman for every 1,000 residents, far below the national average. Mayor Louis Blaylock became so frustrated with the situation that he suggested declaring a modified sort of martial law for the city.[4]

Although the city's rapid growth and transformation in the 1920s made it different from many northeastern urban centers, its changing spatial patterns paralleled their trends. Dallas whites, who made up a vast majority of local residents, segregated themselves by income and class during that decade. As late as 1895, the Social Register listed equal distribution of members of the city's elite throughout the town. By 1925, 60 percent of the elite lived in suburban Highland Park or North Dallas, while 25 percent lived in East Dallas (along Swiss Avenue), 14 percent remained in South Dallas, and only 1 percent resided in Oak Cliff, the area across the Trinity River (see map 2).[5] An even stronger confirmation of the economic differential of neighborhoods appeared in a study made in 1927 by Lockwood, Greene and Company. The rental for housing in exclusive Highland Park, north of the city, averaged $73.22 per month, while an area adjacent to City Park in South Dallas averaged $20.18 per month.[6] Oak Cliff, which developers originally established as a restricted suburban development, took on a different character in the twentieth century. With the exception of several subdivisions like Kessler Park, Oak Cliff assumed an increasingly blue-collar tone in the twenties. Fast-growing East Dallas demonstrated the increasingly seg-

mented nature of Dallas due to the widespread use of the automobile and restrictive covenants. Parts of East Dallas had been developed as an upper-class area in the late nineteenth century, but as the automobile lured residents out farther from the city's core, a new pattern emerged. The southern portion of East Dallas became a working-class area with a mix of apartments, single-family housing, and small commercial establishments. The area nearest downtown housed boarders, while the middle class occupied neighborhoods further out, around Baylor Hospital. The wealthy moved farther north and east along Swiss and Gaston Avenues.[7]

Dallas did fail to follow one spatial pattern common to northern cities. It experienced no new large-scale ghetto, as many northern cities did at this time, but its black population, about 15 percent of the total population, congregated in concentrated pockets throughout the city. The Hall Street neighborhood near North Dallas, the Elm Thicket neighborhood adjoining Love Airport, Wheatly Place in South Dallas, and the Wahoo Lake neighborhood in West Oak Cliff were some of the more prominent ones (see map 3). African Americans also had their own commercial, business, and entertainment section in Deep Ellum, immediately east of downtown Dallas along Elm Street between Preston and Good Streets.[8]

Mexicans also concentrated in Dallas during the 1920s. Although census material does not show it, locals estimated that nearly 10,000 Mexicans settled in the area by 1920, both fleeing the turmoil of the revolution in Mexico and being drawn to the economic opportunities of a booming city. According to one contemporary, Little Mexico, just north of downtown, was "a close-packed mass of flimsy, tumbled-down frame shanties and 'shotgun' houses threaded by narrow, twisting, unpaved streets." The Cumberland Hill School Center became the center of communal life, and a monthly periodical titled *La Variedad* proved the chief organ of communication. In addition, other ethnic neighborhoods persisted in Dallas during the 1920s, including a Jewish area in southeast Dallas and an Italian neighborhood in East Dallas.[9]

The story of rapid urban growth and change in the United States is at least as old as the 1820s, and does not necessarily explain why cities took specific actions. Indeed, responses to urban growth and the problems it creates change over time. By the 1920s, a new way of approaching urban problems appeared, manifested in the discourse about cities among not only scholars (including the Chicago School of Sociology) but also "reformers" associated with the National Municipal League and planners who attended the National Conference on City Planning. No longer did academics, reformers, and planners approach the city as a series of parts to be tinkered



Map 3 Nonwhite Population of Dallas. From the Bartholomew Plan for Dallas. From the collection of the Texas/Dallas History and Archives Division, Dallas Public Library (image #PA98-1/14).

with independently of other parts. A new emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the city came to dominate both governmental reform and planning in the 1920s. Academics such as the members of the Chicago School of Sociology discussed the close interrelationship of municipal corporation to surrounding suburbs as well as the inseparable connection of urban parts. The artificial city boundaries did not delineate the true urban community, according to this view. Rather, city and suburb were part of the "real" urban community. Likewise, the urban area appeared to them so interdependent that one defective part affected all other parts as well as the city.

As a result of this new perception, urbanists promoted a new "systems approach" to urban problem solving in such areas as government and planning. This new perception also created increased anxiety about urban fragmentation and malfunctioning urban parts. In response, reformers embraced the council-manager government to deal with their new perception of the city and its inextricably linked problems while planners promoted comprehensive planning and comprehensive zoning as solutions that articulated their new ideas about the nature of the city. Unlike earlier plans associated with the so-called city beautiful movement that dealt only with public projects seeking to coordinate their development, the new comprehensive plans of the 1920s began with systematic surveys of the economic, social, demographic, political, and public-works aspects of the city, as if the condition of every group and every part of the city affected not only the welfare of the whole but the condition of every other group or part.[10] Even in cities like Dallas, where such a plan did not appear until the 1940s, a growing intensity surfaced in the 1920s over the need to coordinate better treatment for the entire city. The popular council-manager government in the 1920s also reflected this emphasis on the new comprehensive approach to the city and the concern for better coordination of the various governmental functions by making significant changes in the way officials administered and interacted with each other. Urban growth, then, proved not to be the sole determinant of how civic leaders defined and responded to their city's needs. Changing ideas about the city, in Dallas and elsewhere, also helped shape the responses to those cities at this time.

□ 2

Rethinking Planning and Governing in the 1920s

Civic leaders in Dallas after World War I voiced displeasure over the progress of city planning and made new commitments to address those needs. This resulted not only in additional organizations to respond to the planning needs of the city but also in a different approach to the city's physical needs. A new public discourse about the nature of the city, a discourse that helped redefine the meaning of comprehensive and coordinated treatment of the whole, also shaped postwar planning in Dallas. The emphasis on developing and implementing new planning strategies emerged as a major, although not the only, preoccupation of civic leaders in the 1920s. By 1927 the same concerns that had helped redefine planning after World War I pushed civic leaders to question the city's commission form of government. And that would lead to a movement resulting in a council-manager government. Planning and governing strategies in the 1920s, then, showed a new emphasis on and new approach to promoting the welfare of the city as a whole.

Both the City Plan Commission (CPC) and the Dallas Metropolitan Development Association (DMDA), established in 1919, took a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to city planning than had earlier efforts. The CPC was the first official body in Dallas responsible for guiding the city's physical development. The DMDA attempted to coordinate the city's disparate planning groups and act as a resource for them. Both bodies also focused on securing the city's first comprehensive zoning ordinance. These two groups, as well as the Kessler Plan Association (KPA), established in 1924, responded to the city's problems differently than had earlier organizations. The new planning groups treated the city as a system of systems so interrelated that the malfunction of one disrupted all the other elements of the

system. No longer could parks or streets be treated as discrete parts unconnected to other physical elements of urban life.

On January 29, 1919, the city commissioners authorized the creation of a fifteen-member City Plan Commission. According to the resolution offered by Mayor Joe Lawther, the commission would advise the Board of Commissioners on "all natures of public improvements, civic improvements, city planning, opening, widening and changing streets, routing of public utilities, controlling and regulating traffic upon the public streets and ways of the city of Dallas, and other matters relating to civic improvements."[1] It also would help "secure a charter amendment providing an official city plan commission." The *Dallas Morning News* strongly promoted the CPC, a body established to address and coordinate treatment of a variety of physical needs facing the city. As an early advocate of planning in Dallas, the *News* had become increasingly impatient about the city's inability to carry out the Kessler Plan.[2] At its first meeting, the CPC selected aging civic leader J. T. Trezevant as chair, and requested the younger R. E. L. Saner to assume the title of vice chair while actually leading the body. Under Saner's direction, the commission discussed the need to submit a bond issue to widen, extend, and open Dallas's streets. It also made plans to annex areas lying outside the corporate limits.[3] In addition, the commission contacted planning bodies from Denver, Salt Lake City, and St. Louis for guidance.[4]

Several months later, Dallas narrowly approved an amendment to its charter making the city plan commission a permanent arm of local government.[5] This amendment was passed in the 1919 municipal election, which also saw the election of Mayor Frank W. Wozencraft, who appointed a new fifteen-member city plan committee and selected John J. Simmons, prominent real estate investor, as chair. The *News* reported that at this group's first meeting members discussed "ambitious plans for the symmetrical growth and development of Dallas." The commission seemed particularly interested in addressing the problem of downtown traffic congestion, but they also discussed sewer needs throughout the city and brainstormed how to reroute interurbans to promote more efficient public transportation. The real significance of the commission is that for the first time the city had one official body to plan for the physical development of the entire city. This reflected the new emphasis of coordinating the city as a whole, rather than merely solving singular problems.[6]

Lack of adequate funding threatened to hamper the commission's ability to succeed, so the mayor asked the chamber of commerce for help. It responded by creating the DMDA, which promptly initiated a $40,000 fund-raising effort "to employ a permanent, capable corps of engineers

and other technical men to work out and assist in the execution of plans for contemplated improvements."[7]

The chamber of commerce also hoped that the DMDA would help "obviate any appearance of diversity as between sections of the city in the consumption of the [Kessler] plan." The DMDA viewed its main objective as "the ultimate carrying out of the entire city plan program." Toward this end, it attempted to refocus attention from the individual city section to the comprehensive whole. To achieve this goal, it provided an umbrella organization modeled after the city's health and welfare boards for the city's now thirty-eight improvement associations interested in planning. The DMDA also published a planning periodical entitled *Dallas Metropolitan* and hired George Kessler as consultant to help update and improve the city's plan. In addition, the association wanted him to assist officials in developing a comprehensive zoning ordinance for the city. Such an ordinance would allow the city to control private as well as public land use. Much of the DMDA's early work focused on preparing maps that would furnish the necessary data for zoning the city. The DMDA also employed Kessler's planning representative, E. A. Wood, a Cornell University graduate in civil engineering, as resident engineer.[8] Organizers of the DMDA emphasized that the new countywide organization would not replace any existing bodies or "limit their activity in any way." Rather, it would "encourage interest and activity along city planning and community lines in all sections of Dallas and [would] make available to the people of each section the services and opinions of men of wide experience in such matters."[9]

Unlike the earlier Dallas City Plan and Improvement Committee (DCPIC), composed of thirty-eight "prominent citizens" appointed by the chamber of commerce, the new organization's membership included representatives from district improvement associations, women's clubs, service clubs, trade associations, and other similar groups. A. C. Ebie, chair of the finance committee, explained that "the entire city—business, residential and suburban sections—will have the DMDA's best efforts and any and all proposed activities will be considered on their individual merits." Founders of the DMDA would allow no more than one member from any single organization on the governing council and promised that "every section would be represented." This, according to the *News,* provided a "guarantee against any favoritism to any one sector in the city" and instead promoted "the best interest of the entire community."[10]

No issue preoccupied the CPC and the DMDA more than comprehensive zoning. About three months after its creation, the CPC formed a zoning committee and seemed clearly intent on developing a comprehensive zoning

ordinance similar to the ones written for New York City and St. Louis. Toward this end, the DMDA employed not only George Kessler but also prominent zoning consultant Robert Whitten to develop comprehensive zoning for the city. Unlike the city's early forays into zoning, this effort started with the city rather than with a problem and proscribed acceptable land use for the municipality's entire 23.5 square miles, thus reflecting the new emphasis on the city's interconnectiveness. It acted on the assumption that Dallas had become a complex entity made up of separate parts and responded by recognizing those divisions and creating zoning districts for residential, business, and industrial development. Not stopping there, the zoning ordinance identified separate areas in the city for low-density housing, composed of single-family homes and duplexes, and high-density sites, dominated by apartments. It also defined different types of business and industrial areas. Finally, the zoning proposal included five classes of height districts and five classes of "allowable area." In the latter case, it created five classifications for lot size from class A–1, which called for one family per 6,000 square feet of the area of the lot, to class A–5, which required no more than one family for each 375 square feet of the area of the lot.[11]

The first public presentation of the new zoning plan took place at a meeting of the chamber of commerce on November 23, 1920. George Kessler, Robert Whitten, and E. A. Wood, the compilers of the plan, all spoke. Kessler explained how zoning protected the interest of all Dallas citizens, the homeowner and the businessman. He also clarified how zoning was just one part of the larger planning process. He emphasized that the city's transportation, water and sanitation, outdoor recreation, and paving needs all required study and planning. Good planning, Kessler asserted, studied "every physical development of the city" and worked "toward its future." Zoning and planning for Dallas in 1919–20, then, focused on a variety of needs viewed as inextricably linked. Although Kessler saw inadequate transportation as the city's greatest problem, he conceded that it could not be resolved without addressing other pressing needs.[12] Earlier planning and zoning efforts had focused on singular issues or city parts and had not attempted the same type of comprehensive approach now being employed.

At the same time the city embraced comprehensive zoning and planning, it also considered a comprehensive housing act. That act, initiated by the efforts of the Dallas Housing Commission, would regulate the construction and sanitation of all dwellings in Dallas. It promised, among other things, to assure adequate light and ventilation as well as proper sanitation and water supplies, and to demand minimum dimensions for rooms. In reporting on the proposal, the *News* pointed out that the new housing and zoning ordi-

nances were "closely related." Indeed, the newspaper noted that the authors of both ordinances had held several meetings to coordinate the two ordinances "for the greatest welfare of the city."[13]

Comprehensive zoning in Dallas met a setback, however, when the state's supreme court, on November 3, 1921, struck down Dallas's earlier attempt at piecemeal zoning in the case of *Spann v. the City of Dallas*. The court's ruling concluded that zoning promoted aesthetics rather than public safety and reasoned that it did not come under the policing power of the state's cities. Despite the ruling, George Kessler pled for the city to pursue comprehensive zoning, observing that the decision voided only a very limited type of zoning. According to the planner, the city's old ordinance "was simply a partial attempt to do some of the things which a [comprehensive] zoning ordinance will do thoroughly and completely for the whole city." Unlike the city's earlier effort, Kessler continued, comprehensive zoning would "regulate the use of all kinds of property, for the mutual protection of all property and for the safeguarding of investments therein."[14]

Local officials and civic leaders failed to share the optimism of Kessler and concluded that the ruling invalidated any type of zoning in Texas. The day after the court's decision, the *News* predicted that the Spann decision would have "a disastrous effect upon the plans for a zoning ordinance for Dallas." Indeed it did. Stymied by the court ruling, the city did not adopt a comprehensive zoning ordinance until September 9, 1929.[15]

Civic leaders did not abandon planning between the time of the court ruling and the final passage of zoning. Other planning issues, including street widening and extension, the development of the Trinity River levees, and reclamation of the river bottoms, captured the attention of the DMDA. So did the removal of the Houston & Texas Central railroad tracks and the desire for a direct thoroughfare from the north into the city.[16]

The creation of the Kessler Plan Association (KPA) in 1924 by members of the Dallas Property Owner's Association (DPOA) provided another example of planning that typified postwar Dallas. The KPA also reflected the new perception of the city that influenced Dallas civic leaders after World War I. Besides the DMDA and CPC, the DPOA stood as the city's most powerful planning organization in 1919. As we have seen, influential businessmen, including newspaperman George Dealey, department store magnate Alex Sanger, and bank president Edward O. Tennison, participated in this civic organization. West-end businessmen, impatient with the progress of the Kessler Plan, had organized that body in March of 1919 to promote and improve their part of downtown. Club officials collected over $18,000 from wealthy members and set off to plan and lobby for a street through

their section of downtown linking South and West Dallas. They also worked for the leveeing of the nearby Trinity River and the reclamation of its bottoms. Toward this end, the DPOA employed George Kessler as engineer. Kessler revised his plans for the west end, especially those dealing with street traffic and levee development. Yet the high cost of the projects, and the suspicion by some that the DPOA "was organized for selfish purposes . . . contrary to the interests of other sections of the city," led to its demise.[17]

Aware that little advancement could be made so long as Central Business District (CBD) businessmen supported two planning groups with competing priorities, some members of the DPOA pushed for the disbandment of that group and the creation of a new one. According to its Committee for County and City Wide Association, "Only through cooperation and organized effort with county and city wide support of an entire citizenship will things get done."[18] These conclusions led to the formation of the KPA, which would carry out "the entire Kessler Plan and scientific development of every part of greater Dallas." The DPOA took this step in 1924 after concluding that no sectional organization could ever secure the Lamar Street Traffic Way or the Trinity River Levee Project, both pet projects of the sectional planning group. Those two projects were actually citywide in scope, the DPOA concluded, and needed the support of a citywide organization.

The KPA's emphasis on the city as a whole shared some characteristics with the chamber's Metropolitan Development Association. Both solicited participation from a variety of neighborhood groups, treated them as having something significant to contribute, and attempted to promote the welfare of the city as a whole. Although founded by the DPOA, which had been dominated by project-oriented downtown businessmen, the KPA would attract groups from all walks of life and advance the city's interests. Publicity generated by the new organization stressed that it served "no particular section, but all sections alike, since all are to benefit from the Kessler Plan."[19]

The association's board of directors reflected the city's geographic and political composition, by 1928 representing 115 civic groups interested in planning matters—including labor unions, manufacturing associations, and mothers' clubs. KPA leaders invited poor along with rich, blacks as well as whites, to public meetings and encouraged them to discuss their planning needs in what the organization's second president, Dr. E. H. Cary, called "the most democratic organization in Dallas."[20] The association, however, did attempt to educate the members to "want the right thing." At its first meeting, chaired by President Charles Sanger, the membership agreed that special planning emphasis should be placed on alleviating traffic congestion. Since better roadways promised a way of more effectively connecting

the city together, it should come as no surprise that planners prioritized their development during this era of planning for the city as a whole. If the city was to be one instead of many, neighborhoods needed easy access to downtown—the core of the city—as well as to each other. Civic leaders also viewed geographic unity as a prerequisite for civic unity and the making of a coherent community, a priority continually emphasized during this era. As a result, many supporters of planning viewed street thoroughfares as an important necessity.[21]

Because Dallas leaders constantly worried about fragmentation and disunity within the civic body during the 1920s, groups like the KPA used planning not only to foster orderly geographic development, but to encourage a sense of community and consensus among city residents.[22] The KPA depended on two strategies to promote comprehensive planning. First it tried to educate the public on the interdependence of the parts of the whole city. According to Cary, the KPA engaged in missionary work "showing leaders of each group and each district that things they needed would also benefit other districts, and that by joining and putting over the entire Kessler program all would be best served."[23] Borrowing freely from citizen planning movements in Chicago, Los Angeles, and St. Louis, the KPA specifically focused on educating the public about the benefits of planning. For example, the association published in 1927 a text for Dallas seventh graders entitled *Our City—Dallas: A Community Civics.* The 384-page book, written by former school superintendent Justin F. Kimball, emphasized the interrelatedness of the parts of the whole city and traced the benefits brought to Dallas by an active and civically responsible citizenry working for the city as a whole.[24]

The book started by discussing the city's founding and early history. It stressed the role of civic-minded citizens in the city's development. Dallas was just one of fifteen or so towns vying for dominance over the rich North Texas hinterland in the mid–nineteenth century, Kimball observed, but the village became an important city, the author asserted, because "her early citizens pushed and worked and strove to make it grow and develop." Early on, Kimball continued, citizens developed the "Dallas Spirit," characterized by a loyalty to the city, enthusiasm, enterprise, industry and teamwork, "and above all the willingness to make sacrifices for the good of the city and her people." The book's history of early Dallas also stressed how the metropolis grew without any planning. As a result, Kimball concluded, "The city was cramped and confused." Only after the city commission employed George Kessler did Dallas develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to its physical problems. Kimball claimed that the resulting plan was "probably the

greatest single contribution to the future welfare of Dallas that has been made by any human being since John Neeley Bryan [its founder]."[25] If followed, Kessler's plan would, according to Kimball, make the city into a "compact harmonious unit in which people might work and live." The problem with Kessler's plan, Kimball suggested, was that it had been carried out only in fragments, not comprehensively.[26] He criticized the city's failure to implement the entire plan and urged its immediate completion.

Indeed, a parenthetical note in chapter 6, entitled "The Probable Growth of Dallas," reminded teachers that "the essential feature in teaching this chapter is to impress upon the child the fact that Mr. Kessler made a plan for *the city as a whole* [italics mine]," and that it provided one plan "for the city as a unit, and at the same time gave us a plan that touches every part of the city." The book then proceeded to identify and discuss features that inhibited the city's proper growth and development, including badly placed railroad tracks, lack of thoroughfares, inadequate housing, and a meandering Trinity River with a smelly flood plain. The author also discussed the functions of city government and promoted the importance of metropolitan-type rule to guide greater Dallas's development. Finally, he challenged students to be good citizens, and called for a renewal of the Dallas Spirit.[27] "Fifteen years ago," Kimball continued, "our leaders in thought and action were thinking somewhat more seriously than now about the general betterment of Dallas, the development of her personality, the stimulation of her livableness. We ought to swing back to that view-point."[28] The book's last page repeated the theme of civic loyalty and asked students to serve their city "devotedly, unselfishly and without thought of gain."[29]

In addition to financing publication of the book, the KPA provided a forum that allowed various neighborhoods in the city to bring their concerns about planning to civic leaders. Acknowledging the diversity within the city, the planning association sought to provide neighborhoods a setting to voice their concerns and needs, and help experts truly plan for the entire city. Indeed, the KPA repeatedly emphasized that comprehensive planning should be for the city as a whole, not dominated by special, parochial interests. It also used the meetings to educate citizens about the needs of the whole city.[30]

The new enthusiasm for planning and coordinating the city's future in a comprehensive fashion helps explain the city commissioners' decision to establish a City Plan Office in city hall on August 1, 1922, and to hire former Kessler representative E. A. Wood as the city's first plan engineer. He promptly drew up a seventeen-element "Dallas Plan" that called for zoning, street adjustment, and water provision. It also espoused the treatment of blighted districts, adequate recreational facilities, improvement of the Trin-

ity River, traffic control, and regulation of all additions to Dallas, inside and outside. Other elements of the plan called for cooperation between city and county officials in county or regional planning, and promoted the planning of railroad and electric trolley lines as well as improved health and sanitation laws and regulation of the smoke nuisance.[31] The city never published this plan nor does a full edition of it appear to exist, but it clearly influenced the nature of planning in Dallas for the next ten years. Its call for the securing of legislation necessary to carry out every detail of the Dallas plan and its emphasis on developing methods of financing public improvements would initiate a movement that resulted in the Ulrickson Program. Several years later the chamber of commerce also contributed to the city's planning effort with its own "Twenty-five-Year Program" for the city in March 1925. That program ranged from street widening and flood control to public works such as auditoriums and parks.[32]

Although the city now had plans, it still had no comprehensive program to carry them out. This changed, however, after the mayor, following the CPC's recommendation, appointed a five-member board, dubbed the Ulrickson Committee, in June of 1925. Chaired by C. E. Ulrickson, general manager of Trinity Portland Cement Company, the committee included one lawyer and four businessmen. The chamber of commerce and the KPA would assist the Ulrickson Committee in working out a comprehensive program of long-range financial planning similar to one recently developed by St. Louis. The committee, aided by city plan engineer E. A. Wood and city engineer E. A. Kingsley, labored more than two years before issuing its program of public improvements under the title of *Forward Dallas!,* but commonly referred to as the Ulrickson Report.

The fifty-page report proposed a nine-year, $23.9-million bond strategy to finance specified projects including streets, a triple underpass, building lines, a central boulevard, railroad track removal, reclamation of the Trinity River, improved water purification, a municipal auditorium, a municipal airport, and schools. In tune with the new emphasis of the 1920s, the program also called for the development of comprehensive systems for streets, parks, sanitary sewers, storm water drainage, as well as for libraries, hospitals, and the water supply. Some of the programs for the city's physical makeup drew heavily on the Kessler Plan, with other parts borrowed from the Dallas Plan as well as the chamber's report. The result differed from the Kessler Plan in regard to comprehensiveness and treatment of the city.[33]

As might be expected from the general planning rhetoric of the decade, the program called for $5.7 million for street development. Defending this large commitment of money, the committee reminded Dallas citizens, "The

streets of Dallas are the veins and arteries through which the life of the city must flow. Where the circulation is good, we find growth and vigor. Where the circulation is bad, we find blight and dilapidation."[34] Ulrickson committee members expressed particular concern for the "woeful lack of adequate thoroughfares radiating from the heart of the business section to the various residential sections," and also commented on the lack of adequate cross-streets through downtown connecting North Dallas with the city's south side. It also looked beyond the downtown area and warned that streets in Oak Cliff on the west side of the river badly needed "co-ordination, correction and extension." *Forward Dallas!* called for crosstown or "by-pass" streets, "which would enable much traffic to reach its destination without passing through and crowding the already congested sections of the city." Finally, the program concluded that the street systems of both sides of the river "must be properly related to one another and tied together by an efficient number of conveniently distributed, connecting thoroughfares and underpasses." Indeed, the problem of the Trinity River flood plain, which separated Oak Cliff from the rest of Dallas, got special attention from the committee. As matters now stood, the committee complained that "we have in effect two separate towns, connected by virtually one street. Large areas on each side of the river remote from the viaduct are almost wholly unconnected with each other, and are accessible to the rest of the city and to each other only by unsatisfactory and circuitous routes." Such a reality seemed at odds with what the committee felt Dallas as a city ought to be. As a result, the Ulrickson Committee pledged to cooperate with the Dallas Levee Improvement District, committed to leveeing and reclaiming the Trinity River valley by providing adequate drainage and road development. Overall, the Ulrickson Committee identified eighty-two specific projects that if completed would give the "entire city and every section of the city a vastly improved and well-connected street system."[35]

The Ulrickson program also called for $1 million to be spent on developing a sewer system. In explaining the need for the sewer system, *Forward Dallas!* recalled the city's early experience in constructing a few small lines to serve the business section. It complained that this "piecemeal policy has been continued through the years, and no really comprehensive plan has ever been made to take care of drainage areas served by the various main and lateral interceptors." Such an approach no longer seemed appropriate, so the Ulrickson program proposed a comprehensive sewer program for present and future needs. In keeping with its emphasis on serving the city as a whole, the committee recommended that the $1 million should allow "sew-

age facilities [to] be extended to sections not having the same." Such action, the program continued, would be allowed only after the preparation of the comprehensive plans.[36]

Next, the report recommended that $3.5 million be allocated for storm water drainage. As with the sewage problem, the program recommended a systematic approach to drainage. "The City of Dallas has never given serious attention to its drainage problem as a whole," the report observed, "but has pursued a hand-to-mouth policy, resulting in an occasional temporary pipe, a concrete culvert, or an open channel, most of which are usually inadequate, and in the long run represent more or less a waste of money." As a result, the program recommended that a "complete storm water drainage system be planned to take care of the present and future growth of the city before any additional money be expended upon construction."[37]

The program's approach to libraries also offered a system capable of serving the needs of the entire city. At the time of the report, only two public libraries existed in Dallas: the central library built in 1901 with money from Andrew Carnegie, and an Oak Cliff branch erected in 1914. Since then, the report continued, the city's library services had fallen behind places such as Houston. To remedy this, the program recommended that Dallas add four branch libraries, including one for the city's African American citizens. "The sites of the branches should be carefully selected," the Ulrickson report warned, "with a view to equitable distribution of service, and with a view to attractiveness and sufficient size for further enlargement in future years."[38]

Not a traditional physical plan with maps and predictions of future growth patterns, the Ulrickson Program called for the city to develop "mature, scientific and orderly plans" to effectively coordinate the program and argued that none of the proceeds of the bonds should be spent unless "the general city plan for such character of projects has been prepared and approved . . . and the plan for the particular project, consistent with such general plan, has been prepared and approved in advance with the advice of the City Plan Commission."[39] The comprehensive nature of the proposals, as well as the emphasis on the inextricable linkage of different parts of the city, illustrates the prominent focus of comprehensive planning in Dallas in the 1920s.

Not only did the Ulrickson Report identify and offer solutions to many of the city's physical needs, but it also proposed charter amendments to give the city adequate "legal and financial power to plan, prosecute and complete the entire program in an *orderly and connected way* [italics mine]."

The proposed bonds necessary to complete the work would be issued over a nine-year period, and a charter amendment guaranteed that no more than $4 million worth of bonds could be sold in one year.[40]

In all, the Ulrickson committee proposed thirty-two charter amendments to allow the program's execution. Some of these asked for approval of general laws that the state legislature adopted during its last session authorizing cities to perform certain functions such as developing zoning laws, establishing building lines, and levying assessments for parks and parkways. Another included an amendment permitting the city to extend its indebtedness from $25 million to $50 million. Several additional amendments enabled the city to make charges for the use of the sanitary sewer, to provide for and construct a general storm sewer drainage system, and to establish methods of assessing benefits and charges against property owners. Still another charter amendment extended the payment period of assessments for street widenings from five to fifteen years. In addition, charter amendments permitted the city to create a $900,000 revolving fund for street improvement so street pavings would not be delayed by litigation.[41] This would allow for better coordination of street paving for the city as a whole. Together, these charter amendments addressed a variety of needs in Dallas and gave city leaders the ability to circumvent some of the barriers imposed by the state's homestead provision and to carry out their comprehensive Ulrickson program. The multifaceted emphasis of the *Forward Dallas!* program, including its coordinated projects as well as the financial and legal means of achieving them, made it the most comprehensive planning document in the city's history.

The report did not provide a specific timetable showing the date each improvement would be initiated. Rather, it left that decision up to the CPC and a "Committee on Supervision of Expenditures." That group, composed of fifteen citizens from various civic and governmental bodies, would provide a body "of experience, business ability and political independence." Together with the Plan Commission, it would suggest the sequence of projects to the City Commission. Such a procedure allowed the city some flexibility in its response to its complex and changing needs.[42]

The Ulrickson Committee called an election on December 15, 1927, to ratify the program's fifteen separate bond proposals and the thirty-two amendments to the city charter needed for the program's successful implementation. The *News* campaigned relentlessly for adoption of the program, providing front-page articles on the program from December 1 to election day. It also responded to several letters to the editor criticizing the bond package. The publicity for this election emphasized the comprehensive nature of the package being offered for voters' approval. One *News* editorial

concluded, "This is not a city of sections but one community, every citizen of which ought to be deeply wishful for the development of every part of the city."[43] Former mayor Joe E. Lawther also emphasized the need to heal division within the city by supporting "the most comprehensive program of improvement that has ever been proposed for our city." In fact, he continued, "it is the only comprehensive proposition . . . ever submitted to our citizens." Such a program demanded the "revival of the old Dallas spirit," he said, warning, "This is no time to fight for personal or sectional desires. Our city needs a long strong pull all together."[44] J. W. Park, president of the Central Labor Council, also reported that his group unanimously endorsed the bond budget program, agreeing that it was the most "comprehensive and constructive program of city building ever."[45]

The *News* also explained how the bond program would benefit the "little fellow" with its attention to schools, parks, and sewers. Indeed, the program would aid "every citizen of Dallas and every section," according to the *News,* because the Ulrickson Committee envisioned the city as "a single civic entity." "Dallas was not a city of sections," the *News* continued, "but one community." Other *News* articles reminded readers that the bond money meant jobs and continued progress in the race for the urban sweepstakes in the Southwest. Not only did the city suffer competition from Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio for state supremacy, the *News* warned, but it also competed with Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Kansas City, and St. Louis for domination of the larger Southwest. Passage of the comprehensive bond package, according to the newspaper, would help the city meet its challengers.[46]

Some opponents of the Ulrickson Program attacked the basic idea of planning while others feared it would not be fair. D. E. Waggoner, in a letter to the editor, wondered "how any body of men . . . can foresee the future needs of a growing city like Dallas." Former state senator V. A. Collins attacked the Ulrickson Program as "savoring of socialism and declared that the authors probably got their ideas from Russia."[47] J. Waddy Tate, an Oak Cliff resident and future mayor of Dallas, ridiculed planning in general and warned of a conspiracy. "No set of men," Tate warned, "can tell how Dallas will grow, or how fast." Furthermore, he cautioned that four of the five members of the Ulrickson Committee lived in suburban Highland Park and only one called Oak Cliff home. Such a situation had resulted in inadequate attention for Oak Cliff. Indeed, opponents pointed out that although Oak Cliff contained one-third of the city's population it would receive only one-ninth of the bond money. Having too many blue bloods on the committee messed up priorities, according to Tate. "They want us to borrow money

and build a negro library," he complained. That remark suggested that in at least this regard the Ulrickson Program was too comprehensive for this Oak Cliff resident.[48]

Despite such rhetoric and the concern by some that leaders had called the bond/charter election too soon, leaving Dallas citizens little time to discuss the issues, the city's voters approved the Ulrickson's bond schedule and charter amendments in overwhelming numbers. The margin of victory received from the 8,000 voters varied from 2,379 votes for the sanitary sewer system to 1,150 votes for the art museum.[49]

The passage of the Ulrickson package, then, suggests a different solution to the city's planning needs than the one manifested by the Kessler Plan of 1911. That plan had focused on specific problems and needs, and made little effort to treat them as an inextricably linked package. Planning in that decade also emphasized specific problems rather than the whole city. That clearly had changed by the 1920s. New city-oriented planning organizations appeared and an emphasis on systematic planning for the city as a whole emerged. Or at least the *definition* of system had changed. According to one historian of technology, systems before 1920 were viewed as "static entities, composed of diverse, fixed, and limited parts hierarchically arranged." But the new systems of the 1920s, were perceived as "dynamic" and "predicated on a much more complex relationship among parts." Moreover, "each part seemed to acquire a share of definition from its interrelationships with the other parts in the system" so that the "parts seemed to reflect on one another."[50] The new emphasis on comprehensive planning for the city, and on a coordinated and comprehensive bond program for Dallas, reflected this new 1920s notion of Dallas as this type of system. It also influenced the discourse about politics and government.

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Planning was not the only civic undertaking reconsidered in the 1920s. Growing dissatisfaction surfaced over the nature of the city's government during this time. Approaches to government closely followed the planning emphasis and reflected an image of the city that suggested that the whole was more than the sum of its parts and needed treatment in a truly comprehensive way. Critics of the city commission form of government claimed it encouraged city officials to think about their department's functional responsibility rather than the needs of the entire city. Even though this form of government had performed admirably in a variety of ways just as the original Kessler Plan had, neither offered the kind of coordinated program for the city as a whole deemed necessary by those who now viewed the city as a new type of system.[51]

During the 1920s, the Citizens Association's control of local government came undone and local municipal elections became increasingly politicized. The Citizens Association (CA) suffered a particularly devastating blow in 1923 when the Ku Klux Klan–backed slate swept to office by a more than 2 to 1 margin.[52] Two years later, after the Klan had lost its power, the incumbent Democratic ticket, led by seventy-five-year-old mayor Louis Blaylock, badly defeated the CA, which had nominated former Highland Park mayor Perry Claiborne as its mayoralty candidate. A third slate, the Citizens Independent Ticket, led Claiborne to charge that the Democrats won by default since the administrative opponents had been unable to cooperate and run just one slate.[53] Multislates would characterize city politics in the 1920s.

Even though the Democratic administration faltered and experienced tensions and turmoil during the next two years (including a fistfight in council chambers), the business-led CA proved unable to mount a strong challenge in 1927. Indeed, many deserted that body and supported another business-led good government slate called the Nonpartisan Association (NA). That group nominated R. E. Burt, who promised "a good business administration of the city's affairs."[54] This election saw the appearance of three additional tickets, including the Democrats, the All Dallas Party, and Citizens Independents. Several independents boosted the number of candidates for the five positions to twenty-seven.[55]

The business-backed NA and the Democrats benefited most from the all-time-high voter turnout and faced each other in a runoff election. That contest saw Dallasites vote into office the entire NA's slate.[56] Instead of opening up an era of unity, this body exhibited great discord and strife, with dubious efficiency and petty politics.[57] A variety of growth-related issues, from airport development to Trinity River reclamation, helped polarize city government. In addition, a constricting economy due to a bad cotton crop, an oil slump, and a building decline helped inflame unhappiness with local government.

At the same time, accelerating demands for neighborhood services further taxed local government and promoted conflict. One example of this came from Oak Cliff when residents in the Tyler Street neighborhood fought with the city over removal of a streetcar track. When the city failed to force the streetcar company to restore the track and provide transit service, neighborhood activists initiated a recall movement on September 3, 1927. Although protesters secured more than 11,000 signatures, the movement failed when the commissioners threw out 7,000 invalid names.[58]

Even after the business-backed nonpartisan slate secured power, criticism of the commission form of government continued. Louis Head, a writer for the *News,* wrote a fifteen-article series evaluating Dallas govern-

ment with good-government criteria developed by Harvard University professor William Bennett Munro. The Harvard professor had been a supporter of commission government earlier, but his good-government criteria now disclosed defects in Dallas government.[59] Using the Munro criteria, Head concluded that city government in Dallas had an efficiency rating of only 56 percent, enough to rank the city above average but proving it deficient in specific administrative areas. Agreeing with Hooper's earlier evaluation, Head stated that the vital defect of Dallas's government was the "lack of concentration of authority" over administration. The mayor's limited powers failed to override the power of each commissioner. Instead of working for the whole, the newspaperman stated, "Each Commissioner is jealous of his own prerogatives and resents to a greater or less degree the intrusion of some other member in his departmental affairs." The Head series also soundly criticized the commission's spoils system and the failure of the commissioners to educate the public about government by issuing annual reports.[60]

Indeed, critics consistently complained that local government seemed to promote disinterest among the general voting public. In his very first article, "Civic Faults Have Basis in Voter Apathy," Head observed that the last city election had drawn only 17,775 of 45,000 qualified voters to the polls. Even more disturbing, according to Head, these voters proved indifferent once they cast their ballots. "They immediately forgot the promises made by candidates," Head complained, "and go about their individual affairs."[61]

Despite these criticisms, Head's series also identified successful elements of city government. Head's investigation concluded that the city awarded contracts fairly, had an adequate budget system, and had a generally "sound" financial structure "with good audit controls." But these positive attributes were not enough, according to the reporter, who recommended that city government needed some significant improvements, either without charter reform or with it.[62]

About the time Head's articles appeared in the *News,* Mayor Louis Blaylock also criticized the commission form of government. Probably no other man had been so closely associated with it. Blaylock had served the commission thirteen years, including three as finance commissioner, six as police and fire commissioner, and four as mayor. According to Mayor Blaylock, Dallas citizens could never have really effective government under the commission plan because it promoted the politicization of government.[63]

The *News*'s series initiated a wider discussion about city government and council-manager government, a structural innovation gaining much attention throughout the nation in the 1920s. Although some cities had employed

managers before Dayton, Ohio, that city in 1913 became the first to adopt council-manager government. Unlike commission government, Dayton's new governing arrangement provided administrative powers to the city manager, and legislative powers to city council, elected at large without partisan labels. Two years later, council-manager government secured the endorsement of the National Municipal League, and its popularity soared. By 1926, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Kansas City had adopted this well-publicized new form of government.[64] As the city elections of 1927 drew near, several slates of candidates promised to submit the issue of charter reform to the people if elected. Mayoralty candidate R. E. Burt of the Non Partisan Association's ticket made such a pledge, and after winning he appointed a special committee of five to investigate the possibility of the city's adopting council-manager government.[65]

The movement for council-manager government, then, did not stem from an attempt to destroy a political machine, or even to rid the city of incompetent public officials. Nor was it a conspiracy to weaken neighborhood influence through the destruction of wards—that had been achieved in 1907. Rather, the movement focused on creating a more efficient and better-administered government through structural change, a government capable of action on immediate problems and long-term planning for a healthy future.[66] In the 1923 edition of his textbook *Municipal Government,* Professor William Bennett Munro concluded that the council-manager form of government proved superior to commission government because it established "a real pivot of administrative authority" and placed "this under expert control." Munro also thought that council-manager government provided "a better basis for cooperation and harmony," another concern of Dallas leaders.[67]

By the end of the 1920s, Dallas faced major challenges brought on by its rapid growth. That growth had increased the city's appetite for even more expansion, and council-manager government seemed the most efficient tool to realize the city's potential. Finally, council-manager government would better educate residents about Dallas's needs, and allow a professional to accommodate differences generated by the city's various segments. Indeed, the rhetoric of city manager supporters suggested that politics in city government caused fragmentation, and if politics were eliminated (as council-manager government promised to do), then fragmentation would decline.

Shortly after Mayor Burt established his new committee, the *News* ran another series, this time a nine-part report, examining the nature of city government. The first article, again authored by Louis Head, provided some background on the council-manager movement. It also criticized commis-

sion government for not meeting "the desires of the thinking citizens nor the requirement of the phenomenally rapid growth of many communities."[68] The second article looked at the most common objections to the council-manager government—that it gave too much power to one person and that it often meant government by an outsider. The next four articles reviewed the achievement of the council-manager government in Dayton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Kansas City. Other articles surveyed council-manager government in Texas and emphasized the general virtues of the plan.[69]

Despite the enthusiasm generated for council-manager government by the *News,* officials held no general referendum on the matter in 1927 since, as we have seen, Dallas voters were being asked that year to pass the $23.9 million bond issue and charter amendments recommended by the Ulrickson Committee for public improvements. Some civic leaders feared that by asking citizens to vote on the bond issue and the government reforms, they jeopardized the success of both. Although the *News* did not initially agree and wanted no postponement on the city manager referendum, editorializing that "delay would mean death," it eventually reversed its position, since several members of Burt's charter committee strongly felt a postponement necessary. As a result, Dallasites in 1927 voted only on the comprehensive Ulrickson bond program.

Several months after the bond election, the council-manager movement slowly regained momentum. In April 1928, Mayor Burt named Hugh S. Grady, former assistant city attorney, to head a twenty-member charter committee. According to the *News,* that body would "make a systematic study of the charter of the city, completely revising it, ironing out anachronisms, modernizing the provisions that have been antiquated since 1907," and "evolve a document consistent with a population of 300,000 instead of 90,000."[70] Because under the state constitution, cities could amend their charters once every two years, no charter election could be held until December 16, 1929, giving the committee ample time to do its job.[71]

That charter committee included four lawyers, the editors of the *Dallas Morning News* and the *Dallas Times Herald,* and fourteen other businessmen. The city commission confirmed the appointments unanimously. This committee worked with an earlier Burt-appointed committee established to investigate council-manager government.

The urgency for charter revision seemed heightened during this time because of the pressure that the Ulrickson bonds would put on the city's budget. Under the old charter, if the general fund of the city increased then other parts of the budget also required additional allotments. As a result, because the city needed to raise its general fund to service the Ulrickson bonds, the

charter forced it to significantly increase automatic allotments to budget lines, such as parks and schools. That development obliged the city to search for more revenue, resulting in a reappraisal of city real estate and the decision to increase the percent of property value to be taxed from 45 to 50 percent. According to some observers, including city attorney J. J. Collins, the city might have avoided its difficulty had it obtained a charter granting it more flexibility in financial matters. Indeed, Collins asserted that "the difficulty of determining upon a proper revenue for the coming fiscal year was the most compelling reason that council appointed a charter committee."[72]

The committee, which had studied a variety of city manager charters—including that of its neighbor, Fort Worth—issued its report on March 5, 1929. To no one's surprise, it recommended that the city adopt a council-manager form of government. The proposed charter called for a city council of nine members rather than five commissioners, because the committee "believed that distribution of more members in council over the city will give a wider popular representation in the government than will be possible with a smaller number as a commission form of government." The charter committee also recommended at-large elections for council seats rather than ward-based elections "to eliminate the possibility of sectional jealousies and so-called log-rolling."[73]

The eventual charter included a provision that designated three council positions as at-large ones while the other six would be district positions, requiring the council candidate to live in the district even though he or she were elected by the entire city. This provision acknowledged the geographic diversity of Dallas yet guaranteed candidates who, because of their electoral base, would not look out merely for their own district.[74]

The Charter Committee also proposed that council, rather than the people, select the mayor, in order to "prevent jealousies between members of the council . . . and eliminate . . . the bitterness and strife that might otherwise be injected into the elections." This proposal followed the recommendations of the National Municipal League's Model Charter. Finally, the report urged that the new charter should be submitted to the people in December of 1929.[75]

Since the committee released the report during the city election campaign, the *News* quickly pressured all candidates to agree to submit the city manager question to the people to vote on if elected. All five mayoralty candidates agreed, but the victory of independent mayoralty candidate J. Worthington Tate, popularly known as J. Waddy Tate, would spell trouble for the charter movement.

Tate had moved to Dallas from Houston in 1897 to work for the Chicago

Greater Western Railroad Company. He entered the real estate business in 1925 with Colonel S. E. Moss, and the two established the Moss-Tate Investment Company, which helped develop the Hampton Terrace subdivision in Oak Cliff. His success in real estate allowed the fifty-nine-year-old Tate to "retire" and become involved in city politics. He was, according to a local newspaper columnist, "addicted to bold and elegant attire, a gold-headed cane and impressive jewelry." Tate, who resided in Oak Cliff, had served on the CPC under Mayor Louis Blaylock in 1923. He ran an unsuccessful campaign for mayor in 1927, although he did receive more than 5,000 votes after he entered the race just two weeks before the election.[76]

Tate championed the causes of what he called the plain people and labeled his supporters the "blue shirt boys." The mayoralty candidate became known as the "hot dog" mayor because he served hot dogs at some of his campaign rallies. Tate promised to increase the minimum wage for city labor, expand the welfare department, give raises to police and fireman, and place donkeys in the city parks for the children. He also pledged to appoint a woman to the park board if elected. In addition, his platform emphasized that "the paramount issue of this campaign is the conservation of the remainder of the Ulrickson bond money." This included cutting what he viewed as useless appropriations for an African American library and a city art gallery and instead using those allocated funds for a public amusement park. Such positions helped him gain the endorsement from the Independent Voters Alliance, said to include the remnants of the Ku Klux Klan, as well as the Dallas Non Partisan Labor League and much of the city's Republican element. Even though Tate's toughest opponent also hailed from Oak Cliff, the blue shirt candidate received heavy support from that predominantly working-class area. It is unclear how many women voted for him, but it appears that support was heavy due in part, no doubt, to his appointment of Annie F. Chapman to head his executive committee for election. He was the only candidate to have a female heading his campaign.[77]

Although one might be tempted to explain Tate's election as an accident caused by the business elite's preoccupation with the council-manager government movement, this does not appear to be the case. Rather, the election of Tate and two other independent candidates to the commission, R. A. Wylie (street commissioner) and W. C. (Bill) Graves (police and fire commissioner), reflected a rejection of the traditional civic leadership, which had fragmented badly over the use of Ulrickson funds for the Trinity River reclamation project.

At the very time the Ulrickson Committee developed its program, property owners of the Trinity River bottoms fashioned a strategy for leveeing

and reclaiming the Trinity River flood plain. After reviewing engineering reports about the cost of reclaiming this area, the 1,300 property owners in 1926 asked the County Commissioners Court of Dallas to create the City and County of Dallas Levee Improvement District. Under the laws of Texas, this body could sell bonds to help finance improvement of the river bottoms. The members of the district, led by John J. Simmons, manufacturer and longtime civic leader, and Leslie A. Stemmons, president of the Atlas Metal Works and the Southwestern Loan Association, agreed to that plan after working out a comprehensive improvement program with the city, county, railroads, and utilities to shoulder some of the financial improvement (see map 4). The city promised to provide $3,270,000 for water mains, sewers and underpasses while county officials committed $3,339,000 for underpasses and viaducts. The railroads and utilities offered another $5,405,000 of improvements for the area. In return, the district agreed to spend $9 million for the actual leveeing of the river and refilling the soggy bottoms, as well as sharing the costs for storm sewers and roads. Estimates of the final cost for the project exceeded $21 million.[78]

Earlier there had been resistance to heavy public financial subsidy of the levee/reclamation project but now both the city bond proposals, included in the Ulrickson program, and the county bond election, held the same year, passed by impressive majorities. Part of the success of the levee/reclamation program came from its close association with the larger planning efforts for the city as a whole, and its association with the Ulrickson Program.[79] The KPA undertook an impressive educational effort to sell the levee/reclamation program as an essential part of the revised Kessler Plan. Indeed, the KPA attempted to rally citywide support for the completion of all parts of the Kessler Plan. In one pamphlet the association offered the citywide benefits of carrying out the Ulrickson Program: "It will give every section of Greater Dallas wide and ample trafficways, relieving traffic congestion, guarding against the shrinkage of values and reviving blighted areas." The pamphlet concluded by claiming that the program would make "Greater Dallas a unified City, with every section accessible to every other section, with wide thoroughfares for the main flow of traffic in every direction."[80] That last reference was a particularly telling reason for the city to support the straightening, leveeing, and reclamation of the Trinity River, since that program anticipated five new viaducts that would link Dallas to its isolated and cantankerous appendage, Oak Cliff. In the very first issue of the *Kessler Plan Salesman,* published in 1926 by the KPA, a feature article underscored the importance of that project to all of Dallas. Other Kessler publicity for the levee/reclamation would follow. John Surratt, the talented executive



Map 4 Trinity River Reclamation Project, Industrial Properties Corporation

secretary of the KPA, wrote national planning figure Edward Basset after the successful Ulrickson bond election and bragged that his association played a critical role in educating many previously hostile civic leaders as to the worth of the levee/reclamation project for the city as a whole.[81]

Although the levee/reclamation program had been sold to the public as a way to better link downtown Dallas with Oak Cliff, protect the city from flooding, and open up new land for industrial development, many remained concerned by what they viewed as a huge public subsidy for a private real estate venture. Shortly after the county court organized the reclamation district, Stemmons and Simmons created the Industrial Properties Corporation to develop the Trinity River bottoms. That corporation, by exchanging capital stock for properties, eventually owned or controlled nearly 75 percent of the land in the district. Such real estate holdings would allow Industrial Properties to plan and develop a massive industrial park. Estimates that the reclaimed property value could reach $52 million led some to question how much the city should be helping private developers. Other business transactions undertaken by the property owners also raised questions about the reclamation district's business practices. For instance, the district offered its bonds without competitive bidding and gave the excavating contract for the levee to an in-house firm. In addition, Stemmons and Simmons constantly pressured city officials to give their project top priority in regards to bond money.[82] Such action ran counter to the notion publicized by both the Ulrickson Committee and the KPA that the gigantic bond program was for the city as a whole, and threatened to undo the consensus that the KPA had tried to create for comprehensive planning, especially since some downtown businessmen agreed with neighborhood sentiment that said the Ulrickson bond money designated for drainage sewers for needy residential sections should be spent first.

The split in the downtown business establishment resulted in two full slates for the 1929 election—the United Dallas Association (UDA) and the Greater Dallas Association (GDA). The UDA, composed of those opposing the immediate commitment of Ulrickson funds to the reclamation project, nominated as its mayoralty candidate Temple Morrow, grandson of Texas legend Sam Houston. Morrow's heavy involvement in the Tyler Street Methodist Church had led some opponents to label him a religious fanatic but he countered with his own charges, claiming that the GDA ticket had been sponsored by the levee district. If it won the election, Morrow warned, the GDA planned to divert funds from the Ulrickson bond program for more improvements in the river valley than were authorized by voters.[83] Morrow and the UDA called for more unity in city hall and the end to the bickering

that had characterized Dallas. "For three years Dallas has dragged behind the other cities in the state," Morrow warned. Only a "United Dallas, against the call of special interest and organized vice, against bickering and strife," could, according to the mayoralty candidate, redirect the city "toward prosperity."[84]

The GDA, which had allegedly been established by the levee district supporters, nominated W. C. Everett, president of the Empire Building and Loan Company, as its candidate for mayor. Its platform identified the "coordinated expenditures of public funds from the Ulrickson bond issue by the city, the highway bond issue by the county, and the Trinity River reclamation bond issue by the Dallas County Levee District" as the "paramount issue of the city political campaign."[85]

Unlike earlier elections in which the *News* usually backed one ticket, the 1929 election saw the paper, which was very sympathetic to the levee district, splitting its endorsements between the two business slates. "The *News* takes no stock in the theory that ticket unity in advance of election necessarily means harmony afterward," stated one editorial. "Experience of recent years with administrations elected as tickets and not as men makes the exact opposite the more responsible assumption." As the *News* explained, it supported three GDA candidates and two UDA candidates because "they support Dallas as a single entity."[86]

The *News*'s sister afternoon-paper, the *Dallas Journal,* went even further in its editorial position, arguing that supporting a "straight ticket" was a vote for "bossism in the Dallas City Hall," a vote for "influence in government."[87] The *Dallas Times Herald,* chief critic of the levee district's actions, took a different view. It supported "the courageous and open campaign" by Temple Morrow and the United Dallas ticket, explaining that in this election "the only point at issue is whether the rest of Dallas is to be considered in its proper relationship with the levee district."[88]

In the election that followed many apparently agreed with the *News,* since no slate swept into office. For that matter, only one candidate received a majority vote at all—the UDA nominee for finance commissioner, John Harris. Temple H. Morrow and J. Waddy Tate, top vote-getters for mayor, faced each other in a runoff election. UDA candidates qualified for runoff elections in three other positions against independents. The GDA slate, most associated with the levee district, placed only one candidate in the runoff. The *Times Herald* celebrated the achievements of the UDA, reminding voters that their slate identified with the "interests of the city as a whole."[89]

The *Dallas Journal* perceived the election differently and used it to promote council-manager government. "The recent campaign," the *Journal*

observed, "should convince any intelligent citizen that it will be best for Dallas if this should be the last political contest of the sort in connection with administration of the city's business. The imperative need of Dallas and of any growing metropolitan city is businesslike administration," it continued, "backed by a citizenry that is united for the welfare and progress of the city." The *Journal* concluded, "It will be folly to perpetuate a system that makes for dissension among the citizens, that makes possible the election to posts of great responsibility of men who are unfitted for such service."[90]

During the runoff elections, the UDA emphasized two points. First, it questioned if Tate was even competent to be mayor. Second, it called for support of the entire slate to guarantee a "harmonious administration."[91] Within this context, mayoralty candidate Temple Morrow complained that Dallas had lost industries the last two years because of "the turmoil of mismanagement at city hall." "Bankers and businessmen were losing confidence" in their city, he warned, and only the UDA could restore it.[92]

J. Waddy Tate and the other independents agreed and reminded voters that many who supported the UDA slate had helped put together the ticket that resulted in the Burt administration. Tate claimed that downtown businessmen had handpicked the UDA candidates and complained that those office seekers did not adequately represent the city's diversity. Even worse, according to Tate, many of those who participated in the selection process actually lived in Highland Park, the wealthy suburban community just north of the city (see map 2).[93]

John Erhard, former assistant district attorney, attacked the city's factionalism and also emphasized the unrepresentative nature of the UDA and the GDA in explaining why he supported the independent candidates: "Dallas is now dominated by cliques, represented in two slates with the only hope of the people to break their alliances resting on the election of independent candidates." Many voters must have agreed, for the April 23rd runoff election saw more than 20,000 voters elect three independent candidates to the commission, including J. Waddy Tate, in what the *News* called "the most hectic city campaign in the history of Dallas."[94]

Tate defeated Morrow decisively (12,069 to 8,557) while independent candidates R. A. Wylie and W. C. Graves also won. The fifth commissioner's seat went to GDA candidate John Fouts. Tate beat out his rival thanks to his strong showing in the Oak Cliff and South Dallas precincts. In some ways, the 1929 election proved to be a high-water mark for Oak Cliff, as four of the five commissioners lived in that area west of the Trinity River.[95]

Soon after Tate took office, it became apparent that he did not consider council-manager government a high priority, even though he had promised

during the campaign to submit the matter to the public if elected. Tate, who strongly disliked the inclusion of Highland Park residents on the charter committee, demanded that they resign. When they refused, he introduced a bill that would require all city workers, including nonpaid board and committee members to reside in Dallas. Such a bill, the mayor observed, would "keep those Highland Park birds from roosting on the city hall." The commission voted down the mayor's proposal 4 to 1, but passed another proposal for him several days later that exempted nonpaid board members. Had the original proposal passed, Tate would have successfully disrupted the charter commission and delayed its final report. During this time Tate reiterated his promise to submit the council-manager plan to the voters but indicated that he would offer an alternative form of government so the people could have a choice.[96]

When the committee finished its draft of the charter on October 16, Tate balked at its recommendation to hold an election on the new charter scheduled for December 17, 1929. He argued that only the city commission, rather than the charter committee, could call the election, despite the claims to the contrary by charter supporters. He also promised to veto such a proposal if the commission ever passed it, claiming, "Nobody but residents of Highland Park want the city manager plan." Later he modified this position and suggested that the "public utilities [were] behind the city manager idea."[97]

The *Dallas Morning News* and other local newspapers had a different idea, however. The *News* applauded the proposed charter and its attempt "to apply to the business of government in Dallas the same principles of capable management as are employed in the government of the nation's largest business enterprises." Particularly attractive was the plan's ability to centralize responsibility and eliminate "the element of 'buck passing' in city administration." Furthermore, according to the *News,* "It makes the council responsible to the people in a larger degree than the present commissioners are responsible, for it provides for district representation so that every section of the city will have a voice in the council." As a result, the new charter offered a "more representative type of government" while at the same time insuring "the attainment of greater efficiency and responsiveness in its administration."[98] The Citizens Charter Association (CCA) agreed and also stressed the ways the new governmental structure would bring greater efficiency and more responsiveness to the public.[99]

The charter movement did suffer a setback when the city's legal department ruled that the charter committee had no right to call an election. Under state law, Dallas citizens, not the mayor, should have selected the committee.

As it now stood, the mayor's committee only exercised advisory powers and could not schedule an election.[100] In response to this ruling, the commission voted 4 to 1 on November 4, 1929, to call its own referendum on council-manager government. Despite widescale support by the city's newspapers, and notwithstanding the apparent inability to sustain his veto, Tate held his ground and vetoed the proposal to accept the charter committee's report, a necessary first step to holding a December referendum on the matter. He criticized the report for not reviewing the problems in city manager–governed cities, and for neglecting to discuss the origins of the movement or adequately justify why Dallas needed it. He also complained that the committee never consulted with the mayor or the commission and "was submitted as the finished product of an autocratic body, responsible neither to the governing authorities of the city nor to the people." Finally, Tate pointed out that the proposed charter had four elements that the assistant city attorney, A. A. Long, found unconstitutional.[101]

Mayor Tate especially disliked the document's origin. The movement for charter revision did not originate from the people, the mayor observed. "They have known nothing about it, nor could until the lone voice of Louis P. Head came crying through the wilderness." He concluded his veto address by warning that "radical departure in form of government must be undertaken with grave caution," and warned Dallasites that "efficiency is gained in proportion to the disassociation of government from popular control."[102]

Since Tate's veto delayed any action on the bill for seven days, supporters of the charter worked to modify portions of the charter that conflicted with state law. After some delay, the commission overrode Tate's veto and scheduled the vote for a new charter for January 28, 1930. But acting city attorney A. A. Long thwarted this action when he refused to approve the revised city charter in December, arguing that state law required a popularly elected charter committee to author the new charter. Such a ruling made it impossible to hold a January election and threatened to postpone approval of the charter for some time.[103]

In late February, when the city commission attempted to get around the popular election of a charter committee by proposing the revised charter as a series of amendments rather than a new charter, the mayor again vetoed the bill. In this veto message, Tate not only attacked council-manager government, but criticized the coarse attempt to secure the new charter through an amendment process—a process that he correctly observed was "against the spirit of the law." Indeed, such action, according to the mayor, "was born of an utter ignorance of or disregard for fundamental safeguards of demo-

cratic government." He also accused the newspapers of a biased and "vicious" attack on the city commission form of government and railed against the city charter committee and its call for a new city manager charter.[104]

The commissioners sustained the mayor's veto when Bill Graves, police and fire commissioner, reversed his earlier position and sided with Tate. After some reflection, Graves concluded that "the city manager plan is theoretically wrong and unsound from two opposite viewpoints. If the manager can not be interfered with he becomes a dictator . . . and if he is controlled by council in administering the affairs of the city he becomes a mere figurehead, his job and his enormous salary are useless." The People's City Charter Club, a group opposed to council-manager government, endorsed Graves's controversial action and held a rally in the city auditorium the day the commissioner made his announcement. The group passed resolutions praising Graves for his stand and condemned the newspapers for their uncritical endorsement of council-manager government. Some supporters of Graves, like Lanz Miller, smelled conspiracy. "There is a coterie of men connected with the Chamber of Commerce and the Real Estate Board and in conjunction with some men on the Ulrickson committee who have so manipulated and managed affairs that they have profited personally enormously without regard to the general welfare of the city."[105]

Unwilling to concede defeat, the CCA started a petition campaign to place the proposed charter on the ballot as a series of amendments. That action, which required the signatures of 10 percent of the city's eligible voters, proved successful and resulted in a special election scheduled for October 10, 1930, over whether or not to ratify the thirty-nine amendments that would create council-manager government.[106]

The CCA, headed by Hugh Grady and Louis Head, launched its formal campaign for those charter amendments on September 15, 1930, mailing pamphlets of the new charter to the city's 49,797 qualified voters. The CCA also employed John Erhard, the young lawyer active in Tate's campaign, to run the amendment effort. The CCA established a separate organization for Oak Cliff and appointed a banker from that area to head it.[107] Lenore Hall, a prominent clubwoman, chaired a woman's committee that organized Dallas females along precinct lines. Indeed, the CCA, acknowledging the organizational effectiveness of the city's clubwomen, made a special appeal to women for help and relied heavily on them to secure passage of the city manager referendum.[108] In addition to the CCA's attempt to rally women's support, its "flying squadron of speakers" visited every industrial plant and large commercial firm in the city and gave fifteen-minute talks on the advantages of the new charter amendments. The plants did not give the same privi-

lege to charter opponents.[109] Supporters also held neighborhood meetings throughout the city as well as several large rallies.

The CCA sought and secured a variety of endorsements for the charter amendments. All of the city's papers supported the reforms and so did the Dallas Chamber of Commerce. The Junior Chamber of Commerce not only endorsed the charter revisions but actively worked for them. The Dallas Advertising League's journal, *OKed Copy,* broke its own rule about taking partisan stands and recommended the charter amendments, explaining that this was a "business . . . not a political issue."[110]

The campaign continued to emphasize how the council-manager structure would promote a more businesslike (and efficient) government. A *News* editorial promised that it would take "the business of running the city out of politics as far as possible." This was good, according to the paper, because "politics has no proper place in the enterprise at all."[111] Other civic leaders seconded the *News*'s editorial and provided additional reasons for council-manager government.

Mattie A. Slater, a leading Dallas clubwoman, backed the change because "business and professions require specialists now, and certainly city government requires the direction of a specialist." Hugh Grady agreed but also pointed out that by making council a part-time job, "men and women in this town who would make good members of the council but who can not afford to go there and spend all their time" will be able to serve "as you do on the school board." It appears that Grady believed that the city manager and his professional staff would do the hard work and present council with legislation that they could accept or reject. Unlike the commissioners who were full-time, city council would make laws but pass administration of them to the city manager.[112]

Advocates of council-manager government made special appeals to the working classes. First, they argued that the council system would promote wider and more direct representation at city hall because each section of Dallas would have "a voice in the shaping of policies and on their execution." Time and time again the theme that the charter was "endeavoring to widen representation by placing nine men on council" appeared. Campaign manager John A. Erhard promised that the new government could amply respond to the city's pluralistic nature. "We can not build one-sided cities," Erhard observed. "We can not build cities at all unless we take into consideration the needs of all kinds of classes of people."[113]

The day before the election, a *News* editorial probably best reflected why the city's boosters supported city manager government so strongly. "Dallas is now at the parting of the ways," the editorial observed. "It can remain in

the small class or go up into the big city class. The Kessler Plan, the Ulrickson Plan, Industrial Dallas, Inc., the Levee District, the Trinity Canal Association, the City Manager Plan—all are part and parcel of one great program for making Dallas bigger, better and busier than ever before." Support of the city manager plan was critical to this growth program.[114]

The opposition, lacking the money or organization of the charter supporters, waged a limited contest. James L. Lantz, Mayor Tate's secretary, seemed a major player against the amendments. Opponents pitched their campaign particularly to city employees. For instance, a circular with the headlines "Save Our City From Bondage and Despotism" appeared in city hall on the eve of the election. The pamphlet argued that many city-hall workers would lose their jobs with the adoption of the new charter amendments and also predicted that the civil service commission, the subject of one of the proposed amendments, would be a costly burden to the city.[115]

Only 13,179 of the 49,797 eligible voters turned out for the election, but those supporting the amendments won by a 2 to 1 margin (8,962 to 4,217). Most of the eighteen precincts that voted against the city manager plan were located in South or Southeast Dallas. Many of the city's poorer working classes lived in this area and remained suspicious of businesslike government and structure that centralized power in Dallas and made it harder for working people to get elected to council. Voters in North and Northeast Dallas and in Oak Lawn gave the amendments tremendous support (10 to 1 in favor). Much of Oak Cliff supported the city manager plan, too.[116]

The adoption of the council-manager government joined the Ulrickson program and comprehensive zoning as a solution to the problem of the city as defined in the 1920s. Seeing Dallas as a complexly interconnected system in dire need of coordinated and efficient government, civic leaders turned to a council-manager government that would put administration under the control of a professional, but leave the legislative function to citizens elected at large. Just as early planning and zoning practices, with their focus on discrete problems, had failed to address the city in a truly comprehensive fashion before the 1920s, so too did the government organized functionally as the commission government. This government structure proved unable to provide a strong executive to coordinate and administer government effectively and comprehensively. But the fight for better-coordinated government did not end with the charter amendments. Charter promoters created a permanent organization to guarantee that the new government worked the right way. And that organization turned to politics and controversy to secure its goals.

□ 3

The CCA in Control: The Edy Years, 1931–1935

One week after the approval of the charter amendments, leaders of the Citizens Charter Association (CCA) announced that they would work for the election in April of the best men to operate the new government. Under their direction city manager government took shape, one very different from earlier Dallas governments, and one that clearly demonstrated the new vision that the civic leaders had embraced in the 1920s. Although supporters of council-manager government placed great importance on nonpartisan and efficient government, the amendments' attention to coordination and its creation of a governmental structure seemingly able to look after the interests of the city as a whole proved a particularly important innovation. According to a report by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council published in 1939, the Dallas commissioners had lacked adequate prestige "to be independent of the demands of minority interests or pressure groups." In addition, the report continued, "the commissioners' concentration of interest on single departments enabled them to grant special favors or exert political power." Moreover, there was really no one "whose function was to prepare or recommend a program of policy that gave impartial consideration to the needs of all departments." As a result, the researchers concluded, such conditions permitted "minority interests to control municipal politics." According to the report, council-manager structure changed all that, giving Dallas a government that "put into effect the will of the majority and did not try to build up political support by favoring special interests."[1]

The charter amendments also discouraged the traditional role of political parties by refusing to allow party designations on the ballot and by forbidding primary elections to select candidates. Rather, they required council

hopefuls to secure 300 qualified voter signatures on a petition and file it with the city secretary at least one month before the election.[2] The Committee on Public Administration reported that "politics" was "a word with completely objectionable meaning to the city's civic leaders." That word, according to the committee, meant "patronage and selfish intrigue of those who lived on the public payroll and therefore considered hindrances to community development."[3]

CCA leaders not only changed the charter to avoid politics, they also named a nine-member executive committee to help select candidates and secure their election. Three active clubwomen, Grace Fitzgerald, Lenore Hall, and Adella Kelsey Turner, served on the committee. John Erhard, who had guided the charter amendments to victory, managed the CCA campaign.

The CCA selected a slate of businessmen for council. It included Arthur Moore, president of Cox-Moore Drug Company in Oak Cliff. Moore, a candidate for District A in Oak Cliff, was born in Comanche, Texas, in 1890. He came to Dallas at the age of thirty-one to join the Cox-Moore Drug Company. Moore served as a director of the Oak Cliff–Dallas Commercial Association and participated in city beautification projects and highway planning.[4]

H. C. Burroughs, candidate for District B in Oak Cliff, arrived in the city in 1918. Another native Texan, he was born in Merkel, Texas, in 1894. Burroughs owned the Marsailes and Boundary dry goods stores and also served on the Oak Cliff–Dallas Commercial Association's board of directors, in addition to presiding over the Oak Cliff Kiwanis Club.

Victor H. Hexter, a native of Baltimore, Maryland, journeyed to Dallas in 1888. This candidate for District C, South Dallas, headed the board of education in 1908 and currently chaired the city's zoning board of appeal. Hexter practiced law and served as vice president of the Union Title and Guaranty Company. Active in civic affairs, Hexter also sat on the governing board of the Jewish Federation of Social Services.

W. H. Painter, another CCA candidate, ran for the District D council seat for East Dallas. Born in east Tennessee, Painter moved to Dallas at age nineteen and became assistant secretary of the Texas Electric Railway Company. In addition, he assumed the job of secretary in two other business institutions, the Dallas Security Company and the United Fidelity Life Insurance Company.

The CCA's candidate for District E in northeast Dallas, E. R. Brown, arrived in Dallas in 1914. Born in Little Hocking, Ohio, in 1868, he pursued a successful career in oil that culminated in his selection as president of the Magnolia Petroleum Company. By the time of his nomination, the former

president of both the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and the Community Chest was one of the city's most prominent citizens.

T. M. Cullum, the CCA's choice for District F in North Dallas, had lived in the city longer than any other candidate. Born in 1871 near Covington, Tennessee, Cullum's parents brought him to Dallas a year later because his father had been invited to pastor the Oak Lawn Methodist Church. Cullum first went to work for a grocery store but later started a sporting goods firm in 1901. That company, Cullum and Boren, grew to be one of the largest stores in the Southwest. Cullum also presided over the chamber of commerce and the community chest before his selection by the CCA to run for office.

Charles E. Turner, born in nearby Richardson, Texas, in 1886, lived in Oak Cliff when the city annexed that community in 1903. After working for a wholesale drug firm, he entered the real estate profession in 1914 and became a charter member of the Dallas Real Estate Board. His public service included tenure on the City Plan Commission (CPC) and on the appraisal board of business and industrial properties.

Joe. C. Thompson, secretary-treasurer of the Southland Ice Company, ran as a CCA candidate-at-large. Born in Waxahachie, Texas, in 1900, he graduated from Oak Cliff High School in 1922. Thompson served as past president of the Oak Cliff–Dallas Commercial Association and as director of the Oak Cliff Bank and Trust Company.

The final CCA candidate, Tom L. Bradford, was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1887. Active in Dallas public life since 1904, Bradford served as alderman before adoption of the city commission form of government. Not only had he participated in the commission government movement, but he gave the city the Bradford Memorial Hospital for Children. By the time he ran for council, Bradford chaired the board of the Southwestern Life Insurance Company.

The collective profile suggests that these were well-established, respectable citizens who as a group maintained a reputation and achievements superior to earlier council slates. Five of the nine were Masons in a city where Masonry appeared important and powerful. Of the six council candidates whose religious preferences could be determined, three were Methodists, one a Baptist, another a Presbyterian, and a sixth Jewish. Although none had been born in Dallas, they all had made their fortunes in the city as Big D grew from a town to a city. Such an experience surely shaped their attitudes and sense of priorities about Dallas's needs.

The CCA started its campaign on March 31, 1931. CCA leaders relied heavily on the city's clubwomen to promote their ticket, just as they had in

order to secure the charter amendments. In one of the strangest campaigns in the city's history, the CCA refused to write a platform, asserting that the quality of the men on the ticket "constituted a sufficient guarantee that they would give the city the best government possible under the conditions." In addition to no platform, the good government group forbade its candidates to speak—rather, it held rallies in different sections of the city to garner support. Speeches and platforms, according to the CCA, smacked of politics, something that group wished to avoid. The strongly supportive *Dallas Morning News* applauded such actions and reminded readers, "When you elect these men you will send to the city hall a council no one of whose members is beholden to any man or group of men, none of whom has made a single promise, not a single speech, but whose own standing in the community, whose personal integrity constitutes the platform." Hugh Grady, charter supporter, called the CCA candidates "the freest group of men ever offered in Dallas." Grace Fitzgerald predicted that instead of being swayed by partisan or neighborhood concerns, they would "be influenced only by the best interests of Dallas as a whole."[5]

Whether it was the CCA's strategy or the willingness of potential opponents to give the experiment in good government a chance, no opposition tickets appeared to run against the CCA candidates. John J. Kettle, chair of the Dallas County Republicans, announced his party's decision not to adopt a slate of opponents because the present campaign is "one where politics should be forgotten and civic spirit manifested in putting this exceptional ticket into office." The *News* explained the community's support for the CCA candidates by observing that "Dallas has had quarreling and divided leadership for some time and needs to get back to team work and constructive peace." The new council promised to lead the way.[6]

Although six independents challenged the good government slate, CCA candidates swamped the opposition in what the *News* called a "majority that almost reached unanimity." No opponent polled more than 1,202 votes, while the CCA winners received from between 8,655 to 10,097 votes. Only one of the fifty-nine precincts voted against the CCA candidates.[7]

Meeting one day after the election at the Baker Hotel, the newly elected council selected Tom L. Bradford as mayor. After looking at eight to ten other men including T. W. Ballard, C. A. Harrell, and C. E. Schultz, council agreed to hire John N. Edy as its first city manager. The forty-eight-year-old Edy, born in Missouri, received a degree in civil engineering from the University of Missouri in 1909. Although he worked ten years in railroad construction, Edy spent much of his life in public service, starting as an assistant street engineer in St. Louis. He also held the job of county engineer in Mis-

souri and Montana and served as chief engineer and managing executive of the Montana State Highway Department from 1919 to 1923. He left Montana to become Berkeley, California's first city manager. While at Berkeley, he also took a master's in political science and became president of the International Association of City Managers. In 1929, Edy accepted the city manager's post in Flint, Michigan, only to lose his job when an anti–city manager group won election in 1931. Dallas, then, secured an experienced and accomplished city manager. The 5'8" Edy, described by the *News* as "genial, affable and a good public speaker," accepted the job on April 17, after council agreed to let him have a free hand in suppressing vice and granted him sufficient budgetary control to force Dallas to live within its income. It paid him a very substantial salary of $16,500 to manage Dallas.[8] Edy brought new methods to city hall and achieved much of the centralization and efficiency that civic leaders wanted to see in their city government.

Under Edy's leadership, council-manager government fostered a coordination of government unprecedented in the city's history.[9] Changes in the budgetary procedures, including the development of a budget office with financial control, both centralized and coordinated expenditures. Unlike the commission form of government, where each commissioner fought for allocations for his department, and often traded votes for budgetary favors, council had no particular incentive to protect specific departments. Even more important, the city manager "brought all expenditures of the city together in one place and considered them as a whole."[10] The procedure won praise from an independent auditor who wrote that the administration of the city's finances were on par with "the best municipal governments any where in the country."[11] It also reflected the emphasis on governing the city as a whole.

Not only did Edy try to coordinate the city's finances in a better way, but he also did the same for the staff. The city manager held biweekly meetings, primarily to inform department heads of what others were doing. This simple act, according to Stone, for the first time in Dallas's history brought department heads together "to attack problems concertedly." Indeed, Edy spent much of his time conferring with his staff and coordinating activities. He also met with department employees to coordinate their work with other department employees.[12] Because the city now had an overall administrator, Dallas benefited from budgetary planning for the first time. Administrators drew up a five-year forecast of both operating and capital budgets, with detailed plans for departments, equipment, and other city needs.[13] The city manager required even those independent officers, boards, and commissions not under the manager to submit budgets for inclusion in a

consolidated document. As a result, all budgetary needs of the city, according to a Social Science Research Council report, "could be considered as a whole.[14]

Edy mandated monthly reports from departments to keep him further informed and allow him to accommodate the whole. He particularly wanted to evaluate the physical work and accomplishment of each department. Finally, the city manager instituted systematic procedures to allow uniform practices in the city—from answering citizens' questions to buying materials and supplies.[15]

Changes in administrative format reflected a new notion of the city that had helped shape the Ulrickson program too. Both council-manager government and the Ulrickson program treated the city as something greater than the sum of its parts, inextricably linked and demanding treatment as a whole. As a result, both emphasized coordination of all parts and both planned for the future. Just as the Ulrickson program anticipated the future physical needs of the city after careful study of the whole, the council-manager government developed planning tools to anticipate future city needs. For instance, officials instituted performance records to chart the direction in which costs and worker productivity were moving.[16]

The new administrative procedures also helped make government more efficient. Now Dallas had at the helm an officer focused on serving the city as a whole. Inefficiency often stemmed from officials' pursuing personal agendas that neglected the larger city. Eliminating the politics associated with commission government, the city manager attempted to stop such activity and save Dallas money. In addition to halting personal politics, "The central executive made possible coordination of the employees, reducing delays and increasing production," according to the Committee on Public Administration.[17]

Not only did the newly elected slate pledge a nonpartisan approach to government, but the new charter amendments promoted that ideal as well. They discouraged professional politicians from seeking city council seats by paying council members only $20 per council meeting and no more than $1,040 per annum. In addition, the charter stated that the city manager, the city's chief administrative and executive officer, should be selected solely on "his executive and administrative training experience and ability, and *without regard to political consideration* [italics mine]." Along the same lines, the amended charter warned that "neither the Council nor any of its committees or members shall dictate the appointment" of the city manager's choices. The revised charter also provided for a three-member civil service board to select and promote other city workers on the basis of "merit, efficiency, character and industry" rather than political influence.[18]

Council itself changed as a result of charter reform and the influence of the CCA. First, the new council, composed of prestigious businessmen and professionals, saw their entry into government as a service rather than a career, and did not, according to the report, seek to reward their friends with petty favors and special services as the commissioners had. The new at-large council structure also encouraged that body to treat all areas of the city equally, since each council member had a citywide constituency. Unlike earlier legislative bodies that had acted through committees, the council under the new charter, according to the 1939 Social Science Committee report, "dealt with the whole policy of the city, acting collectively." Council formed special committees rarely and depended heavily on a civil service–protected administrative staff that could "produce on short notice information relating to all the departments without favoring or neglecting the interests of any of them." In addition, council members had access to the city manager and his staff. Executive meetings with the manager before council sessions gave council members the opportunity to hear about the city's needs in a "systematic and thorough manner." As a result of these developments, the Social Science Committee concluded, "For the first time the affairs of the city were determined by a deliberative body that considered municipal policy as a whole in relation to the needs of the city as a whole rather than in relation to the needs of individual administrative departments or minority pressure groups."[19]

When the innovative charter amendments took affect on May 1, 1930, they brought a new comprehensive approach to Dallas city government. The changes clearly reflected a different idea not only about urban administration but about the city as a system. Administrative reforms also bore results that endeared this government to a cost- and health-conscious middle class. During its first nineteen months, the CAA-headed government cut costs by $980,000, doubling garbage collection in all sections of the city while spending less money doing so. In addition, it eliminated a $450,000 overdraft in the water department and reduced water rates. Edy, with the help of Jay W. Stevens, fire marshal of California, reorganized the fire department. He did the same for the health department, and saw the American Public Health Association recognize his efforts by giving the city a good health rating. Because of the actions of the health department, the city's milk rating improved from 57 percent to 95 percent. The city manager also established a new central purchasing office that would better coordinate and control city purchases.[20]

Changes in the police department best exemplify the new emphasis on efficiency from the city manager. According to one observer, the police department had for a long time been viewed as a "sinecure of camp

followers," and had to deal consistently with outside interference. Under the new government, according to T. R. Garretson, that all changed. Although he retained the police chief, Claude Trammel, Edy brought in outside help to better organize the department. O. W. Wilson, police chief of Wichita, analyzed the department and suggested ways to improve it. In response to his advice, city officials developed professional standards and required policemen to attend training school. Under city manager government, officials promoted policemen based on ability rather than political pull. The city also equipped police cars with radios and established thirteen patrol districts. "For the first time in the history of Dallas," Captain Garretson reported, "the entire city is receiving a share of protection." And that occurred despite the fact that Edy trimmed the police force by forty-eight men. [21]

Indeed, Edy discharged 10 percent of all city employees, including forty from the water department and twenty from the health department, claiming the latter had become a "dumping ground" for politicians or their friends who could not find positions in other departments.[22] Edy justified his action by reminding citizens that efficient government meant clearing "the chiseling politicians and loafers from the corridors of the city hall." Working under assurances from council that he had complete authority over all employees, Edy dismissed the head of the health department, a political henchmen of former mayor Tate, and demoted the city's popular engineer.[23] The firings had a positive impact on the budget. During the first two years of its existence, council-manager government spent $357,000 less than the city's income, even after it quadrupled welfare department expenditures. Finally, council-manager government negotiated a reduction in power and light rates, and reduced real estate taxes by 15 percent.[24]

Edy, according to one observer, also instilled discipline in city departments—something unknown previously. Even more important, according to the same observer, Edy had made changes at city hall "that should have been made 20 years ago and has made them without fear or favor. This is something that no citizen of Dallas could or would have done for fear of political reprisal."[25] A political scientist from outside Dallas came to a similar conclusion in 1938 when he wrote that Edy "eliminated time-honored procedures and modernized the organization and services of the city government."[26]

Along with his efforts to bring greater efficiency to city government, Edy increased efforts to suppress vice in this Bible-belt city. He enforced regulations against gambling, prostitution, and illegal sale of liquor more consistently than before. Under orders from the city manager, the chief of police broke the bond between gamblers and the police, and suspended those offi-

cers who took payoffs and refused to cooperate with the new enforcement effort. The increased crackdown on vice ruffled enough feathers that patrolmen were assigned to protect the city manager's residence both day and night.[27]

Others opposed Edy because of his large-scale dismissals of city workers and the new emphasis on discipline, hard work, and accountability. The stringent measures had a chilling effect on worker morale. In a letter to Carl Callaway, new head of the CCA, a city employee claimed that 90 percent of the city employees were "very bitter in . . . the way the affairs of the city are being run under the present form of government."[28] Businessmen used to bursting into the mayor's office with suggestions and small talk were also taken aback by the city manager's demand for appointments.

As a result, despite the intent of its founders, the council-manager government became embroiled in "politics," with the actions of the city manager the center of controversy. In January 1933, it became clear that tickets supported by disgruntled citizens would oppose the CCA slate and that those anticharter efforts would make Edy a campaign issue. The most vocal opposition came from former city employees and politicians who had lost their jobs and influence under the new government. The *Dallas Dispatch* observed that at one early political meeting called by an opposition group, forty-eight discharged policemen attended, as well as the former health officer and a former assistant district attorney.[29]

The most formidable challenger emerging at this time appeared to be the Home Government Association (HGA). The core of that party seemed to include four civic organizations from South and Southwest Dallas. J. Elliot chaired its executive committee, which also included W. A. Riley, John G. Brubak, Bertha Swarthrort, and P. L. A. Jeffers.[30] This group not only criticized Edy's high salary but accused the city manager of being self-centered. Spokesmen for the HGA argued that Dallas should be managed by a Dallasite and not some outsider. "Back in the '60's," HGA supporter Judge George Burgess recalled, "my grandfather stood in the city of Richmond and saw Federal troops enter. Some time later he had to take a bomb and run the carpetbaggers out of Virginia. At the same time," he continued, "those who proceeded us in Texas were attempting to run the carpetbaggers out of Texas. We stand here tonight, my friends, in the same situation. It is the intention of the National [*sic*] City Managers Association to dominate the affairs of every principal city of this country. Mr. Edy has spent a great deal of his time since he has been in Dallas attending to the affairs of the City Manager Association." Reflecting the suspicion of other Dallasites, the judge concluded, "Government should come from the people and should rest in

the people. I don't want government from above; I want government from below. The only safe government is that which lies within easy reach of the people. If we do not have that we have tyranny. If this National [*sic*] City Managers Association is going to tell our council what to do I don't want any of this government. What I want is a council who will direct the City Manager [on] what to do and if that council will not tell him what to do, we will tell the council what to do."[31]

The dismissal of John Edy and his replacement by a Dallas man became one of the main planks of the HGA's platform. According to the plank, Edy should be fired "because of his temperamental unfitness for the position, because he had destroyed the morale of the municipal employees, because of his selfishness in insisting on the maintenance of his own salary of $16,500 . . . . while repeatedly cutting those of the rank and file." The platform also attacked the city manager for his "dictatorial attitude toward the general public" and for his neglect of "the forgotten man while safeguarding the vested interests."[32] The HGA slate included three Oak Cliff residents, a South Dallas investor, and the president of the Labor Council.[33]

Unhappiness with Edy's war on vice apparently helps explain the HGA's formation. According to CCA president Carl Callaway, members of the HGA strongly opposed the city manager's strict law enforcement efforts. Callaway claimed that in July of 1933 a businessman visited him with a threat that Police Chief Trammel should ease up on his effort against organized gambling or some "big" businessmen would create an opposition council slate in the upcoming election. When Callaway refused to pressure the CCA-dominated council to respond to this request, the HGA appeared.[34]

Other Dallas citizens formed the Progressive Voters League (PVL) and ran candidates against the CCA. This organization also made Edy a central campaign issue. It accused him of "oversupervision of departments" and promised to replace the city manager if elected with someone "who is imbued with the Dallas spirit, breathes the Dallas atmosphere; someone who is in sympathy with our aspirations and has respect for our traditions." PVL councilmen would "melt the iceberg at Main and Commerce and Harwood and introduce the human element into the municipal government."[35]

In addition to these two opposition slates, the Socialists ran seven candidates, and former mayor J. Waddy Tate and two others sought office as independents. Despite the crowded field of thirty-seven candidates, and despite the lack of endorsement by the *Dallas Morning News*, the CCA slate of eight incumbents and one newcomer won office without a runoff. The *News*'s defection from the CCA ticket resulted from Dealey's anger over the city man-

ager's response to the levee district controversy, an issue that would continue to thwart the CCA's efforts to promote a new sense of consensus and unity in the city.[36]

The CCA-controlled city government had inherited the controversial and unresolved issue about where the city's drainage sewer bonds, approved as part of the 1927 Ulrickson bond program, should be spent. As part of the agreement with the Levee Improvement District, the city had promised to provide $375,000 for protection of that area from excess drainage. Under this arrangement, city officials consented to build a pressure sewer main, the Pacific Avenue and Dallas branch, to keep the water of Mill Creek, east of City Park, from flowing into the reclaimed land. The city also pledged $175,000 for taking care of water accumulating in the hydraulic fill area of the reclaimed area. Finally, it agreed to control the flood waters of the Kids Springs and Coombs Creek branch.[37] Tensions developed when the levee district demanded the city act immediately on all of these commitments despite serious drainage needs found in some city neighborhoods.

The Great Depression also caused problems. There had been grumbling about the city's role in the reclamation program since 1927, but a full-scale revolt broke out in 1930 as the Depression started to affect the city adversely. When Mayor Tate announced the tentative budget for Dallas that year and predicted that the city would have to raise taxes to pay for the debt service needed to complete a $1.1 million pressure sewer for the reclamation area, strong opposition developed. Protesters complained that government should be committed to retrenchment rather than a tax increase. Levee supporters rallied to the mayor's defense and emphasized how important the city's drainage program was to the reclamation program's successful completion. After meeting with the levee district supervisors, Tate publicly reaffirmed his commitment to sell the bonds and raise taxes to service them.

The mayor's decision to support the tax increase set off a protest movement that helped delay completion of the levee project for more than fifteen years. A June 7th meeting drew a crowd of between 800 and 1000 protesters against the tax, including downtown theater owner Karl Hoblitzelle and Kessler Plan Association (KPA) president Dr. E. H. Cary. They applauded Rosser J. Coke, who charged that the reclamation project, a private undertaking, deserved no public moneys. The protesters also created a committee to fight the tax increase and included Hoblitzelle and Cary in it. When John J. Simmons attempted to explain why the district needed the money immediately, the crowd walked out on him.[38]

The insistence that more money be spent on the district irritated those who remembered that the $3.5 million drainage bond had been passed for

the city as a whole. The city suffered from horrible drainage problems and neighborhoods that flooded badly during rainy season, including the fashionable Munger Place on the city's east side. In poorer sections, flood waters got so high that several residents had drowned.[39] The protesters wondered why the city had designated the first bonds to protect the unpopulated levee district rather than the built-up sections of the city. Attorney J. Hart Willis asked when sewers would be provided for "those of us who live on Turtle Creek Boulevard in East Dallas and in other parts of the city [who] have suffered for years from flooding."[40]

In order to counter the charges of selfish interest, levee district supervisors volunteered to provide the city with two gifts of land from the reclaimed Trinity River bottoms. First, they offered 3,300 acres between the levees and the river for a city park. Proposing that this could be the Central Park of Dallas, a levee district spokesman detailed how valuable such a park would be for the city's downtown workers. He also promised generous acreage for the city to develop a new airport next to the central business district. Dallas officials declined both offers, citing the high costs of upkeep involved in maintaining the district's presents.[41]

The levee district's actions had little impact on softening the charge of special interest from some critics. For instance, in an editorial entitled "Will the Taxpayers be Bluffed?" the *Dallas Times Herald* pointed out that the Ulrickson Committee had recommended that Dallas spend no sewer money until consulting engineers developed a citywide plan. Others, such as Dr. E. H. Cary, Karl Hoblitzelle, and KPA secretary John Surratt, also took up this theme and petitioned the city commissioners to consider all parts of the Ulrickson Plan, and work to be "done in all sections of Dallas." The immediate crisis passed in regard to the proposed tax hike, as the mayor and commissioners decided to fund service on the bonds through cutbacks in the city government. But the controversy over the propriety of providing bond money immediately to the levee district did not.[42]

Several days after the commissioners' decision to sell the Ulrickson bonds for that year, Hoblitzelle, Surratt, and businessman Tom Bradford (who would eventually serve as mayor) met with others and formed the Dallas City and County Taxpayers League. That organization called for the "coordinated development of Dallas" and stated that "we are not fighting development of the levee district but are opposing the efforts to place that undertaking paramount to other sections of Dallas."[43] Many associated with the KPA, which had campaigned for the levee/reclamation plan as part of a broader, comprehensive package of improvements, now argued that city of-

ficials had unfairly singled out the levee/reclamation program for special attention while they ignored populated areas in South and East Dallas in desperate need of drainage sewers. According to this view, advocates of the levee seemed willing to sacrifice the needs of the larger city for their own special interests.

Supporters of the levee/reclamation project viewed the situation differently and countered that their undertaking benefited the city as a whole. W. L. Prehn, general manager of Southwestern Bell Telephone, took such a stance when he reminded Dallasites that the levee/reclamation project included five new viaducts that would better connect Oak Cliff to the rest of the city, helping to bind "these two sections together," Prehn contended, so "as to eliminate any sectional or factional feeling." J. L. Lancaster, president of the Texas & Pacific Railroad, also supported the levee/reclamation project and concluded that the "reclamation project is the most important development in the city since its founding."[44] George Dealey, the city's leading planning advocate, threw the weight of the *News* behind the levee/reclamation project and lobbied incessantly with city officials on behalf of the project.[45]

Bad feelings about the reclamation/levee project polarized the city. One side viewed the excessive preoccupation with it as damaging to the development of the rest of Dallas, while levee supporters believed the project would accelerate the development of the entire city and accused levee opponents of harboring their own selfish agendas. Close friends and business associates split and "bitter and irreconcilable enmities developed" between longtime companions. The city's Critic Club, a forum where civic leaders discussed important civic issues, also suffered greatly from these tensions.[46]

Hoblitzelle, Cary, and Surratt joined with Finance Commissioner John C. Harris to demand that the city develop a comprehensive plan for its drainage sewer system before spending more money on piecemeal development. The Citizen Committee on Supervision of Expenditures of the Ulrickson Committee (CCSE) concurred. As a result, the local commissioners, led by independent-minded mayor J. Waddy Tate, secured an engineer to develop such a plan. But the controversy continued when the commissioners refused to employ an engineer recommended by the KPA and the CCSE, and hired a less-qualified engineer to undertake the survey and plan.[47] In addition, the city announced it would release some money for drainage sewers in the reclamation area before the engineer completed the sewer plan. This infuriated Karl Hoblitzelle, who secured a temporary injunction to halt that action.[48] All this occurred at a time when civic leaders were also trying to

restructure city government. Once the CCA achieved that goal, and saw its slate elected to council in 1931, officials had the levee problem immediately dumped in their laps.[49]

The new city council and City Manager Edy proceeded cautiously but gradually antagonized the impatient levee district supporters. First, Edy named O. H. Koch as public works engineer for the city after his first choice, Major Edward Woods, declined the appointment. Koch had earlier been identified with the group fighting the actions of the levee district group. Next, concerned with getting the best sewer plan possible for the entire city, council employed W. W. Horner to develop a general plan for the drainage of the entire city.[50] Horner, the chief engineer of sewers and paving at St. Louis, replaced the Benham Engineering Company, which had been hired to make the plan by the Tate administration. As we have seen, that had been a particularly controversial hiring, since Benham had little experience and had not been recommended by several leading civic organizations. Indeed, the Benham hiring had struck many as an embarrassment to the city's image. A spokesman for one of the recommended companies that did not get the job blasted the Tate administration as being dominated by "high-grade morons." He also observed that in his thirty years of business he had never "run into a city of the population of Dallas with such a low order of intelligence, integrity and standing of the city officials."[51]

The highly recommended Horner, however, provided first-rate expertise in the matter of drainage sewer systems. His finished plan recommended eight new sewer lines, including one for the reclamation district's hydraulic fill area. He also proposed a sewer system for the reclamation area that would allow the district to close its levee walls, without the city having to build the expensive pressurized sewer for the reclaimed area. The city, then, finally had the comprehensive citywide sewer plan that had been called for by the Ulrickson program. New mayor Charles E. Turner greeted Horner's findings with the comment that the conflict had been resolved. Those wanting a more comprehensive plan and an orderly development of the city's sewers had gotten their wish, while those who had prioritized the reclamation project seemingly secured what they had wanted, a chance to start development in the salvaged Trinity River bottoms. Turner concluded that the plan would "benefit the entire city of Dallas and with the adoption of a definite policy of this sort, serving the entire community, there should be a new unity of thought and effort for the city's development."[52] After council approved Horner's plan, the *Times Herald* editorialized that "the new city council demonstrated that its purpose is to promote the growth of Dallas as a whole, giving each section its fair

sense of bond money. Plainly its object is to prevent factional controversy and bring all groups into a unit in developing Greater Dallas."[53]

The initial response from the levee district also seemed positive.[54] However, Leslie A. Stemmons, bitter over what he saw as a reneging of the deal cut before the Depression, continued to push city officials to give the district everything it had promised in the original agreement immediately. He and other district supporters emphasized that the city had a moral obligation to fulfill its commitment of 1927, even if the Ulrickson report was just a recommendation. But Horner, the developer of the drainage plan, pointed out the injustice of the city's providing thousands of dollars for sewer development in an unpopulated area while much of settled Dallas lacked adequate drainage facilities. KPA secretary John Surratt agreed and concluded that the Ulrickson report neither legally nor morally bound the city.[55]

The Depression's continued impact on the city's budget further complicated matters. Although the Ulrickson report had originally anticipated the selling of $3 million worth of bonds in 1932, Edy cut that to $1.2 because of lessening revenue. This created new tensions between residents from East and South Dallas and the levee district. The KPA, now speaking for those people rather than the west end interests, continued to protest about allotting the bond money to the levee district. Surratt invited officers of various improvement leagues to his office and heard them explain the dire needs of their neighborhoods. South Dallas neighborhoods, for instance, had storm sewers that were constantly overflowing; some backed up to their bathrooms. Surratt agreed that these conditions needed top priority, since Ulrickson bond money was "supposed to take care of all of Dallas, and not just one set of people."[56] The *News,* a vocal advocate of the levee district, responded by observing, "All city planning is based on intelligent self-interest. . . . Coordination is the soul of planning; having withdrawn cooperation, the city has to that extent abandoned city planning."[57]

The demands of the levee district intensified after October 1, 1931, when that body defaulted on its loans.[58] Angered by this development and the city's unwillingness to build the drainage sewer in the reclaimed area immediately, the district backed out of its agreement to the Horner plan, and John J. Simmons, one of the project's leaders, unsuccessfully sued the city for breach of contract.[59] Although Simmons lost the suit, the city finally completed its commitment to the levee district in March 1934 when it advertised for bids for the final sewer commitment it had made. Builders completed the project by March of 1935.[60]

Even though the CCA-supported city council and city manager eventually fulfilled the city's obligations, their cautious and slow effort thoroughly

discredited them among many of the levee supporters. George Dealey remained at odds with John Edy, whom he blamed for the long delay. Although Edy had identified the levee/sewer controversy as a political issue and thus a council matter, Dealey viewed it as an engineering problem, and thought the city manager should handle it.[61] Leslie A. Stemmons, one of the organizers of the levee district as well as one of the city's most powerful men, blasted the city manager and his public works director. According to Stemmons, these men were "so prejudiced against the Levee District that they have declined to make proper investigations about matters submitted to them." Instead, they listened to "unfounded rumors." Stemmons concluded that Edy was "a man of insufficient experience in a city the size of Dallas," as well as a man of "small vision and high prejudices."[62]

It is somewhat ironic that a form of government heavily criticized today for being a stooge of business and downtown interests made a stand for neighborhood services, comprehensive planning, and the city as a whole in regard to the levee controversy.[63] Such support cost the CCA dearly in the next election and demonstrated the impossibility of having "nonpolitical" government. Politics—the method of deciding who gets what, when, and where—consumed the attention of CCA council members and underscored the idea that government had to do more than just promote efficient delivery of services; rather, it had to prioritize that delivery, a matter of great controversy in the levee/reclamation matter.[64] The CCA's cautious handling of the levee/reclamation controversy discredited it before powerful levee supporters and played a critical role in the defeat of that good government organization in 1935. Another event, the state's centennial exposition, would also promote political controversy and raise issues that contributed to the CCA's defeat.

4

The Defeat of the CCA and the Victory of Council-Manager Government

Shortly after its successful city council campaign in 1933, the Citizens Charter Association's president, lawyer Carl B. Callaway, resigned. He followed the precedent established by that organization's initial president, lawyer Hugh Grady, who had quit after the first election victory two years earlier. Callaway recommended that this tradition become part of the CCA's constitution to prevent the organization from becoming "a political machine or ever getting into the hands of a small group of men to use it for political purposes or their own personal ends."[1] Toward this goal, Callaway also requested that the membership designate a twelve-person nominating committee to select future slates of candidates. To guarantee that the CCA would remain truly representative, Callaway suggested that the organization include six vice presidents, one from each of the city's districts. In addition, he wanted to expand the CCA's executive committee to 150 members and have each precinct in the city elect one male and one female to that governing body. Callaway also thought that the CCA should welcome "at all times representatives of any group or any section of our city or any class of our people who are not already properly represented on the committee."[2]

The retiring president also believed that the CCA's executive committee should function between elections rather than just during city council campaigns. According to Callaway, such a committee could work "diligently for the interests of all our people" and provide a contact between the mass of citizens and elected representatives. He wanted the CCA to hold semiannual meetings to allow council to report to the membership. Finally, Callaway suggested that the group create a standing fifteen-member committee to act as a contact body between membership and city council.[3] Callaway, then, proposed to create a different type of organization than that which had

initially been devised. Originally, reformers had established this good government group to secure the council-manager charter amendments. Then they worked to make sure the "right type of men" got elected in the first political contest under the new charter. Callaway proposed a more permanent organization to promote good citizenship as well as good government. If Dallas citizens could be educated to be good citizens—willing to support citywide needs—then the charter association would see its candidates elected on a regular basis. Good government reformers in Dallas clearly supported citizen participation as long as it was on their own terms. Although not all of Callaway's suggestions were heeded, he clearly articulated a vision that seemed consistent with an emphasis on the needs of the city as a whole.

Despite some organizational innovations, the CCA faced tough competition for council in 1935. Dallas, like municipalities elsewhere, suffered from the Great Depression. Although its diversified economy spared it from the worst effects of that economic calamity, the city clearly felt the impact. By the end of 1931, 18,500 unemployed men and women applied for relief at city hall. The caseload of the city's public welfare department increased from 1,370 in October 1931 to 2,847 by March 1932. The city's retail sales plummeted from $189 million in 1929 to $130 million in 1935. Building permits declined by more than $3.5 million between 1930 and 1931.[4]

In addition, the charter-dominated government's emphasis on efficiency and businesslike methods put off some Dallasites used to the old days, when officials ran government on a more casual basis. New regulations increased workers' accountability for their time. Under the council-manager charter amendments, the civil service board not only recruited and tested prospective city employees but also constantly rated them. The personnel director (also a new position under the amendments) oversaw the work force. During the first six months this office operated, the cost to the city of time lost to employee illness or injury dropped 30 percent.[5] City employees forced to take a pay cut in 1935, ranging from 5 to 20 percent, complained about the new, more demanding system and its chief administrator. As we have noted earlier, Edy fired many workers not willing to maintain his standards, including substantial numbers from the police and fire departments.

Moreover, Edy saw himself as an administrator (rather than a politician) and acted like one. According to a longtime Dallas observer, newspaperman Sam Acheson, Edy "tended to suspect sinister purposes behind the open smile or warm handclasp of a visitor." Once when banker and former mayor Joe Lawther called on the city manager, Edy greeted him with "You are an old line politician with your hand out. What do you want?"[6] His brusque

manner with Lawther and other business leaders, as well as his treatment of city workers, helped create strong political opposition in 1935. To many Dallasites, Edy's approach to governance appeared too harsh and impersonal, and they called for a more humane government, responsive to individual needs as well as the city's needs. Few publicly argued with the desired goal of a more comprehensive approach to government, but many attacked the means used by Edy to achieve it.

The city's civic and business leaders' new preoccupation with hosting the state's centennial celebration also spelled trouble for the CCA in 1935. Business leaders like banker Robert L. Thornton committed so much energy to centennial planning that all other civic issues, including the 1935 city elections and the health of the CCA, paled in comparison. Civic leaders' time and money went to centennial exposition preparation.[7]

Since 1923 Texans had discussed the idea of using their state's centennial to promote its economic attractiveness throughout the country, but state legislators did not act on the idea until February 27, 1934, more than fourteen months after voters passed an amendment to the state constitution authorizing Texas solons to provide funding for a major exposition. The bill legislators approved in February included a clause allowing the state centennial committee to award the central exposition to the city offering the largest financial inducement and support, much to the chagrin of some who thought cities with historical ties to the Republic of Texas should get the exposition.[8] Dallas leaders saw this as an unparalleled opportunity for the city and decided to bid for the opportunity to host it, despite Big D's lack of historical identity. Led by the Chamber of Commerce president, banker Robert L. Thornton, the city started devising a plan to secure the exposition. On August 3, Dallas business and civic leaders unanimously adopted a report from the chamber's centennial committee, headed by banker Fred Florence, that outlined a strategy to secure the exposition. That report suggested that the city's private and public sectors offer $7–$8 million to host the celebration. The committee recommended that the city turn over the state fairgrounds and its buildings, worth $4 million, for the centennial exposition. In addition it proposed that the business community provide $1–$2 million and asked city council to authorize a $2.5–$3 million bond package to improve the grounds and surrounding streets. At that meeting, Thornton declared that "the exposition offers Dallas its most important project during the last forty years." He reminded listeners how the Chicago Century of Progress Exposition had helped lift that city out of the Depression and predicted the same for Dallas.[9] Civic leaders bubbled with enthusiasm not only

because of the immediate relief the exposition would bring to the city's economy but because of the publicity it would generate for Dallas and the Southwest.

City officials greeted the opportunity to host the exposition with less zeal, however. The *Dallas Morning News* reported that "while businessmen, civic leaders and women's groups are lining up solidly behind the plan to secure the exposition for Dallas, the enthusiasm of city officials is not yet steamed up to the boiling point."[10] The reason was simple—money. City officials feared that another multimillion-dollar bond package would intensify the city's financial crisis. Dallas had experienced the fiscal crunch of the Depression ever since the CCA had assumed power. Charter officials had balanced the budget each year, but not without severe cutbacks. Besides laying off more than 10 percent of the work force, council had cut salaries of city employees an average of 12 percent.[11] The proposed 1934–35 budget already appeared about $260,000 short of anticipated revenue, which meant the city faced either an increase in property tax or, as was finally settled on, a sewer tax to raise the extra money to provide debt service on the sanitary sewer bonds. When council passed this sewer tax on August 29, it faced a massive public protest condemning it as unfair and an undue hardship on the poor and working classes.[12] Within this context, it is easy to understand local government's reluctance to board the centennial booster bandwagon. After intense lobbying by the business community, local officials finally agreed to participate in the centennial proposal with a promise to authorize the bond package if state officials selected Dallas as the host centennial city. After the meeting, Mayor Turner joined the chorus of centennial supporters and called for a "United Dallas" to "get behind the bid for the Centennial."[13]

On September 1, 1934, Dallas, along with San Antonio and Houston, submitted bids for the centennial exposition. Several days later Robert L. Thornton met with the state centennial committee, headed by Dallasite Cullen F. Thomas. Thornton suggested that the centennial should point to the future as much as retell the past, with particular emphasis on the state's progress. Thornton also promised his city would carry out an exposition even without state and federal aid. Only Dallas made such a commitment. By all accounts, Thornton gave an impressive and forceful presentation. The commission made its decision on Sunday, September 9, awarding Dallas the exposition.[14]

The announcement initiated a citywide celebration and the anticipation of the event's impact for the city. According to the *News*, the centennial exposition would "set off a modern renaissance for the city." Not only did the exposition promise the future of economic recovery and prosperity, but the

victory gave an enormous boost of pride to a city that had seen itself steadily losing ground to Houston now that city had completed its ship channel. In an editorial on September 12, entitled "Dallas Is Itself Again," the *News* declared, "Old Man Depression and his brother, Gloom, have had their innings in Dallas and they are out!" It went on to observe how the energetic efforts of civic leaders to secure the centennial had helped reunite the business community. "The lasting benefits [of the exposition]," the *News* concluded, "will be in the intangibles—the spirit of unity, of hearty cooperation and of invincible confidence in the great future."[15]

With the prodding of the newspapers and the city's civic leadership, Dallas voters lent their support to the centennial in an overwhelming fashion. On October 31, 1934, in the midst of the depression, Dallas property owners passed a $3 million bond issue by a vote of 5,520 to 1,088. All sixty precincts voted for the bonds in what the *News* reported as the "largest majority ever cast for a bond issue in the history of Dallas." Now city officials could improve Fair Park, the sight of the centennial exposition, and improve the thoroughfares leading to it.[16]

That successful bond campaign, as well as the larger program of exposition planning, completely occupied the city's business leadership. Charles F. O'Donnell, president of Southwestern Life Insurance Company, chaired the Centennial Fair Park bond committee while leading bankers Fred Florence, Robert L. Thornton, and Nathan Adams played critical roles on the Dallas Centennial's executive committee. After the bond election, these men incorporated the Texas Centennial Central Exposition and issued $2 million in bonds for public sale in denominations of $100, $500, or $1,000. When investors came up with only $1.8 million, twenty-eight leading businessmen met at the First National Bank and underwrote additional fair expenses to the sum of $650,000. And when the state stalled in providing its own aid to the centennial, local leaders agreed to proceed, even though voters at the bond election had been given the impression that local action would be taken only after the state had provided funds.[17] A pamphlet on the "New Plan for Holding the Texas Centennial Central Exposition" explained that "with or without State or National assistance the 'Spirit of Dallas' is undaunted, and Dallas will present to the world a Texas Centennial Central Exposition of which we, and all Texans, may justly be proud."[18]

Thornton and other civic leaders' great enthusiasm for the centennial reflects their understanding of this as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Dallas. Not only would it revive the real estate market and solve the unemployment problem, but in generating nationwide publicity it would lure new industries and residents to the city. Thornton articulated the prevailing idea

of good citizenship and the public interest when he spoke on the need for full citizen support of the centennial. "For if we stand united on general matters affecting the city," Thornton predicted, "we can accomplish a reality that will well record the efforts of those who live today and leave a heritage for those who will live tomorrow."[19] In a later guest editorial for the *News,* Thornton reiterated his theme of civic unity. "The time has come," he warned, "when petty jealousies, sectional bickering, and personal differences must be cast aside by all Dallas citizens for the common good of the city." After predicting that eight million people would attend the centennial, Thornton declared that "we must convince these visitors that Dallas is the leading city of the Southwest—that is our task."[20]

City hall sacrificed for the cause by allowing one of its most prestigious members to work for the centennial. In 1935, before the municipal elections, centennial officials hired Mayor Charles E. Turner at a $12,000 salary as finance officer and special events director of the Texas Centennial Exposition. Turner, a prominent realtor, had served as part of the CCA's original city council slate. Because of these new responsibilities, Turner declined to run for reelection in 1935, depriving the CCA slate of a popular vote-getter.[21]

The combination of the preoccupation with the centennial and Edy's declining popularity helps explain the defeat of the Citizens Charter Association in 1935.[22] On February 24, the *News* announced that the Citizens Civic Association, a group organized in January would field a full slate against the Charter Association. That association owed its existence to Joe Lawther, Tony Brignardello, and Jim Dan Sullivan. The latter had served on J. Waddy Tate's park board and continued for two years on the charter park board before clashing with the city manager over the independent park board's selection of workers. An immensely popular man, the "Wild Irish Rose" ran unsuccessfully against the CCA slate in 1933 and then played a prominent role in developing a secretive political group. According to the *News,* Sullivan had worked for nearly two years to get rid of Edy. Dislike for City Manager Edy also seemed to be the major factor behind Lawther's involvement in this movement.[23]

CCA opponents first called themselves "The Organization." According to one source, "A group of leaders with a taste for ritualistic organization and a hankering for political influence" headed this new political body.[24] One of them had been a leader of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and another the leader of the Home Government Association, which had run against the CCA in 1933. Discharged city employees, men accustomed to working in political organizations for their jobs, made up the association's nucleus. This group particularly targeted the working-class people of South Dallas

and blue-collar Oak Cliff for support and reached out to members of ritualistic organizations like the Elks and Odd Fellows. It collected dues from its members and organized a captain for each precinct and a lieutenant for each block, building up its membership to several thousand. In its effort to secure funds to compete successfully with the CCA, "The Organization" willingly took campaign donations from all sources, including those sympathetic to gambling and the utilities. When a less than sympathetic Dallasite exposed the group and labeled its members "catfish" who lived out of sight in the mud, the name stuck, and The Organization became known as the Catfish Club.[25]

Although Catfish leaders desperately wanted power, they realized that many Dallasites agreed with the nonpolitical rhetoric of the CCA and its emphasis on businesslike government for the city as a whole. They also understood that their group needed to appeal to the city's middle-class constituency, who seemed to have accepted these notions about local government. As a result, Catfish leaders created their own businessmen-led civic group, the Citizens Civic Association, and publicly supported the council-manager government and its emphasis on efficient and nonpartisan government. Earl W. Cullum, Oak Lawn grocer, headed the executive committee of the Citizens Civic Association.[26] On February 7th, that committee announced that it had appointed Hal Mosely as campaign manager. Mosely represented both worlds of Dallas politics. This Texas A&M University engineer had participated in city government since 1915, when he served a two-year term as city engineer. In 1919, while he was still stationed in France, Dallas citizens elected him commissioner of streets and public property. During the 1920s, he sat on the City Plan Commission before retiring to go into private practice. But he also was a frustrated office-seeker, having been rejected by Edy when he applied for the position of director of public works in 1931.[27]

Not only did the Catfish Club select a respected civic leader for its campaign head, but it provided a solid gallery of candidates for council, with three lawyers, including George Sergeant, former chief justice of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. In addition, the Civic slate nominated two insurance men, Cleve Reach and D. R. Graham. Graham had been recording secretary for the Baptist General Convention of Texas prior to entering the insurance business. Other candidates included an Oak Cliff businessman with extensive real estate holdings, a grocer and president of the State Retail Grocers' Association, a packing-plant owner, and the general manager of the Dallas Waste Mills. Writing about those candidates in 1939, the Committee on Public Administration concluded that although they did not compare in

prominence and prestige to the "business leaders . . . on the council from 1931 to 1935," they nevertheless were "substantial citizens, prominent in church, lodge, and service club activities, and could by no stretch of the imagination be called either 'political' or proletarian."[28]

The Civic Association's platform called for a Dallas man for city manager, repeal of the sewer tax, and a commitment to keep the centennial celebration out of politics. It also supported the retention of council-manager government and called for the courteous treatment of citizens and the exclusion of "foreign" experts. Finally, it promised adequate provision for schools, better maintenance of the streets, fair property assessment, and more-efficient garbage pickup.[29]

The CCA organized its slate about the same time. The February 22 issue of the *News* announced that the executive committee of the CCA had selected its candidates. According to the *News,* the CCA had taken that action with little discussion. Only T. S. McBride voted against the slate, saying he felt the committee needed more time to examine prospective nominees.[30] Three other incumbents besides Mayor Turner refused to run for reelection to the time-consuming council. The new charter council ticket included three lawyers, a civil engineer, a salesman, a cotton-seed businessman, and the president of Cox-Moore Drug Company. The two most prestigious candidates, both incumbents, were M. J. Norrell, president of the Texas Bank and Trust Company and former executive of the Chamber of Commerce, and W. A. Webb, vice president and general manager of the Katy Railroad.[31]

As in 1933, the *News,* which had initiated the council-manager movement, failed to endorse CCA candidates, even though that slate was most associated with good government. Once again this decision clearly reflected George Dealey's unhappiness with City Manager John Edy and the CCA council that had appointed him. Even though the city had completed the sewers for the levee district, Dealey's strong personal dislike for Edy most likely influenced his decision to have the *News* avoid endorsing the CCA slate. That paper did not support candidates from any ticket, even though several of the paper's leading reporters urged Dealey to rally behind the CCA. Nor did Dealey contribute money to the good government group, despite the pleadings of powerful retailer Herbert Marcus.[32] Even the efforts of CCA president Dr. W. D. Jones failed to change Dealey's mind. At one point Jones threatened to put the *News* on the spot by bringing in a committee of merchants who advertised extensively in the paper to pressure him. Jones also warned that if the *News* refused to support the CCA he would announce that the *News* had an alliance with the levee district, strong backers of the Civic ticket.[33]

The lack of endorsement did not mean, however, that the *News* withheld an opinion about the meaning of the election. On election eve, the *News* editorialized that one issue dominated the election. "If Dallas is satisfied with the present administration of City Manager John Edy it should vote for the Citizens Association slate. If Dallas is dissatisfied with Edy and the old council," the *News* concluded, "change is assured by electing the Civic Association."[34]

The Civic Association also made Edy the major issue in the campaign. At its initial rally, held at the city's Technical High School, Civic Association leaders called for a "Texas" city manager for Dallas. Frank Holliday endorsed the Civic slate so the city could hire a city manager "who would bow his head at the name of Sam Houston and carry on for Dallas during the Texas Centennial."[35] Not only was Edy an outsider, according to the Civic Association, but he completely dominated council and set the agenda. Council's closed-door executive sessions, something not endorsed by the National Municipal League, helped perpetuate such a perception. These meetings allowed council members to air their differences and resolve issues away from public scrutiny, so that when they met in formal session much business could be conducted with minimum debate or discussion. For some, the city's legislative body appeared nothing more than a rubber stamp for the city manager. Civic candidate Cleve Reach made such a charge during the campaign and complained that council had submerged its identity to its hired man. Others disputed that Edy had really achieved all the success the CCA claimed. For instance, opponents charged that Edy had manipulated the city's financial records to cover up $900,000 that had been added to the overdraft. Civic Association campaigners also accused Edy of depriving the public schools of much-needed revenue. Indeed, Civic Association workers warned forty Dallas teachers to expect a 10 percent pay cut if the CCA slate won the election.[36] The Civic Association also attacked the city's practice of employing experts from other cities. Civic candidate George Sprague ridiculed Edy's decision to pay St. Louis engineer W. W. Horner $60,000 to develop a sewer system for the city.[37]

Throughout the campaign the Civic Association portrayed the CCA and Edy as insensitive to the people's needs, undemocratic, and very much engaged in politics. One Civic supporter suggested that the CCA resembled "the well-oiled workings of a political machine operated and dominated by professional politicians." Civic leaders attacked Edy's decision to cut taxes 15 percent prior to the 1933 election as politically motivated. They accused Edy of appointing prominent CCA members to important city posts as payback for their support. A Civic spokesman insisted that the current CCA

slate had been handpicked by City Manager Edy, campaign manager John Erhard, and an unnamed Republican woman. Council candidate J. Willis Gunn chided the CCA's administration for its "policy of concealment and evasion." Another council candidate, Emil Corenbleth, ridiculed his Charter opponents for being arrogant and "over educated fools." Corenbleth questioned the idea that the CCA worked for the city as a whole, claiming that under their rule South Dallas had become a "forgotten land." Furthermore, he blamed Columbia University–educated City Attorney Hugh Grady and one of the founders of the CCA for holding up the state legislature's passage of the centennial bill to help Dallas finance the centennial exposition. According to Corenbleth, the spat-attired Grady antagonized many legislators with his lobbying efforts.[38] As one might suspect, such appeals stirred the working-class voters of Oak Cliff and South Dallas. So did the attack on the so-called sewer tax.

Public antagonism to the recently approved sewer tax proved a challenge to the CCA's reelection. As we have seen, council approved the tax to avoid raising property taxes necessary to finance the debt service on some sanitary sewer bonds. The act created an enormous amount of protest and anger—particularly from the working-class communities.[39] Council passed the act on August 29 without public hearings or even without giving the city attorney time to look over the proposed ordinance. That law created such an uproar that citizens poured into city hall for a September 5 council meeting, where they protested the tax for one and a half hours. Two weeks later, unhappy citizens returned to the council chambers and flayed the tax once again in what the *News* reported as "probably the noisiest experience since the council-manager government came into power." When former Dallas County district attorney Shelby Cox, CCA's spokesman, commented in favor of the tax, "pandemonium almost broke loose," according to the *News*. Sewer-tax opponent R. C. Travers berated Cox, saying, "You do not represent the poor people." Despite these protests, council retained the tax.[40] The sewer tax issue would haunt the CCA throughout the campaign.

The Charter Association ran a campaign emphasizing its accomplishments and attacking the Civic Association as fronting for "old time, disgruntled politicians who wish to regain control of the city again." Shelby Cox concluded that a group of "discharged, disgruntled and disgraced city employees" provided the real force behind the opposition slate. Moreover, CCA supporters argued that vice lords led the fight against their candidates because of their strong law-and-order record. But it appears that more than the city's criminal element opposed the CCA for its strict law enforcement. According to one observer, a number of businessmen were

fearful that Edy's desire to make Dallas a "bluenose town" would work against its success in hosting the centennial exposition.[41]

CCA supporters saw the centennial issue differently. According to Mayor Charles E. Turner, if the CCA lost the election the Texas Centennial Exposition would "fold up and make Dallas the laughing stock of the nation." CCA supporter Judge R. B. Allen repeated a similar theme when he warned, "Upon the eve of our great Centennial, any change in our present city government would prove unfortunate, and it might even prove disastrous."[42]

As the election drew near, the *News* anticipated a record voter turnout to select a government that would "plot Dallas through probably the most important two years of its history."[43] It appeared to be a close contest, with many expecting a split council in what the *News* termed "one of the most vigorously contested political campaigns in the city's annals." The Civic Association had strong support in the working-class neighborhoods of South Dallas and Oak Cliff, and a heavy turnout from that area would truly threaten the CCA's reelection chance.

Two situations within the city during the election may have encouraged that strong turnout. First, the city was in the midst of a garment workers strike. The International Ladies Garment Workers sent an organizer to Dallas in November 1934 to help unionize the nearly 1,000 dressmakers at the city's fifteen garment factories. By late January 1935, the union had 400 members and started pressuring the dress manufacturers to increase wages and reduce hours. When this did not occur, the women struck in early February. Factories attempted to break the strike by importing "scabs," while the Dallas police responded with brutal tactics against the strikers in support of a local industry that had routinely ignored or circumvented NRA codes. During the city's political campaign, Dallas papers printed detailed descriptions of picket-line skirmishes, the refusal of the garment factories to negotiate, and the jailing of the women strikers. The business community made no effort to intervene and mediate the differences between the exploited workers and their bosses. Such indifference might have made some Dallas workers question the kind of government promoted by the business-associated CCA.[44]

In addition to the garment strike, the city experienced on March 17 a "strike" by workers on government relief. Protesting the wage cuts implemented on March 1, several hundred relief workers led by local socialist Carl Brannin occupied the city hall auditorium and refused to move until officials met their demands. This created havoc because it forced officials to cancel a variety of meetings (including political rallies) scheduled for the city-rented auditorium. Both the garment and the relief strike may have helped explain

the increased turnout from the blue collar precincts in the 1935 election—a turnout that appeared critical in determining that election's outcome. Not everyone seemed anxious to support a government bent on business efficiency and nonpolitical action, or at least not as the CCA interpreted it.[45]

To the surprise of many, voters swept the upstart Civic Association to victory in all nine council seats. Place 9 Civic Association candidate George Sergeant won most impressively, securing 58 percent of the votes against incumbent Alex Camp. Meanwhile, Civic Association candidate for place 5, Cleve Reach, just squeaked by M. J. Norrell with a 51 percent majority. Voting patterns suggest two reasons for this Civic Association victory. First, as expected, the precincts associated with the city's working and poorer classes saw an increase in voting strength of more than 2,300 votes than had been cast in 1933. As a result, the Civic Association picked up 2,300 votes that were not there in 1933. At the same time, the middle- and upper-class neighborhoods of East and North Dallas experienced an increased turnout of a little more than 1,800. Even more important, those sections did not view this election as like earlier ones between those supporting the charter and those opposing it. The campaign focused on more specific issues—such as Edyism and the sewer tax. As a result the traditional Charter stronghold districts did not vote for Charter candidates in the same strength they had in the 1933 election. That year Charter candidates had pulled 7,680 votes from the twenty-seven precincts of middle- and upper-class homes. Two years later the CCA garnered only 6,727 votes and actually lost thirteen precincts in residential districts that in the previous election had given the CCA 65 percent of its votes.[46]

Following the election the *News* described the campaign as "one of the most peculiar ever seen in Dallas because the opposition . . . kept its movements closed in secrecy for the most part. Only in the last week did fireworks begin."[47] It also reported that several days after the election, CCA executive committee members held a stormy meeting where they debated the reasons the good government organization had lost. They also developed new strategies for the future, including a recommendation to establish a full-time municipal research bureau to keep people informed about their government.[48]

Victorious Civic Association councilmen acted quickly after the election and selected Hal Mosely to replace "retiring" city manager John Edy.[49] Mosely, the Civic Association's campaign manager, had wanted to be city manager for several years. He had joined the International City Managers' Association in 1930 and had taken a correspondence course in municipal finance from Syracuse University. Although he was a much more political being than Edy, he refused to take orders from the Catfish Club and appointed

his own men to key positions—men qualified by their experience rather than their political friendships.[50] This was particularly the case when he selected his new police chief, rather than appointing Catfish choice E. J. Railton. By November tension between Mosely and the Catfish Club, and fragmentation among the city council, resulted in a failed effort to fire Mosely by a vote of 5 to 4. The next month the Catfish Club initiated a petition campaign to recall the five councilmen who supported Mosely, but that too came up short.[51]

The new city council did follow through on some of its campaign promises after taking office on May 1. After electing Sergeant mayor, it cut salaries of the "big boys," including the city manager. It offered Mosely a $10,000 yearly salary, $6,500 less than Edy's original pay. Other positions such as the city attorney and the city secretary saw their salaries reduced too. In another populist move, the Civic Association leaders announced that they would hold fireside chats on the city's municipally owned radio station and offer town meetings throughout the city "to bring government to the people" and not make them "feel like strangers in the city hall like they have been feeling." Finally, the new council rescinded the sewer tax, although it raised water rates to compensate for the lost revenue.[52]

Except for these acts, the new council showed remarkable consistency with the earlier CCA ones. It worked closely with business-civic leaders who promoted the centennial to assure the city would be attractive and safe for fair visitors. The city added forty-one policemen, thirty-six firemen, and six health inspectors specifically for the fair. Such actions cost Big D more than $73,000 beyond the money needed to service the $2 million bond issue.[53] Responding to a March 1 *News* editorial calling Dallas a wide-open town, city officials also launched a crackdown on gambling, with special emphasis on removing slot machines, pinball games, and pool tables. According to Mayor Sergeant, Dallas would not be a wide-open town for the exposition. Several days later the *News* reported the success of that promise. Police Chief R. L. Jones called the campaign "one of the most thorough gambling and vice drives in the city's history."[54] A variety of civic groups also formed to help close the town, including the Dallas Council of Church Men and the Good Government League.[55]

Even before the antivice campaign, the new council had done enough to alienate its old ally, the Catfish Club. The secretive group proposed massive charter changes including a salaried mayor with veto power and a district-elected council. In addition, its revisions had the new council playing a more central role in making appointments. According to its sponsor, Jim Dan Sullivan, such change would "bring government closer to the people." Oth-

ers viewed this as a direct attack on the council-manager government.[56] Offering a generally positive assessment of council after its first year in office, the *News* noted that despite the intent of the council-manager government "the council finds it is in politics." Like its predecessor, too, the *News* continued, "It has learned that Dallas has not discerned the difference between council-manager government and aldermanic government."[57]

The Catfish Club proved unsuccessful in its effort to alter the charter and gradually disintegrated. In a *News* report on June 28, 1936, one of its leaders, E. J. Railton, claimed "the Catfish Cub is dead."[58] Meanwhile, the city council it had helped elect was anything but dead. City officials worked smoothly with the centennial exposition committee in carrying out the centennial celebration. Although the exposition fell short of the expected attendance figure of ten million, the *News* reported, under the headlines "Centennial Launches Dallas's Greatest Era," "The consensus of opinions among businessmen generally is that the city has made more history and more progress in the last six months than in all its previous existence."[59]

Council initiated a number of other improvements, including opening up Field Street in the western district of downtown Dallas. Despite the fact that such a project had been called for since the Kessler Plan of 1911, it had been neglected, in part because some thought it promoted growth northward at the expense of East Dallas. Even after voters approved bonds for it as part of the Ulrickson bond package, the Field Street opening languished because of this opposition.[60] Although criticism persisted, council pushed ahead and approved the controversial project. Soon after, the city's business community held a testimonial to honor council members for this and other actions. Principal speakers included bankers Joe E. Lawther and Robert L. Thornton, along with L. B. Denning.[61] More than 1,000 people attended to honor council and to revive the Old Dallas Spirit, according to toastmaster Lawther. Thornton, the city's leading civic figure, praised council, pointing out, "This administration has been courageous enough to be progressive and prudent enough to be conservative."[62] It appeared that council-manager government, even without the CCA in office, had demonstrated its worth to this progrowth, booster-oriented city.

Even though newspapers and civic leaders applauded the actions of council, it faced four different slates of candidates in the 1937 city election. The Utility Rate Reduction League, which had tangled with city council over the telephone franchise a year earlier, announced a full slate of candidates dedicated to lower utility rates and the increased taxation of the telephone, gas, and electric companies. The All-Dallas Ticket, which secured an endorsement from organized labor, ran an antivice campaign and had the distinc-

tion of nominating the only woman candidate. It also called for fair appraisal of real estate and more city jobs for Dallas workers. The Dallas Democratic Association pitched its campaign to the working-class sectors of Dallas and called for the abolition of the council-manager form of government.[63]

But the Citizens Charter Association and the Forward Dallas "parties" played the most important role in the 1937 election. The Forward Dallas party traced its lineage back to the Legion of Honor political faction. That group included a number of politicians associated with the Catfish Club including Tony Brignardello and E. J. Railton. After a postcard survey of selected voters, the Legion endorsed the current council for reelection but also supported the replacement of Mosely as city manager. Even though it is not entirely clear, the relationship between the Legion and Forward Dallas appeared similar to that between the Catfish Club and the Citizens Civic Association in 1935.[64]

The CCA also fielded a slate, but not without some difficulty. The promoters of nonpartisan council-manager government had a problem. The incumbent council, although originally nominated by the partisan Catfish Club, had been impressively nonpartisan. And it had conducted local government in a very efficient and effective way. The CCA executive committee, headed by new president O. D. Brundage and vice president J. J. Collier, decided to support a slate of candidates anyway. Taking more time than usual, the CCA announced that it would support four incumbents for reelection: Sergeant, Brinker, Corenbleth, and Gunn. The CCA endorsed these men, a spokesman explained, because it believed in overlapping terms for council.[65]

Problems developed, however, when the CCA announced that it expected the four incumbents to endorse the rest of its slate. Corenbleth and Gunn declined, citing their unwillingness to support men who would run against their present colleagues. Indeed, the CCA had a hard time securing candidates to run against the well-liked incumbents. Throughout the early stages of the campaign, newspaper articles suggested the Charterites and the Legion might combine their efforts. Another report concluded, "Because of the trouble the Charter Association is having with its ticket . . . the organization was dangerously near breakup." Indeed, several of its executive committee members quit and joined the Utility League's campaign. Although the Legion of Honor claimed it would back all nine incumbent councilman, it eventually decided not to endorse the two CCA nominees, Sergeant and Gunn, and nominated two other candidates in their place.[66]

During the days preceding the election, CCA candidates made the city's continued vice problem a major campaign issue and promised to close the

city if they were elected. Although the incumbent council had successfully addressed this issue prior to the centennial, it changed its tone after nearby Fort Worth opened its Frontier Centennial celebration to compete with the Dallas Exposition. In an effort to lure Dallas visitors thirty miles west, Fort Worth offered massive entertainment and a wide-open town. To combat Fort Worth's appeal, city council, meeting without Mayor Sergeant's knowledge, agreed to open up Dallas too. Prostitution, gambling, and after-hour drinking flourished under the new policy.[67] That situation angered the strong religious community in the city and increased the activities of several antivice groups. The Good Government League, one such organization, held a major rally the Saturday before the city election and invited Mayor Sergeant to attend. Dr. Graham Frank, head of the Dallas Pastors' Association, spoke, as did Major W. G. Gilks, head of the Salvation Army, and Rev. Frank C. Brown, pastor of the city's large and influential First Presbyterian Church. The Cleaner Dallas League, another antivice organization that endorsed CCA candidates, held a parade of Sunday School children during the last week of the campaign to promote better law enforcement. Area pastors conveniently preached about the city's vice problem the Sunday before the election.[68]

The CCA also tried to educate Dallasites about the differing slates. CCA spokespersons reminded voters that "members of the Charter Association are business and professional men and women who have no selfish interests, no political axes to grind, no friends to reward nor enemies to punish." Such statements implicitly suggested that the chief rival, the Forward Dallas ticket, had support from the very political Legion of Honor, bent on removing City Manager Mosely and interested in keeping Dallas an open town. Hugh Grady argued that council-manager government had been subverted under current council's rule by political factions, making it a "mere clerkship" with party leaders attempting to dictate appointees. CCA candidate Sergeant promised that the election of the CCA slate guaranteed a more harmonious council than the city had experienced the last two years. Sergeant, who had kept a journal during those years, emphasized the turmoil of council, particularly in the first year when Catfish Club spokesmen had lobbied hard for their agenda—including specified appointments and a new city manager.[69] For the CCA, then, a government sympathetic to the priorities of the city's business leadership was not enough. Rather, government needed to be nonpolitical and willing to address the city as a whole.

The *News* apparently agreed and threw its support to the Citizens Charter Association. Although it acknowledged the high quality of some opposition candidates, it concluded that the CCA offered the most able and quali-

fied candidates to carry out a "simple program of efficiency, economy and enforcement." The newspaper also believed that the CCA slate held to the civic principles favored by the *News*. Finally, *News* editorials applauded CCA candidates' support of a "closed" city. One observed that "most of Dallas desires with this newspaper a moral city, outlawing the professional gambler, the 'bookie' and the street walker, a city that shields its growing youth from the insidious line of the slot machine, the marble board and the open saloon."[70] This was from a newspaper that had praised the incumbent council's performance in January.

Realizing it was in for a fight, Forward Dallas turned to the city's black community for support. Blacks traditionally had played a minor role in local politics, as they had in the state. However, under the leadership of Rev. Maynard H. Jackson, Sr., pastor of the New Hope Baptist Church, and A. Maceo Smith, a recent arrival to Dallas, African Americans organized themselves into the Progressive Voters League (PVL). Jackson, whose son would later become mayor of Atlanta, emerged as one of Dallas's leading African American citizens in the 1920s. His involvement with the powerful Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, an organization of the city's most prominent African American clergy, made him a logical choice to lead the PVL and unite the city's blacks into a solid voting block. Smith, newly appointed executive secretary of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce, also played a critical role in this group that was established to help Dallas blacks become more involved in state and local politics. A native of Texarkana, Texas, Smith held an undergraduate degree from Fisk University and a master's in business administration from New York University. He started the *Harlem Home Journal* while in New York City but returned to Texarkana in 1929, where he began to organize the Negro Business League in the South. He moved to Dallas in 1933 and soon became executive secretary of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce, which hired him to rejuvenate the organization. Smith also helped create the Progressive Citizens League in 1934 to encourage Dallas blacks to participate more in local elections.[71]

The event that motivated Jackson and Smith to form a more permanent and powerful organization occurred as a result of a special election in 1935 to replace state representative Sarah T. Hughes, who resigned her seat to serve as district judge. Although state law barred blacks from participating in the Democratic primary, special elections had no primary, so blacks could vote. Sixty candidates ran for the office, including the African American attorney Ammon S. Wells, former Dallas NAACP president. Wells lost by only 859 votes. This experience suggested that if more blacks had cast ballots, Wells might have actually been able to win. The enthusiasm generated by the

special election in 1935 led to the formation of the PVL. Working with the Dallas Interdenominational Ministers' Alliance and the Negro Chamber of Commerce, the Progressive Voters League became very active in city council elections. Preparing for the 1937 city election, PVL supporters canvassed black neighborhoods and visited clubs and associations to encourage blacks to pay their $1.75 poll tax. The effort proved successful as 7,000 citizens did just that, more than four times as many as had done so in 1934. That number made up one-sixth of registered voters in Dallas. Not only would blacks vote for city councilmen in the upcoming election, but they also would participate in the school bond election, which included money for a new black high school in South Dallas.[72] The city desperately needed that school because students overcrowded its current one, Booker T. Washington High School, so badly that the board of education had forced students to attend in double sessions for the last five years. Even then students shared thirty-inch desks.

Black mobilization had a significant impact on the outcome of the 1937 election. At a late March meeting, the PVL voted 106 to 0 to support the Forward Dallas association slate. It did this partly to reward the accomplishments of the present council, which had authorized the bond package for a black high school, and had spread gravel on several streets in black neighborhoods in addition to placing fifty-eight street lights in black districts. But the PVL also endorsed the Forward Dallas slate because it pledged to hire black policemen, provide more parks, open up additional city jobs, and help promote better housing and slum clearance.[73]

That support allowed the Forward Dallas ticket to win five of the nine council seats in a runoff election with the CCA. Despite its strong support from the *News,* and its identification with good government, the CCA saw only two nonincumbents win. Indeed, Dallas voters returned seven of the nine council members already serving. Ridding the city of vice, the major issue, according to the CCA, failed to win the good government group the type of support it had anticipated. For blacks, acknowledged by both organizations as a major factor in the election, better neighborhood infrastructure and improved public services, rather than vice control, seemed the decisive issues that drew their support.[74] Many white voters also stayed away from the CCA because in this election it really came across as another partisan organization bent on winning office rather than saving good government. The Forward Dallas Association had initially promoted a slate of the nine incumbents, only to see the CCA attempt to steal four of them for its ticket. The CCA could have simply endorsed them but rather chose to force

them to support its entire ticket and break from their sponsoring organization. Voters sensed that this CCA slate was not really for the city as a whole and rejected it.

Although Forward Dallas candidates had compiled an impressive record of achievement, that body remained vulnerable to charges that it represented groups who wanted specific things from government rather than citizens committed to working for the city as a whole. Even though it cooperated fully with business leaders, the Forward Dallas slate, and particularly its backers, the Legion of Honor, seemed flawed because of some of its particularistic concerns. The formula for urban growth, and thus urban success, according to the city's civic leaders, was unity and cooperation focusing on urban development. Disputes over specific distribution of services promoted disunity, something deadly in the urban sweepstakes in the Southwest. Critics viewed the lack of unanimity over appointments and other issues as the real sin of the present council. However, the election of 1937 exacerbated the problem by putting candidates of two different organizations on council for the first time. Unable to resolve their differences, council members bickered and fought for the next two years. A park board scandal near the end of council's term also promoted an image of corruption and government in disarray.

The 1937 council started its term much like the 1935 council—with controversies about council appointments and the city manager. The four CCA councilmen supported retaining Hal Mosely as city manager, despite the fact he was ultimately responsible for the lax law enforcement that the good government group had so criticized during the election. Several of the Forward Dallas councilmen, still not forgiving him for his break with the Catfish Club, wanted him removed and popular utilities-supervisor Joseph F. Leopold appointed in his place. However, since two of Moseley's strongest critics, Cleve Reach and James F. Cochan, lost their bid for reelection, council voted to retain the city manager by a 6–3 margin, with J. Willis Gunn, Emil Corenbleth, and Max Hahn dissenting. Council also selected the top vote-getter, George Sprague, as mayor by acclamation after incumbent Sergeant declined nomination for the post. In addition, council reappointed all other city heads in what the *News* called a stormy session at city hall.[75] Although city government achieved some noticeable successes during the next two years, including the opening of Field Street, the construction of a new sewage disposal plant, and the expansion of the sanitary and drainage sewers systems, along with improvements at Love Field, conflict and controversy marked council sessions. Council members also faced pressure from

angry Dallas citizens who wanted it to do more to stem the city's vice problem. Carr P. Collins, president of the Dallas Council of Churchmen's Committee of 100, called Dallas "one of the most immoral cities in America."[76]

Contrasting priorities and controversial issues not only pitted Forward Dallas council members against CCA council members, but often caused disputes within both groups. When Charter councilman Z. Starr Armstrong failed to support several street openings promoted by George Sergeant, the frustrated Sergeant responded, "I'm still a Charter Association man and believe in its principles but I am not going to line up with Armstrong and Knight in always opposing public improvements." This helps explain his desertion of the Charterites and his vote for Forward Dallas supporter J. Cleve Reach to replace Max Hahn in council, who died while in office.[77]

Relations between the city council and the park board became particularly testy at times over lines of authority. The park board, appointed by council, did not have to report to the city manager, according to the charter. But City Manager Mosely wanted the park board to submit its plans to public works director A. P. Rollins. Park board members refused, and council split over this issue, some supporting the park board and others the city manager.[78] Additional disputes over the type of sewage disposal plant to erect, a debate over how to handle the algae problem in the city's water supply, and investigations into the Public Works Department and the city-owned radio station WRR also promoted turmoil in council. It was perhaps park board member E. J. Railton who best underscored the turmoil in an October 1937 newspaper interview: "There is no department up there that is not sore at another one. Mosely had a falling out with (City Attorney Henry) Kucera. There is a fight between the police department and the welfare department. There's trouble between the city manager and the supervisor of utilities. There's trouble over the dance hall ordinance, trouble over paving bids, trouble over the way the park department is to make purchases. The council is always bickering."[79] The recession of 1937–38, as well as the disappointing turnout for the city's Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition in 1937, strained council's budget and heightened tensions between its members.[80]

While the council-manager form of government had not solved all problems faced by city officials nor eliminated "partisan politics" from the city, it had provided a more efficient and better coordinated local government than before. In their 1939 study of Dallas government for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, Harold and Kathryn Stone, along with Don Price, compared the new government to the city's earlier city commission government. They emphasized how the city man-

ager was better at coordinating the efforts of workers and departments, reducing delays and increasing production. The authors also pointed out that the new governmental structure promoted planning, selected qualified personnel, and maintained financial control—the three fundamental tools of management. Indeed, they argued that "the city as a large-scale enterprise was run on schedule in a way that showed up the inefficiency of the former commissioners." Finally, they wrote, "It promoted a professional spirit among local officials." According to the Stones and Price, the commissioners had little acquaintance with any professional knowledge or sources of information. But since the council-manager government came to Dallas, officials established new contacts with professional associations, and the government had developed a group of young executives "with a highly professional attitude." In sum, the social scientists concluded that council-manager government had given to the people of Dallas "the kind of government they wanted: an efficient, impartial one, without patronage or special favors."[81] The new governmental structure seemed quite compatible with a progrowth strategy for the city as a whole.

Despite the positive evaluation by social scientists, some civic leaders, unhappy with the continued partisan politics and the perceived fragmentation of local government, wanted more. They desired to do for civic leadership what had been done for planning and government in the city—create a new civic body with enough power and authority to coordinate and help manage effectively the city's disparate problems. Just as the desire for a government body that could get things done for the city as a whole led to the development of the council-manager government, the same motives guided the development of the Dallas Citizens Council.

□ 5

Dallas Business Leadership, Planning, and World War II

The organization of the Dallas Citizens Council (DCC) in 1937 by a group of the city's leading businessmen proved a watershed event. Not only would it provide the most powerful civic body ever established in the city's history, but its members would also help revive the failing Citizens Charter Association (CCA) in 1938. These two bodies would be most responsible for shaping modern Dallas. They too approached Dallas as a system of systems needing coordinated and comprehensive treatment and strongly supported comprehensive planning and the council-manager form of government for the city as a whole.

The city had a tradition of strong business leadership before the DCC. Its chamber of commerce, formed in 1909, had played a critical role in the city's development. Just as the earlier commission government had attempted to make city government more responsive, the chamber tried to do the same for the city's business leadership by merging the city's leading business-led organizations—the Commercial Club, the 150,000 Club, the Freight Bureau, and the Trade League—into one powerful and centralized business organization to work for the welfare of the entire city.[1] Whether it was city planning, promoting industrial progress through an extensive national advertising campaign, developing a municipal airport in the 1920s, or fighting for the right to host the centennial exposition in 1936, leading businessmen invested large amounts of time and money for their version of the civic good.[2]

The chamber, large and unwieldy, and committed to rotation of office, had been unable to resolve the problems of disunity and fragmentation among the elite, however.[3] Both sides of the levee district controversy belonged to the chamber of commerce. Nor was the chamber always able to re-

spond quickly in time of urban crisis. It had a complex structure with a variety of committees and an organizational configuration that limited its ability to act quickly. As a result, while the chamber proved a powerful force in some areas, its composition and orientation prevented it from being influential in many other aspects of community activity.[4] The DCC's more limited structure and smaller governing body gave it greater latitude to act in a number of activities, and facilitated a quick response to urban problems. This helps explain why the *Dallas Morning News* dubbed the new body "the minute men."[5]

According to a *Dallas Times Herald* editorial, the DCC would provide another important role. "Dallas has the Chamber of Commerce and many other organizations as well as its governmental bodies to deal with various community problems," it observed, but "there is an obvious need for *greater co-ordination* [italics mine]."[6] The DCC, then, assumed the role of coordinator of civic undertakings. Numerous groups and organizations had pet projects for which they sought private funding. Because of the enormous wealth represented by the new group, any serious civic undertaking would benefit from going through this committee. As a result, that body could prioritize and coordinate civic initiatives. Those projects it supported had a good chance of success because of the financial resources that might be directed at promoting them. Those without support had little chance.[7] Not only could members of the body bring their concerns to the board of directors for discussion, but DCC leaders encouraged other members of the community to do the same. The *News* understood the coordinating purpose of the DCC from its inception. "Without duplicating the work of any existing organization," the *News* observed, "it offers a basis for merging the interests of Government, business, labor and the arts in support of projects that will make Dallas even more pre-eminent as a Southwest metropolis and a center of industry and culture."[8]

Unlike the chamber of commerce, which saw itself primarily as a booster for Dallas business, the DCC saw itself as the chief booster of Dallas.[9] The *News* used the formation of this group to appeal to civic patriotism. "All citizens of Dallas should work in unison in matters affecting the city's progress," it announced. "Sectionalism should be forgotten. This organization will use its efforts to promote the old Dallas spirit which in years past made Dallas the leader among the cities of Texas."[10]

Although as in the case of the Ulrickson program bonds, businessmen sometimes differed on how best to achieve growth and development, and often favored ways that would best return immediate profit, a host of other public issues demanded and received business leaders' attention when the

immediate rewards were not so evident. Implicit in all this was the assumption that the DCC was best positioned to lead and coordinate the needs of Dallas. Bankers, wealthy industrialists, and newspaper publishers, according to this line of reasoning, held positions that gave them the best perspective on the needs of the entire city and what would best promote the public interest. All other political actors in Dallas, according to business leaders, including neighborhood groups, labor representatives, and minority leaders, harbored a tainted vision of the public interest because of their identification with some part, rather than the whole, of Dallas. They should be heard and should provide input, so the reasoning went, but the final decision would be made by the DCC, much in the same way that the city manager solicited information from his department heads yet himself made the final recommendations in city government. The *Times Herald* summarized this view by warning that "no city can attain balanced prosperity and gain as an enjoyable place in which to live unless it has a leadership that can view it as a whole and prevent bickering between sections and groups."[11]

The DCC emerged as an outgrowth of the centennial exposition. The exposition provided an important boost to Dallas and a real challenge to its leadership. It not only supplied thousands of jobs during a time of high unemployment, but it helped publicize Dallas and the Southwest—the city's trade area—throughout America.[12] Even more important, it brought about a rapprochement of warring business factions and, according to some, helped revive the "Old Dallas Spirit." The *News* emphasized this theme in its evaluation of the exposition's impact. "It is the intangibles of good will, of confidence in Dallas ability to get things done, of individual leadership in big matters," the paper declared, that had made the exposition an "unmeasurable success."[13]

Financing the expensive exposition did not come easily. Banker Robert L. Thornton often had to call leading businessmen together to raise money for it. Because he needed men who could commit their companies' resources immediately, this group evolved into a meeting of corporate presidents, or "yes men," as Thornton called them. When the Exposition Corporation required additional funds to complete the grounds in March 1936, Thornton and twenty-seven other business leaders met at the First National Bank board room and raised $650,000 on the spot. Those business leaders continued to assemble during the summer to provide additional funds to keep the Centennial Corporation solvent.[14] And when civic leaders decided to run the exposition the following year as the Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition, they again reached into their pockets to help fund the undertaking. Thornton secured $457,000 from local businesses for that exposition at a banquet

in the city's Baker Hotel. Civic leaders provided such support because they believed the exposition improved trade relations with Latin American countries and continued to publicize the city throughout the country.[15]

Thornton also continued his regular meetings with business heads to keep tabs on the exposition and coordinate responses to its needs. The success in mobilizing business leaders to provide aggressive, coordinated financial leadership for the exposition convinced the banker that such a body could also benefit Dallas as a whole. As a result, he joined with Nathan Adams to establish a permanent group known as the Dallas Citizens Council, an organization of "boss men" able to commit the financial resources of their companies for civic projects and the booster goals of growth and development.

Membership, limited to company presidents or board chairmen, was by invitation. Only those with a "sincere interest in Dallas" and a "willingness to assume a leadership role in the community at large" could join. Dues were a mere $25 a year and membership was for life. As late as the 1950s, the organization had no permanent office and remained informal. Original membership started at ninety-five (see appendix), but that gradually increased over time as new members were added. The general membership met once a year to ratify the actions of the board of directors, who held monthly sessions. That group, made up initially of twenty-two but later expanded to twenty-five members, served as the core of the DCC.[16]

The first board of directors clearly reflected the power and prestige of the new organization. The original members underscored the dominance of the city's bankers in civic leadership. Dallas's most powerful bank presidents, Nathan Adams, Robert L. Thornton, and Fred Florence, served on that board. So did Joe E. Lawther, president of the Liberty State Bank of Dallas; J. B. Adoue, Jr., head of the National Bank of Commerce; and Ernest R. Tennant, president of the Dallas National Bank. Charles F. O'Donnell, former Dallas judge, president of Southwestern Life Insurance Company, and member of the board of directors of the First National Bank of Dallas, headed the DCC as its first president.

Other board of directors members included A. H. Bailey, J. B. O'Hara, T. M. Cullum, Thomas E. Jackson, Arthur Kramer, Herbert Marcus, Karl Hoblitzelle, Jack Pew, D. Alva Little, C. W. Davis, John W. Carpenter, L. B. Denning, A. M. Matson, H. A. Olmsted, and Walter Prehn. Bailey served as president of Higginbotham's Wholesale Dry Goods Store, and was a dominant figure in the city's dry goods, hardware, and lumber businesses. Like many of the DCC executive board members, Bailey migrated to Dallas from out of state. J. B. O'Hara, a native of Pennsylvania, served as president and

general manager of the Dr. Pepper soft drink company. T. M. Cullen came to Dallas at the age of forty-nine in 1914 from his native state of Tennessee. President of T. M. Cullum and Boren Co., a wholesale and retail sporting goods firm, Cullum prospered as the city grew. Thomas E. Jackson, a native of Illinois, came to Dallas in 1907. He served as Southwestern manager of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, a company he started out with as a salesman in St. Louis. Arthur Kramer, president of A. Harris and Company, was another lawyer who made good in the business world. Born in Louisville, Kentucky, Kramer came to Dallas in 1889 and took a law degree from the University of Texas in 1902. Eight years later he married Camille Harris, daughter of Adolph Harris, founder of the city's A. Harris and Co. Department Store. He assumed the presidency of the store in 1912 and became very active in the city's cultural scene, presiding over the Dallas Symphony from 1925 to 1939. Herbert Marcus, another prominent merchant, also migrated to the city from Louisville, Kentucky. In 1897, the nineteen-year-old Marcus arrived in Dallas and pursued a career in retailing. Ten years later he started a specialty store with his sister and brother-in-law, A. L. Neiman. By the time he joined the DCC, Neiman-Marcus had become one of the city's most famous stores. Besides serving as president of the store, Marcus proved extremely active in civic affairs.

Karl Hoblitzelle was another civic leader born outside of Texas. He arrived in the Lone Star State after working in the St. Louis World's Fair. Taking the money he had earned from that work experience, he started a chain of vaudeville theaters in North Texas as part of his Interstate Amusement Company. During the 1920s he converted those theaters to movie houses and extended his holdings well beyond Texas. By the time he joined the DCC, Hoblitzelle presided over Interstate Circuit Incorporated, and had become quite wealthy and an influential player in Dallas civic affairs.

John W. Carpenter was one of the few Texas natives on the board. Born in Navarro County in 1881, Carpenter came to Dallas in 1918 as manager of the Dallas Power and Light Company. The board of directors named him president of Texas Power and Light Company shortly after it was organized, and he later formed the Southland Life Insurance Company. Carpenter was one of several utility heads who joined the DCC. Other included Walter Prehn, general manager of Southwest Bell Telephone; C. W. Davis, president of Dallas Power and Light; and L. B. Denning, president of Lone Star Gas. Two oilmen also sat on the board of directors: Jack Pew, assistant vice president for the Sun Oil Company, and D. Alva Little, president of the Magnolia Petroleum Company. Born in 1902 in Beaumont, Texas, Pew attended Southern Methodist University, Cornell, and MIT before entering the oil

business. Texas native Little started life in Corsicana, Texas, in 1887. He attended Southwestern University in Georgetown, Texas, and moved to Dallas after graduation in 1914. Nineteen years later he became president of Magnolia Oil Company. Little is known about the final two original members of the DCC board of directors. A. M. Matson was managing director of Butler Brothers, while H. A. Olmsted presided over the Olmsted-Kirk Company. All of these men also served on the board of directors for Dallas banks. Eleven of the twenty-two original board members had served on the executive committee of the Texas Centennial Exposition Commission. Unlike the Exposition Commission, the DCC did not permit proxies.[17]

The all-white board included Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Although several members came from wealthy families, what is most impressive is how many experienced upward mobility in Dallas. Robert L. Thornton provided one of the city's most spectacular rags-to-riches stories. Born in a half-roof sod dugout in rural Texas, he grew up as part of a family of tenant farmers. As an adult, he failed in several enterprises before moving to Dallas and opening a bank on borrowed money. The combination of an acute business sense and a booming city brought the uneducated Thornton spectacular success.[18] Charles O'Donnell, the child of Irish immigrants, lived on a farm west of Dallas. He attended public school and then took a law degree from the University of Texas in 1907. After serving the city as prosecuting attorney, judge, and city attorney, he joined a Dallas law firm and became general consul of the Southwestern Life Insurance Company before being named its president.[19] Nathan Adams, although starting life in a promising situation, also experienced rapid advancement in Dallas. His father, Nathan Adams, Sr., had been a prosperous lawyer and landholder in Giles County, Tennessee, but died shortly after Adams turned five years old. His mother took a teaching job at Giles College to support the family, but cash problems apparently continued to plague them and later forced Adams to drop out of college to help support his mother and siblings. At age 18 he moved to Dallas with $4 in his pocket and took a job as runner for the People's National Bank for $8.33 a month. Later he worked for the National Exchange Bank and by 1894 headed one of its departments. When his bank merged in 1905 with American National Bank, officials appointed him vice president of the new bank. Twenty-four years later he became president of the city's First National Bank.[20]

Fred Florence, head of the city's largest bank, was the son of Lithuanian immigrants living in New York City. Three months after Florence's birth, his family moved to East Texas, where the elder Florence became a small but successful merchant. At age sixteen the younger Florence took a job

sweeping and check sorting at a bank in the East Texas town of Rusk. After learning the banking business there, he moved to Dallas in 1911 and worked for the American Exchange National Bank. He returned the next year to East Texas and eventually became president of the Alto State Bank in Cherokee County. After World War I he cast his future with the growing city of Dallas and accepted a job as vice president of Guarantee Bank and Trust Company. By 1929 that bank had been renamed the Republic National Bank and Florence had assumed its presidency. Like Thornton and Adams, Florence had benefited from the expanding economy and growing opportunities associated with the Southwest.[21]

Jean Baptiste Adoue, Jr., was hardly a rags-to-riches story, but his success clearly underscores the opportunity for advancement in rapidly developing cities like Dallas in the expanding Southwest. Born in downtown Dallas on November 4, 1884, to French parents, Adoue received a law degree from the University of Texas in 1906. However, he turned to banking, working for the National Bank of Commerce, whose president was his father. In 1924 he became president of that bank after his father retired.[22]

DCC members, then, like civic leaders elsewhere, clearly understood the relationship between a growing city and economic opportunity. Many of them had started in Dallas with meager resources but prospered as the city expanded. Because urban growth had been and continued to be so important to their economic success, they believed that extensive involvement in civic undertakings made economic sense and threw themselves into urban service without hesitation. Their particular form of urban activism mirrored assumptions found in planning and government activities.

The DCC also stemmed from an unhappiness with current civic leadership and proposed to provide better coordination and efficiency than earlier business-led civic organizations. Just as the council-manager form of government permitted government to respond more effectively to the needs of the city as a whole, so now the DCC gave civic leaders that same ability.[23] The DCC also promised more stability for civic leadership in the same way that council-manager government fostered it for Dallas government. Council-manager government had done that through professional administration and nonpartisan elections, while the DCC promoted continuity and stability in civic leadership by granting the city's most successful business and civic leaders lifetime membership in their organization, and by including no term limits for the board of directors. In addition, the DCC mirrored the emphasis on using elites to guide city growth. The city manager, a trained professional, now administered government, while professional

planners, often hired from outside the city, helped ensure its proper physical development. The DCC guaranteed a key civic role for the city's most successful businessmen who had proven management skills at a time when many compared the municipal corporation with the business corporation.

The DCC held its first meeting of the full membership on March 1, 1938, at the elegant Adolphus Hotel. Members heard theater owner Karl Hoblitzelle give the keynote address. "You have a more difficult task than the leaders of thirty years ago," Hoblitzelle cautioned. "Things move more swiftly. You no longer know your neighbors. Results depend upon bringing in around the council table representatives of those classes not ordinarily found at such meetings. It will make them better citizens. You will get to know them, these people who work with their hands. It is the only way the democratic form of government can survive."

At that meeting, Hoblitzelle recommended more traffic arteries to the central business district, the development of a superairport, a downtown auditorium, the Trinity River canal, and a master plan for the metropolitan region's future growth and development. Hoblitzelle also called for "fairness to the Negro population." Toward this end, he asked the city to participate in the federal government's slum clearance and public housing program and pleaded with the leaders to help "protect those sections where Negroes live," and "help them to help themselves." The DCC spokesman also called for "better coordination in welfare work and closer cooperation with the working men in building a greater Dallas." In addition he urged leaders to attract high-paying industries, and emphasized that a successful city needed cultural, educational, and medical facilities as well. Hoblitzelle complimented the present government but also suggested that it was "handicapped by lack of interest, the insistent demands of selfish citizens, lack of competition such as that which brings progress and reorganization, economy and efficiency in business" as well as "limitations set by outdated laws and ordinances." In their first official action taken at the meeting, members instructed Chair C. F. O'Donnell to appoint a committee to confer with city officials regarding a downtown auditorium.[24]

As early as February, 1939, the *News* called this group "the most powerful concentration of business executives ever banded together in Dallas for civic good."[25] Although its first year's achievements were modest, they nevertheless underscored the DCC's vision of the public interest. The group helped promote the passage of a 1938 bond issue to expand the city's airport. The DCC also raised funds to refurbish the city's auditorium at Fair Park, and lobbied successfully with council to halt the development of the East

Grand thoroughfare through Fair Park, a project that threatened the integrity of the city's showcase.[26] But even more important, DCC members played a critical role in revitalizing the CCA.

Forbidden by its charter to engage in politics, DCC members saw the CCA as a political vehicle that shared many of its concerns and values. That organization had suffered greatly since its losses in 1935 and 1937, no longer rallying the kind of support it had once experienced in the early 1930s. Even more important, its creation, the council-manager government, had come under strenuous attack from a portion of the city's population. Charter leaders turned to the businessmen for help, giving DCC officials significant influence in selecting CCA slates.

The attack on the council-manager government started during the municipal election of 1937. Candidates from the Dallas Democratic Party promised to abolish the system if elected and to work for its destruction even if they lost at the polls. Shortly after the election, members of the defeated slate formed the Commission Government Association. At its first meeting on November 8, 1937, members elected George K. Butcher as chair. Many supporters of that association came from South Dallas and had also opposed council's failed efforts to hire black police officers. George W. Owens, who seemed to be the prime mover behind the petition drive, had played a major role in the effort. At the meeting, speakers attacked the council-manager government as a dictatorship and called for the return of the commission form of government, as was in place when "Dallas was a symbol of progress and happiness." That organization floundered but reemerged the next year as the Plain People's Party. It wanted Dallasites to be able to elect both their mayor and eight commissioners to supervise the city's departments. Toward this end, it started passing out petitions to force a referendum on this issue.[27]

Sensing danger to the council-manager system, the CCA reorganized to do battle against the movement. After its defeat in 1937, the CCA leaders decided to form an active organization to maintain interest in the city's council-manager government throughout the year rather than reorganize every two years to run a slate of candidates. In addition, the CCA employed a public relations firm to advise it on how to be more successful. It recommended an executive committee representing the city's six districts of South Oak Cliff, North Oak Cliff, South Dallas, East Dallas, Northeast Dallas, and North Dallas. One man and one woman would be selected to represent each district and would work closely with the organization's president, male and female vice presidents, secretary, treasurer, and executive secretary. The firm also advised CCA leaders to organize on the precinct level and also sug-

gested that the CCA executive committee issue a bimonthly bulletin to every member. Finally, the report recommended that the CCA maintain a complete library about city government, have a member attend all council and committee meetings, and maintain contact with other cities over government issues.[28]

CCA officials followed many of those recommendations, including the creation of an executive secretary. They selected Herbert Carpenter for that position and established an office in the Santa Fe Building in downtown Dallas. Finding a new president for the ailing good government group proved difficult. After several other civic leaders declined, insurance man Roscoe L. Thomas accepted the appointment. What he inherited "was not the vital organization of 1931," but a CCA, according to the *Dallas Times Herald,* "shattered by defeats in the 1935 and 1937 elections." Despite these problems, Thomas's strong leadership and willingness to work closely with leading businessmen allowed him to secure the teetering CCA.[29] With the help of the *News,* the CCA also thwarted the campaign to change council-manager government. It now could focus on the 1939 election.

Toward that end, Thomas approached Thornton seeking contributions for a yet unnamed council slate. He secured money only after placing Thornton on a secret nominating committee—a committee that eventually included six bank presidents or vice presidents, a financier, an insurance company president, an attorney, a former mayor, and a securities broker.[30] Thomas initiated this contact with the influential and wealthy business leaders, and it can be said that the CCA needed them more than they needed it. Historically, Dallas business leaders always had access to government officials no matter what kind of governing structure existed. However, because the CCA supported the kind of government form that made sense to business leaders in the 1930s, and because business leaders would now have a chance to nominate candidates with a citywide view, the relationship benefited both parties.

Although so many members of the Dallas Council participated in the Charter Association that the latter would come to be characterized as the political arm of that business civic group, no formal relationship ever existed. But the same financial supporters of the CCA participated in the DCC, too. Not surprisingly, the CCA's interests reflected the same interests as the DCC, including city planning, airport development, and other growth-promoting programs. This stemmed more from a shared vision of priorities than from business leaders pressuring the good government organization for specific favors. To assure no individual pressure from major contributors, the CCA executive committee kept the source of all

contributions secret from individual council candidates and forbade its business-dominated executive committee from ever requesting "services or favors" from the administration it backed.[31]

Dallas business leaders supported the CCA because it emphasized business efficiency rather than partisan politics based on neighborhood issues or class, and because it accepted the basic tenets of the business community—that Dallas growth and economic development should be the top priority. In the context of the city-as-a-whole rhetoric, this made perfectly good sense, since urban development would ultimately benefit all citizens.

The CCA's reemergence as a significant political force in the city not only benefited from increased support from the business community but by a scandal in the park board, disclosed late in December 1938. The city's park board had always been somewhat problematic under the new charter government. As we have seen, that board retained its independence from the supervision of the city manager. It had its own budget, and its appointees remained free of civil service regulation. As a result, it became one of the few remaining vestiges of the patronage system, especially during the Catfish–Legion of Honor era, 1935–1939.[32]

At a hearing on January 6, 1939, George Ripley, park board member and defeated candidate for council under the Forward Dallas ticket, charged that board members Harry Gordon and E. J. Railton had "used their positions for their own gain." He accused the board's vice president, Harry Gordon, of having his house remodeled by city-paid workman. At a later hearing, he testified that E. J. Railton had sold city materials for his own gain. Other accusations alleging payoffs, fixed specifications, and nepotism made the scandal front-page material for most of January and early February. Council dismissed both Gordon and Railton at the end of January, and in March 1939 a Dallas County grand jury returned indictments against these two as well as several park workers.[33]

The park scandal helped further discredit the current bickering government and made the CCA's appeal for unity and efficiency more attractive. During this time, CCA officials announced their group would run nine new men, pledged to doing their own thinking and acting as an economical and efficient administration. As we have seen, the CCA had been holding nonpolitical, educational meetings emphasizing the accomplishments of city manager government since late 1938 because of their concern about a movement to abolish council-manager government. Such activity restored the CCA's image as a civic group bent on good government rather than a political party solely interested in electing its slate.

Other civic bodies announced competing tickets. Robert B. Allen and

Tony Brignardello established the Progressive Civic Association to run a slate of candidates for city council. That group promised that if elected it would investigate every department in the city and provide "a ticket of good, clean, upright men."[34] Robert B. Allen, president of the Progressive Civic League, also pledged to save Dallas from the gamblers who had supposedly had Dallas by the throat for the past three and a half years. He promised to bring in a new city manager and to promote charter amendments to allow the people to elect the mayor directly. Furthermore, he wanted to reduce city government from nine to six council seats elected from each district.[35] The Plain People's Party, dedicated to replacing the council-manager government with a commission form, also proposed a full slate in the 1939 election but eventually withdrew it. A fourth group, the Citizens Nonpartisan Association, called for cooperation with labor and merged with the newly reformulated Catfish Club. In addition to these slates, five independents ran, including George Sprague, incumbent mayor.[36]

Even before the association announced its nominees, CCA head Roscoe Thomas emphasized that his group would select only those who would "forget selfish sectionalism" and would "represent all of Dallas." In a later speech Thomas explained another theme of the CCA. "Dallas voters are tired of politics instead of business methods at city hall," the CCA head observed. "Dallas people know teamwork and a business administration will increase the city's prosperity." The CCA asked voters to elect all nine of its candidates in order to avoid the political bickering and division characteristic of the current administration. Proper coordination of government, according to this view, meant selecting team players, individuals who shared common assumptions about the nature of the city. This differed from politics that emphasized selfish agendas and particularistic goals. Politics, according to the CCA, had caused the park department scandal. Partisan politics during the election also threatened Dallas's well-being by "raising class and racial hatred." Implicit in all this was an assumption that harmony rather than division, and efficiency rather than democracy, were central to effective city government, for this promoted urban growth that would allow "the people of Dallas, laboring classes and office workers alike, to accordingly prosper."[37]

Both the *Dallas Morning News* and the *Dallas Times Herald* endorsed the Charter ticket. Although the *News* conceded that "there is a civic health in individual nominees seeking seats on the city council," it concluded that it is "nevertheless preferable that Dallas policies should be directed by men that the city is absolutely sure can work together for the common good." The lack of harmony in council for the past four years had, according to the

News, "retarded and in some directions completely stopped" progress in the city.[38] Opponents of the CCA viewed the call for consensus and cooperation differently. According to leaders of the other two slates, the CCA was not interested in serving Dallas as a whole. Rather, wealthy businessmen, powerful bankers, and influential newspaper publishers, many of them residents of suburban Highland Park, sought to use city government for their own selfish ends. Jack Burroughs, chair of the Citizens Nonpartisan Association, the CCA's chief rival, denounced the "hidden interests" behind the CCA slate. He particularly singled out Fred Florence, chair of the Republic National Bank, as the power behind the CCA. According to Burroughs, the race pitted "the people's ticket against the bankers' ticket."[39]

Despite the presence of a more representative ticket, including the first labor representative, the CCA drubbed the Nonpartisan Association and all other opponents too. More than 20,000 voters turned out for the April 4 election and gave all the CCA candidates a more than 2 to 1 victory over the opposition. Although traditional strong support from North and East Dallas figured in this victory, black votes also proved critical for the CCA success. Because of the efforts of the Progressive Voters League (PVL), Dallas blacks had become a significant factor in city elections. Indeed, *News* political writer Barry Bishop claimed that blacks constituted "the biggest and most solid [voting] block in the city." A year before the 1939 election, CCA opponent George Owens had promoted district elections to council rather than citywide elections because he feared that blacks under the leadership of the PVL might have too much say in citywide elections. Such a concern made sense, since few voters turned out for city elections and one well-organized group really could sway the outcome of the election.[40] Unlike the 1937 election, this time the league supported the CCA. Charter officials made no promises about black police similar to the one made but unfulfilled by the incumbent council. Instead, the CCA pledged to provide better and more parks and schools for blacks, as well as improve street conditions in black neighborhoods. According to the *Dallas Express,* the PVL endorsed the CCA slate because that organization best supported the program of the league. In an election that saw a little more than 20,000 citizens participate, the 5,000 black voters gave heavy support to the CCA ticket and according to the *Express* became the deciding factor in the election.[41]

Shortly after the CCA victory, council named corporate lawyer J. Woodall Rodgers as the city's mayor. Born in New Market, Alabama, in 1890, Rodgers held a B. A. from Vanderbilt University and a LL. B. from the University of Texas. He did further graduate work at Columbia University. Rodgers entered the Dallas law firm of Saner and Saner after World War I and in

1925 established his own law practice with Charles D. Turner. The Standard Oil Company of Indiana and its Texas subsidiaries were among that firm's clients.[42]

As mayor, Rodgers listed his top three priorities: elimination of the algae in the city's drinking water; the realization of a north–south central boulevard; and the preparation of a Master Plan. He also announced that since council had been elected as a unit it would act and speak as a unit.[43] More than two and a half months after the election, council also named a new city manager, twenty-seven-year-old James Aston. According to the *News,* the selection of a city manager would have been done earlier, but this council, elected on a harmony ticket, wanted a unanimous decision. Aston had been an assistant to Mosely and his right-hand man before taking over as city manager in Bryan, Texas. He only accepted the Dallas offer when council assured him that Mosely had no possibility of retaining his job.[44] Aston wasted little time and selected new department heads, including a police chief, fire chief, and public utilities supervisor.

In some ways, the true significance of this election, however, goes beyond its immediate impact on city government. For it marks the beginning of a twenty-year political dominance by the CCA and the powerful DCC. The agenda of the latter soon became the agenda of city government. The success of these two groups does not mark the first time business leaders helped shape city government—that has been going on throughout the twentieth century. Rather, it was the ability of the DCC to promote consensus among powerful businessmen and the capacity of the CCA to foster the same from the voting public that makes this union so significant. Both successes relied closely on the rhetoric of "the city as a whole" and an assumption that government's chief goal was to promote urban growth and development.

Once elected, the CCA, working closely with the DCC, proceeded to push its vision of the city. Toward this end it embraced comprehensive planning. As we have seen, the DCC had also made comprehensive planning a top priority in 1938, and the next year the businessmen elevated the employment of a city plan consultant and development of a new city plan to its top priority.[45] Just to make sure the newly elected councilmen also understood the needs of the city, C. F. O'Donnell, president of the DCC, visited each lawmaker and explained the group's program of civic development to them.[46] No doubt he emphasized the importance of planning, an issue that Mayor Rodgers already enthusiastically embraced. Not only would planning help the city prepare for the future and combat immediate problems but also, Rodgers believed, planning would focus on the city as a whole and help sweep aside petty political and sectional differences.

The idea of bringing in an outside consultant to help develop a new city plan had been discussed since the late 1920s. As we have seen, the Ulrickson Report recommended the development of a master plan, and in 1928 the City Plan Commission proposed that the city employ Harland Bartholomew to draw up a plan. It did not, choosing instead to hire E. A. Wood, local representative of Kessler and a man already employed by Dallas as city engineer.[47] He developed a master plan map but no real text-based plan as Kessler had done.

Controversy over the levee district led some civic leaders to call again for an outside planner. In 1929 John Carpenter had advised the Critic Club, an organization of leading citizens, that Dallas needed a new plan written by an "outsider, unhampered by local viewpoints and not to be influenced in the slightest by local pressure." According to Carpenter, in terms of planning the city had been riding on a "rudderless craft" since the death of George Kessler in 1923.[48] A year after Carpenter's comments, George Dealey wrote, "If Mr. Kessler were alive today, he would unquestionably urge . . . yet another plan for Dallas; a new city plan extending into the county as a regional plan, coordinating the needs of the present with the probable needs of the immediate future, and unifying the whole metropolitan area."[49] Karl Hoblitzelle, an adversary of Dealey over the levee district, came to the same conclusion about planning in 1938 and, as we have seen, articulated it at the initial DCC meeting. Politicians with their own special projects come and go, Hoblitzelle pointed out, but a master plan drawn up by disinterested professionals would provide a clear guideline for the city's growth. Like Dealey, Hoblitzelle also wanted the plan to "extend beyond the limits of city and county . . . and consider the vast empire from which Dallas draws her people and her wealth."[50] Both recognized that the real metropolitan community extended beyond the municipal boundaries and thus needed inclusion in any new plan.

With the strong endorsement of the DCC, the movement for a new plan seemed to get a boost. Robert E. McVey, city planning engineer, concurred with the DCC and noted that both the Kessler Plan and the Ulrickson program were now out-of-date. Ralph Porter of the Dallas Real Estate Board cautioned that "Dallas never will reach any real objective until the people from differing communities stop bickering and begin to look at suggested improvement from a city-wide perspective," something encouraged by a master plan.[51] Before council fired him, City Manager Hal Mosely had also urged the drafting of a new city plan and appointed a committee to investigate employing an outside planner, an action unanimously endorsed by the city plan commission.[52] The *News* editorialized its strong support by ob-

serving the importance of bringing in an outsider to provide an "objective view of the city's physical problems not clouded by local views." It also repeated the notion that "city planning substitutes expert engineering for the political muddling that often has marked city development in the past."[53]

Shortly after the 1939 election, to energize the city's planning process, city council hired E. A. Wood as Dallas's first city plan engineer. The chamber of commerce joined the movement in 1941 just before Pearl Harbor and established a committee on "Post-War Emergency Plans for Dallas," to prepare a twenty-five-year blueprint to help in the transition from war to peace. And during that same year, Wood completed two "master plans"—one for the fairgrounds, another for the city—while S. Herbert Hare of Kansas developed a park master plan. Like the earlier Wood-drawn plan, these were in fact more master plan "maps" than broader plans with text and ample discussion about current problems and proposals for the city's future.[54]

The DCC supplemented its planning movement with a call for the merger of the wealthy suburban cities of Highland Park and University Park with Dallas proper. In 1938 DCC leaders agreed to assist in a merger movement supported by Mayor Sprague. Civic leaders called for an election that year to amend the city charter to allow Dallas to add additional members to city council if Highland Park or University Park joined Dallas. Merger supporters dropped the amendment just about a month before the scheduled election as strong opposition to consolidation developed in the Park Cities.[55]

Despite this failure, DCC leaders decided to continue the push for merger with its wealthy neighbors. On October 19, 1939, the DCC executive committee voted unanimously to sponsor and finance a campaign to merge Highland Park and University Park with Dallas so as to protect the interests of each municipality. Toward that end, a DCC committee developed a borough system of government, roughly following that of New York City. This plan allowed the Park Cities to maintain control of their parks, police, schools, zoning, and other local functions while officially making them part of Dallas in time for the 1940 census count. Mayor Rodgers strongly embraced the movement and promised that merger would "eliminate the political barrier—the silk stocking bugaboo, the class distinction propaganda of a professional politician which has been the barrier to friendly relations between the three cities and detrimental to a united Dallas." For the mayor, the "well-rounded city" included "men, women, and children from all walks of life. . . . Let the strong encourage the weak," he continued, "the fortunate give aid and comfort to the unfortunate. Every city is composed of its north and south, east and west, and in the great scheme of things, none should live without the other."[56] Merger under this vision would eliminate strife and

finally recognize the interdependence of the three cities providing government for what Dallas leaders viewed as the real social unit. The "silk stocking bugaboo" that Rodgers referred to was the often-reported criticism that outsiders ran city business and politics in Dallas. The fact that DCC membership included fifty-three Park City residents as opposed to fifty Dallas residents gave the statement some merit.[57] Despite a strong lobbying job, the DCC failed to get a vote on the merger issue during the first two terms of the CCA council. However, after the 1943 election, the DCC and Mayor Rodgers revived both the planning and merger movements, making them inextricably linked.

Even before the election, council had authorized Mayor Rodgers to secure the services of Harland Bartholomew to assist the city in developing a master plan. City leaders had sought master plan studies for eight areas: airports, improvement of blighted areas, development of a downtown civic center, major street plan linking downtown to outlying airports, park and boulevard plans, revision of zoning, railroad track removal and relocation, and rerouting of buses and streetcars to improve traffic. The earlier map plans of E. A. Wood and S. Herbert Hare (parks) served as a starting point for a new plan that would be like the Kessler Plan, i.e., a plan with text and available for public consumption. Before finalizing details with Bartholomew, the mayor and several other civic leaders visited St. Louis, Kansas City, Memphis, and Louisville, cities for which Bartholomew had provided plans. What they found bothered them. Generally pleased with the work of Bartholomew, civic leaders returned to Dallas concerned that the cities they viewed had a head start on Dallas because they were already preparing for the postwar era. Louisville's interest in capturing the Latin American air trade particularly upset local boosters because they had assumed Dallas would dominate that trade. Kansas City's plan for 117 projects after the war and for an airport near downtown also made local leaders understand the type of competition they would face in their attempt to increase Big D's size and importance. Newspaperman Barry Bishop voiced such a sentiment when he warned that "competition between cities in the post war period will be the greatest fight for business and leadership this country has ever known." The trip underscored the need to plan and civic leaders returned to Dallas with notebooks filled with information to help their city become a major American metropolis.[58]

Council bought into the planning emphasis and ratified the contract with Bartholomew at an August 7 council meeting. Dallas gave Bartholomew $22,000 for developing the master plan. Under the terms of the contract, the planner would devote ¼ of his time to the plan for the next twenty months.

After that meeting, Mayor Rodgers excitedly told a *News* reporter that Dallas appeared on the threshold of solving all of its major civic problems.[59]

The city's governing body clearly understood Bartholomew's general vision of proper urban development as he made frequent trips to Dallas to share them with the city plan commission, council and civic groups. The planner wanted a "city better balanced in development and more desirable socially than we have had." Toward this end, he promoted a planning program of improvement focusing on the needs of the entire city and its metropolitan region. He also treated the city as a system of systems needing comprehensive and coordinated treatment. Bartholomew proposed a comprehensive major street plan and a comprehensive transit system plan, and a comprehensive plan for rail, air, highway and water transportation facilities. In addition, the planning document provided for a comprehensive system of parks and schools, comprehensive zoning, and the arrangement of public buildings. It also offered a comprehensive housing plan for Dallas and detailed a plan to improve the city's physical appearance. In addition, Bartholomew and his associates produced reports on a capital expenditure program for carrying out the plan and one proposing how best to administer the plan.[60]

In their first report entitled "Character of the City," the planners examined the city's history, its physical characteristics, economic and social background, and municipal finances. They characterized Dallas as a "man-made metropolis" and linked its growth as a trade and financial center to the expansion of the Southwest, an area that included New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. The plan explained that only by examining past developments could it "gauge the future" and lamented the inability of past zoning and planning efforts to "control the total urbanization process" for Greater Dallas (see map 5). Early planning efforts, according to the report, had not been comprehensive enough. Comprehensive planning for Dallas would promote an orderly future development and bring "the maximum urban advantage to all citizens at the most reasonable cost."[61]

The second report, "Scope of the City Plan," appeared in the same volume and laid out the broader purposes of the plan which included both economic and social betterment. First, it would bring "full and wholesome life" to Greater Dallas. It also promised to make Dallas a "convenient and pleasant place to work and live." Third, the plan would foster an attractive city more capable of luring new commercial and industrial enterprises. Fourth, it promised to promote good economy of city resources. Finally, the new plan would encourage "spacious and stable residential neighborhoods."[62]

The third report, "Past and Probable Future Population," anticipated



Map 5 Greater Dallas at the Time of the Master Plan. From the Bartholomew Plan for Dallas. From the collection of the Texas/Dallas History and Archives Division, Dallas Public Library (image #PA98-1/12).

growth patterns. It explained the importance of population projections in planning the location of future schools, parks, electricity, water and sewage, as well as a host of other utilities. The authors of the report thought Dallas "too widely scattered from a social science standpoint" and suggested that such a trend needed to be halted (see map 6). Toward that end, they recommended the need to establish and enforce "controls over all future urban development."[63]

The plan's comprehensive approach treated the city as a system of systems devoting separate reports to these different functions and parts. For instance, report number four proposed a major plan for a more efficient street system. It criticized the city's current "haphazard and uncoordinated development of the present system" and promoted a system that guaranteed greater accessibility to the Central Business District (CBD). At the same time, the report reaffirmed the interrelatedness of street planning to zoning, mass transportation, land use and population density. Street planning without understanding how other urban elements affected it would not succeed.[64]

The fifth report focused on the city's public transportation system. It proposed a transit plan that would "provide maximum service in those parts of urban areas now well-developed." An improved public transit system seemed necessary, according to the report, to promote the health of the Central Business District and to combat excessive congestion. The plan emphasized the best way to guarantee a coordinated streetcar system was through a unified management of that system. It also called for a gradual addition to and extension of the city's 230-mile streetcar system. If the recommendations were followed, the report predicted the development of "a system of transit facilities that will provide the best possible transportation for the people of the city . . . that will be harmonious with the other proposals and objectives of the master plan."[65]

Report number six planned the city's rail, air, highway and water facilities. The object of the report, according to the authors, was "a system of these facilities adequate to meet the needs and properly related to other components of the future urban area." For instance the planners called for a navigation plan for the Trinity River "coordinated with plans for flood control, soil, water and forest conservation, reclamation, alleviation of stream pollution, conservation of wild life, and the storage of water for municipal, agricultural, industrial and recreational uses." In regard to railroads the plan envisioned a "more harmonious relationship between the railroads and urban areas they traverse without any sacrifice in efficiency of railroad operation." The planners also recommended a comprehensive airport plan of



Map 6 Dallas in 1940. From the Bartholomew Plan for Dallas. From the collection of the Texas/Dallas History and Archives Division, Dallas Public Library (image #PA98-1/17).

twenty-one airports. The plan for truck traffic included terminals, provisions for heavier and wider pavements, recommendations for truck by-pass routes and proper traffic regulation. As with the other reports, planners closely coordinated the planning of public transportation facilities with the planning of other urban systems.[66]

"A System of Parks and Schools," the plan's seventh report, proposed "a carefully integrated system of parks and schools to serve the future growth of Dallas." After discussing the close relationship of schools and parks to neighborhood life, the report also stressed the importance of developing homogeneous neighborhoods. It specifically called for the development of additional neighborhoods for Dallas blacks. Towards this end, planners insisted on the construction of new parks in areas scheduled for postwar black development. The report also emphasized that it had been coordinated with the findings and recommendations of earlier planning reports on population, major streets and transit. Finally, "A System of Parks and Schools" repeated a familiar theme when it observed that "a comprehensive system of parks and playgrounds must serve all sections of the city and must be so diversified as to supply the needs of all age groups."[67]

The planners' eighth report, "Land Use," reviewed and analyzed the present development of the city, examined the city's zoning ordinance, and estimated future land needs. The authors reminded the reader of a common theme of the era, that "the city is made up of many small parts, all interrelated and interdependent. Unless all are coordinated with the Master City Plan," they continued, "resulting maladjustments will impair the effectiveness of the plan and introduce undesirable elements into the pattern of the community." Planners repeated here their commitment to promote "a comprehensive, well integrated and well balanced design" of Dallas land use. This report also stressed the need for better neighborhoods and argued that Dallas should be committed to developing and maintaining fine residential areas for "all income groups."[68]

In the next planning report, Bartholomew offered a new zoning ordnance to promote "a reasonable and well-integrated pattern of land use that would be part of the comprehensive master plan." The plan called for eleven different land use districts including two for single family housing. The A-1 district required single family lots of at least 10,000 square feet while district A-2 required single family housing on at least 6,000 square foot lots. This attention to single family housing attempted to correct an earlier zoning ordinance that had not included a zoning district for just single family homes. Planners noted that their zoning ordinance attempted to give "each particular land use . . . adequate area in a suitable location" with "the various land

uses properly related to all others into that pattern most beneficial to the community as a whole." The report concluded that the comprehensive plan benefited "the entire city and that in any conflict with individual interest, the public welfare should be paramount." Just as earlier planning reports had proposed comprehensive street, transit and park and school systems, the land use and zoning reports proposed systematic treatment of all the city's land use.[69]

Possibly the most remarkable of all the reports, number ten, entitled "Housing," outlined the first systematic housing policy and program ever developed for Dallas. Many of the city's bad housing conditions, according to the report, stemmed from "past methods of haphazard or inadequately controlled community growth and the failure of the city to adopt definite policies for firm control of housing standards." The report criticized Dallas housing and suggested that the entire city suffered from neighborhood defects. The reasons were simple, according to the report. "Past housing development [had] been left almost entirely to the vagaries of land and building promotion and exploitation. No conscious direction has ever been given this development, either toward meeting the needs of different ethnic and income groups, or toward controlling and coordinating the physical design and location of this growth. Consequently present housing is a patchwork of individual projects, bearing little relation to cohesive, unified, and homogeneous neighborhoods or to a logical community pattern."[70]

Bartholomew particularly worried both about the city's decentralizing tendency and its lack of effective neighborhood community. To stop the first trend he proposed more adequate subdivision regulation and unified control over the area's entire urban area. He also wanted to safeguard current Dallas neighborhoods by adopting new housing and building regulations as well as a new zoning ordinance. Furthermore, to promote neighborhood stability he recommended local government divide the city's residential areas into neighborhoods and encourage the establishment of neighborhood associations to protect the appearance of each neighborhood. He also suggested deed restrictions to guarantee "neighborhoods of good character." In addition, the plan recommended the rehabilitation of blighted neighborhoods and the clearance and rebuilding of slum neighborhoods. Bartholomew suggested that limited dividend public service housing corporations could be formed to do that task but also proposed additional public housing. The report concluded by noting that "good results can be achieved through cooperation and coordination of individual effort" and reminded readers that "harmful and piecemeal practices must be curbed."[71]

Report number eleven continued the process of focusing on city needs. It

provided a plan for the grouping of buildings into a municipal center for Dallas. According to the report, such a "well-planned group of public buildings would be evidence of well-ordered public business. . . ." Such a grouping would also improve the city's appearance, a topic addressed in report number twelve. It recommended placing such a center adjacent to the CBD where it would not "constitute an interruption of the more intensive high value commercial use of property" and where it could "foster an improved use of surrounding [the CBD] property not already fixed in character." That report reminded its readers that "It is not enough . . . that this future city be an efficient urban machine; it also must be pleasant and attractive place. . . ." Toward this end, the report examined the relationship of other planning phases to the city's appearance and suggested measures to improve the city's orderliness and cleanliness. In addition, it surveyed the design and appearance of both public and private properties in the city.[72]

The final two reports of the master plan proposed administrative policy and practices and a capital expenditure program. The latter recommended a twenty-five-year public works program for the entire urban area. The city at the time was guided by a six-year capital development program approved in 1940. Now the master plan would provide "a basis for coordinating . . . improvements, for eliminating duplication, and for insuring that each improvement [would] be in scale with the requirements that are placed upon it." The report also outlined the basic principles guiding the selection and programming of projects.[73]

In "Administrative Policy and Practice" Bartholomew identified two developments that would make the plan a "truly effective instrument that will direct the growth of the patterns most beneficial for all citizens." First, he urged a strong educational program to promote wide scale understanding of the plan and the need for it. Second, he called for "adequate legal powers and procedures" to fully implement the plan's various phases. Toward the former end he encouraged the publication and distribution of the plan. In addition, Bartholomew suggested the establishment of a new citizens' organization to promote the plan. "Such a large city-wide organization," according to Bartholomew, "could include representatives of all groups and interests without domination by any."[74]

The report also explained the specific legal powers and procedures necessary to implement the plan. It particularly emphasized the need to expand the power of the city plan commission from its advisory role. "Only such a commission," it warned, "could be representative of the various interests of the city" and take the "longview over political and departmental expediency." Just as the city manager's office coordinated Dallas government, an

empowered city plan commission would act "as the coordinating agency for all the governmental and private organizations that are engaged in building the city."[75] The report also stressed the need for better housing and building regulations, subdivision control three miles beyond city limits, health regulations for unincorporated areas in the urbanized area; county zoning, a state urban redevelopment law, and city mandated neighborhood organizations that would be "made an advisory arm of city government." In addition to these recommendations, the report reasserted the need for "governmental unification of the urban area" and suggested that this was the "most important measure needed to insure the development of the community in accordance with the Master Plan." This recommendation initiated another movement by Dallas leaders to have the wealthy Park Cities of University Park and Highland Park join the city.[76]

Unlike some interpretations of wartime and postwar planning which stressed almost a single-minded emphasis on improving downtown, this fourteen volume master plan did not focus solely on the CBD.[77] Although that section received significant attention so did the neighborhoods. A careful reading of the plan underscores the planners' "belief in the interdependence and interrelatedness of the city's different parts." A failure to educate Dallasites to this reality, according to the plan, had doomed the success of earlier planning efforts.[78] In order to focus attention on the city as a whole rather than its parts, the planners carefully avoided report titles associated with specific areas. For instance, Bartholomew produced no report devoted solely to the central business district (CBD) nor the levee district nor Oak Cliff even though the plan included proposals affecting all these areas. It is true that Bartholomew designed the major street plan in part to protect the central business district against decline by making it more accessible. The plan also called for the redevelopment and revitalization of the deteriorating west end of the CBD. And planners proposed to combat blight just outside the CBD by promoting the development of a "fine group of public buildings with considerable open space and planting." One of the major purposes of the master plan was "the development of a compact and stable business district, wherein high property values can be maintained over a long period of time."[79] But the plan had other important purposes, too.

As we have seen, Bartholomew's report on housing attacked the city's "haphazard and heterogeneous development" and emphasized the need to promote stable neighborhoods. It also called for better housing for the city's poor and minority residents. For Bartholomew and others interested in housing during the 1940s, bad housing included more than deteriorated dwellings. It also meant a neighborhood environment that promoted alien-

ation and anomie, rather than a sense of community and concern for the larger city. To help promote better citizenship, Bartholomew borrowed from Clarence Perry's self-contained neighborhood idea and proposed to divide the metropolitan area into eighty neighborhoods. Those units, developed around parks or schools, would promote a sense of local community by providing places for residents to meet and get acquainted. The plan's call for the organization of neighborhood protective and improvement associations in all the city's residential sections also would encourage more neighborhood interaction and civic consciousness. According to Bartholomew, "When the people of a neighborhood fully realize the problem and understand measures that would improve conditions, the first great step will have been taken in the preservation and rehabilitation of residential neighborhoods."[80] Such settings would also help them better understand the interdependence of the larger urban unit.

The report on housing particularly criticized the housing stock for the city's nonwhites. Dallas blacks, according to the plan, suffered not only from lack of proper neighborhood community but also from horrendous housing conditions. Prejudice and discrimination forced Dallas's black citizens, Bartholomew observed, to locate in "the areas of old homes, unsanitary conditions, and generally bad or inadequate facilities." Indeed, Bartholomew warned, "The condition of negro housing is one of the most serious problems confronting the community." Those obsolete areas required mass rebuilding while less severely run-down houses needed rehabilitation. To promote redevelopment, the plan provided specific guidelines on how to rebuild one of the city's worst areas, the Alamo neighborhood.[81]

Bartholomew also worried that the lack of planned development on the city's suburban fringe threatened to replicate "the haphazard and heterogeneous development found in the older parts of Dallas."[82] Indeed, he emphasized that effective planning would not stop at the city limits but would include Dallas's natural watershed, an approximately 200–square mile area that could be expected to be subjected "to some degree of urban development in the next 25 years." This area was "physically, socially and economically a single unit," and required expansion in a "balanced and coherent manner in accordance with a unified plan." The master plan, then, did more than single out the CBD for its single-minded attention. Rather, it focused on developing comprehensive solutions and coordinated systems from housing to streets for the entire metropolitan area. To facilitate such ambitious planning, Bartholomew concluded that there "must be a political unification in some degree."[83]

The emphasis on metropolitan planning, then, helped launch a new effort

to consolidate the Park Cities with Dallas. As it had done earlier, the DCC played a critical role in the movement, providing the funds necessary for a massive advertising campaign. The Greater Dallas Citizens Commission, organized in January of 1945, actually ran the campaign to merge the cities. Officials scheduled an April election to determine if Highland Park, University Park, and another independent North Dallas suburb, Preston Hollow, would vote to merge with the city (see map 6). C. F. O'Donnell, earlier chair of the DCC and resident of Highland Park, headed the committee composed of the area's leading civic leaders. That committee included 200 residents from the Park Cities. Of course, the publicity campaign primarily aimed at convincing the Park Cities residents to vote for merger, in what the *News* labeled as "one of the most vigorous campaigns in Dallas history."[84] According to O'Donnell, it was "difficult to understand how anyone interested in his own welfare through orderly and economic progress of our related cities could possibly see in unification anything but the greater good of all people."[85] Supporters stressed that the master plan could only be fully realized if unification took place.[86] The *News,* in a series of articles, promoted what it called "painless" annexation, arguing that Park Cities' residents would not lose their unique way of life after the merger with Dallas and hinted that Park Cities' voters would be guilty of "selfishness" if they defeated the proposal to join Dallas. Indeed, two days before the consolidation election, the Greater Dallas Citizens Commission ran a full-page advertisement pledging to protect the Park Cities' exclusive zoning, police and fire services, schools, taxes, parks, water and sewage, streets, and local prohibition.

Despite the massive campaign and the promises to preserve the Park Cities' lifestyle, University Park and Highland Park citizens voted against consolidation. University Park defeated the measure by 291 votes even though its mayor, A. L. Slaughter, supported the measure. Highland Park opposed it by 497 votes. Only Preston Hollow agreed to consolidation, by a vote of 300 to 76. In Dallas, every precinct voted for consolidation. The overall loss dealt a hard blow to the DCC and Mayor Rodgers, although the latter claimed that he would not give up his push for a Greater Dallas.[87] Voters in Dallas did approve an amendment to the city charter that allowed the city to annex adjoining unincorporated areas with or without consent of property owners and adopted another amendment that permitted the city to extend its zoning powers three miles beyond the city limits. A day after voters passed the amendments, council annexed forty square miles of Dallas County territory, including areas around the Park Cities.[88]

The city's failure to entice the suburban communities into union did not

derail the larger planning movement. Rodgers continued to promote the master plan program, terming it "a social trust to be protected against the whining and selfish interests." The mayor appreciated the remedial effects of the plan in combating further conflict and fragmentation in Dallas because it met "the needs of every community and section of the city without favoring one against the other, but with consideration for all."[89] That theme reappeared when local leaders offered a $40 million bond package, the largest in the city's history, in December to carry out some of the recommendations of the master plan during the next ten years.

This bond package reflected a commitment to improve the entire city and the impatience of civic leaders to realize the master plan. Bartholomew's effort had projected development over the next twenty-five years and anticipated the construction of public buildings between ten and fifteen years after its completion at a total cost of $146,957,000. He estimated the city's cost for master plan development at a little under $109 million. Local officials, concerned with the need to employ returning veterans, however, decided to accelerate the funding of the master plan and adopt a much larger initial bond package than anticipated by Bartholomew. Although it offered funding for some of the businessmen's pet projects, such as a civic auditorium, a public market, a livestock arena, and airport improvement, the bond package also included proposals for additional schools, fire stations, storm and sanitary sewers, waterworks improvement, and a public library. More than $25 million of the proposed $40 million went to residential neighborhood needs.[90] According to CCA president R. L. Thomas, "North, South, East and West [would] be treated fairly and alike." This might help explain why Dallas residents approved all seventeen bond issues.[91]

Civic leaders and the city government had wrestled with what to include in the bond program since the previous summer. On August 1, several of the city's leading businessmen visited council and requested bonds to cover the building of a civic auditorium, public library building, and livestock arena—all three buildings proposed by the master plan. Robert L. Thornton urged the inclusion of these in an early bond package because they would "build the city faster and place us in a better position to compete with other cities."[92] Debate over whether the bond package should include funding for a civic center—and if so, where that would be— delayed the eventual decision on what to include in the package until October 22, 1945. The two largest bond issues were one for $10 million for school construction and another for $7 million for the civic auditorium.[93]

Throughout the bond campaign, a campaign that saw no organized opposition, supporters emphasized how the city desperately needed the bond

program to keep up with urban rivals such as Houston, Fort Worth, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, and San Antonio. An editorial on the day of the election forecast disaster if Dallas citizens failed to approve the bond issue. By such action, the *News* warned, "Dallas would in effect abandon its magnificent city plan while its competing cities are going ahead."[94]

As it turned out, the plan and bond issue that passed proved inadequate to address the city's immediate needs. Neither had anticipated the city's rapid growth during and after the war, nor the annexation of forty square miles at this same time. Such action made the plan's street and sewer schedule ineffective from the start.[95] Indeed, in the 1940s, the war rather than planning proved the most important event influencing the city's future development. And it showed both the strengths and the weaknesses of the business-civic leadership approach to policy development and urban growth.

World War II brought an economic window of opportunity for Dallas. The city's well-organized business community, aided by efficient and cooperative city government, helped it to take advantage of many opportunities coming from war preparations. The war allowed the city to pursue its interest in aviation and in the military. Dallas leaders not only committed their energies to enlarging the city's airport and making it the aviation capital of the Southwest, but they also initiated an aggressive campaign for the aircraft industry in the 1930s, having promoted airplane manufacturing since at least the late 1920s.[96] In addition, city leaders offered Hensley Field, developed in 1928, as a lure to secure a military base for the city. Just as civic leaders used the war to promote their master plan ideals, so they used wartime preparation to boost these other concerns.

The business community's acquisition of the North American Aviation airplane plant proved one of its major successes. Chamber of commerce leaders had seriously courted airplane manufacturers since March of 1940. They emphasized the city's good weather, "open shop" traditions, and the willingness of local officials to cooperate with the company's needs. But Dallas secured its plant only after President Franklin D. Roosevelt fully committed the federal government to expanding the aircraft industry. In May of 1940, the president announced a production goal of 50,000 airplanes annually and mandated government assistance to promote that goal. Roosevelt authorized the creation of the Defense Plant Corporation and provided large financial assistance to that corporation to help it build plants for aircraft manufacturers. Defense concerns dictated that the aircraft industry decentralize from the coasts and locate new plants inland between the Allegheny and Rocky Mountain ranges. Except for these restrictions, the aircraft com-

panies appeared to have freedom to choose the sites for the new factories. Responding to this new opportunity, Thornton, along with Ben Critz, general manager of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, flew to California and visited with officials of the North American Aviation and Consolidated Aircraft (soon to merge with Hall Aluminum Aircraft) companies in an attempt to secure a new plant. Others on the special committee to secure aircraft industry included Nathan Adams, Fred Florence, C. F. O'Donnell, Z. E. Marvin Jr., and Henry S. Miller.[97]

Their efforts were successful. On August 18, 1940, the *News* announced that the North American Aviation Corporation had selected a site just west of the Dallas city limits next to Hensley Field to locate a $7 million airplane factory.[98] Civic and government leaders played a critical role in securing the plant. Chamber of commerce leaders worked hard to educate factory officials on the advantages of locating a plant near Dallas. In addition, they provided aerial, topographic, and soil surveys for the airplane company based in Inglewood, California. Chamber of commerce leaders also negotiated options from the twenty-seven property owners of the 140 acre site needed for the factory. City council spent $25,000 to expand Hensley Field by 104 acres and built a connecting runway between the plant and Hensley Field's existing runways. Dallas County Commissioners promised to provide necessary utilities and build the needed roads to accommodate the traffic. Officials in nearby Grand Prairie also cooperated and agreed to supply water for the plant and to establish a public housing authority to help address the anticipated housing demand. All these groups clearly understood the economic value such a plant would bring to "Greater Dallas."[99]

Groundbreaking for the plant took place on September 28, 1940, for what the Dallas Chamber of Commerce called "the greatest industrial development in the history of Texas." The factory complex, according to chamber officials, would eventually employ 12,000 workers, six times as many currently employed in the Ford Assembly Plant, the city's largest manufacturing concern. The main building, one of seven structures erected, was a windowless, air-conditioned plant, which encompassed 885,000 square feet of floor space. Plant A, which produced AT Trainer Planes, opened April 7, 1941. By the end of the year, North American employed more than seven thousand workers, a figure that would increase to over 39,000 by 1943 with the addition of Plant B to produce the B-24 Liberator. The $35 million undertaking not only boosted the economy, it also provided unprecedented job opportunities for women, blacks, and unskilled labor. As early as 1942, more than half the workers had never before been employed in a factory. That percentage increased as more blacks and women

entered the work force. In 1944, more than 13,000 women and some 2,400 blacks worked at the mammoth airplane factory.[100]

An equally impressive vocational program helped facilitate the massive labor requirements. Workers clearly benefited from the cooperation between North American Aviation and local and federal officials. The federal government provided $125,000 worth of equipment for a training school located at Fair Park. The Dallas Technical High School, a North American Aviation defense school, and a local vocational training center for blacks supplemented the Fair Park undertaking. The federally funded technical education, then, added immeasurably to the city's economic base by training thousands as skilled industrial workers.[101] It also provided new and better work opportunities for the city's labor force.

In addition to North American Aviation, the city secured two other airplane manufacturers during the war. In 1942, the chamber of commerce participated in the acquisition of the Lockheed Aircraft Modification plant for Love Field. This plant modified the Lockheed Vega planes and was, according to chamber of commerce officials, the largest of its kind in the United States. Like the North American Plant, it more than doubled its size during the war.[102] The Southern Aircraft Corporation also located an airplane parts plant in suburban Garland, northeast of the city.[103]

Other industries benefited from defense preparations as well. For instance, the Defense Plant Corporation built a $3 million diesel factory plant in Garland for the Guiberson Company. Contracts for ordnance production went to several manufacturers. Even established industries like the city's clothing manufacturers benefited from military orders. By March of 1941, well before America had entered the war, defense mobilization had produced more than $91 million in defense contracts for Dallas firms.[104]

Defense mobilization tripled Dallas County's industrial payroll between 1940 and 1943, allowing the chamber of commerce to claim that Dallas was "the war capital of the Southwest." When the numbers included nearby Fort Worth as well as Dallas, they were truly astounding. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that through September of 1943, $115 million dollars had been spent in the Dallas–Fort Worth area by the federal government on the expansion of war facilities. It also found that officials had awarded $1½ billion in contracts to Dallas industry through December of 1943. Approximately 90 percent of that went to the aircraft industry in the area, which employed 85,000 aircraft workers.[105]

In addition to the rapid increase of industry due to mobilization, Dallas also benefited from the expansion of the military presence in the city. As

with the defense industry, this did not just happen but resulted from booster efforts of civic leaders and a cooperative city government.[106] For example, local efforts played an important role in the Navy's decision to locate one of its Reserve Aviation Squadrons in Dallas. The chamber of commerce celebrated this announcement in August of 1940, and pointed out that it had resulted from a major campaign by that business organization to obtain a big training base for the city. General Manager Ben Critz and Industrial Manager Clyde Wallis of the chamber of commerce worked closely with Navy officials and prepared them briefs on the city's advantages. To secure the naval airfield, the city of Dallas deeded approximately thirty acres of its Hensley Field property, located on the opposite side of the runways from the North American Aviation company, to that military branch. The $1 million facility provided a practice training air field for Naval reserve flyers and would also serve during the war as an elimination flight school for aviation recruits. Twenty-five officers and 150 enlisted men would call the base home, as would four squadrons made up of 608 men.[107]

City leaders also secured the Army's Eighth Service Command, the first major U.S. command ever located in Dallas. That body administered the entire army complex for a five-state region and was called the Southwest's greatest and largest business organization. When the government changed the territory that this command serviced, dropping Arizona and Colorado from its region and adding Arkansas and Louisiana, Dallas leaders saw an opportunity to take it from San Antonio. Armed with facts and figures to convince Army officials that Dallas now was the geographic center for the Command, chamber officials undertook an intense lobbying effort to secure the military plum. The Army's announcement of its intention to move this multimillion-dollar business to Dallas in September of 1942 made hard-working civic leaders ecstatic. Not only did it bring in an additional 2,500 newcomers to the city and provide a monthly income of $250,000 but, according to chamber officials, it elevated Dallas to becoming "one of the principal military cities of the nation."[108]

The acquisition of the Fifth Ferrying Group, Air Transport Command, at Love Field in 1942 also profoundly impacted the city's postwar aviation development. The Air Transport Command operated a vast ferrying and transport network that flew planes, men, and cargo wherever they were needed throughout the world. Federal officials selected Dallas as one of the nine nerve centers for this network. As its operations expanded at Love Field in 1943, the army offered to make more than $6 million in improvements at the air field over the next three years if the city secured the necessary land.

That decision persuaded local officials to rethink aviation plans for the post-war world, disrupting proposals to abandon Love as the city's major airfield for a new airport southeast of the city.[109]

Civic leaders had established Love Field in 1917 as a way of securing an aviation training center for the Army Air Corps. The next year, when the Army declared the field surplus, fifteen local businessmen purchased it and ran it as a private airfield. The city bought Love Field on the recommendation of the Ulrickson report, issued in 1927.

Just as they had done in a number of other matters, civic leaders rather than government officials initiated the movement anticipating a great aviation future for the city. Dallas's commitment to municipal airport ownership appears to have been part of a national trend characteristic of the late 1920s. Encouraged by Charles Lindbergh's successful flight across the Atlantic in 1927—which helped demonstrate the airplane's potential—municipalities throughout the country turned to airport ownership. Dallas refused to stop with mere ownership, however, as voters passed a $300,000 aviation bond issue to improve the airfield. By 1934, the city manager reported that Love Field had been transformed "from an unfenced weed-covered field into a modern airport, fully equipped with the most modern apparatus for control of air traffic and given its highest rating . . . by the United States Department of Commerce."[110]

Love Field deteriorated as the Depression took its toll on the city and as reform government gave way to the Catfish politicians. However, the DCC led a movement to improve the field in 1938. Working closely with the chamber of commerce, it secured voter approval of a $300,000 general obligation bond for airport improvement that year.[111]

About that same time, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which specifically designated federal money for airport development. When Dallas officials applied for some of that money, the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) suggested they investigate the possibility of developing a joint regional airport with Fort Worth, a city less than thirty miles from Big D. Civic leaders, who had proposed a joint airport in 1927, agreed to look into the possibilities but smaller Fort Worth balked at the idea, fearing the larger Dallas would dominate any joint airport.[112]

Unwilling to give up, the CAA attempted to coerce Dallas and Fort Worth into the cooperative venture by inviting tiny Arlington, midway between Dallas and Fort Worth, to sponsor the proposed regional airport. Fearful of being left out, Dallas and Fort Worth joined with Arlington and agreed to establish Midway Airport in October 1941. According to the arrangement, the airlines would purchase 1,000 acres of land and deed it to the three cit-

ies, which in turn would form a corporation to erect hangars, repair shops, and a terminal. Federal funds would construct the runways and control tower.[113]

Despite the agreement, the cooperative venture never took place. Dallas Mayor J. Woodall Rodgers and Fort Worth's leading citizen, newspaper publisher Amon Carter, feuded over the final location of the airport's administration building after the plans were altered to make that building more convenient (and closer) to Fort Worth. Dallas newspapers vilified Carter's actions and worked hard to whip up a public frenzy against Fort Worth. Although the Army proceeded to build the airfield with Arlington's sponsorship under the Landing Areas for National Defense Program, neither Fort Worth nor Dallas participated in this venture.[114]

Because of the city's decision not to participate in Midway Airport, Love Field remained the city's principal airport even though it appeared to be inadequate for larger planes coming into service. Wedged in between Bachman Lake on the north and neighborhoods and business areas on the south, east, and west, Love Field's future seemed unclear. That might help explain why Mayor Rodgers was so interested in having Harland Bartholomew investigate the city's airport situation after the planner agreed to do the city's master plan. Realizing that aviation played a critical role in the city's future, and fearful that Dallas had fallen behind, Rodgers claimed that of all the parts to be examined by the master planner, "airport improvements have the No. 1 place on the city's master plan."[115]

After studying the matter, Bartholomew agreed with Dallas leaders' opposition to the Midway Airfield, arguing that the idea of developing an airport nineteen miles from the CBD was not "practical . . . for intensive local use." Bartholomew, who already worried about Dallas becoming "a scattered, abnormally decentralized city," thought such a suburban airport would accelerate the trend. "No large city has its main airline depot at such a great distance from the business district or from the center of population," Bartholomew told a local newspaper.[116] In addition, the planner found the airport "too small in size" for use as the city's superairport.

Bartholomew also believed that Love Field had a limited future because too much money would be needed to make it the city's future superairport. According to the planner, Dallas would be able to secure much greater and far superior air facilities "for the same amount of money" it would take to improve the city's current airport. As a result, he recommended that the city provide minimum expenditures to maintain Love Field as an adequate airport but construct a new one as soon as possible.[117]

Bartholomew recommended a site in southwest Dallas in the Lake June

area for the superairport. That airport would cover 4,400 acres and include 10,000-foot runways and enough room to expand them to 15,000 feet. Such massive size would allow Dallas to accommodate the largest air passenger and cargo ships imaginable. Located about twelve miles from the CBD and a twenty-minute drive from downtown, the site fell within the city's watershed in what Bartholomew viewed as the city's natural metropolitan region. Midway Airport was located outside that region.[118]

At the very time Bartholomew offered his airport plan, the Army made its announcement about improving Love Field. Local officials accepted the Army's proposal shortly after it approved the acquisition of the new airport site in southwest Dallas. Despite this commitment to developing an all-new "superairport," the Army's expenditures on Love Field, just a ten-minute drive from downtown Dallas, clearly revived interest in making Love Field the city's primary airport after the war. According to the *News,* the city decided to hold the Lake June airport in reserve until it had need for 10,000-foot runways. Dallas leaders saw the military's willingness to invest in Love Field as another window of opportunity for postwar economic development and took it. This was particularly important because for some time the city had seen itself as a major air center and feared losing its lead to other rivals.

Dallas businessmen, then, working through the chamber of commerce and the DCC, provided strong and unified leadership when responding to the opportunities brought on by World War II. Civic leaders, not local government, had taken the lead in securing an aircraft factory.[119] Civic leaders also provided both time and money to planning endeavors and to attract defense industry and military operations to Dallas. Aided by a government committed to the same priorities, the city prospered as it had never prospered before. Fighting the Germans, Japanese, and even Fort Worthians unified the city and created a consensus that manifested itself in the limited opposition the CCA council faced during the first half of the 1940s. In 1941 the so-called "harmony council" did face opposition from the Dallas Citizens Association, a group led by W. F. Jacoby, former director of the parks, and former utilities supervisor Joe Leopold, closely associated with the Legion of Honor. It attacked the CCA slate as under bankers' control, criticized council for turning the city over to foreign experts, and suggested implicitly that the DCC now controlled council and the city. Despite its promise to return government to the common working people, the Dallas Citizens Association could not even secure the endorsement of the AFL. According to Bill Harris, head of the local union, the CCA had "come to have a better understanding with organized labor [and] have recognized us in many ways." All

of the city's newspapers endorsed the CCA slate, and the *News* noted that the CCA had produced a "remarkably successful city government which had come far closer than its predecessors to achieving the true objectives of council manager government." The election ending the campaign termed the "dullest in years" saw a complete landslide for the CCA slate, with its weakest candidates drawing more than 65 percent of the vote.[120]

The CCA, cooperating closely with the DCC, proved very successful throughout the war years. In 1943, CCA incumbents ran unopposed for office, the first time that had happened in the city's history. Trying to explain the development, the *News* suggested several reasons for the lack of a political contest, including the war and "an apparent public confidence in the present administration."[121] Two years later, the CCA slate ran unopposed again. Although several CCA opponents tried to get up a rival slate ticket, they found few willing to run against the popular councilmen. Jack Barr, a Dallas contractor, explained the dominant attitude in the following way: "We have a competent group of city officials. I don't believe that there is anyone that is not in accord with the idea of a master plan for Dallas, and the present administration are [*sic*] the logical ones to carry on the work which has been going on for sometime."[122] Rapid growth and plans calling for the development of the entire city helped promote council's popularity. The lack of public conflict between members of council also proved useful in promoting an image of a harmonious council truly interested in serving the city as a whole. And the fact that the war had produced a booming economy certainly did little to discredit local civic leadership or local government.

The CCA's new success, then, appeared closely linked to the ability of the city's business leadership in using the war to improve the Dallas economy and plan for the city's future. The DCC seemed a most effective organization in identifying and responding to city needs. Civic leaders had called for a new comprehensive master plan since the late 1920s, but only when the DCC made it a top priority did the city secure one. Moreover, the extended newspaper coverage of civic leaders associated with the DCC and chamber of commerce working feverishly to secure defense industry and military bases for the area lent great credibility to civic leaders' claims that they were indeed working for the city as a whole. The emphasis on planning during the war, with its systematic treatment of the city, further reinforced that vision. In some ways, revitalization of the CCA and the development of the DCC could not have come at a better time. Because of the nature of the war years, which limited the type of programs the city could undertake; the general wartime mentality, which promoted consensus; and the city's ability to benefit from wartime economic opportunities—for these reasons both the DCC

and the CCA's emphasis on their type of city as a whole approach gained validity. Yet the legacy of that approach was not without its faults. The city's treatment of needy groups, particularly the poor and racial minorities, suggests the limitations of a city-as-a-whole strategy aimed at growth and development.

□ 6

Responding to Urban Problems: Limitations of the City-as-a-Whole Strategy

Civic leaders and government officials in Dallas did not totally ignore urban social problems such as bad housing and poverty, but their emphasis on the city as their primary unit of concern and their own peculiar notion of what best benefited *the city as a whole* clearly shaped their response to those problems. Prioritizing the city as a whole above the individual needs of minorities (such as African Americans or Mexican Americans) or other "interest groups" (such as labor) unquestionably limited how civic leaders and government officials responded to social problems and group needs. For instance, civic leaders defined bad housing as a problem not because it injured the individual spirit and inhibited citizens' ability to look out for their family. Rather, it drew civic attention because bad housing promoted sickness and criminality—forces that adversely affected urban stability. Civic leaders' focus on the city also helps explain their relative inattention to the plight of Dallas workers and their fierce opposition to union organizers. Since the booster rhetoric of the city emphasized ordered growth above all else, government addressed urban social problems most expeditiously when they seemed to promote disorder. But when "solutions" threatened to create turmoil and dissension among the white body politic, civic leaders withdrew or severely modified those solutions. The city's response to black crime and the black community's call for black police is one example of the limits of city action.

When the Progressive Voters League (PVL) in 1937 made the employment of blacks as city policemen a top priority, it was not the first black organization to do so. African Americans had been calling for such employment since 1888, but their voting strength in the council election in 1937 made

such demands more viable than ever before. As we have seen, the PVL endorsed the Forward Dallas Association in 1937 for two reasons. First it had been pleased with the successes of the incumbent council in meeting black needs. Second, Forward Dallas promised to do more and pledged to employ black policemen, build more parks and schools for blacks, and promote better housing and additional city jobs for African Americans.[1]

Several months after the new council took office, African Americans started lobbying with council members for the promised black police. The argument they used to convince city lawmakers to employ black policemen had nothing to do with their rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; rather, they offered a "city as a whole" argument. Dallas had a horrendous murder rate— one of the highest per capita in the nation. In 1936, Dallas experienced 105 homicides: blacks accounted for 79 of those murdered, and all but 5 had been killed by other blacks. Groups such as the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, the Negro Chamber of Commerce, and the PVL all claimed that the employment of African American police to patrol black districts could curtail these embarrassing numbers as well as diminish other black-on-black crime.[2]

Although council had discussed the issue in August 1937 during an executive session, City Manager Hal Mosely appeared reluctant to act without specific orders from the city's governing body. But that group, fearful of alienating some white voters, wanted Mosely to make the final decision and viewed it as an administrative matter. Meanwhile, Dallas African Americans saw no black police, due to what the *Times Herald* called a serious case of "buck passing."[3] That apparently changed after Dr. R. T. Hamilton of the Negro Chamber of Commerce appeared before city council on September 10 and presented a petition signed by 260 of the city's white civic leaders calling for the employment of black police to stem crime in black neighborhoods. Council voted 5–2 to instruct City Manager Mosely to experiment with the employment of black police. Councilman Starr Armstrong, a CCA member, made the motion, stating that "Dallas will be backward if we do not do this." Mosely feared council's action might promote citywide disruption by unhappy whites and "cause the old KKK to be revamped," but obeyed the council's request and ordered the civil service board to immediately prepare exams for blacks to take for the police force the following week. Police Chief Robert Jones announced that at least seven African Americans should be hired so a pair would be available each shift and a reserve available if needed.[4]

Initial reaction to council's decision appeared muted and resigned. The *Dallas Journal* editorialized that it believed council's decision a "mistake"

under the "existing conditions" but now would support the act. Early opposition came from George K. Butcher, former Texas KKK head, who on September 16 called for council to rescind the recommendation. Butcher feared that if the city hired black police that black leaders would next want black fireman, black meter readers, and black city health workers. Despite his agitation, the *Dallas Morning News* reported on September 19 that opponents of the plan, many of whom resided in Oak Cliff, had failed to show much strength.[5]

Opposition to the use of black police increased several days later, however, after lumberman George W. Owens got into the fray by claiming that "this is a white man's city and should be kept that way." According to Owens, "It is time to say we won't stand for Negroes tagging our wives and being insolent." The lumberman took two actions to halt the hiring of black policeman. First, he started a petition campaign, circulating a hundred petitions throughout the city. Second, he filed a temporary injunction to halt the civil service exam for blacks scheduled for later that week. In his request for the injunction, Owens pointed out that Dallas was an essentially southern city bound by southern ways in race matters. To employ black police officers would, according to Owens, create an intolerable condition, causing strife and friction and resulting in lower property values. Owens also claimed that because the city normally administered the civil service exam annually, it was illegal to give it before the end of the year. Justice Tom Ball of the Fortieth Judicial District Court in Waxahachie granted the temporary injunction and scheduled a hearing over a permanent injunction for October 4.[6]

The ruling and delay seemed to give new momentum to black police opponents. Shortly after the injunction former governor O. B. Colquitt spoke out against the employment of black police, claiming it would cause "a dangerous situation and would be certain to cause serious trouble" by inflaming racial prejudice. He argued, "It is our duty to treat Negroes fairly and to see that they are properly cared for but it is a serious mistake to start granting them equality. The appointment of Negro policemen would be the entering wedge toward social equality. City officials should be taught that such catering to Negro votes won't be tolerated in Dallas."[7]

Three days after the temporary injunction, the *Times Herald* reported that Owens had secured between 7,000 and 10,000 signatures protesting council's action. The same day political columnist Barry Bishop of the *News* wrote about what he called a "practical revolt of constituents" over the proposed employment of black police. Despite the continued support of a variety of whites including the Dallas Council of Federated Church Women, city council backed off when it saw the large resistance. The *Times Herald* did

not help matters when it ran the headline "Police Strike Rumored if Negro Cops Hired," even though the *Journal* reported that most Dallas police favored the hiring of black policemen. The *Times Herald,* which saw the effort to employ blacks as nothing but an attempt to pay a debt for black support in the last election, also reported that the local Ku Klux Klan played up the threat of black police when recruiting new members.[8]

In response to the growing pressure, council rescinded its recommendation to the city manager on September 28, 1937, by a vote of 7–2. Only the original sponsors of the resolution, Starr Armstrong and Emil Corenbleth, opposed the order to rescind and allow Dallas to join Houston, San Antonio, Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Galveston, and Austin as Texas cities already employing black policemen. In explaining why he now voted against a resolution he had helped pass, Mayor Sprague explained that "too many people don't want this carried out."[9] While it will never be clear how many actually disapproved, it is quite true that those who did threatened to disrupt the city if leaders did not follow their will, something taken seriously in an image-conscious city trying to recover from the Great Depression. In order to stem the possibility of disorder by the racists fiercely combating the city manager's decree, council reversed itself and ignored the pleas of the black community for justice.

The city's response to its black housing problem, although more complicated, also reflected a concern with not antagonizing whites as well as a desire to improve the horrible housing conditions of blacks. Again, local officials appeared motivated by a wish to improve the city as a whole rather than to correct injustices suffered by blacks. This approach clearly affected the nature of the city's public housing movement. As late as the 1930s, blacks lived in every census tract in the city, in part because 25 percent of that race provided domestic help for whites and resided in servants quarters on their white employers' lots. Most blacks, however, were confined to designated neighborhoods throughout the city (see map 3). The Hall Street–Thomas Avenue neighborhood in North Dallas grew into one of the city's largest areas. Other districts included Elm Thicket in extreme North Dallas near Love Field, Boggy Bayou and Wheatley Place in South Dallas, and a black section in Oak Cliff. Numerous Dallas blacks also lived in an East Dallas "black belt," close to the nearby mansions of Munger Place, one of the city's most prestigious addresses.[10]

Many blacks resided in ramshackle "shotgun" houses, narrow buildings that had rooms of equal width lined up one behind the other, allowing access through doorways without provision of a side hall or some other room, such as a side-galley kitchen, that could be used as a hallway. The name came

from the fact that one could fire a shotgun from the front of the house out through the back, through all rooms, provided that the doors were open. A 1925 survey of black housing in the city by the Civic Federation found 6,723 units for African Americans. Field agents inspected 20 percent of those homes and rated 51 percent of them as barely habitable or completely unfit for habitation. Sixty-six percent of all black housing had no bath, toilet, or indoor water.[11] Little changed during the next fifteen years. The first housing census for Dallas in 1940 discovered 13,789 dwelling units for blacks with 80 percent of those units ranked substandard.[12]

Early on, leaders realized that such housing posed problems for the city as a whole in two ways. First, inadequate black housing produced disease and bad citizens. The civic textbook, *Our City—Dallas,* written for the Kessler Plan Association in 1927 by Justin F. Kimball and required reading for the city's fifth graders, made this point in its chapter on "Zoning and Housing": since "many of the colored people work in the homes of the whites," Kimball observed, "the importance of good housing of the negro is a very vital matter to the welfare of white homes since ill-housed blacks could carry contagious diseases such as diphtheria, scarlet fever, and tuberculosis to the homes of their employers." Kimball went on to tell about such an incident involving scarlet fever, concluding, "We white folks of the south need, not only for humane reasons to our colored neighbors, but also for our own protection and the protection of our children," to see "that our colored people have decent, wholesome, clean homes in which to live and raise our children." The textbook also called for Dallas to provide new opportunities for blacks to become homeowners, since "the home-owning negro is a good citizen and can be depended on to uphold the law and to support the institutions of the state and the city." Kimball concluded by emphasizing the need to open areas for black housing—for humble homes as well as upscale ones. "We white people need this for the benefit of our city," he concluded, and for "our own homes as well as the benefit of the negroes themselves."[13] In an even more forceful statement about the "city as a whole" thesis, Kimball warned that "every such congested, overcrowded, unhealthful center is like a canker or eating sore on our fair city. The rest of our city can no more live and grow and prosper with such a condition, than our body can be well when it has as angry, bleeding inflamed sore on some part of it. The rest of the body will be injured in health and strength; so will the rest of our city."[14]

The other "problem" presented by bad and inadequate housing was that it encouraged blacks to move into white neighborhoods. The expansion of blacks into white areas in Oak Cliff, North Dallas, and South Dallas had helped give birth to the powerful Ku Klux Klan in the city during the early

1920s.[15] Even with the Klan's decline by 1925, tensions remained. Violence erupted when African Americans started moving into the 2300 block of Caddo Street in North Dallas. Vandals bombed Moses Stenor's home in late February 1927, one of four attempts within a month to wreck the homes of blacks moving into the area.[16] In 1929, the *News* reported that whites had tried bombings, burnings, and near riots to stem the expansion of blacks into their neighborhoods.[17]

Throughout the twenties the city responded to this so-called problem by passing racial zoning legislation, promoting racial covenants, and blaming unscrupulous real estate agents for causing the trouble. As we have seen, as early as 1916, city council approved zoning legislation providing for racial segregation by blocks. Council enacted the law to prevent conflict and ill feeling between black and white citizens. With the exception of servants quarters, neither whites nor blacks could live in a block designated for the other race. Both landlords and tenants could be fined as much as $200 a day for breaking the law.[18] One year later the Texas Supreme Court struck down the city's entire zoning ordinance because it violated the "natural right of property owners." The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled racial zoning invalid in its 1917 decision of *Buchanan v. Warely.* The city passed another segregation ordinance in 1921, however, attempting to circumvent the court ruling. That law gave the board of appeals on zoning matters the responsibility for residential segregation. If black or white property owners in a block gave written consent to designate the block either white or black, officials could record the decision in the county deed book. Only after three-fourths of the block's residents requested it could the block's racial characteristic be altered. In 1927 city council passed an ordinance strengthening the power of racial covenants, which restricted the selling of black property to whites. According to the new ordinance, it was "unlawful to make use of any such property so restricted." Three years later, when civic leaders amended the city's charter to adopt council-manager government, it reaffirmed residential segregation by securing section 321, which gave the city power "to provide for the use of separate blocks for residences . . . by members of the white and colored races."[19]

Despite this emphasis on legalizing de jure segregation, civic leaders acknowledged that in order to preserve segregation realtors had to provide decent housing for blacks. Such a theme appeared in Justin Kimball's civics textbook. Adequate housing for blacks, the book observed, was "one of the most importantly vital questions in city planning in Dallas. If suitable areas for good negro housing are not provided by wise city planning," Kimball

warned, "then not only will the welfare of the negroes be injured, but white districts will be blighted in values, the health and wealth of whites lessened, and worst of all, friction and misunderstanding between the races arise." Segregation would only work if the city provided blacks ample room to develop their own housing, something that did not happen in the 1920s.[20]

Conditions only worsened after the Depression. A 1938 city survey of nineteen slum areas found 3,334 of the 3,882 structures studied to be substandard. Forty-three percent of black homes in the Hall Street–Thomas Avenue area examined had no indoor toilet, while 31 percent of the dwellings contained no inside water. Another survey found that 30 percent of black homes were without electricity, while 83 percent were located on unpaved streets.[21]

Such conditions, along with the equally appalling housing for poor whites and Mexican Americans, presented a real dilemma to leaders who believed that bad housing threatened the welfare of the city as a whole. As early as October 1933, there appeared to be some interest in developing a nonprofit corporation to build housing for the city's needy, as allowed by the Housing Division of the Public Works Administrations (PWA). That federal agency provided 85 percent of the loan for low-cost housing at 4 percent interest. However, when this program stalled in Dallas and the rest of the nation, PWA officials decided to build low-cost housing and lease it to local officials.[22]

Despite some interest in the PWA's limited-dividend program, local leaders did not initiate a movement for local public housing when it became available through the PWA. Even though dreadful housing conditions had been documented by a WPA Real Property Survey in 1934, and even though city officials concerned with "the city as a whole" ran local government, public housing came to Dallas only after PWA officials approached M. N. Chrestman, local lawyer and former member of the Texas Relief Commission, about assuming leadership of a public housing movement for Dallas. Two PWA engineers had already made an investigation of the city and concluded that blacks desperately needed public housing.[23] The *News* applauded the movement, editorializing, "There are fewer greater civic services than the elimination of living conditions which breed crime from squalor and misery."[24]

Chrestman agreed to head a public housing committee and invited a group of local civic and business leaders to work with the federal government and investigate the city's housing needs and locate adequate sites for the projects. The committee included six whites and two blacks. Although it

appears the PWA had plans to develop a black housing project, the committee recommended the development of two projects, one for whites and one for blacks, to avoid the appearance of giving special privilege to blacks.[25]

From the beginning, that council planned to build separate housing projects for blacks and whites. Few could disagree about the need for additional housing, since the real property survey had found an acute housing shortage in Dallas with overcrowding in 22 percent of all homes. A very conservative estimate based on the 1934 Real Property Inventory concluded that the city required a minimum of 1,843 new units. The housing committee wanted $3 million in federal aid for a 200-unit project for whites and a 200-unit project for blacks. Black public housing, according to local officials, deserved top priority, but that changed when they found it almost impossible to secure an appropriate site. Although relatively inexpensive vacant land existed within the city limits, local officials stubbornly refused to look at those areas, fearing white protest if officials opened up a new black residential area. As a result, the housing committee focused on securing building sites in already established black areas. The committee found a site in the Hall Street–Thomas Avenue area but feared that title problems in a location owned by fifty different people would delay the acquisition of the area at a time when the PWA wanted to act swiftly.[26]

Despite acknowledging that blacks suffered a much greater proportion of bad housing than whites, the local housing committee requested that the PWA build the city's first public housing project for whites only. That project would be located on an 18-acre vacant tract in North Dallas. Most agreed with a *News* editorial that lamented the decision to erect a white project before one for blacks, since "there is a wider spread of inadequate housing and sanitation for the black than the white population."[27] But the city's color line, and local officials' fear that any breach of it might cause disruption and turmoil that would hurt the city, doomed the PWA project for blacks.

Shortly after the housing project got underway in December, the PWA appointed the Dallas Advisory Committee on Housing to select tenants, to provide a local liaison between the PWA and city government, and to supply advice on the project's management.[28] Members of that group included banker Joe E. Lawther, department store owner Edward Titche, Dr. Justin F. Kimball, and two women, Catherine Hanna and Sarah C. Moore. Nathan Adams, president of the city's largest bank, headed the committee.[29] Although that committee continued to articulate the need for a black PWA project, a curtailment of funds doomed public housing for blacks under PWA sponsorship.

The PWA completed its 181-unit white-only project in 1937. Development costs and the broader strategy of public housing in the 1930s, emphasizing rehabilitating the slum dwellers who were "deserving," also kept the city's neediest whites out of the North Dallas project, called Cedar Springs. Public housing advocates in the 1930s wanted their projects to do more than merely provide adequate shelter; they wanted them, according to the *Journal of Housing*, to make better citizens.[30] As the result, Cedar Springs included more than just dwellings. It provided neighborhood space and organizational activities to promote a sense of community and encourage citizen participation. The Dallas Housing Authority reported in 1940 that Cedar Springs was "alive" with neighborhood activities, all of which "have been sponsored and maintained by the tenants and neighbors in the area." The project had a monthly newspaper, as well as a variety of clubs. A new business district developed nearby and the city provided a park and recreation center as another community focal point.[31] To ensure the success of the experiment, public housing advocates let only those viewed as the "deserving poor" into the project. PWA officials required minimum incomes as well as credit and other references. Indeed, the nature of its residents, including a city policeman, made the project controversial in Dallas and infuriated much of the real estate community. Dr. Paul M. Pearson of the PWA responded by likening the project to "a sort of social siphon." By drawing people from bad, if not the worst, housing in the city, the projects would free up additional dwellings for those "living in less attractive quarters" and "in turn those deserted quarters will be taken over by the next social station. . . . It is hoped," Pearson continued, "such a process would help draw people from the worst slum area resulting in their destruction."[32]

If nothing else, the PWA involvement focused attention on the city's housing problems and helped ready Dallas for action when new opportunities occurred. That took place after Congress passed the Housing Act of 1937, which provided the nation's first permanent public housing program. Shortly after that act, the Texas legislature approved enabling legislation allowing Texas to participate in the program. Black leaders showed great interest in taking advantage of the new housing opportunities. Indeed, a joint committee of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce and the PVL examined the nineteen slum areas identified by the Real Property Inventory of 1934 and called for the city to participate in the recently created public housing program. Black leaders urged immediate action, since their survey also documented that more than 50 percent of the city's African Americans lived in these slum areas.[33] Social workers and members of the Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs joined African Americans in promoting the city's

involvement in public housing. Despite those endorsements, the non-CCA city council divided over the desirability of participating in the program. When Emil Corenbleth proposed creating a housing authority to undertake slum clearance and public housing, councilman J. Willis Gunn opposed the idea and Starr Armstrong asked that council postpone taking action on the housing authority for a week. Jim Dan Sullivan, president of the park board and a large property owner, condemned additional public housing and argued that private enterprise could furnish housing for the poor. After the weeklong postponement, however, council voted 8–1 for the authority.[34]

Although it is hard to evaluate the impact of Dallas business leaders on the public housing movement, it probably was not an accident that council voted for a housing authority shortly after the Dallas Citizens Council's first public meeting. At that gathering, Karl Hoblitzelle's keynote address specifically called for the city's participation in the federal government's program to eliminate slums. As we have seen, banker Nathan Adams, executive member of the DCC, served on the original Dallas Housing Advisory Committee for Cedar Springs and had a deep concern for the housing of blacks.[35] And when Mayor George Sprague appointed the first housing authority for the city, he included C. W. Davis, another DCC executive member on the committee. Others on that first housing authority included Rabbi H. Raphael Gold; Huber Boedecker, president of the Oak Cliff–Dallas Commercial Association; J. S. Loving, vice president of the Dallas Building and Loan Association; and James L. Stephenson, director of Cedar Springs, the PWA housing project. Despite heavy lobbying by the city's black leaders, and the fact that their support had helped elect him, Mayor Sprague refused to appoint an African American to the housing authority, fearing that white opposition to such a decision might torpedo the entire housing program. The Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) did eventually create a Negro Advisory Committee, however, to help in land acquisition and relocation.[36]

Shortly after its establishment, the housing authority ordered Assistant City Plan Engineer R. E. McVey to survey local housing conditions. Such an investigation would not only help the authority develop proposals to submit to Washington, but it would educate the general public as to the awful housing conditions existing in the city. Authority members strategized that an educational campaign might win additional support for this controversial program.[37] The city's black newspaper, the *Dallas Express,* disagreed and argued that any additional survey work to document housing needs was redundant. To underscore the need for immediate action the paper ran a series of articles depicting the grim housing conditions of blacks in Dallas.[38]

Despite this protest, the DHA proceeded to reexamine housing conditions, focusing on the nineteen slum areas identified by the Real Property Inventory of 1934. It defined substandard conditions as those that threatened health, fire, traffic, and welfare of the inhabitants. In the white areas studied, the survey uncovered substandard dwellings in 79 percent of those investigated. Indeed, the Mill Creek area, home of poorly paid white textile workers, contained the greatest number of slum houses in the city. Investigators rated 80 percent of those homes substandard. The survey also investigated a 191-acre slum area within the black Hall–Thomas area and found it contained 76 percent substandard housing, including 447 structures with "terrible conditions existing." In addition, the survey also identified deplorable conditions in Little Mexico, the city's largest Mexican enclave, located just north of downtown. Of the 588 structures surveyed, 568 or 96.6 percent met substandard criteria, including 257 with no indoor facilities.[39]

On reviewing the survey, the *News* demanded that something be done about the slums. "They ring the central business district with blighted areas that breed disease and delinquency and give the city a depressing appearance," it observed. Moreover, it concluded that "piecemeal improvement is impracticable." Rather, the *News* agreed with the DHA that such areas needed complete clearance and replacement with "modern low-rent apartments."[40] Based on the survey the DHA estimated that approximately one-fifth of the city's population lived in substandard houses and concluded that the city plainly needed slum clearance and public housing as authorized by the Housing Act of 1937.[41] Using this information, the DHA agreed to proceed immediately with a black project and promised to develop other applications for white and Mexican American slum clearance projects.[42]

Despite petitions from blacks in the Elm Thicket area near Love Field asking for slum clearance, the DHA decided to locate its project in the Hall–Thomas area, the proposed site of the earlier doomed PWA project. Several factors influenced that choice for the site of Roseland Homes. According to the DHA the "ideal site for slum clearance is one which eliminates the maximum number of obsolete and unsanitary dwellings and which lends itself readily to the development of a project of a size which would permit efficiency in management, the improvement of the neighborhood, and the stimulation of private investment to improve other property which is substandard." The slum clearance project would also help thwart the expansion of blight, which had been moving toward northeast Dallas from this slum area. Finally, according to the DHA, the project would bring better housing to an area that "has definitely [become] established as a negro area," and which was intended to remain that way by the city.[43]

Although council did not support public housing unanimously, in December it approved the resolutions necessary to allow the slum clearance project to proceed. Black leaders applauded the vote, but some residents in the twenty-six-acre Hall Street–Thomas Avenue neighborhood scheduled for clearance voiced displeasure. In a series of meetings beginning in June 1939, affected blacks gathered at the Munger Avenue Church and denounced the DHA's decision to undertake slum clearance in their neighborhood. They disputed the slum designation for Hall–Thomas and characterized it as "the most highly cultivated, progressive and sanitary community in Dallas." At one meeting more than seventy-five black property owners vowed not to sell and ended the meeting by singing "I Shall Not Be Moved." Unable to persuade the DHA to change its site, fifty-three black homeowners led by Will Higginbotham secured an injunction on October 10, and challenged the validity of the state's public housing law.[44]

Both homeowners and renters wondered where they would go after clearance. As we have seen, the city suffered from an inadequate supply of black housing, and black neighborhoods already experienced extreme congestion. At the very time that Dallas blacks protested their displacement, more than 600 whites poured into the auditorium of Ascher Siberstein school to protest the growing presence of African Americans in South Dallas, particularly the area bordered by Lobdell, Eugene, and Myrtle Streets near the newly constructed black Lincoln High School. Rev. John G. Moore of the Colonial Baptist Church led the meeting. Speakers warned of violence if blacks continued moving into the area. Several weeks later at another gathering, whites demanded that two black families move from the south side of Eugene Street immediately. Tension over the expansion of black neighborhoods also existed in North Dallas.[45]

The displacement of approximately 400 blacks so worried housing authority members that at one point they discussed the possibility of housing those being dislocated in tents.[46] The authority did not pursue such an option after City Plan Engineer E. A. Wood claimed in September of 1940 that he had found an area in North Dallas to develop for blacks without encroaching on white areas. He reported this discovery to the all-white Interracial Committee headed by Mayor Woodall Rodgers and DCC former head C. F. O'Donnell, appointed to help with relocation plans. Wood had found whites in a North Dallas area bordering a black neighborhood who would sell or rent their homes to blacks, he thought, if the Interracial Committee lobbied with them. This was the extent of the city's relocation plans.[47]

Delayed by the Higginbotham suit, the DHA did not break ground for the 188-unit project that would house 600 black families until January 2,

1941. Contractors destroyed 266 structures on the 191-acre site. Although the suit bought more time for the DHA to develop relocation plans, none were forthcoming.[48] Faced with severely limited options, some blacks, uprooted by the slum clearance project, moved into a previously all-white area of South Dallas. That action antagonized the area's white residents, who harassed the newcomers and bombed their homes.[49] Civic leaders responded to this new crisis in a way that clearly mirrors their city-as-a-whole approach to urban problem solving.

The first incident of what would become eleven months of violence against blacks in South Dallas occurred when C. L. Walker and George Johnson purchased homes in the 3600 block of Howell Street near Exline Park in South Dallas. When they attempted to move in on September 3, 1940, an angry mob of neighborhood whites, including many rock-throwing housewives, greeted them.[50] One month later, 100 "unmasked" whites visited blacks in the disputed area and told them to move or see their houses bombed. As one white agitator said, "We helped develop this neighborhood. We're too far along to move to a new neighborhood but we couldn't stay here with Negroes. So there aren't going to be any Negroes."[51] Council responded to white threats and violence not by an all-out effort to capture the bombers, something that might further antagonize whites in South Dallas, but by passing still another racial zoning ordinance on October 16, 1940. In addition, city officials offered to buy out blacks who had already moved into the contested neighborhoods. Mayor J. Woodall Rodgers deemed this "solution" as in "the best interests of all citizens in Dallas." Rodgers also blamed blacks who had moved into the white neighborhoods for causing the disturbances. Council rescinded its action on October 30, after being reminded that the state enabling legislation for racial zoning had been declared unconstitutional. Indeed, on hearing a related case, Federal Judge William H. Atwell branded council's October 16 resolutions as "un-American" and warned that it had "no place in any government statute, whether it be the city or the state."[52] Meanwhile, an indignant *Dallas Express* protested, "What will have to be done to make Dallas Policemen wake-up and take some action on the bombings in Negro neighborhoods?" The paper pointed out that Dallas had never experienced a race riot but that now it was a real possibility.[53]

Violence in the South Dallas neighborhood subsided by May, but a new crisis appeared in July when the South Dallas Civic League demanded that the Dallas school board turn Lincoln High, the recently completed South Dallas high school for blacks, over to whites. C. O. Goff, leader of the movement, presented a petition of 1,200 signatures to the school board requesting

the change. When that failed, South Dallas property owners filed an injunction suit to close Lincoln High to blacks. It too failed.[54] Responding to the new crisis, the *Dallas Express* editorialized in August of 1941 that in a short space of time, "Dallas has changed from a comparatively peaceful city, with race relations normal and cordial, to a city that is a veritable powder mine, requiring just one small spark to set off a race war." It particularly decried the lack of white leadership in responding to this crisis. City officials' limited response to these atrocities, it seemed, stemmed from a fear that more aggressive action in halting the violence might actually encourage additional disorder in the city by angry white residents of South Dallas.[55] Such action would be, in their view, harmful to the city as a whole.

Tension continued into the fall. Although Lincoln High School opened the academic year without violence, several more bombings did take place in November. On the 28th of that month, the city experienced its eighteenth bombing, although this was the first one in about six months.[56] The attack on Pearl Harbor and American entrance into World War II appeared to ease temporarily the hostile race relations but certainly did not completely eliminate them.

The 1941 city elections occurred in the midst of the racial tension. The PVL had supported the CCA in 1939 after that group seemed ready to provide better parks and schools for blacks. It refused to endorse the incumbent council and City Manager Hal Mosely, because they had failed to hire blacks for the police force. The solid black vote, which had been critical to electing the Forward Dallas slate in 1937, now played a critical role in defeating it two years later. By 1941, however, the PVL had become dissatisfied with council's handling of the racial problems in South Dallas and supported only two CCA candidates, Ben Cabell and Hal Noble. Had the 8,000 blacks who had registered and paid their poll tax voted, they could have defeated the CCA; but as we have seen, this did not happen and the incumbent council easily won the election.[57] After the election, the *Express* ran an editorial entitled "For a Bigger and Better Dallas," suggesting that it too bought into the city-as-a-whole strategy. In the editorial, it pointed out that the city could remain divided or people could forget their differences and "join hands to make Dallas a bigger and better city." Blacks had voted against the incumbent as a protest vote "against racial difficulties which have gone unnoticed in South Dallas." However, the *Express* pledged continued cooperation with the city to promote its growth and development.[58]

Black civic leadership, then, whether the black press or the Negro Chamber of Commerce, bought into the emphasis on the city as a whole and the goal of growth and development. Indeed, the PVL did support CCA candi-

dates throughout the rest of the 1940s, despite the ongoing injustices faced by blacks in the city. The CCA gave blacks at least some recognition, and a small piece of the pie, to promote a sense of hope that things would get better. Rarely did an alternative slate seem any more sensitive to the needs of blacks in this southern city.

Although white business leadership responded to black needs as much as or more than opposition populist tickets, they still failed to address adequately the city's serious racial problems. Unlike their ability to secure new businesses for the city and undertake massive projects like the centennial exposition, civic leaders floundered in the face of racial tension. While they were able to get most Dallasites to agree on matters affecting the city's economic health, racial issues proved another matter. Preoccupied with promoting harmony and consensus, viewed as necessary for ordered urban growth, the city leaders avoided strategies focusing on black needs and only developed programs to help blacks when such action conformed to their city-as-a-whole strategy. Since the hiring of black police posed a greater problem to the city (by promoting white unrest) than a greater good (by reducing crime), civic leaders dropped the plan.

Unlike the black police issue, civic leaders could make a stronger case for public housing in the context of their city-as-a-whole rhetoric. But as we have seen, their housing program brought as many problems as solutions to Dallas blacks and largely ignored the input of the people being affected. And when displacement of blacks led to unrest in South Dallas, local officials refused to protect blacks and thus antagonize South Dallas whites because such action could lead to further disorder. Rather they tried to avoid additional conflict by moving blacks out of the contested area.

Public housing for the city's Mexican American residents followed a similar pattern: civic leaders identified bad housing among Mexican Americans in Dallas as a problem that affected the welfare of the city as a whole. Fearful that the continued unimproved development of Mexican American housing in the city's largest barrio, Little Mexico, threatened the city's health and safety, leaders approached that problem from a perspective that emphasized the good of the city rather than compassion for the barrio's residents. Instead of providing adequate housing outside the barrio, which might have prompted protests from Anglo residents, local officials advocated strategies to rebuild Little Mexico and promote a better sense of community among its residents.

What became known as Little Mexico occupied an area covering ten city blocks along both sides of McKinney Avenue, just north of downtown. The area started attracting Mexicans around 1914. Surrounded by huge

warehouses and towering smokestacks, congested Little Mexico's population may have reached 10,000 by 1920 (although the census does not verify this), due in part to the impact of the Mexican Revolution. While that number declined after this period, Little Mexico remained, in the words of one of the city's guidebooks, "a close-packed mass of flimsy, tumbled-down frame shanties" and "shot-gun houses threaded by narrow, twisting, unpaved streets, muddy or dusty according to the weather." A survey of the area during the mid-thirties found 94 percent of the homes there in very bad condition.[59]

City officials had long been concerned by the district's miserable conditions. So had the Mexican consul for Dallas, Adolfo G. Dominguez, who described Little Mexico as "the filthiest Mexican settlement I have ever seen."[60] As the city in 1935 prepared for the centennial exposition, Mayor George Sergeant pushed for Little Mexico's improvement to avoid offending Mexicans visiting the exposition. Again, priorities focused on saving face for the city rather than meeting the needs of the Mexican Americans.

Sergeant's interest went beyond merely planning shelter. He proposed that PWA money could be used to develop a model village for Mexicans and a tourist site for city visitors. If the mayor had his way Dallas PWA money would produce a Mexican village with a central plaza and appropriate architecture. Just as San Francisco had its Chinatown, Dallas would have its Mexican village, providing good housing for its Mexican American residents and a tourist spot for visitors.[61] Public housing, then, not only would help Mexican American residents but would benefit the larger city.

Despite the efforts of local officials working with the Mexican consul to convince the PWA to allocate money for a slum clearance and public housing project for Little Mexico, none came. Tenants of Little Mexico did not have enough money to pay the minimum rents required by the PWA. Efforts to get the private sector to provide Little Mexico with better housing also failed, despite the fact that area had only four indoor toilets and, in the words of the past president of the Dallas Medical Society, was a "septic center that should be removed from the city's body." In 1936 the city's Lion's Club sponsored a cleanup program for the district but proved unable to provide additional housing units for the congested district.[62]

Once Congress approved the Housing Act of 1937, local officials jumped at the opportunity to develop a housing project for Little Mexico. They selected a fourteen-acre site containing only eight houses near Summit Play Park in the Little Mexico district. Work started on the $519,000, 102-unit project in September 1941, and the first tenant occupied an apartment September 16, 1942, amid much fanfare and celebration.[63] The project also in-

cluded a community center, equipped with an auditorium, demonstration kitchen, medical clinic, and library—not just for Little Mexico Village public housing occupants, but for the entire Mexican American community. Moreover, the DHA asked its project manager "to build solidly the foundation for a broad community and tenant activity program."[64] Again, officials promoted the idea that public housing in Little Mexico would improve the city's health and produce better citizens.

By the end of 1941, the DHA began construction on three other public housing projects. It developed a new project for whites in East Dallas after rejecting public housing in the area's worst slum area, the Mill Creek district. Before erecting the project, it demolished seventy houses in the fourteen-acre site. The $900,000 project would house 250 families. The DHA also more than doubled Cedar Springs by adding 220 units to the 181 already erected. Finally, the DHA built a 200-unit project for blacks on about fifteen acres of land in East Dallas near Wahoo Park. The DHA destroyed thirty-seven dwellings to develop this project.[65] The local housing authority completed all three projects by January 1, 1943, although wartime shortages delayed an addition to the new all-white project, Washington Place, until 1945. Between 1941 and 1945, the DHA had constructed 1,569 public housing units for Dallas. Of those, 900 units were for blacks and 102 for Mexican Americans.[66] Despite these achievements, the civic leaders' recruitment of war industry and the military intensified the city's housing crisis. When the Housing Authority completed the Cedar Springs Place addition in November 1942, military personnel associated with the Eighth Service Command, rather than low-income residents, became its first occupants. The DHA also turned Washington Place Homes over to the military after its completion. As a result, the DHA reported in 1945 that servicemen's families occupied 30 percent of its dwellings.[67]

Local leaders, then, did not completely ignore the needs of the poor during the 1930s and 1940s. They discussed the city's housing problems and their threat to the city's health and social stability. They even employed controversial programs like public housing to address the city's hideous housing conditions. But the emphasis always remained primarily on the needs of the city as opposed to the needs of blacks or Mexican Americans. Their actions underscore the central role that the city, as opposed to the individual or group, had in urban problem solving during the 1930s and 1940s. Such emphasis is in stark contrast to today's emphasis on individual needs and rights.

Despite the obvious limitations of such an approach, the emphasis on working for the city as a whole brought some benefits to politically impotent

groups like the city's Mexican Americans or the highly discriminated-against African Americans. Because their welfare did impact the larger city's welfare, civic leaders attempted to address their most visible problem, that of inadequate shelter. But the limitations of such an approach to urban problem solving outweighed the success. The city-as-a-whole strategy demanded consensus and avoided the appearance of catering to "special" interests. This not only limited how civic leadership addressed the issues, but also compromised the advocacy role of the black community or other "special" interest groups. For the city to prosper, the argument went, blacks and whites needed to act in the best interests of the city, even if it meant sacrificing one's own agenda. For the public welfare, blacks would stay in delegated areas and conservative whites would turn to the federal government for help. Certain responses by either group might be dangerous since they could encourage fighting and fragmentation within the city—something that would discourage the city's economic growth and development, and hamper the prospects of a good life for all Dallasites.

The city-as-a-whole strategy also dictated the city's response to its labor problems. Between 1935 and 1940 Dallas gained the reputation as one of the fiercest antiunion towns in the nation. Socialist Norman Thomas told the *Times Herald* in 1937 that Dallas had a nationwide reputation of being "more determined in its anti-labor attitude and activities than any other town of its size in the United States."[68] The treatment of female strikers during the 1935 garment workers strike underscored this point.

The Open Shop Association, created by the chamber of commerce in 1919, played a critical role in inhibiting the labor movement in Dallas during the twenties and early thirties.[69] New Deal legislation, providing some protection for laborers, helped the union movement overcome the Open Shop barrier and gain momentum. Between November 1934 and February 1935, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, at the request of local dressmakers, sent Meyer Perlstein to organize the city's dressmakers. Despite the city's conservative nature and its extreme antiunionism, Perlstein managed to enroll about 400 of the 1,000 dress workers in the union.

Faced with incredibly low wages and long hours—and companies unwilling to follow NRA codes—the dressmakers threatened to strike unless management increased wages and shortened hours. When company officials refused to recognize the union and fired suspected members, workers at all fifteen local dress factories went on strike. The strike turned violent on February 12, when pickets attempted to keep strikebreakers away and fought with police. Local lawmen responded with what one historian of the movement has called "brutal tactics" and excessive force. Union officials thought

it so bad they requested that state officials investigate the actions of the city's police force. Most of the violence stemmed from Dallas police efforts to enforce injunctions that limited the number of pickets outside of factories. This pattern of violence continued over the next ten months, as did the refusal of company officials to negotiate with the strikers despite the request of the State Commissioner of Labor that they do so.[70]

Local newspapers, owned by civic leaders, gave a limited picture of the strike. They focused on labor violence and made no effort to discuss the dreadful conditions that led to the walkouts. Nor did they report on local business leaders' efforts to thwart the new union and intimidate potential members. Moreover, the local press failed to disclose the behind-the-scene maneuverings of the Open Shop Association, a group that the Texas Industrial Commission recommended be investigated by the state's attorney general for its response to the strike. Dallas newspapers did cover in full detail the so-called strike-strip riot of August 7, where strikers attacked and stripped ten female workers attempting to enter the Morten-Davis and Lorch Manufacturing Companies. Despite a nearly yearlong strike, the job action failed as strikers voted to end the walkout. The local government, then dominated by the Catfish Club—voted in through labor's efforts—failed to respond to these working people's needs or even curb the police.[71] Nor did the city's most prominent civic leaders seem willing to mediate and bring a just solution to both parties. Because the press blamed the strike on outside agitators, and gave very little positive news about the workers, the strikers failed to rally public support.[72] In the context of the city-as-a-whole discourse, the emphasis in this matter was on the disruption of work and negative publicity generated by the strike. The civic leadership viewed it as a detriment to the economic development of the city as a whole and therefore did nothing to intervene to alleviate the real injustices suffered by the workers.

The antiunion activity at the Ford Motor Company plant several years later and a growing fear of labor radicalism again showed how the city-as-a-whole strategy could create severe hardships for the city's workers. The Ford Motor Company responded to efforts to unionize its Dallas plant as it had in other cities—with violence and a determination not to lose. Even before the CIO attempted to enroll Ford workers in Dallas in 1937, plant managers early that year created an "inside squad" of labor spies to snoop around for union activity and report any organizing efforts of their co-workers. When Automobile Workers union organizers, then affiliated with the CIO, arrived from Kansas City on June 23, thugs beat them up. Two days later general body foreman Rudolph Rutland helped organize a "strong-arm" squad

composed of some of the plant's largest and meanest men to discourage union recruiters and intimidate possible recruits. On June 30, the plant held a big anti-CIO rally and compared that organization with the Nazis.[73] Although the Nazi characterization came from Ford managers, the Dallas newspaper accounts of the CIO generally portrayed it as a confrontational, radical labor organization intent on disruption rather than cooperation, and a promoter of class divisions.

During the summer and fall of 1937, the company's "strong-arm squad" attacked more than fifty people. Three years later, in reviewing its actions, the National Labor Relations Board characterized the squad's antiunion efforts as extremely violent and exhibiting "merciless brutality." The "strong-arm squad" directed its actions not just at automobile organizers, but at any efforts to form unions in the city or promote worker solidarity. The violence climaxed on August 9 with two separate but equally violent attacks.

At the same time Ford attempted to destroy the CIO in Dallas, the AFL endeavored to organize the city's millinery workers. That group had suffered decreasing wages since the abolishment of the NRA codes and had become more sympathetic to collective action than it had been earlier. George Baer, organizer for the AFL-affiliated Millinery Workers' Union, had been in Dallas since April trying to recruit for his union and negotiate with employers. While there, Ford's strong-arm squad abducted him, beating him with black jacks so badly that he lost several teeth and was blinded in one eye.[74]

On the evening of the same day, the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, a CIO affiliate, held a rally in Fretz Park, in the heart of the city's cotton mill district, at the request of some local socialists. Union promoters had scheduled two movies for the program: "Millions of Us" and "The Plow that Broke the Plains." Before the first movie had been completed, thirty Ford employees including members of the "strong-arm squad" disrupted the meeting, smashed the projector, stole the sound recordings, and kidnapped the projectionist, Herbert Hill, a CIO organizer from Tennessee. After beating him, they tarred and feathered the half-naked union organizer and deposited him in front of the *News,* where a newspaper photographer awaited to take a picture of the distressed man.

Both cases raised serious questions about the commitment of the city's police to protect union organizers. In the Baer case, it appears that a Dallas police captain who viewed the union organizer as troublesome tipped off the Ford "goons" on where to find him. In the park incident, no police patrolled the area, even though the city regularly stationed a patrolman there during public events. In addition, it took city police more than twenty minutes to respond to the park disturbance, a seemingly long time for the radio-equipped

force.[75] And when Governor James Allred called Police Chief Bob Jones about the city park incident, the police chief responded that the incident only involved a "couple of Goddamned red sons o' bitches." The police chief also suggested that the only way to prevent further outbursts of violence was by closing city parks and the city auditorium to radical groups.[76]

Local newspapers viewed the attacks differently and strongly condemned them. In an editorial, the *News* called it a discredit to Dallas and lamented that "much of the favorable publicity gained by Dallas in the last two years" had been "undone in a night as readers over the nation learned of shameful acts perpetuated here." In a later editorial entitled "Vigilantes Not Wanted," the *News* condemned Police Chief Jones's desire to keep radicals out of the parks and city auditorium "as an unqualified abrogation of free assembly and free speech." It also cautioned, "It is just as unreasonable as it would be to punish a person whose pocket had been picked instead of capturing the thief."[77] The *Times Herald* editorialized, "There is no room for that sort of thing in Dallas." In discussing the attack at Fretz Park, the *Dallas Journal* in an editorial entitled "A Socialist Has Rights" mourned that the city had been disgraced, and demanded that those who attacked the socialist be apprehended. "This is no petty, personal assault and battery case," it declared, "this is a direct affront to free government itself."[78] City Manager Mosely echoed the same sentiments and promised that "whoever is responsible must be brought to account. The law must be enforced."[79]

When local violence against CIO organizers continued, and after the Dallas police chief failed to give protection to George Baer despite additional threats, Governor Allred sent twenty-five Texas Rangers to the city to find those responsible for the tar-and-feathering and to discover "why local officials can't learn anything definite about the series of outrages against freedom of speech and freedom of assembly."[80] Mayor George Sprague opposed the action as "outside meddling in our city law enforcement." City Manager Mosely also protested the governor's action, arguing, "We're on our toes and be they Socialists, CIO members or Baptist missionaries, they can rest assured that there will be no more tarring and feathering in Dallas."[81] But Police Chief Jones welcomed the additional law enforcement officers and claimed it would keep the city from having to employ more policemen.

The newspapers also approved the addition of state police to Dallas. The *News* applauded the governor's decision to order in the state police "to ferret out responsibility for local interference with freedom of speech." In an editorial entitled "People's Business," the *News* agreed that Allred was "right in furnishing whatever force is necessary to see that the practice [of

tarring and feathering] ceases or is punished." It also concluded that the governor was "wiser than the Mayor and City Manager, far wiser than those misguided zealots who have sought by force to repress in Dallas the right to think and speak."[82] The *Journal* also agreed that "Governor Allred did exactly right in ordering twenty-five state police to Dallas."[83]

The labor violence of 1935 and 1937 and the lack of local response certainly seem to confirm that local government and civic leaders had little time for the needs of working people and unions. However, a closer examination suggests that civic leaders compromised their antiunion stance in several instances. During 1937, probably the worst year in labor history in Dallas, representatives of the Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition, organized and managed by the city's elite business leadership, signed a union contract with the Dallas Building Trades Council making the exposition a "closed shop." P. Dale Jackson, president of the Central Labor Council, called that contract the biggest victory that organized labor had won in Dallas in fifteen years.[84] And when the millinery factory workers struck for higher wages and shorter hours on August 16, 1937, they asked Mayor Sprague to mediate, suggesting they had some confidence that this local official would treat them fairly. The newspapers also seemed more sympathetic to the strikers than in earlier work stoppages, and appeared willing to print reports criticizing management. The *News* reported that Governor Allred's State Industrial Investigation blamed "the chiselers making up a minority of manufacturers for its failure to secure a negotiated settlement." The same newspaper also reported that the Commissioner of U.S. Conciliation Service blamed the manufacturers for the failed settlement efforts.[85]

Maybe the strangest event to take place in 1937 in this strongly antiunion city was its open-arms reception of the head of the AFL, William Green. His visit to Dallas during Labor Day weekend garnered an enormous amount of publicity. Not only did he lead a twenty-block Labor Day parade, but he spoke at the Cotton Bowl on the grounds of the Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition, climaxing that fair's tribute to labor. In addition, he lunched with fifty of the city's leading businessmen. Several reasons seem to explain the city's embrace of this national labor leader. First was pure boosterism. The *News* quickly pointed out that Green was the first president of the AFL to visit the Southwest, and that Dallas had the honor of hosting him. In addition, this grand reception of Green seemed an easy way to give the city's laborers recognition without doing something that might stall the city's industrial growth. Finally, Green offered a more moderate position than the CIO and socialists, with a conciliatory message fitting more closely

with business leaders' view of working for the city as a whole. Indeed, in his speech at the Cotton Bowl, which the *News* printed in its entirety, Green attacked the CIO as being too radical for American working men and accused it of being communist inspired, reaffirming the suspicions local leaders had of the group, which seemed more committed to confrontation than reconciliation.[86]

Labor secured even more recognition in 1939 when the Non-Partisan League selected Wallace Reilly, manager of the Dallas Labor Temple Building and columnist for the *Dallas Craftsman,* as a council candidate. Although he was defeated, this was the first time since the establishment of the council-manager government that a major slate had included a labor leader.[87] And as we have seen, two years later the CCA, most associated with "the establishment," secured the endorsement of the AFL's *Dallas Craftsman.*[88]

The city's most powerful labor organization chose to cooperate with, rather than confront, the CCA and the establishment. It did this, in part, for the same reason that black leaders more often worked *with* Dallas leaders than *against* them. They shared a vision of rapid growth and development of this Southwestern city and agreed that its economic development, fostered by the city's civic leadership, would provide new opportunities for all in the city. They also understood that alternative leadership in Dallas offered less rather than more. The Catfish Club and its splintered organizations provided rhetoric welcoming both labor and blacks in the fold, but its four-year record had been disastrous. The city's worst labor violence occurred during these years, and blacks experienced deterioration instead of improvement in their housing conditions. Although Dallas blacks gained some parks and a high school during the Catfish years, they saw the 1937 council retreat from its commitment to provide black policemen. Moreover, one of the chief constituencies of the Catfish Club was white South Dallas working-class people. They were the city's most vocal racists, due in part to black expansion into their neighborhoods. Indeed, remnants of the Klan appeared to be reassembling in the 1930s, and probably they provided the only real political alternative to the CCA by 1940. Meanwhile, the CCA did not bill itself as a white man's organization; rather, it emphasized its commitment to "represent all of Dallas." Dallas people knew that "teamwork and a business administration [would] increase the city's prosperity," CCA head Roscoe Thomas claimed, and that would promote urban growth that would allow "the people of Dallas, laboring classes and office workers alike, to accordingly prosper."[89]

Citizens apparently accepted this notion during the war years when the city's economy boomed, since no opposition slates fielded candidates against the CCA in 1943 and 1945. But changes in the postwar years would create new challenges for the CCA hegemony, and eventually make it vulnerable to charges of bossism and tyranny. The CCA's response to the challenges marks an interesting but misunderstood chapter in the city's history.

□ 7

Politics, Leadership, and the Public Interest in an Era of Rapid Growth, 1945–1955

During the ten years following the end of World War II Dallas experienced growth unprecedented in its history, but civic leaders still maintained an approach to urban problem solving and the public interest reminiscent of the 1920s and 1930s. Their rhetoric and actions remained focused on the city (and the metropolitan region) rather than individual or group needs. Not only did this show up in the politics of the era, but it also appeared in the city's response to its black housing problem. In addition, the tremendous emphasis on civic loyalty by Dallas's newspapers and schools influenced the city's relationship both with its neighbor, Fort Worth, and with the federal government.

Between 1945 and 1955 the population of Greater Dallas increased by nearly 290,000, from 506,000 to 795,000. In that period, the metropolis gained 151,000 additional jobs and saw 105,000 new dwellings constructed. Furthermore, developers erected an additional twenty-five buildings in the central business district (CBD) during this period. The city's phenomenal growth can be credited particularly to its expanding manufacturing base and the increased migration to the Southwest. Nothing was more important than the city's involvement in aircraft manufacturing.[1]

Before 1940, the city had no one employed in this line of work, but during the war over 43,000 Dallas workers found jobs in that industry. Although this number fell sharply after Japan's surrender, the military action in Korea and the cold war kept this defense industry healthy, so that it employed 17,800 workers in 1953. The cold war also accelerated the city's rise as a manufacturer of electrical machinery and equipment. In 1940 there were about 600 jobs in this field in Dallas. In 1954, Collins Radio Company,

Continental Electronics Manufacturing, Texas Instrument Company, and Varo Manufacturers helped push that figure to nearly 7,000 jobs. By that year, manufacturing also accounted for 74,000 jobs, or 23.4 percent of the city's total employment as compared to the 1940 census manufacturing figures of 19,533, or 19.1 percent of the city's total employment.[2]

The development of the Southwest, and the city's critical role as that region's principal wholesale, retail, commercial, and financial center, also helped accelerate Dallas's growth. Ever since the city had secured railroad links with northern cities in the last third of the nineteenth century, it had emerged as an important wholesale and retail center. By 1948 Dallas hosted more merchant wholesalers than any other city in the Southwest. The city also ranked as one of the leading insurance and financial centers of the country by 1950. In addition, it benefited from the expansion of the federal government. Dallas had over 7,000 nonmilitary federal government workers in forty-three offices by 1952. The national government pumped more than $22.5 million into the city's economy annually.[3]

The discovery of oil in East Texas in the 1930s also boosted the city's growth after World War II. Although it attracted oil companies before the Depression, the city by the 1930s found itself surrounded by some of the most productive oil land in the nation. Several principal oil companies and hundreds of independent oil operators, along with many petroleum geologists and geophysicists, established their main offices in Dallas. The city also produced oil equipment and provided financing for the oil ventures.[4]

Dallas itself changed drastically during these ten years. Not only did oil replace cotton as a major economic stimulus in the city, but the automobile displaced the streetcar as the major means of local transportation. And as the city expanded—from 50 square miles at the beginning of 1945 to 198 square miles at the end of 1955—it felt the decentralizing effects of the automobile.[5] In addition, neighborhoods traditionally reserved for whites in South Dallas and Oak Cliff now housed a growing number of black Dallas citizens.

Other booming sunbelt cities experienced change in government and leadership after the war, but Dallas saw continuity in the nature of its government and leadership with the continued dominance of the Citizens Charter Association (CCA) and the Dallas Citizens Council (DCC).[6] Even more important, despite the rapid changes in the city, civic leaders continued to approach urban problems in a comprehensive fashion that reflected their continued belief that the city, as opposed to individual groups or neighborhoods, constituted the basic unit of concern. Leaders energetically re-

sponded to challenges and opportunities offered in the postwar era in this context and successfully maintained an image of working for Dallas. CCA leaders maintained public support not only by heavy expenditures in elections and domination of the media, but by actions that responded to the needs of the city's various groups and neighborhoods within this broader context. To have focused solely on the CBD would have undercut the power and influence of these business and professional civic leaders. But that did not happen. Between 1945 and 1955 all but one councilman elected was a member of the CCA, and the DCC's agenda became, in fact, the city's agenda. When tensions within the CCA threatened its hold on local government, its supporters in 1953 nominated Robert L. Thornton, founder of the DCC and the city's leading citizen, as mayor. Two years later, the good government organization again faced no opposition for office, the only time that ever happened in peacetime.

The CCA council elected in 1945 included five candidates chosen for their fourth term, one for a third term, and three for their second term. They unanimously reelected Rodgers as mayor but disagreed about the retention of acting city manager V. R. Smithan, who had replaced Aston on April 9, 1941, when the latter joined the Army. Despite criticizing Smithan for his lax effort to wipe out vice, council worked closely with him in regard to the execution of the city's most important task—the implementation of the Master Plan.[7] However, the city's rapid growth impeded the implementation of this ambitious undertaking.

Bond expenditures and the execution of the master plan occupied much of this council's term after the $40 million bond issue (discussed in chapter 5) passed in November 1945. Despite success at the polls, postwar inflation, the city's tax cap, and city officials' commitment to furnish streets and sewers for newly annexed areas thwarted much of the master plan's program, including the auditorium and all other public buildings voted on in the bond election. The rapid influx of population, the need to replace worn-out equipment, and the growing demand for basic services had a strangling effect on the civic leaders' ambitious plans. Even with the postponement of major projects prescribed by the plan, the city increased its 1944–1945 budget of $13 million to $21.5 million for the following year.[8] The city's unprecedented growth in population and territory also severely taxed its finances. By the end of 1946, Dallas had 75,000 more people than the master plan had anticipated. These new citizens needed basic services like sewers, streets, fire and police protection, and water. The city's $50 million debt cap, however, thwarted its abilities to address these needs. In 1952, Dallas ran out of

money to pave residential streets. Although the city completed more than $6 million in civic improvements, council postponed much of the work planned by the water and sanitary departments and the department of public works.[9]

Not only did the higher costs delay public projects, but they resulted in a fiscal crisis for Dallas. Although the city's tax base increased substantially, the population influx caused greater demand for high-priced infrastructure development, especially water, and for an increase in city police and fire protection. To help remedy the financial shortfall, council voted to impose a garbage fee to help make up the city's $1.97 million deficit. According to Smithan, the ninety-cent monthly garbage fee would raise as much revenue as a 31 percent increase in property taxes. He also noted that it would allow the 180,000 who did not directly contribute to city government "to do their part."[10]

Council's action angered some residents, who stormed a November 20th public hearing on the bill. Many from the South Dallas Civic League attended and used the hearing not only to attack the garbage fee as discriminating against small property owners, but to criticize city council in general. Mayor pro tem J. B. Adoue, substituting for Mayor Rodgers, appeared to lose control of the meeting, which eventually ended when five council members and the city manager left. When city council refused to rescind its ordinance, E. M. Lane of the South Dallas Civic League circulated petitions calling for the recall of the solons. He thought that "blood-sucking corporations" should "pay the difference rather than the small man."[11]

Meanwhile council also quarreled over the new zoning proposal Bartholomew developed for the master plan. The mainstay of that proposal rezoned some commercial property back to residential use. That and the strengthening of provisions for nonconforming uses met with heavy opposition, particularly from the Dallas Real Estate Board (DREB). In what the *Dallas Morning News* characterized as "probably the most controversial issue the incumbent administration has yet faced," council ultimately rejected what the DREB called Bartholomew's "idealistic" zoning proposal for one that basically reinforced the status quo. Indeed, the movement's historian concluded that "zoning revision triumphed over zoning reform as the city of 1929 remained inviolate, and new zoning turned to the developing fringe."[12]

The controversy and conflict surrounding some of council's actions provided new hope for CCA opponents and resulted in a plethora of parties and candidates in the 1947 municipal election. That hope may have increased in September 1946 when CCA president Roscoe L. Thomas announced his retirement as head of that organization. Thomas had played a major role in the revitalization of the CCA during his eight-year reign. His resignation came

more than six months before the upcoming elections, to provide his successor adequate time to select committees, organize precincts, and draft a slate of candidates for city office. According to the *Dallas Times Herald,* Thomas's retirement signaled the start of a "complete reorganization of the CCA." Not only would the nominating committee appoint a new president but it would also select an entirely new slate of officers.[13] That committee responded by nominating S. J. Hay, an insurance company executive, as president. The committee also selected Lenore Hall, a prominent club worker, as vice president.

The nominating committee and the CCA split over the new ticket. Some endorsed banker Adoue to head the charter ticket while Rodgers and his supporters rallied behind lawyer R. G. Storey. Adoue and the mayor had clashed over council's actions and the mayor's pet project, Central Expressway. Strong feelings both pro and con about the mayor pro tem ran high and threatened to split the CCA wide open. An inability to select the new ticket also stalled the CCA's effort to name a president. The matter eventually resolved itself when Storey withdrew from the race to become dean of Southern Methodist University's Law School, allowing the CCA to unite behind Adoue.[14]

Sensing the CCA might be in trouble, four opposition parties formed and entered slates in the 1947 election. The Greater Dallas Democratic Association was first to select its slate during the third week of February. Other parties included the All Dallas, GI and Veterans Party, a coalition of three organizations; the Greater Dallas Association; the People's Party; and the People's Protective Party. The names of those four parties underscore the context of the election. The CCA emphasized its role in adequately serving Dallas as a whole, while opposition tickets argued they could best serve Dallas as a whole and attacked the CCA for favoring special interests over the needs of all. All four opposition parties charged that the city's business and banking elite controlled the CCA and failed to respond to the needs of the people. Realizing that such accusations had not been particularly effective in the past, opposition groups also challenged the CCA's efficiency, impartiality, and honesty. L. L. Hiegel, former CCA councilman now campaigning for the All Dallas, GI and Veterans slate denounced his former colleagues and claimed that their incompetence had nearly bankrupted Dallas. C. G. Stubbs of that same slate criticized council for its failure to plan for the city's water needs, while Joe C. Luther of the People's Party accused current councilmen with "squandering and waste."[15]

The All Dallas, GI and Veterans Party also questioned whether the CCA really worked for the city as a whole. It argued that the good government

group neglected "the paving and sewer needs of the smaller communities." South Dallas residents created the Greater Dallas Association after the CCA selected twenty-three-year-old Joe Golman for the South Dallas seat. They complained that the CCA's choice insulted the area. Other council candidates accused the CCA of neglecting the needs of South Dallas and Oak Cliff. Embittered former South Dallas councilman L. L. Hiegel went even further and charged that the "outgoing administration was corrupt." The All Dallas, GI and Veterans Party also blamed the CCA-dominated government for providing unequal assessments benefiting large property owners.[16]

Opponents specifically held the CCA accountable for the previous summer's drought, and for the unpopular garbage tax. In addition, rival slates blasted the CCA for not providing a taxicab franchise to the G. I. Transportation Company and argued that the city spent more money on the municipal airport than it did to remedy its water needs. Others criticized the CCA's "wasteful practice of engaging high salaried experts from out of town to tell us how we should build our city." The familiar cries of banker control and Highland Park interference in Dallas matters also frequented the campaign.[17] Although the faces may have changed, the themes of this municipal election differed little from those of 1933.

Adoue's withdrawal from the race because of illness may have helped heal some of the divisions within the CCA. Indeed, the CCA avoided having to defend any of its incumbent councilmen by nominating an entirely new slate of candidates. That group joined the other four tickets in promising to repeal the garbage tax if elected. Despite this and several other issues, the CCA relied on its usual strategy of emphasizing the nonpolitical nature of the organization by reminding voters that "this ticket has been chosen carefully in the interest of good, honest government which the CCA has always sponsored. In every instance the office has sought the man, not the man the office." A campaign flyer took up the same theme, announcing that the slate consisted of seven businessmen and two professionals—"all married, all church members, all taxpayers." These men pledged, according to the flyer, "fair, impartial, businesslike administration of city affairs."[18] In contrast CCA campaign manager Robert M. Pery charged that special interest groups such as the CIO dominated opposition slates. Indeed, CCA leaders characterized opposition parties as being controlled by "self-seeking individuals—men who do not have the good of the city at heart." For instance, CCA council candidate Joe Golman accused his opponents as being part of "a political machine in South Dallas which seems determined to return the spoils system to City Hall."[19] Such an approach had a clear appeal to the

city's middle- and upper-class voters, who benefited most from the city's economic expansion and did not need additional social services. Those voters also shared the general ethos of growth and efficiency that dominated the CCA.

The newspapers seemed to agree with the CCA perspective and endorsed the good government slate. To vote for the CCA, according to the *News,* was to "insure Dallas a sane, conservative, business-like administration during the next two years." In addition, the *News* assured its readers that "the shadow of no political boss or back-room group hangs over them." The *Times Herald* repeated some of the same themes in its support. "These men were drafted," the *Times Herald* recalled. "Before they were asked to become candidates by the Charter Association, they did not even dream of going into politics. Their only ambition was to promote the welfare of Dallas as a whole to the best of their ability." It concluded that "they represent no special interest or extremist element."[20]

The CCA and its newspaper supporters also pointed out the need for a united council rather than one drawn from several slates. "If personal qualifications were solely determining, it might be difficult to chose in a number of individual cases," the *News* observed. "But the issue is much larger when viewed from the best interest of Dallas. That issue is whether we shall have a united, harmonious governing body at city hall, or one composed of two warring factions." CCA council candidate Roland Pelt called for voters to elect all CCA candidates since "we don't want any fussing at city hall with a split council."[21]

Despite the CCA's vulnerability, and the lack of endorsement from organized labor or the Progressive Voters League, it dominated the election. CCA candidates won two seats outright and secured six others in a runoff. Only the victory of G. C. Stubbs, Sr., of the All Dallas, GI and Veterans slate, over young Joe Golman prevented a CCA sweep. As usual, the CCA carried upper- and middle-income North Oak Cliff, North Dallas, and Northeast Dallas while the All Dallas candidates led in South Oak Cliff, South Dallas, and East Dallas.[22]

Under the leadership of new city manager Roderic B. Thomas and Mayor J. R. Temple, council continued to work on the implementation of the master plan. Council appointed the forty-five-year-old Thomas after Smithan retired to go into private business. Thomas, the first Dallas-born city manager, came to the city from Corpus Christi where he had served in a similar position. A graduate of Texas A&M University, Thomas worked as an engineer for the Dallas firm of Myers and Noyes and served as city engineer for

Highland Park before moving to Corpus Christi.[23] Mayor Temple lived in North Oak Cliff and had been the president of the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce. He also headed the Oak Farms Dairy Company.[24]

These men faced a difficult situation, since state-imposed limits to the city's tax rate and a self-imposed restriction on its borrowing capacity curtailed the city's income and made ambitious public works programs difficult. The city real estate tax rate, which included taxes for schools, stood at $2.45 per $100 valuation. The state limited cities to collecting no more than $2.50. In addition, the city charter permitted Dallas bonded indebtedness to only $50 million, a cap the city fast approached with $45,500,000 indebtedness. The limit prevented Dallas from spending $10 million for new schools even though voters had authorized that in 1945.

Frustrated by the limitation placed on the school district by the city's debt ceiling, civic leaders supported a successful effort to make the school system a separate taxing unit.[25] The next year local officials, helped by the DCC, promoted a $22.4 million bond issue that the electorate favored by a more than 2–1 vote. Moreover, every council district, including South Oak Cliff and South Dallas, voted for the bonds. The bond package included $9 million for water facilities for a city that had seen water usage increase more than 50 percent since 1941. In addition, other bonds included a $5.5 million proposal for sanitary sewers to cover the 25 percent of the city that had none. The city also designated $5.5 million worth of bonds for street paving, widening, and openings. Although supporters of the bond program emphasized how it would benefit "every major section of Dallas," critics suggested that Central Expressway would digest much of the designated roadway money. That roadway, the city's new north–south expressway, had finally been started in January of 1947, although work could not begin on the southern leg of Central until the city provided alternate tracks for the Southern Pacific Railroad to the old Houston & Texas Central Railroad freight yards. As a result, construction on that section came much later, starting on June 15, 1954.[26]

Despite that delay, and the implications it had for South Dallas, the CCA continued to present itself as an organization interested in promoting the city as a whole. That theme dominated the 1949 city election when the city's labor organizations decided to become more involved in city politics. As early as November 1948 the local CIO, with a membership of 7,000, announced it would take part in the next city election. Unhappy that working-class interests were too often ignored, it savaged the CCA's lack of effort to resolve the city's housing, health, and education needs, all affecting the working people of Dallas. In addition, it criticized excessive expenditures

for Central Expressway and for the "obvious bungling on Love Field and the water solution."[27] The AFL's Central Labor Council, which claimed to represent 30,000 working people, also attacked the CCA and promised to become involved in the 1949 local election to elect a council sympathetic to labor needs. Furthermore, it wanted a new city charter that would replace council-manager government with a strong-mayor–council form. This organized labor body complained that council-manager government simply was not "representative of the people" and was "too centralized in one man." The Central Labor Council also felt labor had been denied representation on committees appointed by the city manager and wondered why the CCA had never selected a union man to run for council. The incumbent city administration also alienated the labor council by paying city workers below prevailing construction rates.[28]

The CCA competed against three full slates, one partial ticket, and two independents that election. The Dallas County Democratic Association (DCDA) had strong support from the CIO in addition to independent unions and worked hard to secure endorsement from the city's black population. The DCDA also called for the election of councilmen on a district rather than at-large basis. It ran five candidates of its own and endorsed four other candidates on the Dallas Voters Association (DVA) ticket. Three of these nine candidates were union men, but interestingly enough, none of those union members belonged to the CIO.[29] The DVA, which the DCDA called "a junior charter association," nominated a full slate that included William J. Harris, president of State Federation of Labor. The DVA had been established by L. L. Hiegel, former CCA councilman from South Dallas. It opposed what it saw as the "dictatorial system" associated with the CCA and argued that Dallas had "remote control democracy."[30] Another slate, called the Change the Charter Association, entered a ticket calling for the replacement of the council-manager government with the strong-mayor–aldermanic form of government. Two independent candidates also ran, including the first black council candidate, Howard Daniels, Jr.[31]

CCA officials responded to these challenges by reaffirming their commitment to council-manager government. They also portrayed their candidates as being nonpolitical and "for the city as a whole," and attacked opponents as being promoters of special agendas. Indeed, one CCA spokesman lashed out at what he called a conspiracy of opposition parties to put the city government into the hands of "big labor union bosses and gambling racketeers." One CCA advertisement had warned, "Do not let a campaign of hatred, on the part of a political bunch seeking to grab power for the big national labor union bosses and the nation-wide gambling interests confuse

you." Another advertisement charged that DVA candidate William Harris was the "right hand man of Union Boss Caesar Petrulo of Chicago" and his election would introduce a political machine to Dallas similar to those operating in Kansas City, Chicago, and New York. Just as civic leaders often tried to secure support by rallying citizens around opposition to Fort Worth, the CCA tried the same type of strategy in politics, emphasizing bossism as the enemy.[32]

The CCA also benefited from strong endorsement of the city's daily newspapers, especially the *Dallas Morning News.* The *News* often emphasized the vast achievement of the city under the CCA and projected the good government group as a party of progress, with no ax to grind save the growth and development of Dallas in the interests of all of its citizens. In a front-page editorial the day before the election the *News* asked, "Shall we continue non partisan municipal government, of, for and by all the people of Dallas? Or shall we revert to the old style politically controlled government primarily 'for' the interests of one or the other of a small block of political leaders?"[33] The next day the *News* editorialized, "The Charter Association was formed for the single purpose of keeping ability in and politics out of city government. At two-year intervals, it has drafted men public spirited enough to devote more time to Dallas than they could really spare." Such action, the *News* observed, had helped promote in Dallas "a spirit of enterprise and progress characteristic of a great city."[34]

With the help of the newspapers, the CCA ably set the terms of political debate. Arguing that it worked for the city as a whole, such a discourse suggested, implicitly at least, that all opposition parties sided with special interests. In addition to the rhetoric, the CCA also could provide ample evidence of the advancement of the city as a whole under its tenure, an advancement carefully measured by demographic and economic rather than social indices.

Dallas voters apparently favored this approach. They elected all nine CCA candidates by a 2–1 margin in a contest that saw 23,696 votes cast, the heaviest turnout in the city's history. The CCA even carried South Dallas and South Oak Cliff, historically the most staunchly anticharter neighborhoods in the city. Commenting on the landslide, charter president Laurence Melton concluded that the election signaled "a complete vindication of the clean administration" of the CCA. The largest vote-getter was J. B. "Tieste" Adoue, Jr., who smashed labor leader William Harris for the Place 8 at-large council seat.[35]

Adoue, former chamber of commerce president and head of the National Bank of Commerce, had not served in council the previous two years due to

illness. Although he had been courted by the DCDA, the independent and highly ambitious Adoue agreed to join the CCA slate in February, despite some problems with that organization in the past. Many anticipated that if the CCA slate won election, council would appoint Adoue mayor. When that did not happen, a dispute erupted that nearly destroyed the good government group.[36]

Of the council elected in 1949, six were incumbents. None had served with Adoue, but they must have been aware of his rocky relationship with former mayor J. Woodall Rodgers. Adoue had also irritated some of the council candidates by sending a personal letter to the 68,000 eligible voters, something that suggested he was not playing by the team rules. When the newly elected council met with Melton to decide on the new mayor, it voted 5–3 to elect the current mayor pro tem, thirty-six-year-old Wallace Savage, to that post. Five incumbents voted for Savage. They argued that he deserved the post since he was the current mayor pro tem and was someone with whom council could work. Although it appears that council acted on its own, Adoue charged that the selection of Savage as mayor had been dictated by the newspapers and the "penthouse set." Savage's offer to step down as mayor after serving one year did nothing to assuage Adoue's anger and his feeling of having been double-crossed.[37]

In response to his slight, Adoue helped initiate a movement to change the city charter to allow direct election of the mayor. As early as July 1949, CCA leaders Laurence Melton, Lenore P. Hall, and Katherine Robinson asked council to place the charter-change proposal on the ballot. Council's refusal, by a vote of 6–3, underscored the split in the CCA over the issue. Failing to have council action, supporters of the change passed out petitions to force the vote. The Right to Vote Committee secured more than 14,000 signatures and got the proposal for direct election of the mayor on the ballot.[38]

Opposition to the proposal soon appeared with the formation of the Save the Charter Association. That group included three former CCA presidents and Stanley Marcus, generally conceded as one of the city's more politically liberal leaders. The *News* joined this group in an almost hysterical defense of the current selection process, one that the city's League of Women Voters endorsed as well as Alfred Willoughly, executive secretary of the National Municipal League. In a front-page editorial, the *News* argued that if passed, direct election of the mayor would provide "a substantial change" in council-manager government that would "seriously threaten the continued existence of council-manager government here." Another *News* editorial warned that if the charter proposal passed, "Dallas would eventually revert to a dictatorial, political-boss type of govern-

ment which most larger cities have discarded in the interest of efficiency, integrity, and cleanliness in city hall."[39]

Supporters of the change emphasized its democratic nature. Attorney John White, chair of the Right to Vote Committee, proclaimed that "the real issue is simply whether the people of Dallas as a whole should be given their democratic right to vote for the mayor of their choice, or whether some influential clique should be allowed to dictate the selection of mayor." Councilman Adoue agreed and declared that 68,000 people were better qualified to select a mayor than nine men who might be obligated to "certain selfish groups." Adoue pointed out that the fight to preserve the charter was led by a "clique of influential downtown and Highland Park tycoons." An advertisement for the proposal raised the same theme. "Take the election of Mayor of Dallas out of the hands of a small, privileged, powerful group," it pleaded, "and give it to the people to whom it rightfully belongs." The *Times Herald* supported the amendment and charged that its opponents deliberately misled the people.[40]

Despite the opposition of some of the city's most influential leaders and its most powerful newspaper, the *News,* voters passed the charter change by a 7,620 to 6,216 margin. The proposal to alter the charter also carried in seventy of the city's ninety-two precincts, marking a personal victory for Adoue and his line about a more democratic Dallas. The election is also significant because it emphasizes the limitations of the *News* and personal wealth in swaying elections. Despite the opposition of the city's prestigious civic leaders and the influential *News,* Dallas voters approved the amendment. Money and publicity did not guarantee electoral success in Dallas.[41]

Another charter amendment to raise the city's bonded debt limit from $50 million to $75 million passed that November. Only with an increase in the debt ceiling would the city be able to complete the needed water, sewer, street, and drainage programs scheduled for the upcoming year. Voters agreed and approved such a proposal by a vote of 8,793 to 4,107. As a result, the city undertook the largest public improvement program in its history, despite the continued squabbles within the CCA.[42]

Adoue's unwillingness to be a team player with the CCA continued to cause the good government group problems. Understanding the popularity of the maverick banker, it selected him to be its nominee for mayor in 1951. Although Adoue was born with "a silver spoon in his mouth," according to the *News,* he also had a "genius for saying and doing things that endeared him to the common man."[43] The CCA also nominated four incumbents and developed a ticket emphasizing its pledge to keep organized crime out of Dallas, continue the public works infrastructure program, and cooperate

with the proposals from the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, the DCC, and the Council of Social Agencies to revitalize slum-ridden West Dallas. Furthermore, it pledged the speedy completion of Central Expressway and promised to build a strong and efficient health department.[44] Two opposition slates challenged the CCA for council seats. Former city plan committee member Frank G. Graham established the Square Deal Association and ran for mayor because "we feel that the CCA has run its course and has deteriorated to the point that it is now running the city of Dallas for the benefit of a few and not the best interest of the people." His organization called for the equalization of assessments and the elimination of several "nuisance" taxes. The group also favored more precinct police stations and promised to solve the city's traffic and water problems.[45] The Non Partisan Association, led by Virgil R. Graves, nominated seven candidates but endorsed Adoue for mayor as well as a CCA council nominee. It promised to make city hall "a temple of democracy instead of a house of autocracy" and pledged to eliminate the city's tax on automobiles. Several independents, including a black candidate, Rev. Stacy Adams, also ran.[46] Dallas voters elected CCA candidates by a landslide, giving them majorities in ninety-two of the city's ninety-three precincts. Only 14,208 voted, compared to the 23,696 that went to the polls two years earlier.[47]

Despite the CCA sweep, controversy soon appeared in council over the future of City Manager Charles Ford. Council had appointed Ford to that post in December 1949 after Roderic Thomas had resigned to go into business. Ford gained the appointment when councilman Adoue refused to hire Kansas City city manager L. P. Cookingham. Council had originally invited Cookingham, acknowledged as one of the nation's best city managers, to help it find a suitable candidate. But after working with him, the Dallas lawmakers decided he was the best candidate and offered him the job for $27,500, a significant increase over the current city manager's salary. The deal fell through, however, when Adoue had second thoughts about the appointment and feared the high salary would make the selection unpopular with city voters. Because Cookingham would only come to Dallas if all councilmen were unanimous in hiring him, Adoue's lone opposition prevented the city from securing the services of the talented Cookingham. Instead, council hired thirty-eight-year-old Charles Ford, who had served as assistant city manager since 1945. It paid the novice city manager $13,500.[48]

Adoue soon became disenchanted with the new city manager and asked him to resign after the 1951 election. When Ford refused, Mayor Adoue charged him with inefficiency, ineptness, and bungling and asked the newly elected council not to reappoint him. Council ignored the mayor's request

and voted 8–1 to retain him, with Adoue's vote the only in opposition. This conflict, which continued until Ford finally resigned on May 2, 1952, set the tone for Adoue's administration.[49] The mayor, described by some as "bull-headed, vindictive and ruthless," not only constantly clashed with Ford and city council but had run-ins with the president of the chamber of commerce and new city manager Elgin Crull. A *News* columnist argued that Adoue's "one man show at city hall [had] put city government in contempt in the eyes of the average voter" and helped defeat a $19,185,000 bond issue in January 1952, the first time this had ever happened. At that same election, citizens also voted 6,639 to 4,120 against a charter amendment that would allow the city to exceed its $75 million debt limit by removing the city's $36 million of water and sewer bonds from its $75 million debt limit because they were revenue bonds.[50]

Other factors also helped explain the bond and charter defeats. The city's annexation policy, which since 1945 had added massive amounts of undeveloped land to the corporate limits, spurred the construction of 22,000 new homes during the next six years. And that rapid development led to demands for expensive infrastructure, particularly water and sewers. City officials responded by selling an unprecedented number of bonds to fund the development. Until October 1, 1945, Dallas had sold approximately $65,847,000 bonds in its entire history. During the next six years it sold $72,660,000 in bonds.[51] As a result, the city's debt, which had been $36 million in 1945, more than doubled in less than seven years, and taxes increased, also. Despite this, many sections in the city still had no water or sanitary sewers, and waste overloaded the downtown sanitary sewer system due to the new buildings and the aging system in place.[52] Faced with the mounting taxes not only from local but from state and federal government, the theory went, local taxpayers "revolted" and refused to increase the city's debt limit and sell more bonds since both affected taxes.

A third reason the measure went down to defeat had to do with the continued push of civic leaders to build a civic center. The civic center, proposed in the Master Plan of 1945, had called for a civic auditorium, a city hall, and a library near downtown Dallas. As we have seen, the auditorium had been a top priority for both the DCC and the chamber of commerce since the end of World War II. In November of 1945, voters had approved a $10.5 million in bonds for the entire civic center, but the need to provide basic infrastructure had delayed implementation of that bond. The city now seemed ready to move on the program and signed a contract with architect George Dahl to develop such an area. Landowners of the proposed forty-three-acre site, just south of downtown, protested the city's plan, however. The property own-

ers were particularly upset by the city's refusal to allow them to improve their land, since that might result in higher prices. Feeling that they would not receive a fair price from the city, the property owners organized as the South Side Association and opened an office in downtown to work against the center. Calling the civic center "lavish and costly and nonessential," the association wanted the civic center put to a referendum. When the city refused to allow a referendum on the issue, this group organized the City Wide Taxpayers Association and campaigned against the charter amendment to allow the city to exceed its debt and to sell bonds already approved. Led by former South Dallas councilman Emil Corenbleth, it argued that the amendment would allow the city to sell nonessential bonds for the development of the civic center. Such action, coupled with the still real need for essential services, Corenbleth warned, would cause a huge rise in taxes. The city could have proposed to increase the debt ceiling for essential services, but they chose a sneaky way, according to Corenbleth, so civic leaders could get their long-desired civic auditorium. Shortly after hearing this argument, the Dallas Home and Property Owners Association, led by longtime CCA nemesis Frank Graham, joined the opposition.[53]

The defeat of the bond and charter amendments proved the most serious setback suffered by DCC/CCA leaders between 1945 and 1955, sending shock waves through these groups. Some saw it as the first step in a campaign to discredit the CCA and council-manager government. Others interpreted it as a result of overconfidence and a misreading of the public by civic leaders. The *News* worried that the defeat of the bond issue did not "sound like the old Dallas."[54] The CCA responded to the defeat with a strategy to emphasize again Dallas as a whole.

In March, council started meeting with neighborhood groups and other civic organizations to help decide what bonds to sell in the next bond election. This resulted in a $49,985,000 bond issue. The city manager proposed $39,244,000 and the rest, $10,741,000, came from various civic organizations. Seventeen of the nineteen improvements requested were street improvements; the other two were airport expansion and a new library. Meanwhile, the city dropped plans for the civic center and offered a charter amendment to increase the debt limit from $75 million to $125 million to cover the proposed bonds.[55]

This bond package, dubbed the People's Bond Program, and the massive advertising campaign for it, emphasized that many of the bonds originated from the people and "that every section of Dallas benefits." Campaign literature also promised that passage of the bond package was absolutely necessary for the city's continued growth and development.[56] The strategy

apparently worked, as more than 32,000 turned out in the heaviest local election ever to support all of the bonds, as well as the charter amendment to increase the city's debt ceiling.[57]

Despite this success and the appointment of a new city manager after the bond election, tensions continued between the mayor, city manager, and council. The most important problem involved a severe drought that threatened the city's water supply. Dallas's spectacular growth and industrial development during and after the war severely taxed its water reserve. Between 1944 and 1948, to keep up with the demand, city officials spent $4 million in enlarging its water system. By the time it finished those improvements, new problems required that officials initiate an additional round of work on the water system, including a new water purification plant in Carrollton, Texas, north of Dallas. Despite these efforts, and a program calling for the Army Corps of Engineers to initiate a $60 million reservoir development for North Texas (eventually leading to the lakes of Grapevine, Garza–Little Elm, Lavon, and Benbrook), the city faced a major water crisis during Adoue's mayoralty.[58]

Dallas experienced a three-year drought starting in the summer of 1951. By October of 1952 this escalated into a full crisis when the Army Corps of Engineers issued a report predicting that the city had only a four-month supply of water left. Lake Dallas, the city's main source of water, had fallen more than twenty feet below its spillway, the lowest ever.[59] Council implemented water rationing, the third time this had been done in three years, and discussed ways of tapping emergency sources of water. It considered three major sources. First, the city could secure water from the Red River, although this would be costly and time-consuming. In addition, that water had a high mineral and salt content, which would result in bad-tasting and corrosive water. Second, the city could tap one of Fort Worth's water supplies such as Lake Bridgeport. However, Dallas would need Fort Worth's cooperation and enough water for both cities. Finally, the city could dam the West Fork of the Trinity River and use that water during the shortage crisis. T. Carr Forrest, Jr., water engineer employed by City Manager Elgin Crull to investigate matters, made that recommendation. According to Forrest, the West Fork solution offered the most practical and least expensive plan.[60]

That decision brought a howl of protest from many Dallas citizens, since upstream cities, including Fort Worth, had dumped their sewage in the West Fork for years. Such opposition helped delay council from proceeding with the West Fork option. While awaiting a resolution of that problem, council authorized the digging of several new wells and gave $36,000 to Dr. Irving P. Krick, of the Water Resources Development Company of Denver, to seed the

clouds with silver iodide to intensify any rainstorms in the Dallas watershed. That move of hiring a cloud seeder also proved controversial, but City Manager Crull justified it by pointing out it was cheaper than drilling additional wells.[61]

As more information became known about the type of treatment needed to make the West Fork usable, the mayor, who initially supported the plan, reversed his position and charged that the city manager simply had not been honest with council about the usability of the West Fork water supply. "We've been lied to by Crull on down the line at city hall," Adoue charged. "They know the truth. I have been doing a lot of checking on it," he continued. "All Crull and Hoefle are doing is putting it off hoping it will rain."[62] Having lost confidence in his own city manager, Adoue recommended that council appoint a committee to select an outside expert to investigate the city's overall water needs and to propose a solution to its shortage. It did that at a December 3 meeting, choosing Fred I. Brinegar, president of Continental Supply Company; E. DeGolyer, a geologist; and Robert L. Thornton, head of Mercantile National Bank. Council also voted to abandon the West Fork plan, a popular decision but one that left the city without any immediate plan for the use of additional surface water.

The citizens committee hired C. S. Stevens, E. W. Steele, and Jack Ledbetter of the Houston engineering firm Lockwood and Andrews to undertake the study. That group filed a report on February 10, 1953, and recommended that council should tap both the Red River and the West Fork as emergency measures. Council followed the recommendation, although the latter remained controversial and faced the wrath of Councilman George Schenewerk, who called the West Fork "a stream serving as a sewage outlet for upstream cities."[63]

Council members also wrangled over a proposition to secure water from below the Texoma Dam near the Oklahoma border. This recommendation had been made by Marvin Williams, candidate for mayor. Even though Williams acknowledged this was a long-term solution to the city's water needs rather than a remedy for the immediate crisis, Councilman Clarence Kloppe supported the plan and proposed that council request a $13.5 million bond election to finance it. In what the *News* called "a comic opera session," city fathers voted 7–2 against the plan. Mayor Adoue sided with Kloppe, who called the body a "do nothing council."[64]

City officials never utilized the West Fork Trinity plan, although it proceeded with tapping the Red River and used that supply throughout the 1950s as an emergency measure. Heavy rains in May 1953 finally eased the water crisis, but not before it had tarnished the CCA-controlled council's

reputation for efficiency and effectiveness.[65] Indeed, the water shortage played an important part in the 1953 municipal elections, an election that demonstrated one of the reasons the CCA continued to win elections during these years.

Despite some impressive successes, the incumbent council and its mayor had been highly controversial and often criticized. In addition the CCA appeared about to fragment over the future of Mayor Adoue, who had both strong supporters and critics in the good government league. As a result, 1953 seemed to offer new opportunities for opponents of the CCA to defeat that powerful body at the polls.

Although the city's political season usually started during January of the year municipal elections were scheduled, nineteen CCA leaders met behind closed doors on December 12, 1952, to discuss the future of their organization and nominate a five-person committee to recommend a slate. Notably absent from the meeting were several former CCA presidents and a present officer. The future of Mayor J. B. Adoue, an issue that threatened to split the CCA, most occupied the meeting. A number of the city's leading businessmen refused to endorse any slate that included Adoue, while other CCA members strongly supported the volatile banker.[66]

Fearing that Adoue would destroy the CCA's chances for reelection, S. J. Hay, chair of that body's nominating committee, asked the mayor not to seek reelection. Meanwhile, friends of Adoue launched a postcard campaign to show his continued voter appeal. The *News* also requested Adoue not run again.[67] Unwilling to act until Adoue made a decision about his future, the CCA put off naming a slate until February 23. By then, the mayor decided that he would not run for reelection due to health problems. Having solved one problem, the CCA operated quickly to secure an all-new slate of candidates for council, including former city manager Roderic Thomas. In addition, it selected W. J. (Bill) Harris, president of the State Federation of Labor. But its ability to secure Robert L. Thornton's consent to run as mayor proved its greatest success. Thornton, one of city's most powerful and popular civic leaders, proved a brilliant choice for an organization trying to overcome factionalization and retain its image of being for Dallas as a whole. By nominating Thornton for mayor, along with an entirely new slate of candidates for council, the good government association successfully distanced itself from the previously contentious all-CCA council. It also heeded former CCA president R. L. Thomas's recommendation to make the CCA more representative by creating a twenty-seven-member advisory committee to direct the CCA's campaign. Accord-

ing to the *News,* that committee represented every section of the city and also included blacks, women, and labor leaders.[68]

Marvin Williams, who worked in radio advertising, led the opposition ticket, named the Greater Dallas Party (GDP). It included a woman and a union man as candidates and stressed the failure of the current council to solve the city's water problem; and it endorsed its mayoralty candidate's proposal to secure water from Lake Texoma. GDP candidates also criticized the incumbent council's increase in utilities and its refusal to grant an additional taxi franchise. They also blamed the incumbent CCA council for not providing sewers to the city's Pleasant Mound and Pleasant Grove neighborhoods. Finally, they attacked "government by monopoly" and argued that "the time has come when the business tycoons and financial wizards who have used the city government for their own ends for the past twenty years must come to an end."[69]

To make local government more democratic, GDP council candidate Merl Scheffy advocated a municipal cabinet whose members would be selected from each of the city's council districts. CCA candidate and former city manager Roderic Thomas responded that such a cabinet would hasten the "return of the antiquated, discredited, aldermanic form of government" where alderman would fight for Pork Barrel projects for their own wards "regardless of the welfare of the city as whole."[70]

Indeed, the CCA continually argued that it had provided and would continued to provide the city with "business-like efficient, economical and nonpartisan city government." And because the CCA had no political favors to dispense, "every citizen's welfare [would] receive our full consideration." In endorsing the CCA slate, the *News* echoed this view. The CCA "is not a political party in the usual sense of the word," the *News* contended. "It is a group that is active only during municipal campaigns." Moreover, "The welfare of Dallas is its sole objective."[71] The CCA also emphasized that its candidates were not politicians but civic leaders asked to run for the good of the city. When Marvin Williams challenged Thornton to a debate, the latter responded, "I am not a politician and I do not engage in political debates with anybody. I think that a man who engages in a political debate has to have some elements of a politician and I have none."[72]

Despite its claim of being nonpolitical, CCA leaders were quite politically astute in the way they conducted the campaign. They organized at the precinct level and poured huge amounts of money into an advertising campaign. Fearing that the election might be close, CCA officials placed union man Bill Harris on the slate, the same man who had been labeled a threat to

the city's welfare when he ran against that group in 1949. Now with Harris on the slate, the *Dallas Craftsman,* the mouthpiece of the AFL, endorsed the CCA for the first time.[73] The CCA's efforts to improve black housing also gained the endorsement of the Progressive Voters League for eight of its nine candidates.[74]

The CCA's platform emphasized traditional themes—maintenance of a nonpartisan council-manager government and a pledge to "work as a team for the best interest of Dallas and all of its citizens." It also promised that Dallas citizens would never have to drink West Fork water, and committed itself to developing long-term water planning. In addition, the CCA platform vowed to keep organized gambling out of Dallas, to support the development of Love Field, to push the construction of a municipal auditorium, and continue to work to relieve the black housing shortage and improve interracial relations.[75]

The selection of Thornton as mayoralty candidate, and an all-new council slate, apparently paid off, as the charter ticket swept both the GDP and some independents by a vote of 2–1. Thornton soundly defeated Williams, attracting nearly 70 percent of the vote from the 31,586 who participated. Only sixteen of the ninety-seven precincts voted completely or partially against CCA candidates. CCA opponents, as usual, received heavy support from northeast and northwest Dallas, while some precincts in both East Dallas and Oak Cliff also gave the good government group commanding majorities. Even three of the four new precincts in impoverished and newly annexed West Dallas supported the CCA.[76]

Despite the city's rapid growth after World War II, the city's politics remained amazingly static. The CCA continued as the dominant power and even though the issues changed, the political rhetoric after World War II sounded strikingly similar to the prewar rhetoric. The CCA's success, then, can be explained in part by its ability to sell itself as the party of the city at a time when the city remained a major issue of concern for Dallas voters. And even though the CCA experienced real vulnerability due to the problems from the troubled incumbent council, it maintained its impressive winning-streak in Dallas after the war. It won not only because it controlled the terms of debate—emphasizing citywide issues and underscoring its success in providing relatively efficient and honest government for Dallas—but because it successfully disassociated itself from special interest groups and articulated a rounded agenda that emphasized economic growth and downtown development while also addressing neighborhood problems and pressing social issues such as the lack of available black housing. Although not successful in meeting the latter need, the attention and publicity given to the matter

seemed to reinforce the CCA's image of working for Dallas as a whole. With its emphasis on the comprehensive approach to urban problem solving associated with the Ulrickson program, council-manager government and the Master Plan of 1943–1945, the CCA remained viable after the war.

As we have seen, Dallas African Americans had suffered from horrible housing conditions throughout the early twentieth century. When Harland Bartholomew studied the city's black housing problem in 1944 he called it one of the most serious challenges facing the city and recommended the redevelopment of blighted black neighborhoods and the creation of new black neighborhoods on the city's outskirts.[77] Mayor Rodgers agreed and in December of 1944 announced that "slum clearance and minimum housing standards appear to be at the top of the list of all progressive cities for the postwar period."[78] During the same month, the *News* ran a twelve-part series on the city's slum problem, written by reporter Allen Quinn. After documenting the city's appalling black housing, Quinn went on to emphasize its negative impact on the city. Citing both the bad health and economic impact slums had on the city, he concluded, "There can be no excuse for Dallas keeping the slums which are cancerous growths upon the city's health." Quinn blamed the greed of white landlords as well as the economic conditions of blacks, along with the lack of adequate housing codes and zoning laws, for creating slums. And because of segregation, he concluded that "virtually every Dallas Negro, no matter what his economic or intellectual status, lives under slum conditions or in slum surroundings. It isn't from choice; he has nowhere else to go."[79] Although Quinn preferred that the private building industry provide the housing, he recognized that public housing might be necessary, a sentiment echoed by Mayor Rodgers.[80] Several years later, a joint congressional committee came to Dallas to investigate the city's black housing conditions. Pointing to the cause of overcrowdedness and appalling living conditions, G. F. Porter of the local NAACP repeated Quinn's contention that blacks were "hemmed in by the iron curtain of segregation." A year later, A. Maceo Smith, Dallas racial relations advisor for the FHA, identified the effect of such segregation when he disclosed, "It is harder to find homes for Negroes in Dallas than in any other city in the South."[81]

Despite the claim from the local real estate and building industry that they could provide for black housing needs, and despite the fact they constructed more than 30,000 new homes between 1945 and 1949, private builders erected fewer than 1,000 new dwellings for blacks, although Greater Dallas's black population increased by 30,000 between 1940 and 1950. Fearful whites thwarted efforts by private developers to build large projects for blacks on the city's outskirts. For instance, builder Hub Hill's plan to erect a

2,000 home development just south of Dallas city limits, near Cockrell Hill and Arcadia, ignited protests from these two suburban communities as well as nearby Oak Cliff. White homeowners claimed the location of an all-black subdivision near their neighborhoods would lower real estate values. Moreover, they alleged that such a development exploited blacks by locating them far away from employment opportunities. Yielding to the pressure from both inside and outside the city, council refused to provide water for the development and therefore blocked additional black housing. Such a pattern repeated itself as nearby white neighborhoods prevented the erection of five other large-scale black developments.[82] Not only did little new black housing appear, but completed public works projects such as the construction of Central Expressway and the expansion of Love Field actually destroyed black housing. Symptomatic of the housing shortage, more than 3,800 house-hungry blacks placed their names on a waiting list for public housing.[83]

Faced with limited housing opportunities, blacks responded in several ways. Many either doubled- or tripled-up with relatives, friends, or others. A 1950 survey of black housing conditions found about 7,000 African American families living with other families. Additional black families flooded into West Dallas, an unincorporated tract separated from the city's downtown by the Trinity River. Located on the flood plain that had been "salvaged" by the levees, the housing site remained susceptible to seasonal flooding due to drainage problems in the lowlands. A 1948 survey found nearly 25,000 whites, blacks, and Mexican Americans living there, more than four times the area's population in 1940. Before the war, 1,400 blacks lived in the eastern half of this nine–square mile area. By 1948, over 9,000 blacks resided in this setting of flimsy shacks, abandoned gravel pits, garbage dumps, open toilets, and shallow wells.[84] Conditions in West Dallas were grim. Fewer than 10 percent of West Dallas dwellings contained an indoor toilet in 1948, while only 15 percent of the houses had running water. Tenants drank from shallow wells often located in the same area where human waste was disposed. Problems with inadequate water and sewage help explain the area's disproportionally high number of typhoid, tuberculosis, and polio cases. The area also became a notorious center of criminal activity.[85]

More-prosperous blacks attempted to find housing in South Dallas and bought dwellings from working-class whites eager to flee their deteriorating neighborhoods. The Exline Park area, scene of the 1940 bombings, continued to attract blacks because it bordered an established African American neighborhood. Unfortunately for blacks, some South Dallas whites reacted

as they had in 1940, with bombings and arson to keep blacks from expanding further into their neighborhoods. On February 8, 1950, whites bombed Horace Bonner's home at 2515 Southland Street, near Exline Park. The blast destroyed the front of the house, although Bonner, his wife, and mother-in-law escaped injury.[86] During the next one and a half years bombers attacked twelve black homes in a two–square mile neighborhood of South Dallas. This violence created a real challenge to Dallas leadership. It needed to protect black homeowners and produce alternative housing for blacks while at the same time quelling South Dallas fears that the city had decided to turn their neighborhoods over to blacks.

The bombings intensified Dallas leaders' efforts to find additional housing for blacks. Shortly after the first bombing, Mayor Wallace Savage again repeated his call for additional public housing for blacks. Soon after Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, the DHA with city council's approval had requested 2,800 units of public housing be allocated for Dallas, approximately 10 percent of the number of substantial dwellings found in the 1940 Housing Census. The DHA designated between 70 and 75 percent for black and Mexican American housing. Following the recommendations of the Master Plan, the city also applied for and received a preliminary loan under Title 1 of the Housing Act to plan for the slum clearance and urban redevelopment of a twenty-block slum area in the Mill Creek district. The city eventually applied for $25 million in federal aid for the slum clearance project and was one of the first five cities in the nation to develop a detailed slum clearance proposal. Unfortunately, the lack of state enabling legislation allowing the city to take land for clearance would thwart the city's efforts at slum redevelopment during this time. Moreover, the fierce resistance to public housing by groups such as the Dallas Council for Free Enterprise, established by local realtors and home builders, also stalled the public housing component. Chaired by D. A. Frank, the Council for Free Enterprise lobbied against slum clearance and public housing, arguing it would provide "temptations for graft, corruption and favoritism." Frank also claimed that he had not "found any place in Dallas [he] would call a slum."[87]

Yielding to the pressure of the Free Enterprise Council and the Dallas Home Builders Association, the city agreed to postpone action on public housing and gave home builders ninety days to provide a private solution to the black housing crisis. One such proposal, to turn over part of South Dallas exclusively to blacks, worsened the already heightened tension in that section among whites. Lovell Turner, Dallas realtor and member of the Dallas Free Enterprise Council, proposed to transfer white housing to black housing in an area from south Lamar and Warren Avenues northeast to the

Texas & Pacific railroad tracks. This only increased the paranoia of white South Dallas residents and made some suspect that a deal had been already worked out to abandon their section to black housing. More than 500 angry South Dallas whites attended a meeting on February 23 to protest Turner's proposal. There they heard councilman Roland Pelt, a builder by trade, announce an alternative for dealing with the black housing shortage. Pelt, who headed the builders' committee to find adequate black housing sites, proposed to develop an entire "Negro city" on a 3,000-acre tract of vacant land in the Trinity River bottoms in northwest Dallas, between Harry Hines Boulevard and the Trinity East Levee. He argued that the city or Dallas businessmen could buy the land and then resell it to private builders for development following a city-approved plan. According to the councilman, this would be the logical place to house between 35,000 and 40,000 blacks. It would also include a central business district, churches, suburbanlike shopping centers, a university, three grade schools, and a high school. Pelt made it clear that there was no place in the master-planned community for public housing, noting it would be "strictly a private enterprise deal."[88]

Black leaders saw the proposal differently and rejected the "river bottom city as unfit for residential use because of its proximity to industry and its flood potential." In addition, the Negro Chamber of Commerce claimed that "Negroes would not live there in large numbers and developers would suffer a financial loss."[89] John W. Carpenter, president of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, agreed with the black assessment, concluding that "much better areas could be found for residential development." Under his leadership, the chamber appointed a five-member committee that cooperated with a DCC committee to investigate and report on the black housing problem.[90] If ever a document represented the voice of the establishment, this one did.

"The Report of Joint Committees of Dallas Chamber of Commerce and Dallas Citizens Council on Negro Housing in Dallas County" desired its "studies, findings and recommendations . . . [to be] as comprehensive as possible in the hope that a plan could be evolved which would provide for the present needs of the Negro population of our city as well as for the future needs." It started by identifying two "fundamental factors to which any successful and satisfactory plan should adhere." First, it emphasized that all housing solutions should take place within the Dallas city limits so proper supervision could be guaranteed. Second, it supported segregation of the two races and endorsed housing solutions that would embrace segregation, "so long as segregation . . . does not mean discrimination."

The Joint Committee, according to John Carpenter, was made up of individuals "deeply interested in the welfare of Dallas and *all of its people*—not

just one class, *but all of its people* [italics mine]." According to Julius Schepps, one of its members, the committee "would not just spread a little salve and let it go at that." Committee members met with black leaders, the Dallas Home Builders Association, the Dallas Housing Authority, residents, businessmen, and ministers of South Dallas, and with city council, to understand better the city's needs. It also took a five-hour bus tour examining several black communities and inspected several prospective housing sites.

The committee found that the "shortage of housing for Negroes is acute and critical." It went on to echo earlier reports that Dallas blacks lived under conditions "that threatened the health and welfare not only of themselves but also of our entire community." After reviewing not only those conditions but the economic abilities of Dallas blacks, the committee made recommendations. It proposed the annexation of West Dallas and all other unincorporated areas contiguous to the city containing bad housing. The committee also wanted to locate good housing sites for blacks able to afford better housing. It proceeded to identify six locations for such housing. In addition, the committee recommended that the DHA immediately build 1,000 units of public housing for blacks within the next twelve months and provide 1,500 units within the next 18 months. It also requested that city officials cooperate with the DHA in an urban redevelopment program. In addition, it suggested the creation of an Inter-Racial Committee of not less than fifteen outstanding citizens, in part to stop the bombings in South Dallas. Finally, the committee asked that all citizens assume individual responsibility in meeting the black housing shortage "in a spirit of Christian helpfulness."[91]

As tension increased in South Dallas due to additional bombings that summer, civic leaders tried to implement parts of the Housing Committee recommendations. Shortly after the report, council gave the DHA the go-ahead to produce 1,000 public housing units for blacks within a year.[92] Several months later, members of the DCC, the chamber of commerce, and the Dallas Council of Social Agencies appointed a committee of civic leaders to address the West Dallas problem. That body issued its report on October 19, 1950. It called for a comprehensive, long-range plan for the area and warned that "only by intelligent and diligent effort on the part of the citizens of Dallas County, as a whole, can the problems of West Dallas be worked out satisfactory." Toward this end, the report recommended that the city annex West Dallas and requested that the DHA establish 3,500 low-rent housing units there, including 1,500 for whites, 1,500 for blacks, and 500 for Mexican Americans. After investigating the area, committee members concluded that "if public housing is justified anywhere, it is justified in an area like West

Dallas." It also called on the county to appropriate $150,000 for road and drainage improvements and urged city officials to apply for federal funds to construct a West Dallas sanitary sewer. In addition, the report suggested that the city develop much of West Dallas under Title 1, the urban redevelopment title of the Housing Act. Finally, it proposed the preparation of a comprehensive and long-range plan for West Dallas.[93] Both the DHA and city council approved these requests and initiated action on them immediately.

About the same time civic leaders started to plan for West Dallas, the chamber of commerce also created a new biracial Inter-Racial Committee. According to chamber sources, that committee grew out of activity to ease the black housing shortage, but it planned to deal with racial problems on a variety of fronts. The fifteen-member committee appointed by the Dallas Chamber of Commerce tried to represent many elements of Dallas. It included two representatives from the board of directors of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce; one representative from the DCC; the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce; the South and East Dallas Chamber of Commerce; the Dallas Federated League; the Dallas Pastors Association; the Dallas Bar; the Rotary Club; the Lions Club; the Salesmanship Club; the Civitan Club; the Kiwanis Club; and the Civic Federation. In addition, the committee included four black men and one black woman in its membership. It selected M. J. Norrell, retired labor relations expert for the Magnolia Petroleum Company, as chair and executive director, and Will C. Grant, retired advertising executive, as vice chair. Sam C. Hudson, president of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce, served as secretary for the organization.[94]

At its first meeting, held August 8, the committee set as its major objective the securing of additional housing for blacks but it also decided to study the "whole field of inter-racial relations in Dallas." The committee selected nine areas for attention: housing; health, hospitals, and sanitation; education and cultural resources; legal needs; parks, playgrounds and recreation; welfare, PTA, and social services; employment and professional recognition; churches and religious resources; and citizen participation and interpretation. This unprecedented comprehensive treatment of the race problem in Dallas emphasized the need for "understanding, goodwill and cooperation of all people of Dallas, and of Dallas County."

Although the committees made less than earthshaking recommendations by today's standards, they demonstrated an increased commitment to dealing with black needs. Decrying the fact that only nineteen black doctors practiced in Dallas, the committee recommended recruitment of more African American doctors. In the booster tradition, it also called for the estab-

lishment of a Negro hospital and medical and nurses' training school in Dallas, not only for the city but for the entire Southwest. Until it secured this long-range goal, the committee recommended weekly or monthly clinics for black doctors to "keep them abreast of the advances in their profession." Committee members also requested doctors be given sufficient staff to enable them to treat their patients in public hospitals. In addition, the committee's report suggested that larger private hospitals offer free outpatient clinics for the city's blacks. Finally, it also called for the building of a new city-county Memorial Hospital, which would provide additional hospital beds for blacks.

In the area of education, the report included as a goal the equalization of educational opportunities for Dallas blacks. It recommended more intensive use of black high schools for vocational training and also suggested "a more integrated and better coordinated recreation program for Negro schools as well as more general use of the school's buildings as community centers." Finally, it requested that adult blacks be given access to the Jim Crow Dallas Public Library.

The section of the report on parks and recreation space called for an increase in parks around future black neighborhoods and public housing projects. In addition, the report suggested that areas in the popular White Rock Lake and Bachman Lake parks be open to blacks. It also advised city officials to appoint an experienced Director of Negro Activities under the Direction of the Park Board whose job would be to coordinate the programs and work of all groups engaged in recreational activity for blacks.

After reviewing the welfare and social service programs, the committee concluded that it would not pass judgment on whether there were adequate funds available for welfare and social services. It did conclude that it found no "discrimination or favoritism shown in the distribution of social services." The report's only recommendation asked the president of the Negro Chamber of Commerce to appoint a contact committee to which black citizens could refer all interracial matters of concern.

The Subcommittee on Employment and Professional Recognition urged more training for adult black workers. It also wanted ability, experience, and training to be taken more into account when hiring blacks. Finally, it encouraged blacks to "pool their own resources in the establishing of Credit Unions, Building and Loan Associations, Insurance Associations" and retail centers. It concluded that "lifting the economic level of Negroes in Dallas, would help lift the level of ALL Dallas." Another set of recommendations called for better coordination between black churches, the YMCA, and other agencies to enlarge recreational, cultural, and religious programs for

Dallas blacks. The subcommittee report urged that team spirit—as opposed to a gang spirit—be promoted among the city's blacks. Committee members also asked white and black churches to coordinate efforts and cooperate more regularly to combat potential problems leading to black criminality.[95]

The report, then, stressed the interrelationship of various factors that affected blacks in Dallas. However, the subcommittee on housing, chaired by Jerome Crossman, made the most important recommendation in regard to the pressing housing shortage. First, it encouraged private builders to develop immediately 2,000 units for sale and rent to blacks. It also recommended that public housing be carried through "with as little delay as conditions make possible." The report specifically endorsed the proposed program for West Dallas and pledged to cooperate with the ambitious program of public housing and urban redevelopment. Finally, the committee suggested that business and financial interests of Dallas join together in organizing a nonprofit corporation "to purchase land for and develop a modern Negro community." That program ultimately resulted in the development of Hamilton Park in North Dallas.[96]

White civic leaders and the local government, then, responded to the violence in South Dallas not only by pushing for more housing for blacks, but by approaching the problem in a very comprehensive fashion. The 1943–45 Master Plan had treated the city's physical needs comprehensively and now civic leaders treated the city's racial problems in a similar manner. They clearly understood that racial violence and inadequate housing threatened the welfare of the entire city—their greatest object of concern. As a result, their effort to discourage blacks from moving into disputed areas, another recommendation of the Inter-Racial Committee, should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in remedying the larger problem.[97] It rather suggests the high priority civic leaders placed on preventing massive civil unrest, something deemed unhealthy for a growing metropolis.

Despite strong resistance, then, from certain sections, local officials and civic leaders embraced both public housing and urban redevelopment as ways to resolve the South Dallas trouble. Convinced that the housing shortage resulted in deplorable black housing conditions that truly threatened the welfare of the city as a whole, they made additional black housing one of the city's top priorities. As a result, not only did Dallas participate in one of the largest public housing programs in the nation in the early 1950s,[98] but prominent members of the chamber of commerce and the DCC underwrote the development of the middle-class black community of Hamilton Park.

Still, civic leaders seemed unable to stop the continued bombings in South Dallas and to secure protection for black homeowners in that section.

As early as May 1950, black leaders reported, "It has been publicly attributed to the Mayor and city officials that they are afraid to give protection to Negro residents of South Dallas lest the very act of protecting them be understood as encouragement to them to purchase homes in the area." Civic leaders at this time clearly understood the degree of white resistance to black's expanding their presence in South Dallas and desperately attempted to find alternative solutions to the black housing problem to preserve public order. Meanwhile, black leaders wanted protection and justice for fellow blacks and voiced displeasure when the Dallas police failed to provide needed protection. Rev. B. R. Riley, pastor of Salem Baptist Church and president of the local NAACP, filed a petition with council asking the city to stop the bombings. The *News* observed that the petition, by implication, charged officials with apathetic unwillingness to do anything about the bombings. A month later, forty blacks warned council that Dallas could face serious race trouble if the bombings did not end. Such threats seemed to have little effect on the police. Despite his announcement in August that he knew who was doing the bombings, the police chief claimed no arrests could be made before some "circumstances" happened. That did not occur for ten months.[99]

Matters were not helped when Rev. John G. Moore, pastor of the Colonial Baptist Church and head of the newly formed South Dallas Adjustment League, reported that his group planned to buy out all blacks living between Southland and Pennsylvania Avenues. Claiming that the black influx threatened the area's fourteen white churches, the pastor promised that his group would retake the neighborhood for whites not by bombs but by dollars. Few blacks accepted his offer.[100] As a result, tensions continued and the bombings escalated during the early part of the summer of 1951. And Dallas blacks showed a growing outrage at the city's inability to stop the terrorism. The *Dallas Express* editorialized that summer, "We are concerned at the destruction of the faith that Negroes must keep in the white leadership of Dallas." It went on to accuse Dallas leaders of "sitting on their hands" and wondered why the eighteen to twenty white businessmen "who really run Dallas" did not order the police to stop those bombings. The editorial also criticized some of the city's black leadership for not speaking out more forcefully against the bombings. A Council of Negro Organizations met July 2 and scheduled a mass meeting on the South Dallas bombings after demanding a special grand jury to investigate those blasts. Several weeks later, the Inter-Racial Committee appointed by the chamber of commerce seconded the request for a special grand jury to probe the South Dallas bombings.[101]

The growing impatience, then, of the black community and the increased threat of retaliation, as well as the white community's growing embarrassment over episodes that were, in the words of Mayor Adoue, "blackening the name of the Dallas all over the nation," ultimately resulted in the formation of a special grand jury made up of some of the city's civic leaders. On the very day that the grand jury met, Dallas police with the help of the Texas Rangers arrested Claude Thomas Wright while sheriff deputies in Hunt County arrested his half brother, Arthur Eugen, for the June 25 bombing of a black house in South Dallas. Few believed that these men had masterminded the bombings, and rumors spread that two South Dallas neighborhood associations had been responsible for them. That rumor gained credence when police brought in South Dallas community activist Charles Goff, labor leader and chairman of the Exline Improvement League. Goff had been one of the major opponents of the CCA and had fielded a slate against the good government association in the late 1940s. Eight additional indictments came from the special grand jury as well as a subpoena for the South Dallas Bank and Trust Company to produce bank statements and canceled checks from two South Dallas neighborhood organizations.[102]

The final report of the blue-ribbon grand jury claimed that the "plot reached into unbelievable places." It said that many had been implicated, including people who were highly regarded in their communities. In addition, the report admitted that "there was evidence that lay and religious and community groups, through misguided leadership, entered an action, perhaps unwittingly, that resulted in violence and destruction." The grand jury also recognized that several who "apparently participated in the planning and preparation of the bombs were not indicted" because the young district attorney, Henry Wade, had thought that not enough evidence existed for conviction. The grand jury closed its report by urging that the investigation continue.[103] Only one of those indicted went to trial and even that case failed to bring a conviction.[104] But for Dallas civic leaders, the grand jury investigation had the desired results. The bombings stopped.

White leaders, then, responded to the South Dallas violence much like they dealt with other problems, with an eye to solving the problem in a way that looked out for what they perceived to be the best solution for the city as a whole, rather than the needs or requirements of one group. Had they been most concerned about justice for blacks, rather than peace for the city, they might well have responded to the South Dallas problem much differently. Convictions would have been secured and the workings of all involved exposed. But this would not be the case, since citywide interests dictated a different response. The city's involvement in Love Field develop-

ment was another example of the dominance of the city-as-a-whole ethos rather than one emphasizing the needs of neighborhoods.

As we have seen, during World War II Dallas made a commitment to keep Love Field as its central airport, and citizens had approved a $5 million bond issue in 1945 to assure that would happen. Despite this commitment, lack of a definite airport plan and conflict over lines of authority and responsibility stalled development of the airport and led Dudley M. Steele of the American Association of Airport Executives in 1947 to charge that Love Field was the second-worst airport in the nation.[105]

While Dallas floundered, Fort Worth made a surprising decision in October of 1947 to cooperate with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and develop the abandoned Midway Airfield as the city's municipal airport. Although that city had originally planned to build a new airport six miles south of downtown, the CAA's assurance that it would provide $11.5 million helped to convince Fort Worth civic leaders to develop the airport midway between Dallas and their city.[106] Dallas leaders at first reacted cautiously to Fort Worth's decision, but they became infuriated when the CAA released its National Airport Plan for 1948. As part of the Federal Airport Act of 1946, Congress required the CAA to develop a plan to promote an efficient public airport system. The 1948 plan proposed that Midway be developed as a regional airport to serve the Dallas–Fort Worth area as the primary airport and reduced Love Field to secondary status.[107]

To see its hated rival, Fort Worth, gain support from the Federal Government was too much for some Dallas leaders. They attempted to kill the CAA's appropriation for the Midway Airport and actually took out a full-page ad in the *Washington Post* toward that end. That advertisement charged that the Fort Worth Regional Office of the CAA had "arbitrarily, unreasonably and secretly" planned Midway Airport nineteen miles from Dallas.[108] Despite the protest of their congressman, J. Frank Wilson, that the CAA was attempting to "kick Dallas in the teeth" by making Midway the de facto regional airport, the Fort Worth appropriation passed. Dallas also lost its appeal to the CAA and heard one of its examiners scold the city. "Dallas protest," he observed, "was nothing more than one city's rapacious desire to deprive its neighbor of its inalienable right to prosper." Midway Airport would be developed, according to the CAA official, because that agency wanted the airfield "for defense purposes." Efforts to overturn the appropriations in the federal court proved just as futile.[109]

Dallas took such steps because it did not believe Fort Worth's claim that the expanded Midway Airport, to be renamed the Greater Fort Worth International Airport–Carter Field, was strictly a Fort Worth field. Dallas

officials thought otherwise because the airport's nineteen-mile distance from downtown Fort Worth was about the same distance from downtown Dallas. Civic leaders in Dallas also remembered how the CAA had been promoting a regional airport since 1940. And in 1948, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce confirmed Dallas's suspicions when he urged the city to join in Carter Field's development. Faced with this new pressure to cooperate with Fort Worth, Dallas officials and civic leaders reevaluated Love Field's future.[110]

Despite the almost hysterical refusal to cooperate with Fort Worth by Mayor J. Woodall Rodgers and the city's two largest newspapers, some Dallas leaders took their neighboring city's offer seriously as it became clear that Fort Worth would proceed to construct the new airport. For instance, the powerful DCC met in April 1951 and decided to investigate the possibility of joining Fort Worth to make Carter a true regional airport. After Amon Carter personally offered Dallas an opportunity to co-sponsor the midway airport, one Dallas newspaper reported, "It is no secret that some of the city's most influential businessmen have changed their thinking about the 19 mile airport [Carter Field] and are ready to negotiate with Fort Worth on any basis."[111]

John W. Carpenter, a member of the DCC and president of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, appeared to be the most vocal supporter of joint development of Carter Field. "If you disregard personalities and disregard politics," Carpenter advised, "you cannot fail to see that Dallas should support the Midway Airport as it originally did." Carpenter, who had been a key player in the Dallas and Fort Worth effort to canalize the Trinity River since 1930, called for the establishment of a Dallas–Tarrant County airport authority to control the development of all airport facilities in both counties. Just as the two cities understood the need to work together to secure adequate river transportation, Carpenter thought the cities needed a similar cooperative effort for their aviation needs. Civic leader Stanley Marcus, president of Neiman-Marcus department store, also had reservations about the future of Love Field. He reluctantly agreed to chair a chamber of commerce committee on the city's future airport development only after the chamber convinced city council to engage an outside consultant to evaluate Love Field's future."[112]

Council employed James C. Buckley on November 21, 1951. That act proved an important turning point in the history of Love Field. Buckley, a terminal and transportation consultant from New York City, had been director of airport development for the Port Authority of New York. In that position he had served as the chief architect of regional airport development

for Greater New York. In Dallas, his main charge was to evaluate the future of Love Field, with the opening of Carter Field only a year away. His thorough study not only predicted Love Field's continued importance due to its convenient location to downtown fliers, but for the first time provided a well-documented overview of the tremendous economic value of the Dallas airport. Not only did Love Field provide more than 3,600 jobs and a payroll of over $74.5 million, but its passenger and freight cargo played a critical role in promoting the broader economic development of the city. Love Field's future appeared promising, according to the report, but Buckley warned that it could only be secured with substantial and expensive expansion.[113]

Although Buckley recommended cooperating with Fort Worth to plan a long-range program of regional airport development, his report gave a ringing endorsement to the value of Love Field, and that conclusion shaped the city's aviation policy for the next ten years. Because of its location near downtown, he advised the city to maintain Love Field as its primary airport.[114] The report outlining the best approach to aviation development for the city created a new enthusiasm for Love Field. The report rallied civic leaders and helped them pass an airport bond issue in one of the bitterest and most controversial local elections in Dallas history.

In order to improve Love Field as Buckley recommended, the city needed to expand runways into the built-up areas surrounding Love Field. The provision to extend one of the field's runways from 6,200 to 8,500 feet and build a parallel runway the same size required additional funds and resulted in a $10 million bond issue. Bond money would also build a larger terminal building and fund a new general airport in Oak Cliff.[115]

The bond election proved controversial not only because of the unprecedented financial commitment it asked Dallas voters to make to aviation, but because neighborhoods near Love Field waged a ferocious campaign to defeat it. Supporters of the bond issue, bankrolled by the wealthy and powerful DCC, fought back and poured more than $50,000 into the campaign. They insisted that Dallas needed airport improvement to continue its rapid growth. Banker Robert L. Thornton, probably the city's most influential citizen, warned that Dallas was at the crossroads. "We must go forward," he cautioned, "or be like some of the towns that the railroad passed up. If we don't follow the word of experts who say we must expand Love Field, what word are we to follow?" Disparate groups such as the Dallas Building Trades Council, the Negro Chamber of Commerce, the Dallas Home Builders Association, and the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce supported the bond issue.[116]

The opposition to Love Field, however, proved loud and persistent. More

than 700 blacks who lived in nearby Elm Thicket jammed the North Temple Baptist Church on January 19 and urged defeat of the bond. Much of their neighborhood would be wiped out by the airport expansion; conservative estimates suggested that airport expansion would uproot at least 300 black families. This truly angered some protesters, since they had earlier been relocated by the city's development of Central Expressway. Led by black optometrist J. O. Chisum, Love Field area blacks protested that the city already suffered from an acute black housing shortage, which just two years earlier had resulted in the city's most intense racial tension. Since no present black community could possibly accommodate even half of the people to be dislocated, the uprooting of such a large number of blacks would push these unfortunate citizens into "unfriendly [white] communities."[117] Given the city's recent experience with the bombings in South Dallas due to the black housing shortage, it may seem incredible that city officials and civic leaders, who had real alternatives to Love Field, supported activity that would further the housing crisis. Because those leaders now viewed Love Field as an essential element of urban growth and development, however, their commitment to its expansion and improvement overwhelmed any concern for the plight of a small minority neighborhood. And civic leaders may have soothed their consciences by claiming that the Hamilton Park development north of Dallas, under the Inter-Racial Committee, would somehow take care of the Love Field relocatees, even though it had been developed in response to the already very obvious overcrowding that had caused racial problems in South Dallas. Even certain black groups such as the Negro Chamber of Commerce, composed of the city's leading black businessmen, supported the bond issue, because it would provide more jobs for blacks as it benefited the economic base of the whole city.[118]

White neighborhoods to the north and east of Love Field also opposed the airport bond issue. Although these people would not be displaced by construction, they feared that expanding the airport in this congested area posed a safety hazard, particularly for nearby schools. These opponents formed the Air Safety Committee, and called for the abandonment of Love Field. They cited the recently completed federal study on air safety, popularly known as the Doolittle Report, to question Love Field expansion, since it would be unable to provide the necessary safe zones or runway lengths recommended by the report. But just as city officials dismissed black protests as being the work of short-sighted special interest groups unable to see the larger picture, they treated white dissenters similarly. Indeed, the *News*, which strongly supported Love Field, made sure to emphasize that most of the bond's opposition came from the neighborhoods around the airport,

again suggesting a concern with selfish priorities rather than commitment to improve the city as a whole. Most Dallasites apparently agreed with the civic leadership's interpretation of the bond program. In what was the largest turnout ever for any local election, supporters of airport development won, 19,481 to 15, 194.[119]

The Dallas–Fort Worth airport controversy did not disappear with the Love Field vote. After Carter Field opened on April 24, 1953, Fort Worth leaders undertook an aggressive campaign to secure more commercial airport traffic, and gained some immediate success when American Airlines moved six of its flights to Fort Worth. In addition, whenever an airline applied for new flights to the Dallas–Fort Worth region, Fort Worth leaders pushed Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) officials to make Fort Worth the terminus for the entire area. That city's first success in this regard sent shockwaves through Dallas. When Central Airlines requested permission to fly into the Dallas–Fort Worth area from Oklahoma, the CAB designated Carter as the sole terminus for the flight. The decision horrified Dallas leaders, since they understood that the CAB's power to designate airline travel to a single airport in a region could thwart any future development of Love Field and make Carter Field, without Dallas input, the regional field for the area.

For the next several months following the CAB edict, civic leaders worked to have the decision reversed. Lobbying efforts with the CAB, protests to Congress, and eventually judicial action all failed to overturn the CAB's decision, creating outrage about what Love Field advocates identified as undue outside governmental interference. The *Times Herald,* for instance, ran an article under the headline "Chamber Says New CAB Edict Violates the City Rights of Dallas." And an embittered chair of the chamber of commerce's aviation committee, Angus Wynne, Jr., complained that "no board sitting in Washington should be able to dictate to Dallas which airport they [*sic*] should use."[120]

Controversy increased even more in November of 1954 when, under the prodding of CAB chair Char Guerney, Fort Worth offered to sell half interest in Carter Field to Dallas. Angered by Guerney's action, Dallas Chamber of Commerce president and DCC member Jerome K. Crossman attacked the idea and charged the CAB chair with injecting himself "extra-legally into the affairs of [the] community."[121] Consultant James Buckley also advised the city to reject the offer because of its adverse impact on the city's economic well-being. After meeting with council, Mayor Thornton did just that, despite threats from the assistant secretary of commerce, John R. Allison, that he would push Carter Field as the transcontinental route terminal for both Dallas and Fort Worth.[122]

Although the *Times Herald* predicted that Love Field would loom as the major issue in the 1955 municipal election—since some still believed that Dallas needed to cooperate with Fort Worth—no such issue appeared. Indeed, opponents to Love Field even failed to nominate a slate, and for the first time in Dallas history during peacetime, no opposition appeared against the CCA. As a result, voters in 1955 reelected Thornton and the eight incumbents. Much of that slate's electoral success had to do with its ability to work in harmony and get things done. During it first two years, Thornton's council put more public improvements under way—including the civic auditorium—than ever before in the city's history. Even the *Oak Cliff Tribune* and the *White Rocker,* neighborhood newspapers often critical of the CCA, had good things to say about Thornton's administration. The *Oak Cliff Tribune*'s editor called this council "the most progressive; most talented; squarest shooting; most farsighted; most successful" since he arrived in Dallas eleven years earlier.[123]

This undoubtedly was true, but the city's fight with the federal government also seemed to rally support for the CCA. Now more than ever, the city apparently needed strong civic leadership to combat a threatening federal government. Despite the CCA's success and the conflict with the federal government, the *Oak Cliff Tribune* wondered if there was "too much power in too few hands."[124] Other Dallasites might have thought the same way, but happy with the results, they continued to support the business-dominated slate. But as changing definitions of the city emerged in the late 1950s, the CCA's emphasis on and interpretation of the good of the city became increasingly challenged.

□ III

The New Provincialism: From City as System to City as Setting

Dallas in 1960 seemed a very different place than the Dallas that planning and political activists sought to tame in 1930. Then, the city's population stood at 260,734 in little more than a 45–square mile area. By 1960, 679,684 Dallasites lived in a city of 282 square miles (see map 7).[1] The automobile, now established as the dominant mode of transportation in Dallas, helped reshape spatial relationships throughout the city and between city and suburb. The postwar central business district's building boom also completely refashioned the downtown area, as significant population shifts in the city's residential sections altered the social geography of the city. The city's economic base, tied closely to banking, insurance, and commerce in the 1930s, now expanded to include significant manufacturing. The city's thriving economy and easy access by both rail and air helped explain its growing importance as a center for regional branches of national companies.

Although larger than the Dallas of 1950, ten years later Dallas was not a fundamentally different place than it had been at midcentury. No depression or world war had occurred during those ten years, nor any other cataclysmic event. True, the city experienced a 56 percent increase in population during the 1950s, a rate 9 percent greater than the city's growth in the 1940s, but that remained well short of the city's 73 percent growth rate during the 1920s.[2] Probably World War II brought more fundamental change to the city than any single event in the 1950s. Despite the paucity of outside events during the decade, however, Dallas experienced such significant shifts in the way its leaders perceived and responded to urban problems by the late 1950s that civic leaders' approach to urban problems in 1950 shared more in common with approaches of the 1930s than those of the 1960s. The 1960s' approach to urban problems seemed tied to new ideas about the nature of the city and the public interest and would be the foundation for the new public discourse about the city still shaping Dallas today.

Despite the rapid success and development of Dallas after the war, a success closely associated with comprehensive planning and council-manager government, the popularity of those strategies of city management weakened. Changes in the Dallas Citizens Council and the Citizens Charter Association also suggest that some fundamental transformation in urban problem solving took place in the late 1950s. This did not happen overnight, but a shifting emphasis from the city as a whole to one that prioritized the rights and needs of its citizens would help radically transform notions of good government and good planning. The city as a setting for individuals to pursue their wants and aspirations replaced the city as a social system to be coordinated and improved.

The Dallas experience with government and planning was not unique at



Map 7 Urban Area of Dallas in 1960. From U.S. Census, 1960.

this time. Academics, writing in the 1950s and 1960s, no longer defined the city as a territorial community that molded the desires, values, aspirations, and personalities of its inhabitants. Sociologists such as Herbert Gans challenged the assumptions behind the Chicago School of Sociology, which had emphasized the behavioral shaping role of cities and concluded that it was

individual choices and demands—based on the characteristics of the people involved—and not the "city" that best explained the behavior of urban residents.[3] Nor did the comprehensive plan developed by an expert for the city or metropolis, nor a centralized government run by "experts" and nonpoliticians, seem the best way of tackling the city's needs and problems. Indeed, the very nature of those needs and problems became reconfigured so that the new definition of good planning or good government included a commitment to maximum feasible participation of all parties concerned in planning and governing. Advocacy planning and the neighborhood revolt emerged as just two manifestations of this new conceptualization of the city. One consequence of this change would be a new emphasis on the particular rather than the whole, a political discourse of confrontation to secure (or protect) one's rights rather than a discourse seeking consensus for the good of the city. Such rhetoric, then, promoted a new fragmentation that would threaten the city more readily than the city-as-a-whole rhetoric of the 1930s.[4]

□ 8

The Decline of the City-as-a-Whole Strategy

Changes in the way Dallasites approached planning and politics after 1955 suggested a rethinking about the nature of the city that would ultimately lead to the abandonment of the city-as-a-whole discourse and approach to urban problem solving. Comprehensive physical planning for the whole city by outside hired experts gave way first to a new type of downtown-oriented, laymen-based planning and eventually to a planning emphasis that focused on the needs of various citizen groups rather than the city. The same type of changes also took place in local politics as the city-as-a-whole discourse gave way to a new particularism, one both emphasizing needs of individual groups and protecting the rights of individuals. By the late 1950s subtle but significant changes had taken place not only in the Citizens Charter Association (CCA) but also in the discourse of local politics. In both planning and politics, then, the interests of individuals and groups began taking precedence over the needs of the city, and the *public interest* soon became the *various publics' interest*. Probably the clearest example of this was the city's planning movements in the fifties and sixties.

As early as 1950, City Plan Engineer Marvin R. Springer suggested that Dallas revise the Bartholomew plan, already out-of-date because of the city's rapid growth and development. Springer, who had worked for planner Harland Bartholomew before coming to Dallas, thought the updated plan should take into account the city's rapid population growth, changing land use, and increasing traffic needs. The latter had received attention after the city and county united for an intensive nine-month study of the area's traffic patterns that year. He also believed that the new plan should take up the issue of future annexation, zoning, housing and neighborhoods, schools, parks, and public buildings. If his proposal had been followed, Dallas would

have revised the entire comprehensive plan of 1943–1945.[1] Council took no action on this proposal because the city's rapid growth gave the overburdened, small planning staff little opportunity to do anything but subdivision control.[2]

Only after Robert L. Thornton, who in the 1920s served on the City Plan Commission, became mayor did Springer's proposal become reality. On September 6, 1955, council authorized the appointment of a committee of citizens selected by the mayor to draw up a new master plan. Thornton insisted that a committee of laymen citizens initially develop this master plan. According to the mayor, a group of civic leaders representing various Dallas organizations interested in planning, aided by the city plan department, would help develop a preliminary plan. Toward that end, he appointed a nine-member committee to work out a "comprehensive new blueprint for the city's future growth." The master plan, according to city officials, would guide all development from about 1960 to 1980.[3]

Thornton appointed D. A. Hulcy, president of Lone Star Gas Company, to head the Dallas Master Plan Committee. Hulcy presided over the Dallas Chamber of Commerce between 1947 and 1949, and had served as president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1951–1952. In addition, he headed the powerful DCC at this time.[4] Other members of this citizen committee, which would work closely with the City Plan Commission, included Roland L. Pelt, home builder and president of the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce; former city manager James Aston, now vice president of First National Bank; industrialist John E. Mitchell, who also served as vice president of the Greater Dallas Planning Council; Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, president of the Dallas Board of Education; Frank W. Cawthon, Dallas district engineer for the State Highway Department; T. Carr Forrest, Jr., consulting engineer who had many contracts with the city, including one for long-term water development; Howell H. Watson, realtor and chair of the City Plan Commission; and Marvin Springer, city plan engineer.[5] In addition, council proposed a charter amendment that gave charter status to the plan commission, now under the public works department, and allowed the city to adopt legally its next master plan for the city. Until this time, none of the city's plans had been officially approved, including Bartholomew's massive master plan of 1943–1945.[6]

At the beginning, this planning effort seemed consistent with earlier ones. City Plan Engineer Marvin Springer, who oversaw the work, proposed a sixteen-phase plan that included not only transportation, parks, and plans for future public buildings, but also recommendations for housing and neighborhood improvement. Springer not only stressed the need to provide

a comprehensive plan for the city, but also observed that "the complex arrangement of school districts, utility districts and municipal boundaries . . . emphasizes the need for a broad metropolitan approach to the municipal planning for the area for Dallas."[7] This plan would focus on Greater Dallas, underscoring more than ever the interconnection of city and suburb.

This planning process, however, also differed from earlier ones. Citizen input received more attention than ever before. Laymen rather than professional planners comprised most of the Dallas Area Master Plan Committee, or Hulcy Committee, as it was popular known. Initially, Mayor Thornton predicted that "when this local group gets its work in shape as it is needed, then we will employ some national expert—as we have in the past—to come in and go over all of these plans with the local committee in the hope we can bring forth a master plan for the future development of our city that will have enough dreaming as well as a lot of realistic thinking."[8]

The product of this committee, however, differed substantially from earlier planning strategies. First, the mayor never did call in a national expert, although Springer, who clearly had a national reputation, played a critical role in developing the plan. Springer resigned as city plan engineer in 1958 to pursue private consulting opportunities, but the city retained him as a consultant for the plan. In addition, this plan seemed more interested in soliciting citizen input. The plan's authors promised that "numerous groups and agencies throughout the city will be requested to help in the new master plan." In preparing one volume of the plan, the committee consulted downtown building managers and property owners, along with the Dallas Transit Company and other key players.[9] Nor did the plan address all of the phases outlined by Springer.

By the time council dismissed the Hulcy Committee in 1961, it had produced five reports. The first appeared in 1956. *A Look at Past Planning for the City of Dallas* provided a brief overview of earlier planning efforts. It evaluated the Kessler Plan of 1911, the Ulrickson Plan of 1927, and the Bartholomew Plan of 1943–45. The document concluded that where the city had followed planners' proposals it had benefited, and it also uncovered problems associated with neglecting parts of each plan.[10]

The second report, *Urbanization—Dallas Metropolitan Area,* examined the growth trends of Dallas County, the city's metropolitan region, and projected the future development of the 900–square mile metropolitan area. It started by reviewing the current population trends in the area and then predicted the county's estimated size to 1980. It also projected future population figures for each Dallas County community, explaining that the "encirclement of Dallas by suburban municipalities will create numerous

problems relating to planning and development of highways, utility systems and other major municipal facilities." As a result, it continued, "the coordination of the physical expansion of the twenty-nine incorporated municipalities of Dallas County is essential to the welfare of the entire metropolitan area." The planners also recognized that the population increase of Fort Worth's Tarrant County was resulting "in the amalgamation of the two counties into one large metropolitan area." Such growth, according to the plan, made "apparent the need for overall coordination and planning of their development in the interest of the whole region."[11] This report, then, suggests planners were still viewing the city and metropolitan region as the proper unit to deal with, and it underscored the concern with planning for the region as a whole.

The committee never delivered a comprehensive plan for the metropolitan region, however. Rather, it issued three substantial reports dealing with important problems, while at the same time it ignored a variety of components usually associated with comprehensive planning. For instance, it took on the city's traffic problem in *Thoroughfares—Dallas Metropolitan Area (1957),* a report that provided a new thoroughfare plan for Dallas County. The planners argued that this topic deserved the committee's priority because "the streets and highways of a community are the basic framework about which all other development is built." They also emphasized how the increased use of the automobile depreciated the value of the county's existing highway system, as did its "haphazard and uncoordinated development," resulting in a "lack of balance in the present system." After analyzing the city's street system, the plan proposed "an integrated system of freeways, expressways, major thoroughfares and secondary streets designed to meet the needs of the rapidly growing metropolitan area and to be a guide for growth." Indeed, the report promised that if planners developed a comprehensive thoroughfare plan, and government officials enforced it, Dallas County would have more orderly and efficient communities.[12]

Two years later, in 1959, the committee issued another report, *Parks and Open Spaces—Dallas Metropolitan Area.* As did the thoroughfare plan, this one used the county as the basic unit and offered a new plan for future park development and open space preservation. It criticized the area's suburban communities for not having adequate play and park space and called for a comprehensive park program to help remedy that problem. In addition, it recommended that the Dallas park system increase by over 5,100 acres and suggested that a playground be located in every one of the city's neighborhoods. Finally, it called for a "co-ordinated stand for the use of fences, walls, street trees and plantings on both public and

private open spaces." This report, as had the thoroughfare report, attacked a single problem in a comprehensive fashion.[13]

The final report, *Dallas Central District*, spent its first 116 pages analyzing the city's urban core in an attempt "to assure the Central District remains a vigorous and competitive factor in the overall development of Dallas." It paid much attention to the significant impact of the automobile and the congestion that it caused to the central business district (CBD), noting that streets and offstreet parking occupied more than half of the downtown area. The report clearly recognized that the outward movement of the city's population threatened some of the CBD's functions and proposed the development of high-rise apartment buildings to counteract this tendency. The plan also suggested a significant expansion in offstreet parking and offered other methods such as street widenings in the downtown area to allow better accommodation of the automobile. Other proposals to improve downtown included the development of beautified pedestrian ways, a single public transportation complex around Union Station, and a system of underground walkways to manage the anticipated increase in downtown pedestrian traffic.[14]

A volume focusing solely on the downtown clearly differentiated the Hulcy plan from the Bartholomew plan. This could be explained by the changing relationship of downtown to the metropolitan area, particularly in regard to its retail and entertainment functions. Although the downtown area experienced a spectacular building boom after the war, including the erection of twenty-four multistory buildings between 1945 and 1957, retail sales there declined 1.7 percent while the rest of the city, with the help of newly developed shopping center strips, experienced an 80.9 percent increase. Dallas observers usually blamed traffic congestion for this relative decline (downtown still contained 75 percent of the city's retail business). The number of people entering the core area by car increased by 70 percent between 1949 and 1961. In addition, the growing blight in the areas bordering downtown, as well as an obvious deterioration in the older western half of the CBD, troubled civic leaders.[15]

There is no doubt that downtown Dallas faced challenges and problems after the war, but so had downtown Dallas at the turn of the century and after World War I. The formation of new downtown organizations and the development of a downtown plan in the 1950s should be viewed not only as a response to those real problems, but also as mirroring changing notions about the metropolitan region and the nature and goals of planning. The city's failure to complete this "comprehensive" plan also suggests a growing tendency to focus on specific problems, or problem areas, and spend less

time emphasizing the inextricable linkages between the whole. It is ironic that when this plan started it promised a comprehensive approach unprecedented in the history of Dallas because of its emphasis on the city and county. But a project that projected such ambitious goals ended up emphasizing a strategy to better one part of metropolitan Dallas, the downtown. And this underscored a growing concern by some that rather than being part of a whole, the downtown and suburbs were competitors.

Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of the postwar discourse about metropolitan America was its emphasis on the threat of suburban development to urban well-being. Rather than cheering the decentralization of business, which offered some remedy to the traffic congestion downtowns suffered at this time, urban boosters rallied to the defense of downtown and adopted an adversarial posture. Downtown businessmen as well as government leaders, of course, had good reason to fear the migration of people and commerce away from the central city and to the suburbs. They saw the growth of suburban shopping centers as a threat to the CBD's tax base and feared that postwar blight would spread if they failed to take corrective measures. Although the planning discourse continued to include the need to plan for the metropolitan region, the emphasis and attention by the mid-1950s clearly centered on the downtown.[16]

Even before the city's downtown plan had been released a variety of organizations had developed strategies to treat the downtown. As early as 1950, local civic and planning groups invited one of the Urban Land Institute's Central City Panels to analyze how the city should cope with its surge of traffic and pedestrians flooding its streets. It also addressed issues such as parking, hotel accommodations, and blight eradication. Two years later citizens formed The Committee of Twenty-One to help beautify downtown Dallas. When members decided to expand that committee, it became known as The Committee for the Central Business District. That body investigated some downtown problems and, among other things, recommended the formation of a Main Street Association to control and improve the area on Main Street between Akard and Ervay.[17]

The Greater Dallas Planning Council, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Dallas Citizens Council also had committees studying approaches to revitalizing the urban core. The Dallas Retail Merchant's Association launched Dallas Unlimited, Inc., a huge promotional program for the city's CBD. In addition, it initiated a massive advertising campaign to "emphasize the natural advantages and attractions for shopping the central business district."[18]

In late 1957, a new organization appeared that focused on the CBD as a discrete problem requiring special planning. The Greater Dallas Planning Council (GDPC) spearheaded a movement to create the Central Business District Association (CBDA). Sixty business leaders participated in the organizational meeting to formulate programs to help "rejuvenate Downtown Dallas." The organization particularly focused on maintaining and protecting property values in downtown and doing whatever necessary to keep the area attractive to the public. During its first year, the CBDA undertook a long-range study of methods for expanding downtown Dallas's commercial importance. Its managing director promised that the CBDA would be a clearinghouse of information to promote the redevelopment of rundown sections of the urban core.[19]

Although the founding of the CBDA and the Hulcy Plan's emphasis on the downtown are not in themselves ample evidence to suggest that a fundamental transformation in the way civic leaders thought about and responded to the city occurred in the mid-1950s, other developments do suggest such a change. The fate of the city's urban renewal program and the changing nature of local politics seem to suggest a lessened importance being placed on "the city as a whole" as the basis for urban problem solving.

When the state legislature finally passed a bill in 1957 authorizing urban renewal, many civic leaders saw the realization of new opportunities to improve Dallas. Not only did the Dallas Citizens Council continue to push for the urban renewal of West Dallas but the CBDA became a strong advocate of Dallas participation in the federal program for parts of downtown.[20] Shortly after the state legislature passed its enabling legislation, a DCC committee on West Dallas unanimously concluded that "the Urban Redevelopment plan offers the most practical means for slum eradication." Their published report urged government officials to "study the provisions of the new act" and initiate "suitable action" as "soon as practical." It wanted "no delay in making and adopting plans for getting rid of slums and other blighted areas under the provisions of the Urban Renewal Act."[21] Less than a year later the board of directors of the DCC voted unanimously to urge city council to hold the required public hearings for urban renewal.[22]

Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 authorized the federal government to fund two-thirds of the net cost of buying and clearing slum property. After clearance, the land then would be sold to private developers for much less than they could have purchased the land under normal circumstances. The 1949 law had a predominantly residential clause that required 90 percent of the project to be dwellings before clearance, or as a result of clearance. The

urban renewal law passed later as part of the Housing Act of 1954 contained less stringent requirements on the nature of land to be cleared or on the final redevelopment project.

Urban renewal advocates had not sat idly by, waiting for the enabling legislation. They formed a rehabilitation committee in 1953 to enforce housing codes and upgrade deteriorating neighborhoods. Led by developer Trammell Crow, the group selected a twenty-eight-block area just northeast of the downtown business district to fight blight and slum conditions. First, they surveyed the area to identify substandard conditions and to develop ways of eliminating or correcting those conditions.[23]

After Congress established urban renewal, the Citizens Joint Rehabilitation and Slum Clearance Committee participated in that law's rehabilitation program. It selected Little Mexico for its pilot rehab project, an area whose 1,800 persons lived in 450 dwellings. This project, which stressed code enforcement, was one of the earliest in the country to get FHA Section 220 modernization loan approval. According to a chamber of commerce report, it marked the first time that the city government, private property owners, and the federal government had worked together to arrest blight. Pleased with the results of the initial effort, the city's rehabilitation committee planned projects for an Oak Cliff neighborhood and for a Pleasant Grove community.[24]

After the state passed its enabling legislation for urban renewal, Dallas leaders still faced several obstacles. First, the enabling legislation allowed cities to participate in the federal program only after they held a public hearing on urban renewal. Even more important, it required that a majority of voters approve urban renewal in a public referendum before the city could start a federal slum clearance program. Third, it prohibited cities from participating in urban renewal unless they developed a general or master plan. This differed from the federal requirement that a plan needed only to be in preparation. Fourth, the enabling legislation gave former property owners of land acquired through the use of eminent domain the first right to repurchase the cleared land. Finally, Texas law forbade any public housing from being erected on land acquired by the city under urban renewal laws.[25]

Almost immediately after legislators passed the enabling legislation, the Dallas Citizens Council Committee on West Dallas joined with the rest of the DCC and asked city council to apply for federal funds to improve an 800-acre area in West Dallas, approximately one-half mile from the CBD. On November 20, 1957, federal officials approved a $36,690 advance for a feasibility study of the area.[26] As we have seen, the earlier effort to revitalize West Dallas, the plan of both the DCC and the chamber, had stalled after the

completion of the massive housing project, since lack of enabling legislation had thwarted further progress. Now the possibility of federal funds for urban redevelopment reenergized the commitment for bettering West Dallas.

Using part of the federal grant, the city hired the consulting firm of DeLeuw, Cather and Company of Chicago to study a site in West Dallas bordered by Hampton, Singleton, and the Trinity River levees. In addition, civic leaders formed the Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal to push the city's participation in the federal program. That committee's nine-man steering committee included Milton F. Brown, president of Mercantile Bank; W. W. Overton, Jr., chair of the board of Texas Bank and Trust Company; Ben Wooten, president of the First National Bank; lawyer and former mayor J. Woodall Rodgers; and real estate developer Avery Mays.[27] By April of 1958, the chamber of commerce and the Greater Dallas Planning Council joined with the DCC in its request for a public referendum, as required by state law, to allow the city to accept federal urban renewal funds. The CBDA also strongly endorsed federal urban renewal and proposed to redevelop blighted areas on the edges of downtown with federal money. And a 1958 *News* poll found that 60 percent of those interviewed favored the use of federal funds for urban renewal.[28]

Despite the endorsement of many civic leaders, the proposal to use federal urban renewal moneys ran into fierce opposition, too. Congressman Bruce Alger led the fight against federal urban renewal, arguing, "It just isn't the Dallas pattern of doing business." Alger attacked the use of eminent domain for private development, warned that the program would result in much red tape, and reminded voters that "Federal regulation follows use of federal funds, which means accepted forced integration in public housing, and wage rates on urban renewal land clearance set by the Secretary of Labor, not by the local people and local economy." Alger overwhelmed the city manager, the mayor, and council members with documentation supporting his view when he mailed a two-pound, five-ounce package containing fifty-two separate exhibits to each of them.[29]

Bruce Alger, the first Republican ever sent to Congress from Dallas County, scored what the *News* described as "a shocking upset" in 1954. That year he defeated former Dallas mayor Wallace Savage for the post. The young Alger, who described himself "as probably an ultraconservative," won in part because Savage had alienated the liberal arm of the Democratic party.[30] The development of the Republican Party in Dallas appeared both a symptom and a cause of the changing political climate in the city during the 1950s. Although local elections officially remained nonpartisan, a growing partisanship entered municipal politics as never before.

This type of "politics," which was new to the era, ultimately disrupted the DCC's ability to work harmoniously on social issues.

One of the first consequences of this new type of partisanship surfaced when Alger attacked urban renewal. The Congressman's opposition to federal programs that might specifically benefit Dallas, such as the new federal highway act and the Rivers and Harbors Authorization Bill for a Trinity River survey, had already alienated him from much of the city's leadership.[31] Yet capturing the strong support of North Dallas women's clubs with his anticommunist rhetoric and constant warning about the expansion of the federal government, the ex-realtor successfully won reelection in 1956 against District Attorney Henry Wade, despite the latter's attempt to portray Alger as a gradualist when it came to race relations. Indeed, Alger was one of the few southern congressmen who refused to sign the Southern Manifesto, which pledged to use every legal means possible to maintain segregation in the public schools. But his constant and strong opposition to federally sponsored urban renewal played a major role in that program's plight in Dallas.[32]

Other strong voices of opposition spoke at a two-and-a-half-hour public hearing held by city council on June 23. More than 150 residents packed council chambers and debated the merits of urban renewal. Some, like the Dallas Women's Chamber of Commerce, opposed urban renewal as socialistic. Others, like Ben Carpenter of Oak Cliff, worried about the abuse of eminent domain and wanted the CBD excluded from urban renewal funds. Joe F. Maberry, representative of the Home Builders Association of Dallas County, thought urban renewal should be used only as a last resort. W. P. Vaughin, a black builder, cautioned that urban renewal would be "the making or breaking of Dallas." We need urban renewal, certainly, "but we need it in the right way." Vaughin reminded council that blacks had no place to go after being removed from West Dallas slum areas, since other black neighborhoods were already overcrowded. Former mayors Jimmie Temple and J. Woodall Rodgers strongly supported urban renewal, as did John E. Mitchell, Jr., a veteran of West Dallas slum study committees. According to Mitchell, West Dallas needed "a bulldozer—not a coat of paint or a pot of pansies on the window."[33]

Several days after the hearing, Mayor Thornton announced that council would postpone the vote on urban renewal until after the November congressional elections. The Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal also cooled its efforts around election time in an attempt to avoid making urban renewal a campaign issue.[34] That election saw Barefoot Sanders—supported by labor, many of the city's bankers (now dubbed the Main Street

crowd), and the *Dallas Times Herald*—run against Alger. The *Oak Cliff Tribune*, the city's third-largest newspaper, charged that the Upper Main Street crowd supported Sanders because he favored urban renewal. Although Sanders had great financial backing from key civic leaders, Alger benefited from the support of multimillionaire oilman H. L. Hunt and defeated Sanders by a 7,000-vote margin.[35]

After the election, supporters of urban renewal continued their crusade for the program in Dallas. At a debate on urban renewal at a Dallas Real Estate Board (DREB), Henry S. Miller, Jr., former DREB president and current chair of the Dallas Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal, charged, "Foes of urban renewal are chiefly slum owners and persons fearful that redeveloped property would compete with their own."[36] Had that been true, civic leaders would have been able to proceed with urban renewal. But this did not happen. The *News* reported on January 18, 1959, that council would not hold the referendum on urban renewal until after the April council elections because the topic drew "stiffer than expected opposition."[37] And when it became a major campaign issue in that local election and threatened to defeat the CCA, council backed away from the issue.[38] Indeed, a month before the election, Mayor Robert L. Thornton announced what he characterized as a revolutionary West Dallas revitalization program that did not need federal moneys. "Operation Bootstrap," as it was called, depended on private lending institutions to provide moneys necessary to repair West Dallas's bad housing. No use of the controversial eminent domain would be needed.[39]

The response to urban renewal in Dallas, then, marks a significant shift in local politics. Other issues more important than Dallas's welfare became central to the debate over urban renewal. Those opposing urban renewal particularly objected to the use of eminent domain. To them, the individual's rights to private property clearly outdistanced the needs of the city. In addition, the controversy over urban renewal underscored a strong dislike of many citizens to the growing involvement of the federal government in their lives, a growth that many blamed for higher taxes and outside control of traditional local concerns. Place this in the context of the cold war and an almost hysterical fear of communism and socialism, and add several influential political figures who assumed a populist guise, and you have the makings for the defeat of urban renewal in the late 1950s. A changing discourse about the nature of the city and its leadership helps explain the defeat of urban renewal in the city and can be found not only in the discussion of that issue but also in the council elections of 1959 and 1961.

Robert L. Thornton and the entire CCA slate had been reelected in 1957,

although not without a fight. That year two opponents challenged Thornton for the mayoralty—Frank Cusack, Oak Cliff resident and leader of the People's Candidate slate, and George F. Fox, independent candidate. The rhetoric of this campaign generally mirrored other ones. The CCA ran on its record of public works, good law enforcement, and efficient government, while opponents challenged the CCA candidates for being out of touch with the people and favoring the downtown interests. In this campaign, however, Laurence R. Melton, president of the CCA, also became an issue. The printer had headed the CCA since 1948, and as one of three members of the executive committee functioning between elections, he clearly had a major say in candidate selections and CCA platforms. As a result, opponents accused him of bossism and charged that he had turned the CCA into a ruthlessly efficient political machine.[40]

Despite such accusations, Thornton and the CCA slate swept to victory in an election that saw more than 62,000 ballots cast. Only one CCA nominee needed a runoff to win—Ruth Collins, the first woman candidate nominated by the charter group. She beat Harold C. Abramson in the runoff by a little more than 700 votes, thanks to strong support in North and East Dallas.[41] But two years later some of that support would waver as partisanship and the politics of fear would replace politics for Dallas as a whole as a major campaign theme.

New patterns, then, in politics paralleled patterns of planning in the late 1950s, as reflected in the Hulcy Plan. The fear that the Dallas public really perceived the CCA as an elite-dominated organization helps explain Melton's effort to restructure it. During the summer of 1957, the CCA president announced the decision to reorganize the good government association as a year-round, full-fledged political party. CCA leaders would replace the three-member executive committee with one made up of between thirty-five and forty members representing all parts of the city. In addition, the CCA established formal membership and organized on a precinct level. Finally, CCA leadership decided to establish permanent headquarters with a paid executive secretary. These changes, according to Melton, would draw the CCA closer to the people and regain grassroots support. "Because of the rapid expansion of the city," Melton remarked, "we have been getting out of touch with the people." As a result, the CCA head warned, "We must get closer. We must inform the people about the CCA and good government between elections."[42]

Despite these modifications, the CCA ran into trouble during the 1959 election when seventy-seven-year-old Robert L. Thornton decided to run for a fourth term as mayor. Dairy store owner Earle Cabell, son and grandson

of Dallas mayors, had expected the CCA nomination for mayor in 1959, but a last-minute decision by Thornton to seek reelection changed all that. Cabell opted to run against his old friend anyway, particularly after Republican leaders from North and East Dallas urged him to by arguing that the CCA had become too liberal and dominated by Democrats.[43]

In addition to the injection of partisan politics into local elections, now that Alger and the cold war had helped strengthen the Republican party in Dallas, another actor emerged as a key player in this election—neighborhood political organizations. Groups with specific neighborhood goals, such as the North Dallas–Walnut Hills Improvement League and the White Rock Committee for Conservative Legislation, challenged the previously dominant "for Dallas as a whole" rhetoric and rallied support around neighborhood quality-of-life issues rather than citywide growth concerns.[44] Furthermore, the 1959 election reflected a growing unhappiness in the city about the distribution of services, federal-urban relations, and the whole concept that a select few knew what was best for the city.

Cabell, who himself had been a member of both the CCA and the DCC, focused his campaign rhetoric not on Thornton but on the CCA. He charged that its leaders had abdicated their responsibilities to Dallas as a whole and had created "a ward heeling type of political machine. The early patriotic and unselfish leaders of that group," according to Cabell, had "given way to an handful of would be king makers, under the longtime domination of a full time Political Boss." The Dallas machine, according to Cabell, was "nothing more than a syndicate of downtown landlords, bankers and millionaires, who pick the candidates, tell them what to say and after elected, tell them what to do."[45]

Cabell not only challenged the structure of the CCA's organization, but he also questioned its campaign rhetoric emphasizing that only a unified, all-CCA administration producing a harmonious and efficient council could best serve Dallas. The dairyman countered that "a mixed council would be in the finest tradition of representative democracy." Even more important, Cabell questioned the very notion that individuals should sacrifice their particular concerns for Dallas as a whole. For instance, Cabell opposed the fluoridation of Dallas water out of a concern for the few. "Regardless of the alleged benefits of such mass-medication," he observed, "it is wrong in principle. Where matters of vital public health are concerned," Cabell warned, *"the wishes of any group, even though a minority, should not be subordinated to the arbitrary will of any other group* [italics mine]."[46] Government, then, according to this vision, owed its first commitment to the individual rather than to the city as a whole.

Cabell resisted federally subsidized urban renewal in Dallas for some of the same reasons. Because it confiscated property and sold it to other business interests for improvement, Cabell called urban renewal "the most socialistic measure to be passed onto the citizens of Dallas." In another policy statement he proclaimed, *"I will not advocate any expensive, grandiose project that completely disregards the rights and wishes of one segment of the city just to provide conveniences to the residences of any other section* [italics mine]."[47] According to the mayoral candidate, "Leaders who are anti-Socialistic in their belief should not have to think twice before condemning this monstrosity. If passed, the city could bankrupt itself for the benefit of a few big-time real-estate promoters, and the security of home-ownership as we have known it would be destroyed under the proposed changes in the law of eminent domain. I shall fight the submission of such an act, and if submitted I shall fight its passage."[48]

The growing anti–federal government posture of the *Morning News* (now run by the late George Dealey's son, E. M. [Ted] Dealey), fueled not only by the court's ruling on school segregation in 1954 but by perceived interference of the federal government in the Dallas–Fort Worth Airport controversy, helped promote a new parochialism in a city that had historically turned to Washington for help, acknowledging it was part of a system of cities affected by forces beyond its borders. Not only had the Dallas Chamber of Commerce sent a lobbyist to Washington in 1941, the first to do so in Texas, but it worked closely with Texas congressmen to guarantee that it would secure its fair share of federal help. Indeed, Sam Rayburn claimed Dallas leaders asked him for more favors than did civic leaders from his own district.[49] Now, however, the most important issue in Dallas was not the economic welfare of the city, but the threat of an expanding federal government and creeping socialism. Some of Cabell's most outspoken supporters voiced such concerns. For instance, Cabell backer Ed C. Schwille, chair of the White Rock Committee for Conservative Legislation, had been a vocal opponent of urban renewal before Cabell's candidacy, claiming it was "pure communism."[50] At the same time, Cabell attracted the approval of South Dallas and Oak Cliff because he challenged the powerful CCA, now portrayed as a group dominated by greedy downtown businessmen unconcerned with neighborhood needs.

Other candidates for council raised similar and familiar themes. All independent council candidates but one opposed the city's participation in the federal urban renewal program. They also accused CCA officials of being preoccupied with improving downtown at the expense of neighborhoods and the city's thoroughfare system. Some charged that the CCA did not ably

represent the various interests within the city and accused Melton of "machine boss rule."[51] According to one council candidate, Lucian Holmes, Jr., Melton selected candidates before a council-nominating committee even met. He continued, "Many of us one time Charter supporters know that there is no semblance between the ideals of which the CCA was founded and the political machine of today to which it has degenerated."[52]

The CCA countered its opponents' accusations by emphasizing the city's progress under its control. For instance, a CCA advertisement bragged that the city's growth under that organization's leadership meant "jobs and payrolls for working people and helps bring about prosperity for all."[53] In a campaign speech, former CCA president S. J. Hay challenged Cabell's efforts to discredit the CCA and warned that "the business climate of Dallas is due for a rapid change should a bunch of independent candidates, full of pet schemes and hatred take office."[54] Even the staunchly anti-CCA *Oak Cliff Tribune* acknowledged that "city progress under [Thornton's] regime has probably been the greatest in Dallas history" and has "been infinitely fair to Oak Cliff."[55]

It is ironic, then, that the administration that came closest to achieving the goals of the CCA—economic growth and development for the city as a whole—experienced some of its severest criticism during the 1959 election. But such a focus no longer had the same impact as earlier, because a new concern about neighborhood rights more forcefully entered the campaign discourse. The *Oak Cliff Tribune,* after praising the public works record of Thornton's administration, went on to attack the CCA for consistently preventing "top notch opposition from developing" through economic coercion. It concluded by noting, "One party government is not indigenous to the American system no matter how benevolent."[56]

Others must have agreed. Even with a substantial campaign chest, the good government party saw only five of its nine candidates elected outright for office. Rival office seekers forced Thornton, as well as three council candidates, into runoff elections. Despite his sterling record, Thornton beat Cabell by less than 1,800 votes, and since the third candidate, George Fox, secured a little more than 2,100 votes, he deprived Thornton of a majority.[57]

The CCA won with the endorsement of the *Times Herald* and numerous black leaders even after an African American, C. B Brinkley, Jr., entered the race as an independent. But it failed to gain the support of the *News,* which remained neutral in the election. Thornton did not pile up the normal big-vote totals in North Dallas because of the strong opposition from the North Dallas–Walnut Hill Improvement League. That group formed after the city announced its intent to develop a six-lane highway through the Walnut Hill

neighborhood.[58] Thornton also lost votes to North and East Dallas conservatives who feared the banker was too liberal in regard to federal help for the city.

During the runoff, Thornton picked up the endorsement of the Dallas AFL–CIO, but the CCA continued to struggle against charges of bossism. The good government association mounted a massive newspaper, radio, and television blitz during the last few days of the campaign, not just to reelect Thornton but to help its other three candidates secure office. The strategy worked fairly well: Thornton beat Cabell by almost 3,000 votes in an election that saw more than 71,000 people vote. CCA candidates won two of the three council seats, too, although independent Joe Geary, who secured almost 3,000 more votes than Thornton, defeated his CCA opponent by over 11,000 votes.

Even with Thornton's narrow victory, Cabell's supporters apparently got their way in regard to federal urban renewal. Afraid of igniting a full-scale controversy that threatened to split the city's civic leadership, including the DCC, and further weaken the CCA, the mayor opted for revitalization in West Dallas that would use FHA moneys but avoid the federal government's urban renewal program. No referendum was ever held in Dallas over urban renewal.

Although they won the election, CCA officials, stung by the criticism of independent candidates and the more than 34,000 votes against Thornton, instigated changes in their organization after the election.[59] Shortly following the mayor's reelection, Melton announced that the CCA would launch a massive educational program to clarify its goals: the preservation of council-manager government and the promotion of efficient government. If the CCA resembled a "machine" at all, Melton observed, it was "a machine interested only in perpetuating good government." Melton, a controversial figure and a growing liability to the CCA, also declared that he would not serve beyond his current term, ending in January of 1961.[60]

Education, according to some CCA supporters, would not be enough. They called for still another reorganization of their association to develop a greater groundswell of support. In a critique of the CCA, lawyer Robert L. Clark proposed that body should combat what he viewed as a "loss of prestige." Local politics was changing, according to Clark, as novice political workers were "breathing new life into city politics and shifting the domination from Main Street to suburbia." Clark concluded that the CCA, which faced charges of bossism, had to respond to this trend. Although the good government group had always encouraged widespread public support for its candidates, its rank-and-file members had played little part in candidate

nomination and association decisions. By the late 1950s, such action had become a liability, the lawyer observed, because "citizens are just plain tired of being told who is going to run for what." Local politics should no longer be a spectator sport, Clark contended, but rather should encourage participation and the power that goes with it.[61]

Toward this end, the lawyer recommended that CCA leadership reorganize their body to include meaningful participation by the city's various neighborhoods. Observing that the "newly asserted strength of self-starting neighborhood groups" had proved an important factor in the opposition's strength during the last election. Clark called for the CCA to provide more opportunities for this "newstyle voter worker." Not only would such action provide fresh faces and new ideas, but it might permit the CCA to educate the public about its good-government goals. Going to the voter for advice and involvement was a must, Clark warned, because times had changed. For too long, the CCA had "closed [its] eyes and ears to changing political moods, behavior and actions in the city's elections." Now was the time to acknowledge new conditions, according to Clark, "since the city's political geography, its political environment and its political community had all changed." Others agreed with this analysis. The *News,* for example, argued that the Charter Association needed new blood and a new program to "dispel the public notion that it is run by a hand-picked few of the city's big shots."[62]

The CCA responded to such recommendations by naming a twenty-two-member committee to study reorganization. It echoed Clark's sentiments and concluded that the "structure [of the CCA] was adequate for the 1930's and 1940's, but it has not kept pace with the changing political climate of the 1950's."[63] Developer W. H. Cothrum chaired the committee, which conducted a series of "grass roots neighborhood meetings throughout the city to hear what the city's residents thought the CCA should do." From those meetings it recommended a district-based organization. The CCA would create a twenty-one-member committee representing the different geographic parts of the city. Committee members would propose candidates for CCA office and suggest names for council and mayor to the good government organization's nominating committee, composed of the CCA president and six district vice presidents. That group, then, would make its final choices only from the nominations submitted by the district groups. The new CCA plan also required council candidates to hold neighborhood meetings to allow more participation in drafting the CCA platform. These changes marked a significant departure from traditional CCA practices. Unlike the 1940s and early 1950s when a select group of civic leaders tightly

controlled the good government organization, the new CCA relied more on citizen input for both platform and candidate selection, following the tone if not the specifics of Clark's recommendations.[64]

Despite its new emphasis on grassroots participation, the CCA never regained the kind of support it had experienced in the 1940s. Not only did it face opposition in Oak Cliff and South Dallas, but its popularity declined in North Dallas as residents placed neighborhood issues above the CCA's city-as-a-whole agenda.[65] Nor was everyone convinced the CCA had really changed as its new structure might suggest. Despite the new neighborhood initiative, executive committee members still retained veto power over all decisions made by the community groups. And during the 1961 election, the Chamber of Commerce Development Fund actually collected contributions for the CCA.[66]

Controversy over the 1961 selection of the mayoralty candidate also lost the good government organization some support. Initially, it appeared that the CCA planned to nominate current mayor pro tem Elgin Robertson as its candidate for mayor. Robertson, former head of the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce, was well respected and well liked in that area, but not a familiar name in fast-growing North Dallas, where forty-two percent of the electorate now resided. Others wanted Joe Geary nominated as the CCA mayoralty candidate. Geary had been active in the CCA prior to 1959, managing Thornton's first campaign for mayor, but as we have seen, he ran as an independent for council in 1959 and secured a larger vote than Thornton. He had also avoided attacking the CCA with the ferocity that Cabell had and seemed bent on running for mayor in 1961 with or without CCA support. His North Dallas residence and more dynamic personality also appeared to work in his favor. As a result, the CCA nominating committee selected him "unanimously" for the top post, much to the chagrin of some Robertson supporters. Geary launched his campaign with the theme of "unity without uniformity."[67] He explained that in 1959 he had opposed the CCA because it had "grown stale" and "no longer represented the people." That had changed, according to Geary, with the "new grass-roots movement within the CCA."[68]

Despite these changes, the *News* refused to endorse Geary and threw its support to Earle Cabell. Although it applauded the CCA for its "sincere effort to broaden its base" through scores of grassroots meetings, it also reminded its readers that "it does not have a monopoly on civic virtue or competence." Publisher Ted Dealey's close relationship with the Cabell family certainly helps explain the endorsement by the city's most influential newspaper, but so was Cabell's pledge "to fight dictation from Washington."[69] At

a time when a growing number of Dallasites were focusing on the threats from Washington rather than the needs of the city as a whole, the CCA's agenda became a liability. Meanwhile, more-liberal groups also endorsed Cabell and the slate running against the CCA because of that group's past history. For example, the Dallas County Committee on Political Education (COPE), the voice of local labor, endorsed Cabell and six independent council candidates. "In the past campaigns," a COPE statement explained, we have "on occasion supported candidates of the CCA"; however, "we have found out the hard way that once a candidate is elected they [*sic*] become a member of a controlled council, and they seem to function as a part of a machine rather than as individuals."[70]

Finally, the CCA's posture as an organization promoting the best interests of the city as a whole seemed to deteriorate during the 1960s as constant charges of favoritism and special interest permeated the campaign rhetoric. These developments help explain why CCA candidate Joe Geary lost to Earle Cabell by more than 2,500 votes in an election that saw 82,308 votes cast. Two other non-CCA candidates won council seats in the most crushing setback the good government organization had experienced since 1937.[71]

Although the election of conservative Earle Cabell, as well as the disbandment of the Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal, which had led the fight in 1958, suggests that opponents had killed federal urban renewal in Dallas, the issue gained new life after the election thanks to a report by the Build America Better Committee. The Dallas Real Estate Board, the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and city council had invited that group to survey the city's slums. The four-man committee included Guy T. O. Hollydale of Baltimore, chair of the committee; R. Gordon Tarr of Cincinnati; Lloyd D. Hanford of San Francisco; and John Haeus of Columbus, Ohio. They spent five days visiting Dallas's slums.[72]

Their report contained twenty recommendations, including the use of eminent domain and participation in the federal urban renewal program. Such action was necessary, according to the committee, because "we found in this city housing conditions among the most grievous we have seen." It also observed that "the city's pilot project in conservation and rehabilitation, appears to have run out of gas. Weeds and rubble conceal past good intentions." Indeed, the report took special aim at the city's "Operation Bootstrap" project under way in West Dallas, suggesting it "is too slow in pace, too limited in extent, too light in impact."[73]

Following closely on the heals of that report, the *Dallas News* printed its own investigation of the city's slums, focusing on West Dallas. It too concluded that the city's West Dallas Revitalization Project had not adequately

cleared the slum conditions in that district. The thirteen-part series emphasized the drastic shortage of decent, low-cost housing and the deplorable conditions in which many of the city's poor were forced to live. Immediately after the series, the *News* ran a series of interviews with civic leaders to keep the issue before the public. In response to the efforts of the Build America Better Committee report and the *News* series, council created a new committee to "chart a course in slum improvement."[74]

The new push for federal urban renewal and the use of eminent domain pressured Cabell to act. Unwilling to embrace either, the mayor nevertheless responded to the call to clear the city's slums with his own "dramatic and sweeping program." On March 25, 1962, Cabell announced a plan to build 3,000 additional units of public housing, including 750 for aged whites, 750 for aged blacks, and 1,500 more units for younger blacks. These units would be scattered throughout the city, according to the mayor, and erected on vacant land. After builders developed these units, Cabell promised to enforce vigorously the city's building codes. Unlike the federal urban renewal program that displaced the poor without providing adequate housing, the Cabell plan offered housing first. In addition, slum clearance could be undertaken without resort to the use of eminent domain for urban renewal, something strongly opposed by the mayor. Those units demolished would be leveled because they failed to meet proper housing codes. Cabell also requested improved zoning laws, better paving, and adequate city services for areas now designated slums.

The mayor's proposals created a stir and won enthusiastic support from both the city's daily newspapers. However, city council responded cautiously to the public housing recommendation, although initial reports had five of its members supporting this proposal. CCA councilman George M. Underwood, who had headed the council's new slum committee, commented in a council session, "We are, as a council, in complete agreement with the exception of housing." Later, he suggested that council might support a public housing program if it were truly for the indigent and poor unable to pay more than $25 a month for rent.[75] Others, like the Dallas Real Estate Board, voiced even stronger objections. That group's former president, Lyn Davis, became the leading spokesman against public housing and launched a petition drive to get a public referendum on public housing after the Dallas County Homebuilders, another public housing opponent, announced it would not.[76]

Cabell did not sit idly by in the face of growing opposition. He lobbied with a variety of groups including the staunchly conservative organizations such as the Women's Council of Dallas County, who strongly opposed pub-

lic housing. Cabell, who himself had very respectable conservative credentials, told the women not to be so "dogmatic" in their opposition to public housing. He also visited the city's influential Dallas Citizens Council. However, unlike earlier times when the forceful DCC actually had initiated public housing, now, badly divided by the conflicting views of Democratic and Republican members, it refused to endorse the mayor's plan.[77]

Others voiced their disapproval at a public hearing held in the council's chamber on a sweltering August afternoon. About 250 people jammed the chambers and heard 75 speakers criticize the mayor's plan. About 20 blacks joined the protest. White realtor Lyn Davis called public housing the "Trojan horse of creeping socialism." After the meeting, he wrote to Bruce Alger, "The people of Dallas are incensed by the Mayor's dictatorial attitude." Opponents of public housing also secured more than 7,100 signatures on a petition demanding a referendum on public housing.[78]

A little less than two months before the November referendum, Congressman Bruce Alger again intervened in the local debate. He sent Cabell and the council a three-page letter with addenda challenging the need for public housing. Not only did he want public housing defeated in the referendum, but he urged "the liquidation of public housing in Dallas by disposing of the [other DHA] properties into private hands." Several days after the letter the *Times Herald* ran front-page headlines that announced "Alger Might Quit if Public Housing Wins, He Asserts." According to the story, Alger apparently threatened that if Dallas acted hypocritically enough to accept public housing and return him to Congress, he would seriously consider resigning.[79]

As the November 6 referendum neared, opponents to public housing launched a major advertising campaign against it.[80] A pamphlet titled "Do You Want a Public Housing Project in Your Backyard?" argued that "public housing is political housing and is the greatest step toward socialism." Cabell responded to such charges by suggesting that realtors and housing developers opposed public housing primarily because of "their own personal greed."[81]

In a curious move, all council members of the Citizens Charter Association went on record as opposing Cabell's public housing plan while the three independents supported it. This is strange because the CCA had historically supported public housing. Even in this election, its grand old man, Robert L. Thornton, endorsed it.[82] But these CCA council members seemed more intent on posturing for the next council election instead of looking out for the city's welfare. If Cabell's most important program soundly lost at the polls, the theory went, his own credibility and electability might well be hurt too.

When given a chance to voice their opinion, voters soundly defeated public housing 41,272 to 26,272. Not only did conservative North and East Dallas defeat it overwhelmingly, but even a West Dallas precinct voted against the mayor's plan, despite the desperate need for better housing in that deteriorated area.[83] Cabell clearly suffered a major setback, but it did not mark the end of his political career.

Dallas voters' rejection of public housing proved just one example of a growing reaction against anything that smacked of socialism or communism during the postwar era. While many cities had exhibited anticommunism hysteria during the early 1950s, Dallas's concern with communism appeared to accelerate in the late 1950s. For example, Dallas conservatives protested communist art in the Dallas Art Museum during the mid-1950s. At a March 14, 1955, meeting, the Public Affairs Luncheon Club, a woman's organization interested in civic affairs, accused the Dallas Art Museum of having "a tendency to over-emphasize all phases of futuristic, modernistic and non objective paintings and statuary and to exhibit, promote and acquire the works of artists who have known communistic affiliations." Soon, several other organizations including the local post of the American Legion joined in the crusade to purge the art museum of communist paintings. Under the growing pressure, the Museum's Board of Trustees agreed to bar art that promoted communist propaganda and also promised not to acquire works from communists or members of Communist-affiliated organizations. Under pressure from patrons, however, the board reversed itself about seven weeks later, promising to acquire art on the basis of its worth as art. Trouble resurfaced the next year when anticommunists protested the showing of a traveling exhibition called "Sport in Art." Because the House Committee on Un-American Activities suspected four of the artists involved in this collection of communist tendencies, local anticommunists believed the exhibit subversive. Although the well-organized protest failed, and the museum showed the exhibit, it helped promote Dallas's image as a reactionary city.[84]

The attack on Lyndon Johnson on November 4, 1960, four days before the presidential election, furthered the city's reputation as a hotbed of reactionary activity. Although like much of Johnson's life, the specific incident is clouded by different interpretations, the most common one is that a group made up primarily of angry Republican women mobbed vice presidential candidate Lyndon Johnson and his wife as they left a luncheon at the Adolphus Hotel.[85] Johnson, whom many viewed as having betrayed the conservative cause by agreeing to run as vice president on the Kennedy ticket, happened to be in downtown Dallas during Republican Tag Day, a time

when Republican women solicited contributions for their party. They constituted the core of the group that mobbed Johnson. Congressman Bruce Alger, a participant in the mobbing, explained that it was a "hubbub of a large gathering fighting for a society free from federal control." Ladybird Johnson offered a different view. "We were hissed at and spat upon," she complained, "in a mob scene that looked like some other country."[86]

Although the *News* apologized to the Johnsons for the incident, it seemed much more concerned about an advertisement placed in the evening *Times Herald* welcoming the vice presidential candidate and his wife to Dallas. The advertisement, according to the *News,* had included names of prominent citizens who had not granted permission for their names to appear in the newspaper. The *News,* a vocal supporter of the Nixon and Lodge ticket, spent much more print criticizing the *Times Herald* than the mobbing of the Senate majority leader.[87] Indeed, the *News* had become increasingly shrill in its conservatism since the early 1950s. As we have seen, Ted Dealey now served as publisher and seemed much more concerned with growing federal control and the threat on internal communist conspiracy than with the fate of the city as a whole. Dallas's continued fight with the federal government over the plight of Love Field, as well as the federal court's attack on segregation, certainly help explain the *News*'s position, but so does the weakening of the public discourse on the city as a whole.[88]

Dallasites had always been suspicious of the federal government, but found that during the 1930s and 1940s it was quite useful in helping the city secure some of its economic and social goals, thanks in part to the prodding of the National Municipal League. PWA and WPA projects not only provided relief for the city's unemployed, but considerably helped the city improve its underdeveloped infrastructure. In addition, public housing for low-income residents furnished critically needed dwelling units for the poor and thus helped ease growing racial tensions in the Dallas. City officials also lobbied constantly with Washington to help in developing a Trinity River canal. And during the 1940s, the government's commitment to Love Field played a pivotal role in the city's aviation development. Even more important, wartime construction of airplane factories and the establishment of federally financed training schools for them provided an important stimulus for the city's economy.

By the 1950s, federal government activity, which had apparently helped Dallas, seemed to be giving way to policy adversely affecting the city's economic and social well-being. As we have seen, in aviation the government's interest in promoting air safety and efficiency prompted its commitment to a metropolitan regional airport to be shared by Dallas and Fort Worth. Its

decision to promote Carter Field, located midway between Dallas and Fort Worth but controlled by the latter city, resulted in massive protest and acrimonious assaults on the federal government by locals. Indeed, the conflicting goals of federal policy discussed above, and Dallas policy—which stressed economic development for the city and dominance over the region—promoted an era of federal government baiting by the city's civic leadership unprecedented in Dallas's history.

Although tensions between the federal government and the city seemed to ease by 1956 when the CAA allocated $375,000 for Love Field improvements and reclassified the Dallas airport from continental to intercontinental status, the détente was short-lived. The development of commercial jet travel in the late fifties made congested Love Field vulnerable once again and gave new life to the regional airport concept.[89] Not only did jets intensify the noise problem for surrounding neighborhoods, but they required longer runways. As a result, the FAA Airport Plan for 1959 called for Love Field to develop parallel runways of 9,200 feet. In response to this demand, local officials, who had just completed a $7.5 million terminal in 1957, proceeded to initiate a $9 million airport expansion program. In November of that year, plans met a snag when the FAA rejected a local request for funds because the city's Love Field plan did not provide an adequate safety zone at the end of the runway to satisfy FAA officials.[90]

Fearful that Fort Worth and the federal government might launch another offensive to force Dallas to cooperate in the development of Carter Field as the regional airport, the city accelerated its airport expansion without federal aid. However, a lawsuit filed by forty-three Love Field–area homeowners seeking to halt expansion plans delayed construction for nearly two years and helped refocus attention on the area's need for a larger, more regionally based airport.[91] Indeed, the early 1960s proved difficult for Dallas as the FAA refused to funnel additional moneys into Love Field, while at the same time granting federal dollars to Carter Field. Even more disconcerting for Dallas leaders, in 1961 a joint FAA/CAB committee specifically endorsed the idea of promoting regional airports.[92]

Matters only worsened when Najeeb E. Halaby, head of the FAA, testified before a senate subcommittee in 1962 that the FAA would "not put another nickel in Love Field." Congestion at the Dallas airport, and its inability to handle future aircraft, made new appropriations unthinkable, according to the FAA chief. Halaby also chastised the city for not developing a regional airport with Fort Worth and called Dallas's commitment to Love Field nothing more than a "pure, unadulterated case of childish civic pride."[93] Twelve days later the CAB ordered an investigation to determine if

there should be a regional airport in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. Halaby's remarks and the CAB's action created a new uproar in Dallas.[94]

To city leaders who were justifiably proud of their airport, built mostly with Dallas money, Halaby's remarks seemed a declaration of war. Local officials feared federal action undermined the city's $32 million investment in Love Field and threatened its $35 million payroll. The federal government's action struck them as particularly unfair since local tax money had played such a critical role in Love Field's development. According to one estimate, Carter Field received $4.70 in federal aid for each passenger while Love Field saw only 43 cents per passenger in federal aid.

Moreover, Dallas was already feeling the economic impact of the suburban migration of people and businesses, and suspected that a truly regional airport located beyond the corporate limits would further encourage the suburban trend. This context helps explain why conservative mayor Earle Cabell promised to fight the federal government "with every weapon at my command." Chamber of Commerce Aviation Committee chair H. L. Nichols also protested what he called the "deliberate and massive attack upon Dallas and its airport . . . by two agencies of the federal government." Nichols charged that such action "marked a misuse of Federal Power in an effort to dictate to Dallas a course of action contrary to Dallas's own interests."[95]

These criticisms, however, did not stop the CAB from holding hearings during the summer of 1963 to determine whether a single airport should be designated to serve the Dallas–Fort Worth area. After meeting for more than two months, CAB examiner Ross Newman ruled that "it would not be in the public interest to designate either Greater Southwest [Carter Field] or Love Field a regional airport at this time."[96] The Dallas victory proved short-lived, however, because the CAB decided to review Newman's decision. After that review, the CAB announced on September 30, 1964, that both cities must be served by a single facility and gave Dallas and Fort Worth 180 days to find a suitable location for a regional airport. If they failed to agree on a site, the CAB threatened that it would locate one.[97] The highly successful Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport eventually resulted from that pronouncement, but to Dallas leaders at the time it served to underscore the federal government's apparent adversarial role to their own goals for the city's economic growth and development.

Washington's involvement in race relations during the 1950s did not bring the same type of condemnation from the city's top civic leaders as did the airport controversy, but it seemed another example to many Dallas citizens of the federal government's efforts to undermine social relations in the Texas metropolis. When the United States Supreme Court ruled against

segregation on May 17, 1954, in the famous *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision, the *Dallas News* responded in a mild editorial entitled "Segregation Ruling Ends an Era." It conceded that "constitutionally the *News* does not believe the Court to be wrong," but then warned this was the first step in the NAACP's effort to promote social intercourse between blacks and unwilling whites, something the *News* did not like.[98] Civic leaders responded with similar caution. When local school officials refused to allow twenty-eight African American students into white schools in 1955, the Dallas chapter of the NAACP sued. For the first several years, the school board asked the court to allow it to complete twelve studies on the best way to approach integration. In August 1957, the state legislature passed a law that permitted school districts to integrate only if citizens approved a referendum supporting integration. This encouraged more delay. And when officials held the vote in 1960, Dallasites clearly registered their opinion of the 1954 federal court decision, voting 4 to 1 against integrating the city's public schools.[99]

Despite the vote, a reluctant Judge T. Whitfield Davidson, Jr., of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, ordered Dallas, the nation's largest city still segregated, to integrate in September of 1961. Fearful of the violence that had occurred in some southern cities such as Little Rock and New Orleans, the DCC worked out a plan to promote peaceful integration.[100] That group immediately formed a Committee of Fourteen including seven blacks to develop plans for the peaceful integration of Dallas schools. The committee also promoted strategies to integrate public places in the same way. Fearful that black-initiated efforts to integrate downtown Dallas might lead to violence and thwart efforts by the chamber to recruit more business, civic leaders formulated a program of managed integration, although not before certain blacks started picketing downtown stores that would not serve them. Under this growing pressure, the Committee of Fourteen arranged for blacks to walk into forty-nine downtown restaurants and be served on July 26, 1961, without incident. Merchants also removed whites-only signs throughout downtown.[101] The action brought the city good national publicity. For instance, the *New York Times* observed that "there seems to be today a dominant spirit of moderation and goodwill [in Dallas]."[102]

That fall, under the guidance of the Committee of 14, eighteen black children entered first grade at eight previously all white elementary schools. No violence or protest occurred, in part because of the DCC's campaign to sell integration to the city. It hired Sam Bloom, a public relations man, and pro-

duced a twenty-minute movie called *Dallas at the Crossroads,* and showed it all over the city. Narrated by Walter Cronkite, the film stressed the importance of avoiding the conflict that had typified school integration in Little Rock and New Orleans.[103]

Despite the reluctant but peaceful compliance with the court ruling, the federal court's decree helped fuel the already strident anti–federal government feeling in Dallas. And while the *News* carefully restrained from promoting racial tensions, it did not use the same restraint in its attack on the federal government in foreign policy and other domestic areas.[104] Its constant assaults on Kennedy, the United Nations, and Big Government seemed to help legitimize the ravings of the city's well-organized extreme right wing led by political reactionaries such as Dan H. Smoot, front man for ultraconservative oil tycoon H. L. Hunt; Frank McGehee, founder of the National Indignation Convention; and retired General Edwin A. Walker, who while active had supplied ultraconservative John Birch Society material to his troops.[105]

Indeed, it was Walker, along with the John Birch Society, who organized a demonstration against U. N. delegate Adlai E. Stevenson, speaker for the city's observance of United Nations Day, held on October 26, 1963. Not only did protesters harass and interrupt Stevenson during his speech to 5,000 at the city's Memorial Auditorium, but about eighty demonstrators outside the auditorium booed the ambassador, and several shoved, hit, and spat upon him as he left the building.[106] Civic leaders, deeply embarrassed by the incident and troubled by the bad publicity it gave the city, sent a telegram apologizing for the incident to Stevenson, noting the city was "outraged and abjectly ashamed of the disgraceful discourtesies you suffered at the hands of a small group of extremists."[107]

Two days after the incident, Mayor Earle Cabell criticized the city's reactionaries as a "cancer on the body politic" and pled with Dallas citizens to "help us restore sanity to our city." He then proceeded to identify the larger malaise that permitted such incidents to occur. "The constructive thinker and civic builder," Cabell stated, "although in the majority has become engrossed in his own affairs and has permitted a small but highly vocal minority to project the image of our city to the world at large."[108] The key here was his allusion to being engrossed in one's own affairs, suggesting that the desire to work for the city as a whole had declined since the city-building days of the 1930s or 1940s. Some outside critics suggested that the major problem in Dallas stemmed from the control of the city by the oligarchy of business leaders associated with the DCC, rather than the highly vocal minority of

the reactionaries Cabell referred to in his speech. For by the 1960s, a time that emphasized individual rights rather than corporate needs, this apparent lack of democracy seemed particularly offensive.

The assassination of John F. Kennedy on the streets of Dallas on November 22, 1963, proved a major event in the life of the city because of the microscopic examination it brought to Dallas, along with the nation's widespread revulsion and hate. Even more important, it helped extend the life and power of the business elite in Dallas politics and civic leadership when massive changes occurred elsewhere, including the Southwest, due in part to a new notion about the relationship between the city and its citizens. During the 1930s and 1940s, the public discourse had emphasized the city or the metropolis as the key object of concern. By the 1960s, the citizen, as represented by different ethnic, racial, class, or neighborhood groups, now became the principal unit of concern.[109] In city politics, democracy replaced efficiency as the chief goal of city government. This change had already started to occur in Dallas before the Kennedy assassination and had helped explain Cabell's 1961 victory, along with the two independents. Understanding the impact of the changing discourse provides some insight as to why so much criticism was directed to a city that by *National Municipal Review* standards was incredibly well run. But the national attack on the city after the Kennedy assassination rallied citizens to defend the city's reputation and civic leadership, and thus stall a process of change that had started in Dallas during the late 1950s.

Kennedy's assassination in Dallas made the entire city turn inward and evaluate its soul. For instance, the chamber of commerce altered its regular annual meeting program scheduled for December of 1963 to invite three leading citizens to discuss the responsibilities of citizenship.[110] In the following November election Dallas voters ousted their incumbent congressman, the ultraconservative Bruce Alger, by what the *News* called a "substantial margin."[111] Alger had become an embarrassment to the city for his extremism, so vehemently attacked after the Kennedy assassination, but to many he also had proven a liability to the city. Civic leaders wearied of his refusal to support the request for federal money to canalize the Trinity River and became angry when his government bashing in Congress cost the city several federal agencies. They supported popular (and conservative) mayor Earle Cabell to run against Alger—a move that helped defeat the congressman.

With the election of Cabell to Congress, the CCA-dominated city council chose Texas Instrument head Jon Erik Jonsson as the new mayor. Born in

Brooklyn, New York, in 1901, Jonsson came to Dallas in 1934 with the Geophysical Service, a company that did seismographic surveys for major oil companies. From these beginnings, he helped build Texas Instruments, an important high-tech industry characteristic of those established in the sunbelt after World War II. This leading civic figure had headed the DCC at the time of his selection as mayor.[112]

Jonsson found a city devastated by the Kennedy and Oswald assassinations. He recounted later that he confronted an atmosphere of "tragedy, grief, confusion, and uncertainty." Dallas had become known as "the city of hate," and for several years civic leaders worried that top industrialists and financiers around the country might avoid it because they viewed it as dominated by extremists.[113] Such fear did not paralyze the mayor, however. He believed that the tragic events of 1963 could rally Dallas citizens together for the good of the city. "I realized that if any good could come from disaster," Jonsson later recounted, "it might well be because we cast aside petty differences to join in [a] more closely knit, cohesive effort to create a city of . . . excellence."[114]

Toward this end, Jonsson in 1964 promoted still another planning initiative. Called *Goals for Dallas,* and roughly modeled after President Dwight D. Eisenhower's *Goals for America* program, this planning effort differed substantially from the Kessler and Bartholomew plans. Earlier efforts had been focused on shaping the physical city, and assumed that such action could benefit Dallas's economic and social development. Although occasionally consulting laymen, these plans, along with the goals they were drawn to fulfill, were developed or guided by professional planning experts viewed as the only ones qualified to understand the needs of a complex city. *Goals for Dallas,* however, expanded both the objects and the means of planning. Unlike earlier efforts, the new planning program emphasized the necessity of establishing community goals as much as planning for them. In addition, it called for maximum feasible participation of the city's residents and from the start relied on laymen rather than professional planners. Only after Dallas's citizens set goals would civic leaders attempt to translate them into concrete plans. Unlike earlier plans, which assumed that the city was more than the sum of its parts (and people) and that city goals might be different than the goals of some of its citizens, the new "plan" appeared to view the city merely as the sum of its populations, and sought to transform a consensus of their belief in what the city should do into a plan for that city. Managing the city's diversity for the benefit of Dallas as a whole gave way to responding to the needs of individuals and groups.

According to Jonsson, the first stage of his program would be the setting of goals—the ideals, aims, objectives for the city. The mayor thought this process would allow the people of Dallas to determine the type and character of the city they wanted.[115] A twenty-seven-member planning committee composed of business, political, and religious leaders headed the privately financed effort. Dr. Bryghte D. Goldbold, on leave as vice president of the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest, and a small staff headed that committee. It acted as a board of directors that oversaw the entire *Goals for Dallas* undertaking. Initially, planning committee members wrote thirteen essays on different city topics and identified problems in areas such as government, design, health, welfare, transportation, public safety, education, recreation and entertainment, cultural activities and economy.

Following the completion of these essays, eighty-seven men and women representing a variety of "backgrounds, creeds, races, viewpoints, interests and occupations" attended a conference held in June 1966 at the Stagecoach Inn in Salado, Texas. They read the thirteen essays written the previous spring. According to a later report, "These papers did not propose goals" but rather were "statements of the problems." In preparation for this gathering, the participants had also studied other reference material and attended a seminar conducted by a panel of international experts. At Salado, the assembly drafted a set of proposed goals after much discussion and compromise. According to one account, "The Salado group looked beyond themselves. Several likened the conference to a religious experience."[116]

Following the meeting, city officials published the thirteen essays, along with the Salado goals, in paperback-book form and distributed it to the public libraries. The Goals Planning Committee asked churches, PTAs, civic clubs, chambers of commerce, and other organizations to encourage their members to read the essays and study the proposed goals. In November, the committee held thirty-three neighborhood meetings throughout the Dallas area to allow citizens to review the Salado goals and give their reactions, and offer revisions to the document. Nearly 6,400 people attended those meetings and provided their input on the ninety-eight proposals. The goals committee then summarized the thousands of suggestions gleaned from neighborhood meetings and from the more than 1,200 comment cards and letters received. It held another meeting, this time in Arlington, Texas. Those neighborhood meetings and mail-in replies helped modify 60 percent of the goals and add twelve new ones. The resulting document from this planning movement differed greatly from the earlier plans of Dallas. Physical devel-

opment, although discussed under the headings of City Design and Transportation and Communications, competed with new planning categories focusing on individual and societal needs such as government, health, welfare, public safety, and higher education. For instance, the general goal for health was found on page 8: "The physical and mental well-being of its citizens is a major Dallas goal." This was followed by ten specific goals, such as the provision of the very best in hospital facilities and staffs.[117] Under public safety *Goals for Dallas* made the following statement: "Each citizen must be assured the opportunity to enjoy life in our community in peace and free of fear from criminal acts and preventable disasters." A specific proposal to help realize the general goals was to "make careers in law enforcement and other public safety services more attractive."[118] Even the general goal for the design of the city—"a city of beauty and functional fitness that enhances the quality of life for all its peoples"—emphasized the needs of people rather than the city as a unit.[119]

Later, during 1968 in another series of neighborhood meetings, citizens helped prioritize the goals, resulting in another publication, entitled *Proposals for Achieving the Goals for Dallas.*[120] It too emphasized the new orientation toward the citizen as opposed to city needs. For instance, one of the proposals about improving the city's physical design called for a plan for each district and neighborhood in the city. "Neighborhood plans require deep insights into economic and sociological conditions and the needs of citizens," the plan observed, "as well as a physical plan for streets, parks, schools and such."[121]

The commitment to fuller citizen participation in urban affairs, first reflected in changes in the Citizens Charter Association in the late 1950s and in the Hulcy Plan, completed in 1961, manifested itself even more fully in the Goals for Dallas Program. And with it came changing priorities, turning from the city to the city's citizens. This change did not mark the termination of business leadership dominance in civic affairs, nor did it signal an end to civic boosterism for Dallas. But it clearly represented a turning away from the type of city-as-a-whole discourse that had dominated the rhetoric and influenced the actions of civic leaders since the 1920s. And as the new discourse became more prominent, it would help explain the decline in the dominance of the Dallas Citizens Council as *the* guiding force for Dallas, and provide a context for understanding the growing impatience from certain sectors of Dallas for justice and economic opportunity even as these were occurring. Finally, it not only would better clarify reasons for the decline of the traditional planning that had guided Dallas development

throughout the twentieth century, but it would also help explain the rejection of at-large council election for Dallas by a federal judge in 1975, and the subsequent destruction of the CCA.[122]

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Although the Dallas experience is different from other cities in particulars, and because its stage in development manifests the consequences of the city-as-a-whole discourse more clearly than older cities, the assumptions about the nature of the city that appeared in Dallas between 1920 and 1950 represent national trends and assumptions. For Dallas leaders were civic boosters before they were southerners, or southwesterners, and they constantly looked beyond the parameters of their region for guidance in how to run and promote their city. Clearly the regional setting of Dallas influenced civic leadership, but ultimately the determining factor shaping their efforts had more to do with an urban rather than a regional ethos. Undoubtedly civic leaders in the 1920s sympathized with many of the goals of the Ku Klux Klan. Yet because that vigilante group threatened the city's reputation, produced disunity, and proved a detriment to its welfare, prominent civic leaders joined hands to oppose it. Thirty years later, many civic leaders, undoubtedly racist and committed to educational segregation, placed the welfare of the city above their own notions about race and promoted peaceful integration in response to court rulings.

Dallas leaders in the 1950s and 1960s also reflect changes that took place nationally—changes that resulted in abandonment of or deemphasis on the primacy of traditional physical planning by experts, and an overly centralized city government preoccupied with efficiency. Because of the strong manifestations of the earlier city-as-a-whole approach, Dallas did not exhibit these changes as spectacularly as some cities. Still, this chapter has suggested that changes nevertheless occurred. Local government that had garnered so much praise now suffered under an avalanche of criticism, because the definition of what government should do changed with new notions about the city. If the city was not a real unit capable of shaping individual behavior, but rather a setting for groups and individuals to pursue their own needs and agendas, then government and planning that primarily focused on the larger unit no longer seemed as important as it once had been.[123] Planning in the 1950s and 1960s also became increasingly preoccupied with meeting the needs of individuals and groups rather than the city as a whole.

Epilogue

Dallas in the 1990s still maintained council-manager government and embraced comprehensive planning. But the characteristics of both planning and government had changed significantly, as had the political discourse of the city. Council-manager government now included fourteen council members elected by districts, with only the mayor elected at large. And the promoters of the council-manager system of government, the Citizens Charter Association (CCA), had disappeared. Traditional histories of Dallas blame the destruction of this good government organization on the ruling of U.S. District Judge Elden Mahon in 1975, which voided the city's at-large system of selecting councilmen, but it was more than that.[1] Even though Dallas had prospered greatly under the CCA-dominated council-manager government and had even shown "spectacular improvement" in its responsiveness to minority concerns, according to Judge Mahon, the good government organization saw its popularity decline in the early 1970s. By 1975 the CCA had become increasingly perceived not as an organization for good government but as a body dominated by downtown interests, unresponsive to the needs of the people. Erik Jonsson's reelection victory in 1969 proved to be the last CCA victory in the mayoralty race. In 1971, forty-two-year-old Wes Wise, a popular broadcaster, beat out CCA nominee Avery Mays in a runoff election for mayor in a campaign where he emphasized he was for "all the people" rather than "the city as a whole." Wise, along with four other independents, won again in 1975, in the city's first election after the court ruling that resulted in district rather than at-large elections. Under the new system developed by council, voters from eight districts would select their own representatives while three other councilmen (including the mayor) would still be elected at large. In that contest Wise defeated former CCA head John Schoellkopf by a huge margin, the loser only receiving 36 percent of the votes cast.[2] Not only did several districts elect CCA opponents, but all three

at-large victors were CCA rivals. In explaining the CCA's defeat the *News* cited its "image problem" and the turmoil and bitter feuding associated with that organization. Even within the group, political factions and fighting had replaced the consensus characteristic of the earlier CCA.[3]

The court ruling did not end federal involvement in local elections, nor did it satisfy everyone. African Americans and Mexican Americans called for further changes, including a larger number of districts. One spokesman even wanted a twenty-two-member district council. In 1988, during a time of growing racial tension in the city due to confrontations between police and minorities, two blacks, Marvin Crenshaw and Roy Williams, filed suit against the 8–3 council system. At the same time, Dallas mayor Annette Strauss, concerned about the growing racial discord, formed Dallas Together in an attempt to improve the city's tense racial setting after the Dallas Alliance, another civic organization, issued a report concluding that Dallas presented a complicated and "troubling picture of a community divided along racial, economic and educational lines."[4] According to the mayor, Dallas Together—a seventy-six-member interracial body of civic leaders—would "study underlying causes of racial tension threatening to further polarize the city." Its report, issued in January of 1989, called for multicultural education and offered specific plans for increasing minority representation in business management positions within the city. In addition, the thirty-page report recommended changes in the city's political structure. "Our city council districts," the report concluded, "do not provide sufficient opportunity for *all our citizens to be properly and fairly represented* [italics mine] in a system that is designed to meet the needs of contemporary Dallas."[5] As a result, it advised the mayor to form a committee to recommend possible changes to the city's governmental structure.

Mayor Strauss did just that and appointed a Charter Review Committee chaired by white Dallas lawyer Ray Hutchison. Instead of bringing peace to the racially troubled city, that committee's decision to alter the 8-3 system to a unique 10-district and 4-quadrant arrangement resulted in further controversy and division within Dallas. Under the plan, the new charter would divide the city into ten ward districts, with each electing its own council representative. In addition, the new plan carved Dallas into four quadrants based on population rather than defined neighborhoods. Only residents of those quadrants would vote for that council representative. In addition, the charter committee proposed an amendment that allowed most city boards and commissions with fewer than fifteen members to be expanded to that number so each council member could make at least one appointment to each committee, thus making them more representative of the city's diverse pop-

ulation.[6] Although the city's blacks and Hispanics applauded the appointment amendment as a welcome attempt at diversity, they strongly opposed the 10-4-1 system, despite the support of the city's newspapers and the establishment.

The *News* applauded the proposal, calling it "the best of both election worlds." It concluded by noting, "No plan offers a better opportunity to elect a balanced city council that reflects the make-up of the community."[7] Black and Hispanic leaders disagreed and demanded a 12-1 or 14-1 system where all council candidates would be elected from districts. Indeed, the committee's announcement of its support of the 10-4-1 plan scheduled for voter approval in August set off civil rights demonstrations unprecedented in the city's history. The results of the August 12 election did little to quell that unrest. Although the new charter passed by more than 66 percent of the total vote, African American and Mexican American neighborhoods soundly defeated it. Several months after the election, one magazine concluded that "the city stands today more divided along social, ethnic, and economic lines than, perhaps, ever before in its history."[8]

Before Dallas started functioning under the plan, U.S. District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer ruled on a lawsuit by Marvin Crenshaw and Roy Williams challenging the constitutionality of the city's older 8-3 system. They contended that racially polarized voting and appeals to Anglo-voters along with biased media coverage prevented African Americans from winning at-large elections.[9] On March 28, 1990, the judge agreed and declared that the 8-3 system violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because it "hindered [minorities'] participation in the political process." He also expressed his unhappiness with the city's newly confirmed charter and eventually called for the city to approve a 14-1 system to give minorities new opportunity to get elected. Dallas voters defeated the 14-1 proposal by 372 votes in an election that saw 98 percent of blacks voting for it, 87 percent of Hispanics endorsing it, but more than 70 percent of the city's white Anglos rejecting it. Despite this defeat, the city eventually complied with the judge's order without a popular mandate. Council districts were carefully drawn to allow more minority candidates to get elected to council, an action that resulted in the city's most diverse council in its history.

What is most important about this development in Dallas history is how thoroughly the discourse of representative government had replaced the earlier theme of efficient and comprehensive government as the dominant issue in the city. Even the establishment, through the Dallas Alliance, Dallas Together, and the Charter Review Committee, agreed that representativeness of government was the most important goal. Representation itself, rather

than its end product, became the overwhelming objective in the Dallas political discourse of the 1980s and 1990s. The debate was over how best to achieve this diversity rather than whether it was an acceptable goal. Although Dallas retained the council-manager government, the spirit behind that government had drastically altered and reflected the new vision of Dallas as a setting for individuals and groups to pursue their own agendas. The city-as-a-whole philosophy was dead.

On one level, the new planning movement in Dallas that resulted in the Dallas Plan seems to contradict the notion that the city-as-a-whole approach has basically faded away, but a careful look at this plan too will suggest that new assumptions about planning, first noticeable in the 1950s, helped shape even this latest comprehensive effort.

The Dallas Plan, initiated by the Dallas Citizens Council and taken up by city council in August of 1992, provided the city's most ambitious city-planning effort since the Bartholomew Plan of 1943–1945. Indeed, the *News* called it "the boldest planning effort in the city's history."[10] This new plan, funded by private business but commissioned by city council, would offer a blueprint through the year 2025. When completed in the fall of 1994 it called for a $6.6 billion building program for the city, including a Kennedy Center–type arts center for downtown, a blockbuster city aquarium for Fair Park, and a satellite airport for depressed South Dallas. It also recommended the development of a Center City, including a more dynamic central business district and healthier surrounding neighborhoods, to reestablish the urban core as the heart of the city.[11]

The Plan was originally directed by Richard T. Anderson, past president of the Regional Plan Association. He promised a plan "equitable to all citizens of the city regardless of where they live and what their needs are."[12] Veteran city planner Karen S. Walz replaced Anderson in May of 1994. Walz, according to the *News,* specialized "in hammering out agreements among divided urban factions." She especially had a strong reputation for "consensus-based community planning," according to the *News.* Indeed, the planning process of the 1990s relied heavily on securing input from the city's various residents. From the beginning, civic leaders sought planning "built on widespread consultation and public involvement for community leadership to carefully weigh and carefully implement, expeditiously."[13] Planners promised to make the process "open and inclusive." In the spring of 1993, members of the Dallas Plan effort went to the public with a program entitled "Listening to the City." They held 160 meetings throughout the municipality, where they solicited citizen input. Based in part on this effort, Dallas Plan team members developed a framework for the work of the Dallas

Plan. After the *News* published a draft of the plan, team members held outreach meetings in each of the city's forty-three statistical communities. Team members also met with neighborhood associations, religious groups, professional organizations, business groups, representatives of higher education, and many civic groups. During the last three months of 1993, Dallas Plan proponents conducted 125 meetings involving 3,500 participants. Backers of the plan bragged that the Dallas Plan was "not based upon the ideas of a small number of planners, but rather an approach based upon the views, hopes and dreams of citizens of Dallas."[14]

Even after the report was released in 1994, public participation continued, since the plan not only projected long-term projects but also emphasized short-term needs, including a decaying infrastructure. All city neighborhoods were consulted as the city set the annual agenda. Moreover, twenty-one Dallas Plan Workshops were held in 1995 to educate citizens about the plan and to solicit their views about immediate urban priorities.[15] The Dallas Plan also sought input by mail, fax, and E-mail.[16] Such activity led the *News* to conclude that the "plan is a result of extensive community comment."[17]

The new plan, then, differed greatly from other plans, both in the way it was constructed and in focus. The new approach of soliciting ideas from the city's residents and centering on the needs and desires of Dallas's diverse population differed significantly from the earlier Kessler Plan and the Bartholomew Plan. Those plans started with the city rather than its citizens. The *News* reflected this focus when it concluded that "rather than displaying artists' renderings of grand boulevards, glowing new office parks and downtown walk-ups, Dallas plan consultants say they'll be emphasizing policies aimed at equalizing city services, levying money from other government agencies and linking new development to community needs."[18]

Both government and planning in the 1990s, then, suggests how differently civic leaders perceived their city in the 1990s than they had before 1955. Earlier planners and government reformers worked under the assumption that the city was a complex system of systems needing expert guidance and civic leadership closely associated with the city's best citizens. The needs of the city as a whole took precedence over the needs of individual groups or neighborhoods, and efficiency became the chief goal of government. Good citizenship meant promoting the welfare of the city as a whole.

By the 1990s the needs and aspirations of the city's citizens, rather than the city as a whole, had emerged as the priority of the day. The city became much more of a setting for individuals and groups to pursue their dreams and goals. "Good government" now became government that promoted the

most access to power for the city's citizens, rather than efficiency for the city. And planning became a community undertaking rather than a process dominated by experts.

As this book has suggested, the old city-as-a-whole approach clearly had severe problems. Too few, no matter how well-meaning, had too much power and control of the city's development. The emphasis on the city as a whole also made it too easy to neglect the needs of the city's poorest groups and neighborhoods. But as recent developments in the city's history suggest, the correctives to these problems and the political discourse that legitimizes them have created a new set of problems just as threatening to the city's future. The rabid parochialism of today's political factions and special interest groups has neglected an important fact—that the lives of all are intertwined within the larger setting of different neighborhoods, racial and ethnic groups, and classes. The emphasis on citizenship solely as rights for individuals rather than responsibilities to the whole has also created a dangerous imbalance and threatened the city's health.

The future of Dallas, and urban America, depends in large part on adopting a new public discourse that emphasizes the interdependence of the larger metropolitan area, while not losing sight of the needs of the particular. Such an approach to the city would combine the best of the city-as-a-whole approach with sensitivity to the rights and needs of individuals, neighborhoods, and racial and ethnic groups. For Big D, the Dallas Plan may be a beginning in that direction. If such a path is not taken, however, the future for Dallas, as well as other American cities, is bleak.

□ Appendix

Charter Members of the Dallas Citizens Council, 1937

Nathan Adams, President, First National Bank
J. B. Adoue, Jr., President, National Bank of Commerce
A. H. Bailey, President and General Manager, Higgenbotham-Bailey-Logan Co.
Louis W. Bailey, President and Editor, *Dallas Dispatch*
Fenton Baker, President, Baker Hotel
A. C. Bigger, President, Metropolitan Building and Loan Association
E. H. Blum, Vice President, Atlantic Refining Co.
F. A. Brown, President, Graham-Brown Shoe Co.
William J. Brown, President, Titche-Goetlinger Co.
Murrell L. Buckner, Vice President and General Manager, Union Terminal Co.
F. W. Burford, President, East Texas Refining Co.
Jack P. Burrus, President, Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co.
F. O. Burns, President, Safeway Stores of Texas
W. R. Burns, Vice President and General Manager, Dallas Railway Terminal Co.
D. Harold Byrd, President, Byrd-Frost, Inc.
E. R. Callier, President, Trinity Cotton Oil Co.
John W. Carpenter, President, Texas Power and Light Company
J. H. Cassidy, President, Egan Co.
William Collier, Vice President, Better Business Bureau
R. H. Crocker, General Manager, A&P Food Services

T. M. Cullum, President, Cullum and Boren Co.
C. W. Davis, President, Dallas Power and Light Co.
E. M. (Ted) Dealey, Vice President, *Dallas Morning News*
L. B. Denning, President, Lone Star Gas Company
Sol Dreyfuss, President, Dreyfuss and Son
A. Morgan Duke, President, Gulf States Life Insurance
Arthur A. Everts, President, Arthur A. Everts Company
W. D. Felder, President, W. D. Felder and Co.
Lewis R. Ferguson, Lone Star Cement Corporation
Edgar L. Flippen, President, Gulf Insurance Co.
Fred F. Florence, President, Republic Bank
J. J. Foley, General Manager, International Harvester Co.
Eugene B. Germany, President, C&G Oil Co.
Tom Gooch, Vice President, *Daily Times Herald*
W. A. Green, Jr., President, W. A. Green Co.
E. P. Greenwood, President, Great Southern Life Insurance Co.
Jake L. Harmon, President, Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Co.
Edward T. Harrison, President, Trinity Universal Insurance Co.
S. J. Hay, President, Great National Life Insurance Co.
Otto Herold, President, Oriental Laundry Co.
Karl Hoblitzelle, President, Interstate Circuit Inc.
F. P. Holland, Jr., President, Texas Farm and Ranch Publishing Co.
T. E. Jackson, Southwestern Manager, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
Luther Jordan, General Manager, Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Laurence S. Kahn, President, E. M. Kahn and Co.
Arthur L. Kramer, President, A. Harris and Co.
J. L. Lancaster, President, Texas & Pacific Railroad
Joe E. Lawther, President, Liberty State Bank
W. M. Lingo, President, Lingo Lumber Co.
Albert Linz, President, Linz Brothers
D. Alva Little, President, Magnolia Petroleum Co.
J. F. Lucey, Lucey Petroleum Co.
Herbert Marcus, President, Neiman-Marcus
W. B. Marsh, President, Harris-Lipsetz Lumber Co.
Z. E. Marvin, Sr., Chairman of the Board, Marvin Drug Co.

A. M. Matson, Managing Director, Butler Brothers
Robert Mayer, President, J. Kahn and Co.
J. Kirby McDonough, President, Murray Co.
R. S. McFarland, Vice President, Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware
B. F. McClain, General Manager, Hart Furniture Co.
Frank L. McNeny, McNeny and McNeny Real Estate
David Metzger, Metzger Dairies
Henry S. Miller, Real Estate
Homer P. Mitchell, President and General Manager, Texas Employees Insurance Association
Charles R. Moore, President, Austin Bridge Co.
Edward T. Moore, Chair, Simms Petroleum Co.
W. J. Morris, President, Continental Supply Co.
H. S. Moss, President, Moss Petroleum Co.
Harris Neil, General Manager, Coca-Cola Bottling Company
C. F. O'Donnell, President, Southwestern Life Insurance Co.
J. B. O'Hara, President, Dr. Pepper Co.
H. A. Olmsted, President, Olmsted Kirk Co.
J. S. Ownby, President, Shipjar Warehouse Co.
D. H. Pace, General Manager, John Deere Plow Co.
J. Durrell Padgitt, Secretary-Treasurer, Padgitt Brothers Co.
J. F. Parks, President/General Manager, Dallas Coffin Co.
Hyman Pearlstone, President, Higgenbotham-Pearlstone Hardware Co.
Julius H. Pearlstone, President, Pearlstone Mill and Elevator
W. F. Pendleton, President, Southern Gin Co.
J. M. Penland, President, Southwestern Drug Corporation
S. B. Perkins, President, Perkins Dry Goods Co.
John G. Pew, Assistant Vice President, Sun Oil Company
A. F. Pillett, President, Republic Insurance Corporation
Lawrence S. Pollock, President, Pollock Paper and Box Company
Walter Prehn, General Manager, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
Ted W. Robinson, General Manager, The Borden Co.
Julius Schepps, General Manager, Schepps Wholesale Liquors
Hugo W. Schoellkopf, Vice President, The Schoellkopf Co.
Otto Schubert, Jr., General Manager, The Adolphus Hotel

Harry L. Seay, President, Southland Life Insurance Company
E. E. Shelton, President, Dallas Building and Loan Association
E. P. Simmons, President, Sanger Brothers
Rae E. Skillern, President, Skillern Drug Co.
Orval A. Slater, Secretary, Fishburn-Oriental Dyeing and Dry Cleaning Co.
E. L. Smith, Oil Operator
Earl B. Smyth, President, Fidelity Union Life Insurance Company
H. E. Spalti, President, Olive and Myers Manufacturing Co.
Ernest R. Tennant, President, Dallas National Bank
J. R. Thomson, General Manager, Coca-Cola Bottling Works
R. L. Thornton, President, Mercantile National Bank
Harold F. Volk, President, Volk Brothers Company, Inc.
D. Easley Waggoner, Vice President and General Manager, United Fidelity Life Insurance Co.
Lindsley Waters, President, Tennessee Dairies, Inc.
F. Z. Williams, Vice President and General Manager, McKesson and Robbins, Inc.
Jas. K. Wilson, President and General Manager, Jas. K. Wilson Co.
J. E. Ziegelmeyer, President, Huey and Philip Hardware Company, Inc.

□ Notes

Introduction

1. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Shadow Master in the Sunbelt," *New York Times,* July 17, 1997.

2. In its very first volume, published in 1912, the *National Municipal Review* identified Dallas as "one of the most progressive cities of the Southwest" based on its planning and good-government record. See "City Plan Reports and Commissions," *National Municipal Review* 1 (July 1912): 452.

3. Alan I Marcus, "Back to the Present: Historians' Treatment of the City as a Social System During the Reign of the Idea of Community," in *American Urbanism: A Historiographical Review,* ed. Howard Gillette Jr. and Zane L. Miller (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 9–11. Also see Roy Lubove, *The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York City, 1890–1917* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), and M. Christine Boyer, *Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of American City Planning* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983).

4. Marcus, "Back to the Present," pp. 7–25.

5. There have been some who have taken this approach in some form. M. Christine Boyer mixes discourse with class in her insightful analysis *Dreaming the Rational City.* Also see Eric Monkkonen, *America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and Towns, 1780–1980* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Zane L. Miller and his students have been the most committed to this conceptual approach to urban history. See Miller's *Suburb: Neighborhood and Community in Forest Park, Ohio, 1935–1976* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981). Also see Alan I Marcus, *Plague of Strangers: Social Groups and the Origins of City Services in Cincinnati* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991), and my *Making Better Citizens: Housing Reform and the Community Development Strategy in Cincinnati, 1890–1960* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).

6. Otherwise outstanding books often miss this context. See Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Jon C. Teaford, *The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870–1900* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); and Joel Schwartz, *The New York Approach: Robert Moses,*

Urban Liberals, and Redevelopment of the Inner City (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993).

7. This book does not mean simply to duplicate the groundbreaking studies by Christopher Silver and Carl Abbott that explored how urban politics shaped the nature of planning in the twentieth-century city. Rather, it is interested in demonstrating how changing perceptions of the city helped determine the nature of planning and politics in Dallas and elsewhere in the twentieth century. See Christopher Silver, *Twentieth-Century Richmond: Planning, Politics and Race* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984), and Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

8. Marcus, "Back to the Present," p. 8.

9. For an important discussion of this belief in the shaping impact of the city on individual behavior, see Zane L. Miller and Bruce Tucker, "The Revolt Against Cultural Determinism and the Meaning of Community Action: A View From Cincinnati," in Jack Salzman, ed., *Prospects: An Annual of American Cultural Studies*, vol. 15 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 413–19.

10. Ibid.; Alan Ehrenhalt, "The Modern Urban Dilemma: Who Speaks for the City?" *Governing*, July 1991, p. 15.

11. Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55* (October 1964): 157–69; James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

12. Stephen L. Elkins, "State and Market in City Politics: Or, The 'Real' Dallas," in *The Politics of Urban Development*, ed. Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), pp. 29–30.

13. Blaine A. Brownell, "The Commercial-Civic Elite and City Planning in Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans in the 1920s," *Journal of Southern History* 41 (August 1975): 353. Also see Don H. Doyle, *New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860–1910* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

14. Miller, *Suburb*, pp. xiv-xv.

15. David R. Goldfield, *Cottonfields and Skyscrapers: Southern City and Region, 1607–1980* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Goldfield, "The Urban South: A Regional Framework," *American Historical Review* 86 (December 1981): 1009–34.

16. Although Amy Bridges provides a type of regional analysis in her recent look at reform politics in the Southwest, she too clearly acknowledges the timing of Southwest development rather than some indigenous Southwestern culture as the key to understanding the peculiar patterns of that region. For Bridges as for me, the city-building prospects made possible by the underdeveloped nature of the region in the early twentieth century was most critical in shaping the priorities of urban government. See Amy Bridges, *Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 54–57.

PART 1

1. William L. McDonald, *Dallas Rediscovered: A Photographic Chronicle of Urban Expansion, 1870–1925* (Dallas: Dallas Historical Society, 1978), pp. 63–85; *Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide for 1904* (n.p.: Galveston Dallas News Publications, n.d.), p. 248; Maxine Holmes and Gerald D. Saxon, eds., *The WPA Dallas Guide and History* (Dallas: University of North Texas Press, 1992), pp. 130–34.

2. *Dallas Morning News* [hereafter *DMN*], Jan. 1, 1901.

3. Hanes and Saxon, eds., *Dallas Guide and History,* pp. 76, 80.

4. For more on the idea of the city as a system see Marcus, "Back to the Present," pp. 7–24.

5. Zane L. Miller, Alan I Marcus, and Henry D. Shapiro are most responsible for educating me about the changing perception of cities as systems between 1900 and 1920. See Alan I Marcus and Howard P. Segal, *Technology in America: A Brief History* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), pp. 133–270; Henry D. Shapiro, "The Place of Culture and the Problem of Identity," in *Appalachia and America: Autonomy and Regional Dependence,* ed. Alan Batteau (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 111–41; and Zane L. Miller, "Pluralizing America: Walter Prescott Webb, Chicago School Sociology, and Cultural Regionalism," in *Essays on Sunbelt Cities and Recent Urban America,* ed. Robert B. Fairbanks and Kathleen Underwood (College Station: Texas A&M University, 1990), pp. 151–76.

CHAPTER 1

1. "An Act to incorporate the City of Dallas, and grant it a new charter," S. B. 256, *Special Laws of the State of Texas Passed at the Regular Session of the Twenty-First Legislature, January 8, 1889–April 6, 1889,* pp. 1228–40.

2. "An Act to incorporate the city of Dallas, and grant it a new charter," S. B. 197, *Laws of Texas, 1822–1897,* vol. 10 (Austin: Gammel Book Co., 1898), pp. 1357–62.

3. The other elected offices besides the school board were the city attorney, chief of police, city tax assessor, city tax collector, city health officer, city judge, street superintendent, superintendent of water works, and chief of the fire department. See "An Act to incorporate the city of Dallas, and grant it a new charter," H. B. 342, *Special Laws of the State of Texas, 26th legislature, January 10, 1899–May 27, 1899,* pp. 93–143.

4. Ibid.

5. *DMN,* Jan. 8, 1899.

6. Quoted in Frank Mann Stewart, *A Half Century of Municipal Reform: The History of the National Municipal League* (1950; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), pp. 15–21 (quote on p. 21). Also see Kenneth Fox, *Better City*

Government: Innovation in American Urban Politics, 1850–1937 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977).

7. See, for instance, Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 55 (October 1964): 157–69, and James Weinstein, "Organized Business and the City Commissioner and Management Movements," *Journal of Southern History* 28 (May 1962): 166–82.

8. Robert Gary Peacock, "The Origins of Commission Government in Dallas, 1902–1907" (master's thesis, North Texas State University, 1975), pp. 29–31. The most scholarly work yet done on turn-of-the-century government reform that led to the commission form of government, this study concluded that "businessman's government was not the culmination of a conspiracy by Dallas business and commercial leaders to wrestle control of municipal government from established politicians and ward interest groups; rather, businessman's government was the result of demands from all parts of Dallas for municipal reform. Most Dallas citizens were convinced by the early 1900s that urban expansion was contiguous with urban progress, but the problems created by rapid municipal growth and development brought many citizens to the realization that an efficient, effective city government was essential to future urban progress as well" (p. 111).

9. *DMN,* Nov. 14, 1902.

10. Ibid., Nov. 16, 1902.

11. Ibid., Mar. 12, 1897.

12. Ibid., Dec. 16, 1902, Jan. 8, 1903; Peacock, "Origins of Commission Government," p. 5.

13. *Laws of Texas, 1822–1897,* vol. 8 (Austin: Gammel Book Co., 1898), ch. 11, sec. 174.

14. *Vernon's Annotated Constitution of the State of Texas,* vol. 3, *Constitutional Articles 13 to End* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1993), art. 16, n. 46, p. 284.

15. *DMN,* Jan. 1 and 7, 1906.

16. Ibid., Aug. 21 and 23, 1903.

17. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1903.

18. Ibid., Jan. 18, 1903.

19. Peacock, "Origins of Commission Government," pp. 21–28.

20. *DMN,* May 5, 1905.

21. Ibid., Apr. 2, 1905.

22. *Special Laws of the State of Texas,* 29th Legislature, H. B. 628, pp. 441–61. The charter amendments also provided for two other positions appointed by the mayor: chief engineer of waterworks and sidewalk inspector.

23. Harry Jebsen, Jr., Robert M. Newton, and Patricia R. Hogan, "Centennial History of the Dallas, Texas Park System, 1876–1976" (unpublished manuscript, Texas Tech University, 1976), pp. 175–77.

24. *DMN,* Jan. 1, 1906.

25. Ibid., Jan. 1 and 7, 1906. The *News* emphasized that under the commission government, five officials would be charged with "the entire responsibility of conducting the city government and that they shall be definitely accountable for every act of government, whether performed by them individually or through lieutenants whom they shall choose." Also see *DMN*, Jan. 7, 1906; Peacock, "Origins of Commission Government," pp. 34–36.

26. *DMN*, Mar. 25, 1906.

27. Peacock, "Origins of Commission Government," pp. 34–36; *DMN*, Apr. 18, 1906.

28. *DMN*, Nov. 21, 1906.

29. Ibid., Mar. 9, 1907.

30. Peacock, "Origins of Commission Government," p. 83.

31. *Charter of the City of Dallas, 1907 (Including Amendments of 1909)*, art. 3, sec. 1.

32. Ibid., art. 3, sec. 2, 6, 8, 12, 13.

33. Other cities believed this too. By 1911, over 100 cities had adopted the city commission form of government and by 1917 over 500 cities employed this governmental form. See Bradley Robert Rice, *Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Movement in America, 1901–1920* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), p. xiv.

34. Eric Monkkonen has reminded us about the transformation of city government from regulatory to service oriented in the second half of the nineteenth century, characterizing it as a new mode of "city building by entrepreneurship." See his *America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and Towns, 1780–1980* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 143.

35. Philip Lindsley, *A History of Greater Dallas and Vicinity*, vol. 1 (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co., 1909), p. 298.

36. *DMN*, Mar. 8, 1907; Peacock, "Origins of Commission Government," pp. 92–108.

37. William H. Wilson, *The City Beautiful Movement* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 257; Suzanne K. Keist Shepard, "A Design for Dallas: G. B. Dealey and City Planning, 1900–1920" (master's thesis, University of Texas at Arlington, 1978), p. 103; *DMN*, Jan. 11 and 14, 1903.

38. Other improvement associations included Deere Park, Fairland, East Dallas Heights, Oak Cliff, Colonial Hill, Ladies Auxiliary, North Haskell, Western Heights, Oak Lawn, Holmes Street. See *DMN*, May 22, 1910; Jan. 4, 1906.

39. Ernest Sharpe, *G. B. Dealey of The Dallas News* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955), pp. 1–86; Wilson, *City Beautiful Movement*, p. 258.

40. Wilson, *City Beautiful Movement*, pp. 259–60; *DMN*, June 27, 1916.

41. *DMN*, Feb. 5, 1910.

42. Ibid., Feb. 4 and 5, 1910.

43. Ibid., Feb. 26, 1910.

44. The subcommittees focused on the following topics: public hygiene and

sanitation; city and district housing; municipal art and design; parks, playgrounds, and social centers; transportation; suburban extensions; education; and a general city-planning committee that also served as an executive committee.

45. *DMN*, May 26, 1910.

46. Wilson, *City Beautiful*, pp. 50–51, 258–60.

47. *DMN*, May 26, 1910.

48. Wilson, *City Beautiful*, pp. 106–8; Wilson, *The City Beautiful Movement in Kansas City* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1964), pp. 132–36; Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order, 1820–1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 236.

49. George Kessler, *A City Plan for Dallas* (Dallas: Dallas Park Board, 1912). Professor Joan Draper notes in writing about the famed Chicago Plan of 1909 how that comprehensive plan also focused on the city's public realm only: see her "Paris by the Lake: Sources of Burnham's Plan of Chicago," in *Chicago Architecture, 1872–1922*, ed. John Zukowsky (Munich: Prestal-Verlay, 1987): 108–10.

50. Wilson, *City Beautiful*, p. 266; Kessler, *City Plan for Dallas*, p. 7.

51. Kessler, *City Plan for Dallas*, pp. 7, 16.

52. Ibid., p. 25.

53. Ibid., p. 22.

54. Ibid., pp. 9–12.

55. Ibid., p. 13.

56. Ibid., pp. 14–19.

57. Ibid., p. 8.

58. Wilson, "Adopting to Growth: Dallas, Texas and the Kessler Plan," *Arizona and the West* 25 (August 1983): 253.

59. Kessler, *City Plan for Dallas*, p. 40.

60. Wilson, *City Beautiful*, pp. 274–75.

61. Kessler had treated zoning in one sentence in his plan when he wrote that "regard for the interests of the people at large means the city should be divided into areas and zones each devoted to its own particular purpose" (ibid., p. 8). See also *DMN*, July 14, 1915.

62. *DMN*, July 14, 1915.

63. William Neil Black, "Empire of Consensus: City Planning, Zoning and Annexation in Dallas, 1900–1960" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982), p. 142; *Spann v. the City of Dallas*, Texas Supreme Court, 235 SW 513, Nov. 2, 1921. The court ruled this type of zoning was not a proper exercise of the city's police power.

64. *DMN*, April 4, 6, 20, and Aug. 5, 1916.

65. Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 142–46; Seymour I. Toll, *Zoned America* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969), p. 227.

66. Quoted in Shepard, "A Design for Dallas," p. 167.

67. *DMN*, Mar. 19, 1919.

68. Dealey was one of fifty-two charter members of the American City Planning Institute established in 1917. That was the first professional planning organization. Membership required two years' experience in some phase of planning. See

Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 163.

69. Louis Head, *The Kessler City Plan for Dallas: A Review of the Plan and Its Accomplishment* (Dallas: *DMN*, 1925), p. 3; E. A. Wood, L. V. Sheridan, and K. K. Hooper, "City Planning in Dallas, Texas," *Proceedings of the Twelfth National Conference on City Planning, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 19 to 22* (1920): 13–16; *DMN*, Mar. 15 and May 28, 1919.

70. Head, "Kessler Plan for Dallas," p. 15.

71. Wilson, "'Merely Unpractical Dream': Removing the Texas & Pacific Tracks from Pacific Avenue," *Legacies: A History Journal for Dallas and North Central Texas* 2 (fall 1990): 27.

PART 2

1. "Skyline Charts Growth," *Dallas*, May 1956, pp. 29, 51.

2. Lockwood, Greene and Co., *Industrial Survey of Dallas: An Engineering Appraisal of Conditions Affecting Manufacturing* (Dallas: Industrial Dallas, Inc., 1927); *Dallas*, December 1928, p. 32; *Dallas*, April and May 1928; *DMN*, Apr. 10, 1931.

3. *DMN*, Mar. 6, 1930.

4. Ibid., Jan. 20 and 28, 1927.

5. Patricia Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Dallas, 1990), p. 59.

6. Industrial Department, Dallas Chamber of Commerce, *Dallas as a City in Which to Live: A Consideration of Living Conditions and the Cost of Living* (Dallas: Industrial Dallas, Inc., 1928), pp. 22–23.

7. School of Architecture and Environmental Design, University of Texas at Arlington, "East Dallas: Transitions, 1872–1977: An Urban Study Report" (January 1979), pp. 30–34.

8. Works Progress Administration, "Guide and History of Dallas," unpublished manuscript, Dallas Public Library, p. 507.

9. Ibid., pp. 212, 517–18.

10. Professor Zane L. Miller first called this differentiation to my attention. For the then new planning emphasis see *The Official City Plan of Cincinnati, Ohio* (Cincinnati: City Planning Commission, 1925), and Thomas Adams, *Planning the New York Region* (New York: Committee of the Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1927); and Thomas Adams, Harold M. Lewis, and Theodore T. McCrosky, *Population, Land Values and Government* (New York: Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1929). Dallas did not develop such a plan until the 1940s, but it also followed that pattern.

CHAPTER 2

1. *DMN*, Jan. 30, 1919.

2. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1919; Louis P. Head, "The Kessler Plan for Dallas: A Review

of the Plan and Progress and its Accomplishment," pamphlet reprint from the *Dallas Morning News.*

3. Minutes, Dallas City Plan Commission, Feb. 10, 1919; *DMN,* Feb. 11, 1919.

4. *DMN,* May 2, 1919.

5. Ibid., Apr. 4, 1919. The amendment was adopted by a 149-vote majority. Dallas had been a home rule city since 1915.

6. *DMN,* May 2, 1919.

7. Ibid., June 24, 1919.

8. The Metropolitan Development Association raised $10,000 among its membership and secured another $21,000 from its parent organization, the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, in 1920. See E. A. Wood, L. V. Sheridan, and K. K. Hooper, "City Planning in Dallas, Texas," in *Proceedings of the Twelfth National Conference on City Planning, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 19 to 22* (n.p.: n.d.), pp. 15–16; Head, "Kessler City Plan for Dallas," p. 3; City Plan Commission minutes, Feb. 10, 1919; Black, "Empire of Consensus," p. 81; Sam Acheson, *Dallas Yesterday,* ed. Lee Milazzo (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1977), p. 181.

9. *DMN,* June 23, 1919.

10. Ibid., July 18, 1919.

11. Dallas City Plan Commission, *Proposed Zoning Ordinance for the City of Dallas* (Dallas, n.d. [1920?]); Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 132–38, 287; *DMN,* Nov. 24, 1920.

12. *DMN,* Nov. 24, 1920.

13. Ibid., Nov. 19, 1920.

14. *Spann v. the City of Dallas,* Texas Supreme Court, 235 SW 513, Nov. 2, 1921; *DMN,* Nov. 16, 1921.

15. *DMN,* Nov. 3, 1921; Black, "Empire of Consensus," p. 156.

16. *DMN,* Nov. 16 and 20, 1921. At the end of December, the city even passed a law making it hard to locate businesses in neighborhoods. Anyone wishing to build in a residential area had to apply for a permit from the building department, weather a hearing before the board of appeals, and await a decision on whether the business constituted a nuisance or threatened the safety to the neighborhood (ibid., Nov. 29, 1921).

17. *DMN,* June 25, 1919; W. A. Dealey to C. C. Sanger, Dec. 24, 1923, Dealey Papers, box 3, Dallas Historical Society [hereafter DHS].

18. *Report to DPOA from the Committee for County and City Wide Association,* April 11, 1924, Dealey Papers, box 3, DHS.

19. Louis P. Head, "Shall Dallas Continue to 'Just Grow' As Topsy Did or Will You as a Citizen Have it Grow by a Plan," Kessler Plan Association pamphlet, n.d., Dealey Papers, box 23, DHS.

20. The language of cooperation and the acceptance of a pluralistic approach to the city was in direct contrast to the hate and intolerance of diversity promoted by the Ku Klux Klan in Dallas during the early 1920s. Both, however, were reactions to the new "realities" of the twenties—an acknowledgment that the melting pot in American society was not working in the way that folks at the turn of the

century had anticipated. See Henry D. Shapiro, *Appalachia on Our Mind: The Southern Mountains and Mountaineers in the American Consciousness, 1870–1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), pp. x-xi, 15–16, 31, 57–58. For the Klan in Dallas see Kenneth T. Jackson, *The Ku Klux Klan and the City, 1915–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66–80.

21. *DMN,* May 8, 1928; George B. Dealey, "Dallas is Realizing the Kessler Plan," in *American Civic Annual,* ed. Harlean James (Washington: American Civic Association, Inc., 1929), pp. 180–84; Committee for County and City Wide Association, report to Dallas Property Owners Association, April 11, 1924, Dealey Papers, box 3, DHS; *DMN,* Jan. 2, 1925.

22. As Paul Boyer has pointed out, such an appeal to a civic ideal had been around since the turn of this century and had served as a strategy for moral control. But the new emphasis on the civic ideal in the 1920s was not to change behavior of all the groups in the city, but to give them a commonalty that would allow them to work together despite their differences. See Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order, 1820–1920* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 261–76.

23. *DMN,* Jan. 1, 1926.

24. Ibid.; Justin F. Kimball, *Our City—Dallas: A Community Civics* (Dallas: Kessler Plan Association of Texas, 1927).

25. Kimball, *Our City,* p. 69.

26. Ibid., p. 65.

27. Ibid., p. 80.

28. Ibid., p. 360.

29. Ibid., p. 364.

30. *DMN,* May 8, 1928.

31. Ibid., Jan. 1, 1923. Wood provided a synopsis of the plan as early as September 7, 1922. See also ibid., Sept. 8, 1922; Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 81–82.

32. "City Planning Stressed by Twenty-five-Year Program Committee," *Dallas,* Mar. 1925, p. 9.

33. Ulrickson Committee, *Forward Dallas!* (Dallas: The Committee, 1927).

34. Ibid., p. 17, 18.

35. Ibid., p. 18–20.

36. Ibid., pp. 37–39.

37. Ibid., pp. 39–42.

38. Ibid., p. 46.

39. Ibid., p. 14; "The Ulrickson Committee Report: Comprehensive Plan for City Improvements Turned Over to Citizens," *Dallas,* Nov. 1927, p. 7.

40. Ulrickson Committee, *Forward Dallas,* p. 4.

41. *DMN,* Dec. 11 and 12, 1927. Of the thirty-nine charter amendments offered that December, twenty-two were directly connected to the carrying out of the Ulrickson Report. Others included altering the park board, modifying the city's power of annexation, and offering new legislation concerning residential segregation.

42. Ulrickson Committee, *Forward Dallas,* p. 11. Members of the Committee

on Supervision of Expenditures would include two members from among the presidents or active vice presidents of Dallas banks, selected by the Dallas Clearing House; two members from the chamber of commerce, selected by the board of directors; one member selected by the Presidents Club; one member from the school board; one member from the Oak Cliff Commercial Association, selected by its board of directors; one member from the Technical Club; two members from the City Plan Commission; two members from the Kessler Plan Association; and two members from the Ulrickson Committee (ibid., p. 15).

43. *DMN,* Dec. 6, 1927.

44. Ibid., Dec. 2, 1927.

45. Ibid., Dec. 3, 1927.

46. Ibid., Dec. 9, 1927.

47. Ibid., Nov. 27, 1927

48. Ibid., Dec. 6, 1927; Black, "Empire of Consensus," p. 88.

49. *DMN,* Dec. 17, 1927.

50. Marcus and Segal, *Technology in America,* p. 255.

51. For more on the criticisms of the city commission form of government, and its decline in the 1920s, see Bradley Robert Rice, *Progressive Cities: The Commission Government Movement in America, 1901–1920* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), pp. 84–108.

52. *DMN,* Apr. 4, 1923.

53. Harold A. Stone et al., *City Manager Government in Dallas* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1939), pp. 8–9; Jackson, *Ku Klux Klan,* p. 74; *DMN,* Apr. 7 and 8, 1925.

54. *DMN,* Apr. 5 and 20, 1927.

55. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1927.

56. Ibid., Apr. 6 and 20, 1927.

57. Ibid., Feb. 19, 1929.

58. Ibid., Sept. 1 and 4, 1927; Mar. 20, 1927.

59. Munro had been a member of the National Municipal League's standing committee on commission government, which had praised that form of government in 1911. His twenty-five-page discussion of the new form of government in his 1912 textbook on city government was also generally very positive in his evaluation. See Rice, *Progressive Cities,* pp. 104, 107.

60. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 15; *DMN,* Jan. 14, 1927; Feb. 4, 1927.

61. *DMN,* Jan. 7, 1927.

62. Ibid., Feb. 4, 1927.

63. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 11.

64. Richard S. Childs, *Civic Victories: The Story of an Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1952), pp. 163–65.

65. Roscoe C. Martin, "Dallas Makes the Manager Plan Work," *Annals of the American Academy* 198 (July 1938): 64; Louis P. Head, "Dallas Joins Ranks of Manager Cities," *National Municipal Review* 19 (Dec. 1930): 806–9.

66. The experience in Dallas closely parallels the national movement away from the city commission form of government to the city manager form of government at this time. See Rice, *Progressive Cities,* pp. 100–109.

67. William Bennett Munro, *Municipal Government and Administration,* vol. 1, *Government* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1923), p. 423.

68. *DMN,* May 24, 1927.

69. Ibid., May 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, 1927.

70. Ibid., Apr. 27, 1928.

71. Ibid., Sept. 19, 1927.

72. Ibid., Mar. 11, 1928.

73. The entire report was printed in the *DMN,* Mar. 6, 1929.

74. *Charter of the City of Dallas 1907 (Including the Charter Amendments of 1909, 1911, 1916, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1930),* art. 1, sec. 19.

75. *DMN,* Mar. 11, 1928.

76. Ibid., Mar. 3, 1929; Mar. 13, 1967; *Dallas Journal (DJ),* Apr. 1, 1929.

77. *DMN,* Mar. 2, 3, 17, and 18, 1929.

78. Industrial Properties Corporation, *Trinity Industrial District* (Dallas: Industrial Properties Corporation, 1931) pp. 3, 8. In 1928, Simmons was awarded the Linz Greater Service Award, one of the city's most important public honors for service. See *DMN,* Dec. 28, 1928.

79. The campaign for the county road bond, which included the money for viaducts over the levee area, also emphasized the important role roads would have in tying the city and county together. According to a *News* article entitled "Let Us Remake Dallas County into One Great Community," the road money would permit the "welding of the city and county into a single physical unit no less than a single political and legal unity" *(DMN,* Mar. 20, 1928).

80. Head, "Shall Dallas Continue," pamphlet, Dealey Papers, box 23, DHS.

81. *DMN,* May 11, 1933, Mar. 26, 1933. Surratt joined the KPA in 1922 as executive secretary and quickly became the driving force behind that body. Newspaper clipping, *Dallas Morning News,* Dec. 30, 1957[?], author's possession.

82. Petition of Dallas Drainage Association to City Council, n.d. Dealey Papers, box 3, DHS; Industrial Properties Corporation, *Trinity Industrial District; DMN,* Feb. 20, 1928, Oct. 1, 1935, May 4, 1947.

83. *DMN,* Mar. 1, 3, 29, Apr. 1, 1929.

84. Ibid., Mar. 1, 1929.

85. Ibid., Mar. 4, Apr. 24, 1929. Acheson, *Dallas Yesterday* , p. 186.

86. *DMN,* Mar. 27, 1929.

87. *DJ,* Apr. 1, 1929.

88. *Dallas Times Herald* [hereafter *DTH*], Apr. 2, 1929.

89. Ibid., Mar. 3, 1929.

90. *DJ,* Apr. 3, 1920.

91. Ibid., Apr. 19, 1929; *DMN,* Apr. 9, 1929.

92. *DJ,* Apr. 19, 1929.

93. *DMN,* Apr. 21 and 23, 1929.

94. Ibid., Apr. 23, 1929.

95. Ibid., Apr. 24, 1929.

96. Ibid., May 19 and 23, 1929.

97. Carolyn Jenkins Barta, "*The Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government" (master's thesis, University of Texas, 1970), pp. 31–33; *DMN,* Oct. 18, 1929.

98. *DMN,* Oct. 18, 1929.

99. Report of the Executive Committee of the CCA, May–Nov. 1931, Carl Callaway Collection, Dallas Public Library (DPL).

100. Minutes, City Commissioners Meeting, Dallas City Hall, Jan. 20, 1930.

101. The proposed charter called for four-year terms for the alderman despite state constitutional limits set at two years. The charter also set longer term limits for the park board, the Civil Service Commission and the City Plan Commission and thus broke state limits. Third, Long found that the new charter included "a hiatus of half-a-day in the set up of the city's physical year." Finally, the charter forbade primary elections, and Long argued that this directly conflicted with the general election laws of Texas. See *DMN,* Nov. 5, 7, 1929.

102. Ibid., Nov. 7, 1929.

103. Ibid., Dec. 19, 1929.

104. Minutes, City Commissioners Meeting, Feb. 17, 1930.

105. Ibid, Mar. 1, 1930.

106. Ibid, Mar. 4, 1930; Barta, "*The Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government," pp. 33–35.

107. Stone, *City Manager Government,* pp. 22–23; *DMN,* Sept. 14 and 16, 1930.

108. *DMN,* Sept. 14 and 16, 1930.

109. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 24.

110. Ibid.

111. *DMN,* Sept. 16, 1930.

112. Ibid., Sept. 17 and 29, 1930.

113. Ibid., Sept. 27 and Oct. 4, 1930.

114. Ibid. Oct. 9, 1930. The Trinity Canal Association, established by the Chambers of Commerce of both Dallas and Fort Worth, had a goal to "promote the canalization of the Trinity River from the Gulf of Mexico to Fort Worth." Like the other significant movements in Dallas, it had been initiated and controlled by businessmen rather than the government, and was dedicated to expanding the city's economic opportunities. River traffic, the argument went, would substantially reduce freight rates and provide the city new opportunity for industrial development. Working with the Levee District, and acting, as it turned out, quite prematurely, the promoters of canalization in July 1930 dredged a turning basin for barges on the Trinity River just west of the city's Union Terminal Railroad Station. Businessmen supporting the canalization movement, just as they had the planning

and industrial booster campaigns, believed the city manager movement would promote a more effective government to help them realize their goals. See "Constitution of the Trinity River Canal Association," Amon Carter Papers, Amon Carter Museum, Fort Worth, Tex.; *DMN*, July 15, 1930.

115. *DMN*, Oct. 9, 1930.

116. Ibid, Oct., 11 and 12, 1930.

CHAPTER 3

1. Harold A. Stone et al., *City Manager Government in Dallas (Texas)* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1939), pp. 49–50, 63. The Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council in 1937 investigated the operation of the council-manager form of government in eighteen cities, Dallas being one of those examined. The staff of three persons visited Dallas during December 1937 and February 1938 to gather information for their case study of Dallas (ibid., p. iii).

2. *Charter of the City of Dallas 1907 (Including Charter Amendments of 1909, 1911, 1916, 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1930)*, art. 1, sec. 19.

3. Stone, *City Manager Government*, p. 18.

4. All of the following candidate sketches come from the *DMN*, Apr. 8, 1931.

5. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1931.

6. Ibid., Apr. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, 1931.

7. Ibid., Apr. 8, 1931; Carolyn Jenkins Barta, "*The Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government" (master's thesis, University of Texas, 1970), p. 147.

8. *DMN*, Apr. 17, 1931; Leonard D. White, *The City Manager* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 103–14; untitled speech by Mayor Charles E. Turner [1933?], Carl P. Callaway Papers, Dallas Public Library (DPL).

9. Good coordination became a goal of the council-manager form of government not only in Dallas but elsewhere. Robert Burnham has written incisively about the council-manager government in Cincinnati, suggesting important parallels between the Cincinnati and Dallas experiences. See Robert Burnham, "Pulling Together for Pluralism: Politics, Planning and Government in Cincinnati, 1924–1959" (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1990), pp. 104–45.

10. Stone, *City Manager Government*, p. 45.

11. Untitled speech by Mayor Charles E. Turner, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

12. Stone, *City Manager Government*, p. 34.

13. Ibid., p. 39.

14. Ibid., p. 45.

15. Ibid., p. 35.

16. Ibid., p. 91.

17. Ibid., p. 90.

18. *Charter of the City of Dallas 1907 (Including the Charter Amendments of*

1909, 1911, 1916, 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1930), ch. 3, sec. 11; ch. 6, sec. 24; ch. 19, sec., 114.

19. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 50.

20. Untitled speech by Carl B. Callaway, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

21. T. R. Garretson, Dallas Police Department, 17 Month Report, Callaway Papers, DPL; Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 30.

22. Report of Public Health Department for 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

23. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 28.

24. Untitled speech by Mayor Charles E. Turner, n.d., Callaway Papers, DPL.

25. Seaborn C. Massey to Carl Callaway, Mar. 30, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

26. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 30.

27. Ibid., pp. 51–52.

28. Smith to Callaway, Feb. 8, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

29. *Dallas Dispatch* clipping, Jan. 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

30. *DMN,* Mar. 5, 1931.

31. Speech at Initial Rally of the Home Government Association by Judge George Burgess, Mar. 18, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

32. The platform also called for a reduced salary of not more than $10,000 for future city managers.

33. Campaign flyer, *Needed: A New Deal at City Hall,* Callaway Papers, DPL.

34. Statement of Carl B. Callaway, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

35. Kent D. Allens was president and Edgar Hartsfield was its secretary. Campaign flyer, *The Progressives,* Callaway Papers, DPL; *DMN,* Feb. 10, 1933. This group should not be confused with the later black Progressive Voters League.

36. Barta, "*The Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government," pp. 44–45.

37. Memo to Chamber of Commerce from the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Dallas Levee Improvement District, Nov. 21, 1930, Dealey Papers, Dallas Historical Society.

38. *DMN,* June 8, 1930; *DTH,* June 8, 1930.

39. *DTH,* Sept. 28, 1933.

40. *DMN,* June 10, 1930.

41. Ernest Sharpe, *G. B. Dealey of The Dallas News* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955), p. 252; *DMN,* May 24, 1933.

42. *DTH,* June 11 and 12, 1930; *DMN,* June 12, 1930.

43. *DMN,* June 15, 1930.

44. Ibid., Oct. 30 and Dec. 3, 1930.

45. Longtime planning advocate Dealey's support of the levee/reclamation district was somewhat compromised by his owning 15½ acres of river bottom land, which would increase in value once reclamation took place. See Sharpe, *G. B. Dealey,* pp. 251–52.

46. Ibid., p. 252.

47. *DMN,* Dec. 19, 1930.

48. L. A. Stemmons to L. S. Stemmons, Mar. 18, 1938; L. A. Stemmons to John E. Owens, Apr. 24, 1933, Dealey Papers, DHS.

49. L. A. Stemmons to L. S. Stemmons, Mar. 18, 1938, Dealey Papers, DHS.

50. *DMN,* May 2 and July 1, 1931; Sept. 21, 1921.

51. R. E. McDonald to Robert T. Hill, Dec. 15, 1930, Dealey Papers, DHS.

52. *DMN,* Sept. 21, 1931.

53. *DTH,* Sept. 23, 1931.

54. *DMN,* Sept. 21, 1931.

55. Ibid., Sept. 24, 1931; Aug. 1, 1932; J.C.M. to Leslie A. Stemmons, May 26, 1933; Louis Head to King, Nov. 29, 1932, Dealey Papers, box 42, DHS.

56. E. D. Hurt's statement, Mar. 2, 1932, Dealey Papers, box 44, DHS.

57. *DMN,* May 26, 1933.

58. *City and County of Dallas Levee Improvement District, Dallas, Texas* (Dallas: First Southwest Co., 1951), p. 3.

59. *DMN,* Aug. 15 and Sept. 28, 1933.

60. *Dallas Dispatch,* Mar. 22, 1934; *DMN,* Jan. 3, 1936.

61. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 54.

62. L. A. Stemmons to George Dealey, Jan. 14, 1933, Dealey Papers, box 42, DHS.

63. Early examples of that criticism can be found in Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," in *American Urban History: An Interpretive Reader With Commentaries,* ed. Alexander B. Callow Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 421–439; James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 92–112; Richard M. Bernard, "Metropolitan Politics in the American Sunbelt," and Amy Bridges, "Politics and Growth in Sunbelt Cities," in *Searching for the Sunbelt: Historical Perspectives on a Region,* ed. Raymond A. Mohl (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press), pp. 69–84.

64. Newspaperman Sam Acheson wrote to George Dealey that "I have never seen a governing body at city hall more politically conscious than the council is at this time." In another letter he repeated this thesis and concluded that "Council is fairly conscious of and concerned about political consequences of whatever they [*sic*] do" (Sam Acheson to G. B. Dealey, Jan. 10 and 11, 1933, Dealey Papers, box 43, DHS).

CHAPTER 4

1. Carl B. Callaway, postelection speech, 1933, Callaway Papers, Dallas Public Library [hereafter DPL].

2. Callaway to Glenn G. Wiltsey, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, June 4, 1934, Callaway Papers, DPL.

3. Callaway, postelection speech, 1933, Callaway Papers, DPL.

4. Roger Biles, "The New Deal in Dallas," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 95 (July 1991): 7–8; Mrs. Albert Walker, Director, Department of Public Welfare, Report, 1933[?], Callaway Papers, DPL.

5. Roscoe C. Martin, "Dallas Makes the City Manager Plan Work," *Annals of the American Academy* 198 (July 1938): 67.

6. Sam Acheson, "Joe Lawther was Catfish Founder," *DMN,* Mar. 24, 1969. According to newspaperman Barry Bishop, "Nobody liked [Edy] because he had a job to do and he did it. . . . He brought Dallas [government] into the twentieth century." Quoted in Kenneth B. Ragsdale, *The Year America Discovered Texas: Centennial '36* (College Station: Texas A&M University, 1987), p. 80.

7. According to one source, both the Civic Association and the Charter Association were limited by inadequate finances. See E. E. Crull to Mr. Truax, Feb. 8, 1935, Dealey Papers, box 39, DHS.

8. Ragsdale, *Year America Discovered Texas,* pp. 1–37.

9. *DMN,* Aug. 4, 1934.

10. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1934.

11. Ibid., Aug. 11, 1934.

12. Ibid., Aug. 30, Sept. 6, and Sept. 17, 1934.

13. Ibid., Aug. 11, 1934. According to Stone, City Manager Edy's resistance to the city's involvement in a large bond issue created resentment from the civic leaders. Stone, who seems to have based his book on extensive interviews with community leaders, provides a confusing portrayal of this entire incident, however. He claims the sewer tax had its origins in funding the centennial bonds, but the sewer tax was initiated before the centennial package was developed. From newspaper accounts it appears Edy's commitment to a sewer tax had more to do with his interest in restoring pay cuts to city workers. See Stone, *City Manager Government,* pp. 56–57.

14. Ragsdale, *Year America Discovered Texas,* pp. 54–58. Dallas's bid totaled $7,791,000. Houston bid $6,507,000, and San Antonio $4,835,000. Centennial historian Ragsdale emphasized that Dallas's "cooperative leadership, unique in the state" played an important role in the city securing the centennial exposition. So did the city's long experience running the State Fair of Texas and its fear that it was losing out to Houston in the urban sweepstakes for the Southwest (ibid., p. 298).

15. *DMN,* Sept. 11 and 12, 1934.

16. Ibid., Sept. 18, Oct. 31, and Nov. 1, 1934.

17. Advertisement for Texas Centennial Central Exposition Bonds, State Centennial Papers, box 30, DHS; *DMN,* Nov. 22, 1934; April 26, 1935; March 25, 1936.

18. "A Statement Covering a New Plan for Holding the Texas Centennial Central Exposition at Dallas," pamphlet, State Centennial Papers, DHS.

19. *DMN,* Dec. 5, 1934.

20. Ibid., Dec. 6, 1935.

21. The hardworking Turner died unexpectedly on March 5, 1936, at age forty-nine. He never got to see the centennial that he played such a role in promoting. See *DMN,* Mar. 6, 1936.

22. In his history of the centennial exposition, Ragsdale claims that a fundamental issue in the 1935 campaign was a proposal to widen and open Field Street in downtown Dallas. According to Ragsdale, many prominent businessmen on the east side opposed Field Street because it would improve property values northward and possibly hurt East Dallas real estate property values. This may have been an issue among some of the business leaders, but no mention of it is found in the *News*'s coverage of the campaign. See Ragsdale, *Year American Discovered Texas,* p. 80.

23. *DMN,* Apr. 3, 1935; Acheson claimed in 1969 that a prominent civic leader had confided that Joe E. Lawther had actually formed the Catfish Club. See also *DMN,* Mar. 24, 1969; Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 58.

24. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 65.

25. Ibid.

26. Other members included O. D. Brundage; E. M. Dillon; Jim Williams, South Dallas Cattle buyer; Will T. Henry, former city attorney; Harold Young, attorney; W. E. Ulm, president of the Oak Cliff Dad's Club; M. E. Glass, hardware merchant; Tony Brignardello; Dr. L. L. Butler; Hal Mosely; Harry Stanyer; and Laura Pierson. See *DMN,* Feb. 3, 1935.

27. Stone, *City Manager Government,* pp. 56, 70–71.

28. Ibid., p. 66. Included in the slate were two Baptists, two Presbyterians, two from the Christian church, a Methodist, a Jew, and an undeclared. Five of the candidates were Masons. See *DMN,* Feb. 25, 1935.

29. *DMN,* Feb. 24 and Mar. 1, 1935.

30. Ibid., Feb. 22, 1935.

31. Ibid., Feb. 12 and 25, 1935.

32. Landrum to George Dealey, Mar. 12, 1935, George B. Dealey Papers, box 39, DHS; George Dealey to Herbert Marcus, Feb. 28, 1935, Dealey Papers, box 39, DHS.

33. Barry Bishop to Barrett, Feb. [?] 1935, Dealey papers, box 39, DHS. Later, Jones claimed he was only joking about the pressure tactics. See Bishop to Dealey, Feb. 25, 1935, Dealey Papers, box 39, DHS.

34. *DMN,* Apr. 2, 1935.

35. Ibid., Mar. 20, 1935.

36. Ibid., Mar. 31 and Apr. 1, 1935.

37. Ibid., March 20, 23, and 31, 1935.

38. Ibid., March 24, 27, 29, 30, and 31, and Apr. 1, 1935.

39. Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 56–57.

40. *DMN,* Aug. 30, 1934; Sept. 6 and 20, 1934.

41. *DMN,* March 29 and Apr. 1, 1935; Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 50.

42. *DMN,* March 23 and 31, 1935.

43. Ibid., Apr. 2 and 3, 1935.

44. Patricia Evridge Hill, "Origins of Modern Dallas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Dallas, 1990), pp. 295–306.

45. *DMN,* Mar. 19, 1935.

46. Harold Stone created the categories of group A-D based on economic/social status of the precincts. I have used the categories but have looked at the voting returns in a different light. He blamed the CCA loss on large-scale defections from the Charter ticket by the middle and upper classes. I have suggested that the increased turnout of working classes also played a critical role in the turnaround. See Stone, *City Manager Government,* pp. 68–69; Barta, *"The Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government," appendix D (election returns), pp. 97–99.

47. *DMN,* Apr. 3, 1935.

48. Ibid., Apr. 9, 1935.

49. Edy went to Washington to work in Roosevelt's administration as assistant director of the budget and later he became Toledo's first city manager.

50. Ibid., Apr. 25, 1935; Stone, *City Manager Government,* p. 71.

51. According to Catfish leader Jim Dan Sullivan, the Catfish Club had wanted Mosely named director of public works rather than as city manager. See Ruggles to George Dealey, Apr. 12, 1935, Dealey Papers, DHS; *DMN,* Nov. 25, 1935; Dec. 4 and 17, 1935. According to the *News,* Catfish officials decided not to file the recall petitions because they could not get a list of candidates willing to run and disrupt centennial preparations (ibid., Jan. 31, 1936).

52. On April 23, Civic Association supporters voted to maintain their organization as a permanent, nonpolitical, and nonsectarian organization. No members of the executive committee could hold public office. Dr. L. L. Baker was named chair of the executive organization. This group resembled the CCA in many ways and helped counter the latter's claim to being the only true good government organization in the city. See *DMN,* Apr. 24, 1935; Mar. 17, 1935; Apr. 7, 14, and 29, 1935.

53. *DMN,* May 8, 1936.

54. Ibid., Mar. 1, 18, and 22, 1936.

55. Ibid., Mar. 27, 1936.

56. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1936. According to the *News,* the proposals would bring the CCA back in full force.

57. Ibid., May 2, 1936.

58. Ibid., June 28, 1936.

59. Ibid., Nov. 29, 1936.

60. Ragsdale, *Year America Discovered Texas,* pp. 80–82; *DMN,* Jan. 16, 1937.

61. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1937.

62. Ibid., Jan. 30, 1937.

63. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1937; *Dallas Craftsman* [hereafter *DC*], Feb. 12, 1937; *DMN,* Feb. 14, 1937; Apr. 4 and 11, 1937.

64. *DMN,* Jan. 6 and 19, 1937.

65. Ibid., Jan. 8 and Feb. 1, 1937. It also would have supported Max Hahn but he was seriously ill and most expected him not to seek reelection.

66. Ibid., Feb. 7, 12, 21, and 24, 1937.

67. Ragsdale, *Year America Discovered Texas,* pp. 260–89.

68. The Minute Men made up another antivice organization. See *DMN,* Mar. 31, Apr. 1 and 4, 1937.

69. Ibid., Feb. 14 and 28, Mar. 20, and Apr. 17, 1937.

70. Ibid., Apr. 1, 1937.

71. W. Marvin Dulaney, "Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas? "in *Essays on the American Civil Rights Movement,* ed. W. Marvin Dulaney and Kathleen Underwood (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993), pp. 70–73; Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League: A Political Voice for African Americans in Dallas," *Legacies: A Historical Journal for Dallas and North Central Texas* 3 (spring 1991): 30–32; *DMN,* May 3, 1973.

72. Dulaney, "The Progressive Voters League," pp. 28–32; *Dallas Express* [hereafter *DE*], Mar. 27, 1937.

73. *DE,* Mar. 27, 1937.

74. *DMN,* Apr. 7 and 21, 1937.

75. Minutes, City Council Meeting, May 1, 1937, vol. 46, p. 36; *DMN,* May 2, 1937. The Forward Dallas decision for mayor was not without controversy itself. J. Willis Gunn claimed that two years earlier he was promised the mayorship if he won a second term. D. R. Graham also wanted it (ibid., Apr. 27, 1937).

76. *DTH,* Nov. 26, 1937.

77. *DMN,* Jan. 1 and 5, 1939.

78. *DTH,* Dec. 12, 1937.

79. *DJ,* Oct. 21, 1937.

80. Since the city had invested so much to secure the centennial celebration, it decided to promote a new international exposition after the Centennial Exposition closed. Its attendance proved even more dismal than that of the centennial. Although officials had predicted a turnout of seven million for the exposition, the final count fell short by 2.4 million. See *DMN,* Nov. 1, 1937.

81. Stone, *City Manager Government,* pp. 90–91.

CHAPTER 5

1. Andy DeShong, "The Dallas Chamber of Commerce: Its First Seventy Years, 1909–1979," unpublished manuscript, DPL, pp. 1–2.

2. Ibid., pp. 4, 19, and 30.

3. A twenty-one-member board of directors elected for a three-year term ran the chamber of commerce. According to its constitution, "no director who has served two consecutive terms immediately preceding the election shall be eligible for re-election until after the lapse of one year" (Dallas Chamber of Commerce, Constitution, 1936[?], John W. Carpenter Papers, box 36, University of Texas at Arlington [hereafter UTA] Special Collections).

4. Carol Thometz, *The Decision Makers: The Power Structure of Dallas* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 39.

5. *DMN,* Mar. 3, 1938.

6. *DTH,* Mar. 3, 1938.

7. One civic leader stated this succinctly in 1961 when he remarked, "This body (the DCC) has the power to make or break any idea or proposal that certain groups may come up with. It is such a powerful group that nothing can succeed without its support." Quoted in Thometz, *Decision Makers,* p. 37.

8. *DMN,* Mar. 3, 1938.

9. According to its constitution, the Dallas Chamber of Commerce's purpose was "to give proper direction and impetus to all commercial movements; the encouragement of friendly intercourse between business men and the city of Dallas, the county of Dallas, and the state of Texas" (Chamber of Commerce, Constitution, 1936[?], Carpenter Papers, box 36, UTA).

10. *DMN,* Feb. 8, 1938.

11. *DTH,* Mar. 3, 1938.

12. From an attendance standpoint the centennial exposition proved disappointing. When he lobbied for the right to hold the exposition before the Texas Centennial Commission in 1934, Thornton claimed that unless the exposition drew ten million people it would be a failure. Total attendance to the fair was 6,350,000. See R. L. Thornton, Address before the Texas Centennial Commission, Sept. 6, 1934, Centennial Exposition Papers, box 15, DHS; Frank N. Watson to H. Emerson Evans, Feb. 16, 1937, Centennial Exposition Papers, box 15, DHS.

13. Speech before the Oak Cliff–Dallas Commercial Association, Feb. 12, 1937, Centennial Exposition Papers, box 4, DHS; *DMN,* Nov. 1, 1937.

14. *DMN,* Mar. 25, 1936; Ragsdale, *Year America Discovered Texas,* p. 296. The Texas Centennial Central Exposition Corporation concluded business on November 29, the last day of the exposition, with a loss of more than $2.8 million (ibid., p. 294).

15. *DMN,* Mar. 27, 1937. Attendance for this exposition was even more disappointing than the year before. Only 2.38 million attended, despite predictions of 7 million (ibid., Nov. 1, 1937).

16. *Charter By-Laws and List of Officers and Members of Dallas Citizens Council, Dallas Texas* [pamphlet], 1938, John W. Carpenter Papers, box 141, Special Collections, UTA; Thometz, *Decision Makers; Fortune* 39 (Feb. 1949): 101–3.

17. *Charter By-Laws,* John W. Carpenter Papers, box 141, Special Collections, UTA. The biographical sketches were developed from the CTX Bio Clips at the Dallas Public Library.

18. Darwin Payne, *Big D: Triumphs and Troubles of an American Supercity in the Twentieth Century* (Dallas: Three Fork Press, 1995) pp. 161–62.

19. *DMN,* Apr. 23, 1948.

20. *DTH,* Apr. 23, 1930; *DMN,* June 18 and 19, 1966.

21. *DTH,* Nov. 7, 1947; Feb. 5, 1956.

22. Ibid., Nov. 18, 1956.

23. Foreword by Stanley Marcus, in Ragsdale, *Year America Discovered Texas,* p. xiv.

24. *DMN,* Mar. 2, 1938.

25. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1939.

26. Ibid.

27. Barta, "*Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government," p. 55; *DMN,* Nov. 9, 1937; June 30 and July 24, 1938; *DTH,* Jan. 2, 1938.

28. Frank N. Watson and Associates, "Citizens Charter Association, 1930–1938," Oct. 5, 1938, Carpenter Papers, box 141, UTA.

29. *DMN,* Jan. 4 and June 30, 1938; Feb. 8, 1939; Sam Acheson, *Dallas Yesterday* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1977), pp. 194–95; *DTH,* Apr. 2, 1939. The public relations report also recommended that the CCA work closely with big business since "the responsibility for efficient municipal government rests primarily upon the business interests of the city. They have more at stake" (Watson and Associates, "Citizens Charter Association," Oct. 5, 1938, Carpenter Papers, box 141, UTA).

30. Acheson, *Dallas Yesterday,* p. 195; *DMN,* Feb. 9, 1939; Oct. 4, 1946.

31. *DMN,* Feb. 8 and 28, 1939; Oct. 4, 1946.

32. This anomaly in the principles of good government occurred because Edwin J. Kiest, publisher of the *Times Herald* at the time of charter reform, insisted on the independence of the park board in return for his newspaper's support. He had been the longtime chair of the park board, the agency that ran the park department, and did not want to relinquish his power to the city manager under the proposed changes. As a result, the park board retained its independent status, although it did receive funding from the city council. See Ann P. Hollingsworth, "Reform Government in Dallas 1927–1940" (master's thesis, North Texas State University, 1971), pp. 8–9.

33. Harry Jebsen, Jr., Robert M. Newton, and Patricia R. Hogan, "Centennial History of the Dallas, Texas Park System, 1876–1976," unpublished manuscript, Texas Tech University, 1976, pp. 498–501. Railton was eventually sentenced to two years in Leavenworth, a federal prison, since he had been misusing WPA funds. Gordon received no sentence but his involvement ended his career as a C.P.A. (ibid., p. 501).

34. *DMN,* Jan. 3 and 25, 1939.

35. Ibid., Jan. 13, 1939.

36. Ibid., Jan. 20, 1939; Barta, "*Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government," p. 58; *Dallas Craftsman* [hereafter *DC*], Feb. 17, 1939.

37. *DMN,* Feb. 12, Mar. 4, and Apr. 4, 1939; *DTH,* Apr. 2, 1939; *DC,* Mar. 17, 1939.

38. *DMN,* Mar. 12, 1939.

39. *DTH,* Apr. 2, 1939; *DMN,* Feb. 26, Mar. 26, and Apr. 2, 1939.

40. *DMN,* Mar. 23, 1939; Apr. 10, 1938.

41. *DE,* Mar. 25 and Apr. 8, 1939.

42. *The New Handbook of Texas,* vol. 5 (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1996), p. 650.

43. *DMN,* Apr. 14, 1939.

44. Ibid., June 17 and 21, 1939. Several councilman thought Aston too young for the post and initially supported other candidates.

45. *DMN,* Feb. 8, 1939.

46. Ibid., May 3, 1939.

47. Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 89–90, n. 2.

48. John Carpenter, "City-Planning Needs of Dallas," paper given at the Critic Club, Nov. 25, 1929, Critic Club Papers, DHS.

49. Memo from George Dealey, undated [1930?], Dealey Papers, DHS.

50. *DMN,* Mar. 2, 1938. An editorial later that year entitled "Regional Planning" suggested that a document like the New York City Regional Plan be developed for the Dallas–Fort Worth area to address issues such as water and transportation (ibid., June 1, 1938).

51. Ibid., June 13, 1939.

52. Ibid., Mar. 4, 1938.

53. Ibid., June 22, 1938.

54. Although Wood had been the city's first city plan engineer in the 1920s, he left the next decade to become a private planner. See Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 97–98.

55. Ibid., pp. 257–58.

56. *DMN,* Nov. 2, 1939.

57. *DMN,* Mar. 2, 1938; Oct. 20, 1939; Lewis W. Bailey, "Dallas Weighs City-County Merger," *National Municipal Review* 6 (June 1940): 370–79.

58. *DMN,* July 21, 1943.

59. Ibid., Apr. 1, 7, and 22, 1943; May 18 and 20, 1943; Aug. 8, 1943; Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 99–101.

60. *DMN,* Apr. 22, 1943; Jan. 24, 1945.

61. Harland Bartholomew and Associates, "A Master Plan for Dallas, Texas," Report No. One, "Character of the City," Sept. 1943, pp. 3, 35.

62. Bartholomew, "Scope of the City Plan," Report No. Two, Sept. 1943, p. 38.

63. Bartholomew, "Past and Probable Future Population," Report No. 3, Oct. 1943, pp. iv, 23. The final report did not include a statement that the City Plan Commission had deleted before approving the document, which read, "one sector can grow at the expense of some other section." The commission feared that such an observation would encourage the very neighborhood parochialism that it was trying to overcome. See Minutes, City Plan Commission, Oct. 28, 1943.

64. Bartholomew, "A Preliminary Report Upon Major Street Plan," Report No. Four, Nov. 1943, pp. 3 and 79.

65. Bartholomew, "Local Transit Facilities," Report No. Five, Feb. 1944, pp. 16 and 27.

66. Bartholomew, "Transportation Facilities: Rail, Air, Highway, Water," Report No. Six, July 1944, pp. iii, viii, and 40.

67. Bartholomew, "A System of Parks and Schools," Report No. Seven, June 1944, pp. iii, 5, and 30.

68. Bartholomew, "Land Use," Report No. Eight, Oct. 1944, pp. iii–iv, 4–6, and 16.

69. Bartholomew, "Zoning," Report No. Nine, Feb. 1945, pp. 28 and 29.

70. Bartholomew, "Housing," Report No. Ten, Dec. 1944, pp. iv and 22.

71. Ibid., pp. 6–44.

72. Bartholomew, "Public Buildings," Report No. Eleven, pp. 5, 9, and 12; "The Cities' Appearance," Report No. 12, pp. 1–2.

73. Bartholomew, "A Preliminary Report Upon A Capital Expenditure Program," Report No. 14, Jan. 1945, pp. 1–2, 13–15.

74. Bartholomew, "Administrative Policy and Practice," Report No. 13, Mar. 13, 1945, pp. 3–12. Council never did print a consolidated master plan for public consumption because it deemed all printing bids it received too costly. See Minutes, City Council, Dec. 18, 1946.

75. Bartholomew, "Administrative Policy and Practice," pp. 4, 17.

76. Ibid., pp. 12–14.

77. See for instance Carl Abbott, *The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 124–125, and Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 100–134.

78. Bartholomew, "Land Use," Oct. 1944, p. iv; Bartholomew, "Zoning," p. 32.

79. E. A. Wood, "Master Plan for City of 670,000 by 1970," *Dallas,* Dec. 1943, p. 12; Bartholomew, "Public Buildings," Feb. 1945, p. 26–27.

80. Bartholomew, "Housing," pp. 22–23, 36–37.

81. Ibid., p. 20.

82. Ibid., p. 22.

83. Bartholomew, "Administrative Policy and Practice," Report No. 13, p. 9.

84. *DMN,* Apr. 4, 1945.

85. Ibid., Jan. 28, 1945.

86. "A Master Quiz on Unification and the Greater Dallas Master Plan," pamphlet, Robert L. Thornton Papers, DHS.

87. *DMN,* Apr. 4, 1945.

88. Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 282, 285.

89. *DMN,* Nov. 28, 1945.

90. Ibid., June 15, Dec. 8 and 9, 1945.

91. Ibid., Dec. 4, 1945.

92. Minutes, Dallas City Council, Aug. 1, 1945.

93. *DMN,* Oct. 23 and Nov. 13, 1945. The demand for more schools reflected

the enormous spatial growth experienced by the city. Between March 1944 and October 1945 Dallas corporate limits had expanded by 50 percent (ibid., Oct. 23, 1945).

94. Ibid., Dec. 8, 1945.

95. Ibid., p. 106. In April 1947 the *News* claimed the city needed more than $54 million in public programs for a five-year period, $14 million more than was anticipated by the plan. See *DMN,* Apr. 24, 1947.

96. "Statement about Dallas role in securing North American Aviation approved by Dallas City Council," n.d., Thornton Papers, DHS; *DMN,* June 30, 1928.

97. E. C. Barksdale, *The Genesis of the Aviation Industry in North Texas* (Austin: Bureau of Business Research, University of Texas, 1958), p. 3; *DMN,* July 5, 1940.

98. *DMN,* Aug. 18, 1940. This was not the first announcement about an aircraft factory. On July 5, 1940, the *News* announced that Hall Aluminum Aircraft Corporation had selected a site just west of the Dallas city limits next to Hensley Field to locate a new airplane factory. What the paper did not tell was that the airplane manufacturer agreed to come after Dallas civic and business leaders pledged more than half a million dollars to help the company in Dallas. That deal fell through, however, when Hall's merger efforts with Consolidated Aircraft manufacturers stalled. Because North American Aviation could immediately establish operations in Dallas, city officials sealed the deal with them rather than Hall. Consolidated, by the way, eventually located a factory in nearby Fort Worth. See *DMN,* July 5, 1940.

99. *DMN,* Aug. 18, 30, 1940; Barksdale, *Genesis of the Aviation Industry,* pp. 1–7; "North American Comes to Dallas," *Southwest Business* 19 (Oct. 1940): 9; "Statement about Dallas role in securing North American Aviation approved by Dallas City Council," n.d., Thornton Papers, DHS.

100. Local boosters also claimed it was the country's first new aircraft plant constructed under the national defense program. See Barksdale, *Genesis of the Aviation Industry,* pp. 1–7; "North American Tells 30,000 about Dallas Plant," *Dallas,* Nov. 1941, p. 36; J. Gordon Turnbull, "From Blueprints to Production," *Dallas,* Apr. 1941, p. 10; Employment Trend in Selected Establishments by Primary Area and Industry, War Manpower Commission Records (WMC), Record Group (RG) 211, Federal Archives and Record Center, Fort Worth, Tex.; "Report of Current and Required Employment," WMC Records, RG 211.

101. George L. MacGregor, "Democracy's Arsenal Needs Trained Workers," *Dallas,* Mar. 1941, p. 9; *DTH,* July 25, 1943.

102. "Lockheed Plant in Dallas Largest of Kind in the U.S.," *Dallas,* Mar. 1943, p. 43.

103. Memo, War Manpower Commission, "Mr. McNutt's Statement to the Truman Committee Regarding Dallas Labor Market Situation," Nov. 10, 1943, WMC Records, RG 211.

104. Ibid., S. A. Guiberson, Jr., "Guiberson History Written in Black and

Gold," *Dallas,* Apr. 1942, p. 8; "Contracts Total $91,000,000," ibid., Mar. 1941, p. 11.

105. "Dallas, Business and Federal Capital of the Southwest," *Dallas,* Dec. 1943, pp. 16–17; F. O. Burns, "Dallas—The War Capital of the Southwest," ibid., July 1942; United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, "A Statistical Summary of the Dallas–Fort Worth Area: Dallas and Tarrant Counties," Jan. 1944, WMC Records, RG 211.

106. For a more extensive look at the relationship between the city and the military throughout the twentieth century see Roger W. Lotchin, *Fortress California, 1910–1961: From Warfare to Welfare* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

107. "$3,000,000 Naval Base," *Southwest Business,* Sept. 1940, p. 5; "Dallas Gets Naval Air Base," *Southwest Business,* Oct. 1940, p. 7.

108. Ernest R. Tennant, "Dallas Due to Benefit from Big Acquisition," *Dallas,* Nov. 1942, p. 13; "Eighth Service Command to Begin Move November 15," ibid., p. 9; *DMN,* Sept. 10, 12, 1942.

109. *DMN,* Sept. 11, 1942; Stanley H. Scott and Levi H. Davis, *A Giant in Texas: A History of the Dallas–Fort Worth Regional Airport Controversy, 1911–1974* (Quanah, Tex.: Nortex Press, 1974), p. 11.

110. *DMN,* Dec. 15, 16, 1927; Scott and Davis, *Giant in Texas,* p. 3.; "Forward Dallas: Report of the Ulrickson Committee, 1925–1926," n.d., n.p.; American Public Works Association, *History of Public Works in the United States, 1776–1976* (Chicago: American Public Works Association, 1976), p. 192; Dallas, Texas, *Progress: An Official Report of Municipal Achievement in Dallas, 1934* (Dallas: n.p., n.d.), p. 22.

111. *DJ,* Dec. 23, 1937[?]; B. B. Owen, "Dallas Stake in Aviation," *Southwest Business,* Apr. 1939, p. 11.

112. Donald R. Whitnak, *Safer Skyways: Federal Control of Aviation, 1926–1966* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1966), pp. 159–60; "Regional Airport—Story with Many Chapters," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* (*FWST*), Aug. 19, 1962; Oct. 2, 1940; Scott and Davis, *Giant in Texas,* pp. 5–6.

113. Scott and Davis, *Giant in Texas,* pp. 6–7; *FWST,* Sept. 10, 16, 1941; Oct. 17, 1941; Jan. 8, 1942.

114. Scott and Davis, *Giant in Texas,* pp. 9–12.

115. *DMN,* Aug. 31, 1943.

116. *DTH,* Feb. 1, 1944.

117. Bartholomew, "Transportation, Facilities," p. 44.

118. Ibid., p. 43.

119. When Consolidated Aircraft Corporation showed an interest in locating in Dallas, Nathan Adams told a special board meeting of the chamber of commerce that Dallas would fail to secure the factory if it left negotiations up to the city council. See Minutes, Special Board of Directors Meeting, Chamber of Commerce, June 18, 1940, Carpenter Papers, box 36, UTA.

120. *DMN,* Mar. 6, 12, 13, 28, and 31, and Apr. 2, 1941; Jenkins, "*Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government," p. 104.

121. *DMN,* Apr. 4, 1943.

122. *DTH,* Feb. 8, 1945.

CHAPTER 6

1. *DE,* Mar. 27 and Sept. 18, 1937; W. Marvin Dulaney, *Black Police in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 34–35. Dulaney notes that Dallas actually had a black policeman in 1894, but he was killed in the line of duty two months later and was never replaced.

2. *DMN,* Aug. 28 and Sept. 11, 1937.

3. *DTH,* Aug. 10, 1937.

4. *DMN,* Sept. 11 and 14, 1937; *DE,* Sept. 18, 1937.

5. *DMN,* Sept. 17 and 19, 1937.

6. Ibid., Sept. 22, 23, and 24, 1937; *DJ,* Sept. 23, 1937.

7. *DMN,* Sept. 25, 1937.

8. Ibid., Sept. 26, 1937; *DTH,* Sept. 24 and 26, 1937; *DJ,* Sept. 24, 1937.

9. *DJ,* Ibid., Sept. 29, 1937. During the controversy the Negro Chamber of Commerce solicited letters from Southwestern cities with police to prove that they worked out well in many cities. See *DTH,* Sept. 26, 1937.

10. *WPA Guide and History,* p. 507; William Word, "Hidden Nooks of Dallas Black Belt," *DMN,* Nov. 29, 1925.

11. *DJ,* May 4 and 5, 1925; Press Release to NAACP by Civic Federation, Elmer Scott Collection, DHS.

12. Dallas, Texas, "1950 Negro Housing Market Data," Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce Papers, DPL.

13. Justin F. Kimball, *Our City—Dallas: A Community Civics* (Dallas: Kessler Plan Association of Dallas, 1927), pp. 195–97.

14. Ibid., pp. 198–99.

15. Kenneth T. Jackson, *The Ku Klux Klan and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 196), pp. 66–80.

16. *DE,* Feb. 26, 1927; *DMN,* Mar. 8, 1927.

17. *DMN,* Nov. 21, 1929.

18. Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 126–27.

19. Ibid., pp. 144–46; "Segregation in Dallas 1916–1968," Mar. 9, 1993, Dallas Municipal Archives and Records Center.

20. Kimball, *Our City,* pp. 198–99. A committee of blacks went to Finance Commissioner John Harris with the same plea. They asked that Dallas provide an "opportunity (for Negroes) to own homes and develop their neighborhoods with the same sort of public investment afforded to white areas." See *DMN,* Feb. 10, 1927.

21. City of Dallas, Texas, "General Survey of Housing Conditions, Aug. 1938," pp. 11–12; *DE,* July 24, 1937; Mar. 12, 1938.

22. *DMN,* Oct. 15, 1933. A summary of Dallas's proposed limited-dividend housing through June 1935 can be found in a file at the national archives labeled "Dallas Correspondence," Public Housing Administration Records (PHAR), RG 196, National Archives (NA). For more on the PWA program see my *Making Better Citizens,* pp. 74–86.

23. *DMN,* May 26, 1935; Bertram E. Giesecke to Judge M. N. Chrestman, May 15 and 17, 1935, PHAR, RG 196.

24. *DMN,* May 27, 1935.

25. Ibid., May 26 and 27, 1935; *DE,* Mar. 5, 1938.

26. The Real Property figures appeared in "General Survey of Housing Conditions," Aug. 1938, p. 17; *DMN,* May 27 and July 23, 1935; *DE,* Aug. 10, 1935.

27. *DMN,* Aug. 11 and Sept. 26, 1935.

28. J. T. Haile to Elmer Scott, Jan. 13, 1936, Elmer Scott Collection, DHS.

29. *DMN,* May 27, 1935; *DE,* June 1, 1935; July 8, 1939.

30. "Dallas Housing Authority Celebrates Its 15th Anniversary," *Journal of Housing* 9 (Dec. 1952): 432. For more on the purposes of early public housing, see Fairbanks, *Making Better Citizens.* See also *Urban Housing: The Story of the PWA Housing Division, 1933–1936* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing, 1936), p. 90.

31. *Annual Report of the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas* (DHA) for Mar. 11, 1938 to Dec. 31, 1939 (typescript), Dallas Housing Authority Offices, Dallas.

32. *DMN,* Dec. 10, 1935.

33. *DE,* Feb. 19, Mar. 5 and 12, 1938.

34. Ibid., Mar. 5 and Oct. 29, 1938; *DMN,* Mar. 5, 1938. The less than unanimous support for public housing by city officials may help explain why Dallas city council stalled so much in carrying out its promise to develop a park and a playground for the PWA public housing project. James L. Stephenson to Nathan Strauss, Jan. 28, 1936, PHAR, RG 196, NA.

35. *DMN,* Mar. 2, 1938.

36. Ibid., Mar. 15, 1938; *DE,* Mar. 19, 1938; July 15, 1939.

37. Minutes, Dallas Housing Authority, Apr. 11, 1938; *Annual Report of the DHA for Mar. 11, 1938 to Dec. 31, 1939.*

38. *DE,* Aug. 20 and Sept. 3, 1938.

39. "General Survey of Housing Conditions, Aug. 1938," pp. 1–13.

40. *DMN,* June 26, 1938.

41. "General Survey of Housing Conditions," pp. 14, 18.

42. The Dallas Real Estate Board made it very clear that it opposed future open land projects similar to Cedar Springs and would only tolerate slum clearance projects for Dallas African Americans and Mexican Americans. See *DMN,* June 3, 1938; *DE,* June 11, 1938.

43. *Annual Report of the DHA for Mar. 11, 1938 to Dec. 31, 1939;* DHA Minutes, Nov. 8, 1938.

44. *DE,* July 22 and Sept. 16, 1939; *Annual Report of the DHA for Mar. 11, 1938 to Dec. 31, 1939.*

45. *DE,* Sept. 16 and Oct. 7, 1939.

46. DHA Minutes, May 3, 1938.

47. *DMN,* Sept. 24 and Oct. 3, 1940.

48. The DHA did set up an office at the housing site that guided African Americans to already overcrowded black enclaves but did nothing to provide actual relocation housing. See *Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1940 to Dec. 31, 1940.*

49. *Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1940 to Dec. 31, 1940; Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1941 to Dec. 31, 1941; DTH,* Mar. 26, 1950.

50. "Acts of Violence Against Dallas Negro Homeowners," American Civil Liberties Union Archives (ACLU), Princeton University Library; Memo to American Civil Liberties Union from Thurgood Marshall, July 28, 1941, ACLU Archives; *DMN,* Sept. 4, 1940.

51. *DMN,* Oct. 4, 1940.

52. *DE,* Jan. 18, 1941.

53. Ibid., Mar. 15, 1941.

54. Ibid., Aug. 16, 1941.

55. Ibid., July 12, 1941.

56. Ibid., Sept. 6 and Nov. 29, 1941.

57. Ibid., Mar. 27, 1937; Apr. 8, 1939; Mar. 29, 1941.

58. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1941.

59. *WPA Guide and History,* p. 517; *DMN,* Mar. 24, 1936.

60. *DMN,* May 31, 1935.

61. Ibid., July 25 and Aug. 11, 1935.

62. *DJ,* May 30, 1935; *DMN,* July 25, Aug. 2 and 11, May 31, 1935; *DMN,* Mar. 24 and 27, 1936. There had been plans by the city to condemn some of the worst shacks and tear them down but this never took place, possibly because officials understood this would only create greater congestion or promote dispersal, neither attractive options. As it was, the area's 688 dwellings housed over 6,000 people (ibid., June 2, 1939).

63. *Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1940 to Dec. 31, 1940; DMN,* Sept. 15 and 24, 1942.

64. *Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1942 to Dec. 31, 1942; DMN,* Sept. 24, 1942.

65. *Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1940 to Dec. 31, 1940.*

66. DHA, *Designed for Living. 10 Year Report of the DHA.*

67. *Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1942 to Dec. 31, 1942; Annual Report of the DHA for January 1, 1944 to Dec. 31, 1944.* Indeed, the *News* reported

that the availability of these two projects was a major decision of the Eight Service Command in moving its command headquarters to Dallas (*DMN,* Oct. 3., 1942).

68. *DTH,* Sept. 9, 1937.

69. In the late 1920s the AFL undertook an aggressive campaign to unionize Dallas and all of Texas. The Open Shop Association campaigned strongly against the AFL's effort to promote the closed shop and reminded Dallas employers, "The very fundamentals of the closed shop are opposed to any understanding between employer and the employee. They are set on the basis that the employee has one interest, and that the employee has a different set of interests; and that it is necessary for the employee to always fight the employer." See C. A. Jay, Vice President of Dallas Open Shop, "Dallas and the Open Shop," December 1927, Carpenter Papers, UTA.

70. Hill, "The Origins of Modern Dallas," pp. 295–312; *DJ,* Apr. 2, 1935; *DMN,* Aug. 14, 1935.

71. Hill, pp. 305, 310–12; *DMN,* Aug. 14, 1935; Jeff G. Jones clipping scrapbook, DHS.

72. Lester Lorch of the Dress Manufacturers Association typified the outsider viewpoint when he observed that the strike was caused by Northern and Eastern agitators coming to Dallas. For more on the outsider thesis see Hill, "Origins of Dallas," p. 298.

73. *Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board,* vol. 26, Aug. 1–26, 1940 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 332–43; Hill, "Origins of Dallas," pp. 313–20.

74. Professor Hill has pointed out Baer's vulnerability because of his union president's interest in industrial unions, something that made that union suspect among Dallas's AFL leaders (Hill, "Origins of Dallas," p. 324).

75. Ibid., pp. 324–26; *NLRB Decisions,* vol. 26, pp. 363–67; Herbert Harris, "Terror in Texas," pamphlet in Ford Motor Plant Collection, box 1, Labor Archives, UTA Library.

76. Quoted in Hill, "Origins of Dallas," p. 328.

77. *DMN,* Aug. 10 and 20, 1937.

78. *DTH,* Aug. 10, 1937; *DJ,* Aug. 11, 1937.

79. *DTH,* Aug. 10, 1937.

80. *DMN,* Aug. 20, 1937; *DJ,* Aug. 20, 1937.

81. *DJ,* Aug. 19, 1937.

82. *DMN,* Aug. 21, 1937.

83. *DJ,* Aug. 20, 1937.

84. *DC,* Apr. 9, 1937; *DMN,* Apr. 9, 1937.

85. *DMN,* Aug. 17 and Sept. 9, 1937.

86. Ibid., Sept. 6 and 7, 1937. Norman Thomas, who visited the city several days after Green's speech, highly criticized it and suggested that it made him "just another ally of the Open Shop Association" (ibid., Sept. 10, 1937).

87. *DC,* Mar. 10, 1939.
88. Ibid., Mar. 28, 1941.
89. *DMN,* Apr. 2 and 4, 1939.

CHAPTER 7

1. *DMN,* Dec. 2, 1955; Richard C. Henshaw, Jr., and Alfred G. Dale, *An Economic Survey of Dallas County, Texas* (Austin: Bureau of Business Research, University of Texas, 1955), pp. 75. When Dallasites talked about the Southwest they usually meant Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Oklahoma (ibid., p. 4).
2. Henshaw and Dale, *Economic Survey of Dallas,* pp. 77, 102; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Vol. II Population,* pt. 6, Texas, p. 1032.
3. *DMN,* Mar. 23, 1952.
4. *An Economic Survey of Dallas County Prepared for the Texas and Pacific Railway Company,* no. 13 (Austin: Bureau of Business Research, University of Texas, 1949), sec. 4.05. Dallas County itself was one of the few counties in Texas with no oil.
5. Black, "Empire of Consensus," p. 286.
6. Carl Abbott, *The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities,* rev. ed. (Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 123–25.
7. *DMN,* May 2, 1945. Smithan responded by hiring a new police chief, Carl Hansson, and promoting a general shake-up of the police department.
8. *DMN,* May 3, 1945; Nov. 17, 1946.
9. Ibid., Dec. 31, 1946; Apr. 21, 1952.
10. Ibid., Nov. 21, 1946.
11. Ibid. The failure of Adoue to control the council meeting and Mayor Rodgers's insinuation that the mayor pro tem was particularly responsible for the disgraceful meeting intensified the already bad feeling between the two men (ibid., Dec. 19, 1946).
12. Black, "Empire of Consensus," pp. 211–13.
13. *DTH,* Sept. 22, 1946.
14. *DMN,* Feb. 1, 1947.
15. Ibid., Mar. 25 and 30, 1947. Hiegel based his claim on what he thought was an extravagant sale of bonds to fund infrastructure development. Since 1944 Dallas had sold $19,670,000 worth of bonds.
16. Ibid., Mar. 17 and 28, and Apr. 2, 1947.
17. Ibid., Mar. 20 and 25, 1947.
18. Ibid., Feb. 27, 1947; Flyer for CCA, 1947, CCA newspaper clipping file, DPL.
19. *DMN,* Mar. 25 and 26, 1947.
20. Ibid., Apr. 11, 1947; *DTH,* Apr. 11, 1947.
21. *DMN,* Mar. 26 and Apr. 3, 1947.

22. The Progressive Voters League split its endorsement and only supported two CCA candidates. *DE,* Mar. 29, 1947; *DMN,* Apr. 16, 1947.

23. *DMN,* Apr. 29, 1947.

24. Ibid., May 29, 1947.

25. *DMN,* July, 18, 19, 27, and 30, 1947.

26. As early as 1911, the Kessler plan had called for a boulevard on the Houston & Texas Central Railroad (H&TC) right of way. Voters had approved $450,000 in bonds for it when they passed the Ulrickson program in 1927. But high costs, the Depression, and problems of securing the right of way from the railroad company helped stifle the project until the 1940s. The right of way issue particularly threatened the boulevard since the Southern Pacific, user of the H&TC railroad tracks, balked at removing them south of downtown Dallas. As a result, South Dallas citizens refused to support the project unless this occurred. Eventually, the Southern Pacific agreed to relocate them if the city promised them alternative access to the old H&TC freight yards.

In 1943, council finally passed the ordinance to start acquiring land for the project after the state agreed to share the costs. According to the *DMN,* "Two of the happiest men in the meeting were councilmen L. L. Hiegel of South Dallas and Bennett H. Stampes of Southeast Dallas," because they saw special benefits for their section of the city from this road. Not only did supporters emphasize how the road would better connect North and South Dallas to the urban core, but they explained how the project would help cushion the expected postwar recession by giving jobs to returning veterans. About this time Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944, which also provided funds for the project, which eventually costed $31 million, nearly 70 times the amount designated in the Ulrickson program. Groundbreaking for the northern leg of the expressway took place January 31, 1947, and the old H&TC track removal started that August. See *DMN,* Jan. 14, 1943; Aug. 19 and 24, 1947; Jan. 9, Nov. 14 and 20, 1948; *DTH,* Aug. 18, 1949; May 29, 1954; untitled newspaper clipping, n.d., undated article in Highways, the Central Expressway clipping file in the DPL; *DC,* Nov. 19, 1948.

27. *DMN,* Nov. 21, 1948.

28. Ibid., Jan. 9, 1949; Nov. 7, 8, and 14, 1948.

29. Ibid., Apr. 1, 1949.

30. Ibid., Mar. 23, 1949.

31. Ibid., Apr. 4, 1949.

32. Ibid., Apr. 4 and 5, 1949.

33. Ibid., Mar. 29 and Apr. 4, 1949.

34. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1949.

35. Ibid., Apr. 6, 1949.

36. Ibid., Feb. 4, 1949.

37. Ibid., Apr. 17, 1949.

38. Ibid., July 23, and Aug. 30 and 31, 1949.

39. Ibid., Nov. 1 and Oct. 27, 1949.

40. Ibid., Nov. 1, 1949; *DTH,* Oct. 30 and 31, 1949.
41. *DMN,* Nov. 2 and 3, 1949.
42. Ibid., Nov. 1 and 2, 1949.
43. Ibid., Apr. 8, 1951.
44. Ibid., Feb. 27, 1951.
45. Ibid., Mar. 4, 7, and 16, 1951.
46. Ibid., Mar. 11 and Apr. 4, 1951.
47. Ibid., Apr. 1 and 4, 1951; May 13, 1951.
48. *DTH,* May 3, 1952; *DMN,* Dec. 10 and 11, 1949. It could be argued that Adoue also feared having a strong city manager since he clearly wanted the mayor's office to become more involved in governing the city.
49. *DMN,* Jan. 31 and May 3, 1952.
50. Ibid., Apr. 8, 1951; Jan. 26 and Feb. 21, 1952. Voters defeated seven bond proposals. See *DTH,* Jan. 30, 1952.
51. *DTH,* Apr. 1 and 4, 1951; May 13, 1951.
52. Ibid., Mar. 15, 1951; Jan. 29, 1952. City policy had government pay half the cost of sewer and water mains for housing developments and pay for the cost of paving street intersections. Ibid., Jan. 31, 1952.
53. *DTH,* Dec. 5, 1951; *DMN,* Nov. 13, 1945; Jan. 27, 1952.
54. *DMN,* Jan. 27, 28, and 30, 1952. This is another example of how newspaper support and the financial support of the city's civic leaders failed to sway public opinion.
55. Ibid., Mar. 1 and 30, 1952. City officials designated almost half of the bonds for waterworks and sanitary sewers and one-third for street improvement.
56. Flyer, 1952 Bond Election, Bond clipping file, DPL; *DMN,* Apr. 26, 1952.
57. *DMN,* May 2, 1952.
58. Ibid., Sept. 5, 1948; Mar. 4, 1951. Between 1946 and 1953 Dallas would invest $34.1 million for water. That sum was more than seven times the amount spent during the city's first sixty-five years. See M. E. Bolding and Erie H. Bolding, *Origin and Growth of the Dallas Water Utilities* (Dallas: n.p., 1981), p. 159.
59. *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* (*FWST*), Oct. 1, 1952; *DTH,* Oct. 16, 1952. This report surprised local officials, because only a month earlier the city's water superintendent, Karl Hoefle, had estimated the city had eight months of water remaining.
60. *DMN,* Aug. 22, 1951; *FWST,* Oct. 27 and 30, 1952.
61. *FWST,* Nov. 12, 1952; *DTH,* Nov. 16, 1952; Bolding and Bolding, *Dallas Water Utilities,* p. 157.
62. *FWST,* Nov. 29, 1952.
63. *DTH,* Feb. 26, 1953; Bolding and Bolding, *Dallas Water Utilities,* p. 57.
64. *DMN,* Mar. 18, 1953.
65. Ibid., Feb. 11, 1953; *DTH,* Feb. 26, 1953.
66. *DMN,* Dec. 12, 1952; *DTH,* Dec. 9 and 14, 1952.
67. *DMN,* Jan. 16, 1953.

68. *DTH,* Feb. 15 and 23, 1953; *DC,* Feb. 27, 1953.
69. *DMN,* Apr. 1, 3, and 8, 1953.
70. Ibid., Mar. 26 and 29, 1953.
71. Ibid. Mar. 22 and Apr. 3, 1953.
72. *DMN,* Mar. 9, 1953.
73. Ibid.; *DC,* Apr. 3, 1953.
74. *DMN,* Apr. 8, 1953.
75. Ibid., Mar. 2 and 22, 1953; Apr. 1, 1953.
76. Ibid., Apr. 8, 1953; *DTH,* Apr. 8, 1953.
77. Harland Bartholomew and Associates, "A Master Plan for Dallas," Report No. 10, "Housing," 1944, p. 37.
78. *DMN,* Dec. 15 and 24, 1944.
79. Ibid., Dec. 16 and 18, 1944.
80. Ibid., Dec. 24 and 25, 1944.
81. *DTH,* Oct. 29, 1947; *DMN,* Apr. 21, 1948.
82. *DTH,* Jan. 10, 1950; *DE,* Jan. 21, 1950; *DMN,* Feb. 11, 1950; *DTH,* May 28, 1950.
83. *DMN,* Feb. 11, 1950.
84. "Text of Negro Housing Survey," *DTH,* May 28, 1950; "Report of the West Dallas Survey," Council of Social Agencies of Dallas, July 1948, pp. 1, 4.
85. Ibid.; DHA, "Report of the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas for the Year 1950 and to July 1, 1951," p. 9. By 1950 the area's population topped 30,000.
86. Undated newspaper article, Dallas blacks clipping file, 1950s, DPL; *FWST,* July 12, 1951; Jim Schutze, *The Accommodation: The Politics of Race in an American City* (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1986), p. 13.
87. DHA Minutes, Oct. 10, 1949; *Annual Report of the DHA for 1949; DMN,* Oct. 19 and Dec. 21, 1949; *FWST,* Apr. 9, 1950.
88. *DMN,* Feb. 24 and 26, 1950; *DTH,* Feb. 26, 1950.
89. *DE,* Mar. 4, 1950.
90. Ibid., Mar. 18, 1950; "Toward Better Understanding: Report of the Joint Committee on Negro Housing of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and Dallas Citizens Council, May 24, 1950, and of the Dallas Inter-Racial Committee, January 24, 1951," (Dallas: Dallas Chamber of Commerce, n.d.), Carpenter Papers, box 38, UTA Special Collections.
91. "Report of Joint Committee on Negro Housing"; "Text of Negro Housing Survey Report"; *DTH,* May 28, 1950; *DMN,* May 28, 1950.
92. "Report of the Joint Committee of Dallas Chamber of Commerce and Dallas Council of Social Agencies on Problems of West Dallas," Oct. 19, 1950, Carpenter Papers, box 38, UTA Special Collections; *DMN,* Mar. 19, 1950.
93. "Report of the Joint Committee of Dallas Chamber of Commerce and Dallas Council of Social Agencies on Problems of West Dallas," Oct. 19, 1950, Carpenter Papers, box 38, UTA Special Collections; "Summary of Report of the Special Committees of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and the Council of Social

Agencies, Oct. 19, 1950," in *Annual Report, Dallas Housing Authority, 1950 to July 1951,* pp. 7–10.

94. Memorandum, Notes on formation of Inter-Racial Committee of Dallas Chamber of Commerce, June 9, 1950, Carpenter Papers, box 38, UTA Special Collections; "New Interracial Committee Drafting Program of Work," *Dallas,* August 1950, p. 10; *DE,* Aug. 5, 1950; *DMN,* July 20, 1950.

95. "Toward Better Understanding," Report of the Joint Committee on Negro Housing of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and Dallas Citizens Council, May 24, 1950, and of the Dallas Inter-Racial Committee, January 24, 1951 (Dallas: Dallas Chamber of Commerce, n.d.), Carpenter Papers, box 38, UTA Special Collections.

96. Memorandum, Notes on formation of Inter-Racial Committee of Dallas Chamber of Commerce, June 9, 1950, Carpenter Papers, box 38, UTA Special Collections; "New Interracial Committee Drafting Program of Work," *Dallas,* August 1950, p. 10; *DE,* Aug. 5, 1950.

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98. Seymour Freedgood, "New Strength in City Hall," in *The Exploding Metropolis,* ed. by editors of *Fortune* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 72.

99. *DMN,* May 11 and June 7, 1950; *DE,* Aug. 12, 1950.

100. *DE,* Jan. 13, 1951.

101. Ibid., June 30, 1951; *FWST,* July 14, 1951.

102. Schutze, *Accommodation,* pp. 20, 70–72.

103. *FWST,* Sept. 23, 1951.

104. Schutze, *Accommodation,* p. 71.

105. *DMN,* May 9, 14, and 29, 1947; June 20 and 25, 1947.

106. Scott and Davis, *A Giant in Texas,* p. 18; *DMN,* Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1947.

107. *DMN,* Feb. 3, 1948; *DTH,* Feb. 11, 1948.

108. *Washington Post,* June 1, 1948. The advertisement also reprinted a CCA Regional Office Report issued on September 10, 1947, that stated "our plan is to make Love Field the secondary air-line airport to supplement the large airport to be developed at the Midway Airport site to serve the Dallas and Fort Worth metropolitan areas."

109. *DMN,* July 4 and 7, 1948; June 2, 1948; Sept. 16, 1948.

110. Ibid., Sept. 13 and May 18, 1945; Dallas, Texas, Departments of Aviation and City Planning, "The Dallas Urban Plan for Aviation," 1948 (typescript); *DMN,* May 17, 1948.

111. *DTH,* Apr. 15 and June 26, 1951.

112. Ibid., Aug. 5, 1951; "Statement to members of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce by John K. Carpenter," Aug. 4, 1951, Amon Carter Papers, box 14, Amon Carter Museum, Fort Worth, Texas; *DMN,* Oct. 20, 1957; Andy DeShong, "The Dallas Chamber of Commerce: Its First Seventy Years" (typescript), Dallas Public Library.

113. *DMN,* Dec. 10, 1951; *New York Times,* Apr. 1, 1949; Jameson W. Doig, "Coalition-Building by a Regional Agency: Austin Tobin and the Port Authority of New York Authority," in *The Politics of Urban Development,* ed. Clarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1987): 73–104.

114. James C. Buckley, Inc., "Report of the Future of Love Field Dallas Texas with Respect to Service by Scheduled Air Carriers, Mar. 1952" (typescript), DPL.

115. Minutes, Dallas City Council, July 1, 1952, Resolution 52–2510; *DMN,* Jan. 23 and 27, 1953.

116. *DMN,* Jan. 25, 1953; *DTH,* Jan. 26, 1953.

117. *DTH,* Jan. 20, 1953; *DMN,* Jan. 21, 1953; *DE,* Jan. 24, 1953; J. O. Chisum, "The Oppressed Negro and Expansion of Love Field," J. O. Chisum Collection, box 1, DPL. Chisum estimated Love Field expansion would dislocate nearly 4,000 blacks. See *DMN,* Jan. 21, 1953.

118. *DE,* Jan. 24, 1953; *DMN,* Jan. 23, 1953.

119. *DMN,* Jan. 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1953; *DTH,* Jan. 20, 1953. The Doolittle Report (*The Airport and Its Neighbor*) was prepared by a presidential commission headed by World War II air hero Jimmy Doolittle. It was formed in response to three separate airplane crashes that occurred within a one mile area of residential Elizabeth, New Jersey (near the Newark Airport), in a six-week period in 1952. See *The Airport and Its Neighbors: The Report of the President's Airport Commission* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952).

120. *DMN,* Aug. 14, 1953; *DTH,* Sept. 4 and 7, 1954; May 21, 1954; Aug. 8, 1954.

121. Char Guerney, Chair, CAB to W. O. Jones, Fort Worth City Manager, Nov. 5, 1954, Earle Cabell Papers, box 11, DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University (SMU); *DMN,* July 1 and Nov. 14, 1954.

122. *DMN,* Nov. 26, 1954.

123. *Oak Cliff Tribune,* Mar. 17, 1955. Merl Sceffley, unsuccessful candidate in 1953, had tried for two years to develop an organization to challenge the CCA but failed. Scheffley had been a strong supporter of a cooperative effort with Fort Worth to develop a truly regional airport (*DMN,* Apr. 6, 1955).

124. *Oak Cliff Tribune,* Mar. 17, 1955.

PART 3

1. Black, "Empire of Consensus," p. 286.
2. Ibid., p. 15.

3. Zane L. Miller, "Pluralizing America," pp. 164–65; Herbert J, Gans, "Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life," in *American Urban History: An Interpretative Reader with Commentaries,* ed. Alexander B. Callow, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 512–13. This essay originally appeared in 1962.

4. For a similar transition taking place in a northern city, Cincinnati, see Zane L. Miller and Bruce Tucker, "Cincinnati: The New Urban Politics: Planning and Development in Cincinnati, 1954–1988," in *Snowbelt Cities: Metropolitan Politics in the Northeast and Midwest since World War II,* ed. Richard M. Bernard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 91–108.

CHAPTER 8

1. *DMN,* Nov. 12, 1950.
2. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1958; *DTH,* Nov. 17, 1957.
3. *DTH,* July 30, 1960.
4. *DMN,* Jan. 18, 1968.
5. Ibid., Sept. 9, 1955.
6. Ibid., Sept. 25, 1955.
7. Department of City Planning, Dallas, Texas, for the Dallas Area Metropolitan Planning Committee, *Urbanization—Dallas Metropolitan Area. A Report of Growth and Expansion* (Dallas, July 1956), p. 17.
8. *DMN,* Oct. 23, 1955; *DTH,* Sept. 7, 1955.
9. *DMN,* Oct. 23, 1955; May 31, 1958.
10. Department of City Planning, Dallas, Texas, for the Dallas Area Metropolitan Planning Committee, *A Look at Past Planning for the City of Dallas* (Dallas, January 1956).
11. Department of City Planning, *Urbanization—Dallas Metropolitan Area,* pp. 29, 34.
12. Department of City Planning, Dallas, Texas, for the Dallas Area Metropolitan Planning Committee, *A Preliminary Report Upon a Major Street Plan* (Dallas, 1957), pp. 114, 118, 157; "City Hall Report: The Master Plan Committee," *Dallas,* August, 1956, p. 29.
13. Department of City Planning, Dallas, Texas, and the Department of Parks and Recreation, for the Dallas Area Metropolitan Planning Committee, *Parks and Open Spaces—Dallas Metropolitan Area* (Dallas, Apr. 1959).
14. Department of City Planning, Dallas, Texas, for the Dallas Area Metropolitan Planning Committee, *Dallas Central District* (Dallas, 1961), pp. 8–12; *DMN,* Jan. 22, 1961.
15. Department of City Planning, *Dallas Central District,* pp. 8–12. Carl Abbott has recently characterized the period between 1955 and 1965 as an era of downtown as a failing business center. See his "Five Downtown Strategies: Policy

Discourse and Downtown Planning Since 1945," in *Urban Public Policy: Historical Modes and Methods,* ed. Martin V. Melosi (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 10–11.

16. Abbott, "Five Downtown Strategies," pp. 10–13; Robert B. Fairbanks, "Metropolitan Planning and Downtown Redevelopment: The Cincinnati and Dallas Experiences," *Planning Perspectives* 2 (Sept. 1987): 237–53.

17. "Dallas: An Exercise in Growth," in *Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal,* by L. Adde (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1961), pp. 70–99; *DTH,* Jan. 26, 1953; "Report and Recommendations of the Committee for the Central Business District," n.d. (typescript), DPL.

18. *DTH,* June 21, 1955.

19. Ibid., Dec. 5, 1957; *DMN,* Jan. 15, 1958. Minutes, DCC Board of Directors Meeting, Apr. 2, 1957, Carpenter Papers, box 141, UTA.

20. *DMN,* Mar. 13, 1958.

21. Special Committee of the DCC, "Report on Conditions in West Dallas" (Dallas, June 4, 1957).

22. Minutes, Board of Directors, DCC, Apr. 1, 1958, Carpenter Papers, box 141, UTA.

23. *DTH,* Apr. 28, 1953; *DE,* May 23, 1953.

24. *DMN,* Nov. 11, 1956; *DTH,* Mar. 6, 1956; "City Hall Report: Making History in 'Little Mexico,' " *Dallas,* Nov. 1956, p. 21.

25. Schermbick, *Urban Renewal for Texas,* p. 21.

26. *DMN,* June 9, 1957; *DTH,* Nov. 11, 1966; Miscellaneous paper on Dallas urban renewal, Bruce Alger Papers, box 4, DPL.

27. *DTH,* May 14 and Sept. 11, 1958.

28. *DMN,* Mar. 13, 1958; Apr. 5 and 9, 1958; May 15, 1961.

29. Ibid., Apr. 21 and May 5, 1958.

30. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* Nov. 4, 1954. According to the *Post-Dispatch,* Savage had been defeated because the Liberal Democratic Action Committee and the CIO had urged their members to vote against Savage because of his treatment of liberals when he served as chair of the Texas Democratic Executive Committee in 1952. He had also libeled the liberal Leslie Hacker in the Democratic primaries.

31. John C. Carpenter to Robert L. Thornton, Apr. 22, 1958, Carpenter Papers, box 141, UTA.

32. Henry Wade, untitled campaign speech, Alger Papers, box 2, DPL; *DMN,* Nov. 3, 1954; Barefoot Sanders Campaign flyers 1958, Alger Papers, box 2, DPL; *DMN,* Nov. 3, 1956; "One Among 22," *Newsweek,* Jan. 17, 1955, pp. 22–24.

33. *DMN,* June 24, 1958; *DTH,* June 24, 1958.

34. *DTH,* Mar. 26 and Nov. 9, 1958.

35. *Oak Cliff Tribune,* Sept. 26 and Oct. 17, 1958; H. L. Hunt to Alger [?], Sept. 17, 1958, Alger Papers, box 4, DPL; *DMN,* Nov. 5, 1958. Hunt, who moved to Dallas in 1938, never found acceptance by the city's civic leaders because of his un-

willingness to work for Dallas as a whole. He routinely refused requests for contributions to civic causes. See also Henry Hurt III, *Texas Rich: The Hunt Dynasty from Early Oil Days through the Silver Crash* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), p. 123.

36. *DMN,* Jan. 9, 1959.

37. Ibid., Jan. 18, 1959.

38. In addition to the political controversy surrounding federal urban renewal, local officials wanted to wait until the court decided on the validity of the state's urban renewal law. That did not occur until July 15, 1959, when the Texas Supreme Court ruled it constitutional. *DTH,* July 16, 1959.

39. Ibid., Mar. 8 and Aug. 23, 1959.

40. *DMN,* Mar. 19, 22, and 23, Apr. 1, 1957.

41. Ibid., Apr. 17, 1957.

42. Ibid., July 21, 1957.

43. *DTH,* Feb., 18, 1959.

44. Ibid., Jan. 22, 1959; Robert L. Clark, "Times Have Changed: A Discussion of Municipal Politics and Elections in the City of Dallas," Oct. 1959, Earle Cabell Papers, box 6, DeGolyer Library, SMU.

45. "Stephan J. Hay: An Oral History Interview, by Alan Mason on June 24, 1980," Dallas Mayors Oral History Project, pp. 70–73, DPL; Statement of Earle Cabell, Feb. 19, 1959, Cabell Papers, box 6, SMU; *DMN,* Apr. 3, 1959.

46. Statement of Earle Cabell, Feb. 19, 1959, Cabell Papers, box 6, SMU.

47. Ibid.

48. News Release—Earle Cabell for Mayor headquarters, Mar. 10, 1959, Cabell Papers, SMU; Statement of Earle Cabell, Feb. 19, 1959, Cabell Papers, SMU.

49. Minutes, Dallas Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors, July 24, 1942, Carpenter Papers, box 37, UTA Special Collections. The Trinity River Improvement Association sent Dale Miller to Washington to lobby for the canalization of the Trinity River. When it had difficulty paying him it worked out an agreement with the chamber of commerce to split his salary. *DMN,* Apr. 13, 1958.

50. *DTH,* Dec. 10, 1958.

51. *DE,* Mar. 14, 1959; *DTH,* Mar. 19, 1959; *DMN,* Apr. 3 and 5, 1959.

52. *Oak Cliff Tribune,* Mar. 30, 1959.

53. *DC,* Mar. 27, 1959.

54. *DMN,* Apr. 1, 1959.

55. *Oak Cliff Tribune,* Jan. 26 and Mar. 2, 1959.

56. Ibid., Mar. 2, 1959.

57. *DMN,* Apr. 5 and 9, 1959.

58. *DE,* Apr. 4 and 18, 1959; Barney Johnson, chair, North Dallas–Walnut Hill Improvement League, to W. N. Bret, Jr., Cabell Papers, SMU.

59. *DMN,* Apr. 18, 19, and 22, 1959.

60. *DMN,* Apr. 24, 1959.

61. Clark, "Times Have Changed," pp. 4–5.

62. Ibid.; *DMN,* Dec. 13, 1959.

63. "Proposed Plan for Reorganization," n.d., Thomas Unis Papers, DHS.

64. "Organizational Plan and Operating Procedure for the Citizens Charter Association as Adopted by the Reorganization Committee," October 1960 (typescript), Unis Papers, DHS; *DTH,* Dec. 13, 1959; Jan. 8, 1961; *DMN,* July 7 and Dec. 9, 1960. CCA President W. H. Pierce explained the CCA made these changes because there was a public perception that the CCA was "shutting out a democratic selection of candidates." Form letter from W. H. Pierce to CCA membership, Jan. 12, 1961, Unis Papers, DHS.

65. *DMN,* Jan. 30, 1961.

66. Ibid., Mar. 12, 1961.

67. Ibid., Jan. 30, Feb. 2, Feb. 3, 1961.

68. Ibid., Feb. 3, 1961

69. Ibid., Mar. 19, 1961.

70. *DC,* Mar. 24, 1961.

71. *DMN,* Apr. 6, 1961; *DC,* Apr. 28, 1961.

72. *DMN,* May 15, 1961.

73. *Build America Committee, Dallas—A New Look: An Advisory Team Report* (National Real Estate Board, 1961), pp. 6, 16, 22, and 32; *DMN,* May 14, 1961.

74. *DMN,* Jan. 31 and Feb. 7, 1962.

75. *DMN,* Mar. 25, 1962; Minutes, City Council, Apr. 9, 1962; *DTH,* June 25, 1962.

76. *DTH,* June 28, 1962; Statement of James W. Smith, Home Builders Association of Dallas County, news release, June 26, 1962, Bruce Alger Papers, DPL.

77. *DMN*[?], May 3, 1962; Memo to Members from J. T. Suggs, president, June 7, 1962, Cabell Papers, box 8, SMU.

78. *DTH,* Aug. 14 and Sept. 7, 1962; Lyn Davis to Bruce Alger, Aug. 15, 1962, Alger Papers, DPL.

79. Bruce Alger to Earle Cabell and Members of City Council, Sept. 12, 1962, Alger Papers, DPL; *DTH,* Sept. 15, 1962.

80. The actual wording of the proposition was as follows: "Shall the City Council of the City of Dallas enter into a cooperation agreement with the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas, Texas?" *DMN,* Nov. 3, 1962.

81. "Do You Want a Public Housing Project in Your Neighborhood? (pamphlet by Dallas Voters Against Public Housing)," Alger Papers, DPL.

82. *DMN,* Sept. 6, 1962; R. L. Thornton to Earle Cabell, June 12, 1962, Cabell Papers, box 8, SMU.

83. *DMN,* Nov. 7 and 8, 1962.

84. Carolyn Ann Carney, "The 'City of Hate': Anti-Communist and Conservative Attitudes in Dallas, Texas, 1950–1964" (master's thesis, University of Texas at Arlington, 1994), pp. 27, 39–62. Quote from p. 40.

85. For two different interpretations see Payne, *Big D,* pp. 305–7, and Carney, "City of Hate," pp. 18–23.

86. Warren Leslie, *Dallas Public and Private: Aspects of an American City* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1964), pp. 165–73, 180–86. Quote from p. 184.

87. *DMN,* Nov. 5, 1960.

88. Ted Dealey once visited Kennedy at the White House and accused the President of trying to lead the country "on Caroline's tricycle." Leslie, *Dallas Public and Private,* pp. 154–55.

89. The first commercial jet landed at Love Field on November 10, 1958. Regular jet service started the following February. See *DMN,* Nov. 11. 1958. Dallas's longest runway at this time was 7,500 feet. See Scott and Davis, *Giant in Texas,* p. 34.

90. *DMN,* Mar. 31, 1959; *DTH,* Nov. 13 and 22, 1959.

91. Draft of Proposed Report of the Aviation Committee for George Coker, 1960; *DTH,* Oct. 9, 1962.

92. In March of 1960, the FAA approved a $907,500 grant to lengthen Carter Field while at the same time denying a Dallas request. James Winchester, "The Great Dallas-Fort Worth Controversy," *Flying,* May 1961, p. 85; *DMN,* Mar. 1, 1963.

93. Telegram, Mayor Earle Cabell to Najeeb E. Halaby, Aug. 1962, Cabell Papers, box 11, SMU; *DMN,* Aug. 17, 1962; *DTH,* Aug. 30, 1962.

94. CAB to City of Dallas, Apr. 21, 1962; CAB, "Initial Decision of Ross I. Newman," Apr. 7, 1964, Dockett 13959, Cabell Papers, box 11, SMU. For more on the airport controversy see Robert B. Fairbanks, "A Clash of Priorities: The Federal Government and Dallas Airport Development, 1917–1964," in *American Cities and Towns: Historical Perspectives,* ed. Joseph F. Rishel (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1992), pp. 164–84.

95. Earle Cabell News Release, Aug. 22, 1962, Cabell Papers, SMU; H. L. Nichols to membership of Chamber of Commerce, Aug. 31, 1962; Love Field Advisory Committee Data, Aug. 20, 1962, Cabell Papers, box 11, SMU.

96. CAB, "Initial Decision of Ross I. Newman," Apr. 7, 1964, Dockett 13959, Cabell Papers, box 11, SMU.

97. Scott and Davis, *Giant in Texas,* p. 49.

98. *DMN,* May 18, 1954.

99. Walter J. E. Schiebel, *Education in Dallas: Ninety-two Years of History, 1874–1966* (Dallas: Dallas Independent School District, 1966), p. 160. The vote was 30,324 against integration and 7,416 for it. See *DMN,* Aug. 7, 1960. The best account of integration in Dallas can be found in Glenn M. Linden, *Desegregating Schools in Dallas: Four Decades in the Federal Courts* (Dallas: Three Forks Press, 1995). Also see Frank T. Read and Lucy S. McGough, *Let Them Be Judged: The Judicial Integration of the Deep South* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1978, pp. 76–91; W. Marvin Dulaney, "Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, Texas?" in *Essays on the American Civil Rights Movement,* ed. W. Marvin Dulaney and Kathleen Underwood (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993), pp. 76–77.

100. Linden, *Desegregating Schools in Dallas,* pp. 37–39. Even before that Court decision the report emphasized that "plans should be made in advance that, should our schools be integrated, law and order should prevail in Dallas no matter what situation arises." It also emphasized that "it was essential that disorders such as occurred in Little Rock be prevented here." See Stanley Marcus, "Dallas Citizens Council for the Year 1958," Carpenter Papers, box 141, UTA Special Collections.

101. Dulaney, "Whatever Happened in Dallas," pp. 79–81.

102. *New York Times,* July 30 and Sept. 7, 1961.

103. "Dallas, Houston: A Big Contrast," *Texas Observer,* Sept. 9, 1961, p. 3; Schutze, *Accommodation,* pp. 125–33; Dulaney, "Whatever Happened in Dallas," pp. 81–82.

104. According to *Texas Monthly* writer Lawrence Wright, under E. M. "Ted" Dealey the *News* "became the most strident, red-baiting daily paper in America." Wright also pointed out that George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi Party, had concluded that "Dallas has the most patriotic, pro-American people of any city in the country" (Lawrence Wright, "Why Do They Hate Us So Much?" *Texas Monthly,* Nov. 1983, p. 228).

105. Payne, *Big D,* pp. 307–9; Carney, "City of Hate," pp. 24–26.

106. Leslie, *Dallas Public and Private,* pp. 188–90; *NY Times,* Oct. 25, 1963.

107. *NY Times,* Oct. 26, 1963. After the incident, ABC radio commentator Edward P. Morgan charged that "the big D now stands for disgrace." See "City of Hate," p. 17.

108. *DMN,* Oct. 27, 1963.

109. See Miller, *Suburb,* pp. 227–41.

110. *DTH,* Dec. 1, 1963.

111. *DMN,* Nov. 4, 1964.

112. Vita for John Erik Jonsson, clipping file, Dallas Public Library; Dave Dillon, "Erik Jonsson: Contemporary Dallas is a Testament to His Grand Vision as Mayor," *DMN,* Aug. 17, 1986.

113. *DMN,* Jan. 23, 1967. These fears generally did not match reality, as the city continued to boom in the mid-1960s. See Payne, *Big D,* p. 326.

114. "Jonsson Moves on Wide Front in Pursuit of City Excellence," *DTH,* Feb. 6, 1969. Jonsson equated the Kennedy assassination's impact on Dallas "to the total devastation other cities had known due to World War II." He hoped that like them, Dallas "could rise again and be bigger and more beautiful" (*DTH,* Sept. 4, 1986).

115. The following discussion of Goals For Dallas relies heavily on three documents: "Goals for Dallas Speech Outline," August 24, 1966, DPL; "Goals for Dallas: A Program of Citizen Participation in Setting and Implementing Goals of a Major American City," January 1968, DPL; and *Goals for Dallas* (Dallas: Goals for Dallas, 1966).

116. "Goals for Dallas Speech Outline," August 24, 1966, pp. 4–5.

117. *Goals for Dallas: Mutual Aims of Its Citizens* (Dallas: Goals for Dallas, 1957), pp. 8–9.

118. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

119. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

120. *Goals for Dallas: Summaries of the Proposals for Achieving the Goals for Dallas* (Dallas: Goals for Dallas, 1969).

121. Ibid., p. 7.

122. The best account of the CCA during these years can be found in Payne, *Big D,* pp. 351–65.

123. Such a change is associated with what Zane L. Miller has called the revolt against culture, a rebellion against the notion that spatially based culture determines individual behavior. See Miller and Tucker, "The Revolt Against Cultural Determinism and the Meaning of Community Action," pp. 413–43.

Epilogue

1. Darwin Payne, *Big D,* pp. 358–59.
2. *DMN,* Apr. 6, 1975.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1988.
5. Ibid., Jan. 13, 1989.
6. Ibid., Aug. 13, 1989.
7. Ibid., Aug. 10, 1989.
8. Dennis Holder, "The Tragedy of 10–4-1," *Big D,* November, 1989, p. 86.
9. *DMN,* Mar. 29, 1990.
10. *DMN,* Oct. 3. 1993; *Dallas Citizens Council Report,* vol. 3, Summer 1993.
11. Ibid., Oct. 16, 1994.
12. Ibid., Jan. 7, 1993.
13. "What is the Dallas Plan," *The Dallas Plan,* Sept. 1, 1993.
14. City of Dallas and The Dallas City Plan, Inc., *The Dallas Plan* (Dallas, Oct. 1994), pp. A1-A3.
15. *DMN,* Apr. 21, 1996.
16. Ibid., Jan. 4, 1996.
17. Ibid., Feb. 19, 1996.
18. Ibid., Feb. 28, 1994.

□ Bibliographic Essay

Although source material on Dallas is not as accessible as for some cities, there is clearly enough to explore a variety of topics in Dallas history. My study has relied greatly on the city's newspapers, including the *Dallas Morning News,* the *Dallas Times Herald,* and the *Dallas Journal.* Other papers particularly helpful were the *Dallas Express,* an African American newspaper, as well as the *Oak Cliff Tribune,* the city's largest sectional paper and a constant critic of the establishment. Labor periodicals also were consulted, although they were not as helpful. I accessed much of the material by reading microfilm, but the Dallas Public Library (DPL) has a very good clipping file from the 1940s onward. There is also an index to the *News,* although it is difficult to use. Newspaper clippings dealing with growth and political issues could also be found in the scrapbooks of Jeff G. Jones at the Dallas Historical Society (DHS). I also used the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* clipping file found in Special Collections at the University of Texas at Arlington Library (UTA) to get a rival city's view of Dallas.

This study relied on a number of important collections housed at the DHS, the DPL, the DeGolyer Library at Southern Methodist University (SMU), and Special Collections at UTA. Clearly the most important collection concerning turn-of-the-century Dallas is the George Bannerman Dealey Papers, found at the DHS. This fifty-four-box collection explores a variety of significant Dallas developments between 1890 and 1940, including politics and planning. Another helpful DHS holding is the Elmer Scott Collection. It deals with early philanthropic activities in Dallas, especially the Civic Federation of Dallas, and provides valuable insights into the early public housing movement in the city. The Texas Centennial Papers includes committee reports and correspondence about Dallas's participation in the Texas Centennial Central Exposition and also the Pan American Exposition. This proved one of the most useful collections for my coverage of the 1930s. The Thomas Unis Papers helped me grasp the workings of the Citizens Charter Association (CCA) in the 1960s and nicely complemented political sources found at other collections. Less helpful holdings were the Robert L. Thornton Collection, which primarily deals with the city's efforts to incorporate the Park Cities; the Critic Club Papers, a collection that includes papers by civic leaders on significant public issues; the small Dallas Love Field Collection; and the Hatton William Sumners Papers. Sumners was a longtime congressman from Dallas.

The local archives at DPL also hold major collections of Dallas history. The Bruce

Alger Papers proved the most helpful to this manuscript. Alger, the city's first Republican congressman, played a major role in the political discourse of Dallas in the 1950s and 1960s, and his collection introduces the scholar to the city's conservative political nature. It offers a valuable introduction to the battles over public housing and urban renewal during those years. The Carl B. Callaway Collection documents the early development of the CCA. Callaway was that organization's second president, and his collection contains not only his personal papers but also some organizational papers of the CCA. The Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce Collection, the John and Ethelyn Chisum Collection, and the Juanita Craft Papers provide considerable insight into the workings of the city's African American community. The DPL also houses the important chamber of commerce publications *Dallas* and *Southwest Business,* which yielded valuable information on the city's economic development. In addition, it maintains bio-clips on microfilm that proved very helpful in putting together some of my biographical sketches. Equally important was the library's rich oral history collection of civic and political leaders.

The Special Collections of the UTA Library also houses several useful archival sources. It contains extensive holdings on the area's labor movement and includes the *Dallas Craftsman.* I also drew on their Ford Motor Plant Collection and benefited from several transcribed oral interviews of labor leaders. The Dallas Citizens Committee, an organization that opposed the CCA in the 1960s, also has its papers preserved at UTA. Undoubtedly, the most important collection at UTA for me was the recently acquired John Carpenter Papers. Carpenter, who presided over both the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and the Dallas Citizens Council (DCC) after 1940, was one of the city's leading citizens. That collection contains important papers from both those organizations, including the minutes of the executive committee of the DCC. This collection is simply the richest we have on business leadership in Dallas between the 1920s and 1960s and is destined to play a major role in shaping the writing of this city's history.

The Earle Cabell Papers at the DeGolyer Library at SMU also proved critical to my discussion of the late 1950s and 1960s. This is a rich collection that documents a variety of issues during that time period and provides insight into the important but often ignored challenge to the dominance of the CCA. It also proved helpful for understanding the city's commitment to Love Field in the 1950s and 1960s. The DeGolyer has recently received the Stanley Marcus papers. Although that collection remained closed to me, when opened it will be enormously important to the modern history of Dallas.

The Dallas Municipal Archives and Records Center, located in the Dallas City Hall, also facilitated this study. It housed both the minutes of the city commissioners and city council as well as the ordinances from those bodies. In addition, I consulted the minutes of the city plan commission located there. The Archives of the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas, maintained at the body's administrative offices, also held valuable information on the city's public housing movement and included not only annual re-

ports of that body but also minutes of its meetings. A collection of documents housed in the basement of the Love Field Terminal also enriched my understanding of the city's aviation history.

This study also benefited from the Public Housing Administration Records, Record Group 196, at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. That collection included studies and correspondence concerning Dallas's early forays into public housing. The War Manpower Commission Records, Record Group 211, housed at the Federal Archives and Record Center in Fort Worth, Texas, addressed how World War II impacted the city's economic, demographic, and social development. In addition, a collection of newspaper clippings and other information on the bombings of Dallas's black homes from the American Civil Liberties Union Archives located at Princeton University proved quite useful in discussing that turbulent time in Dallas history. The A. Maceo Smith Papers, now located at the Dallas Museum of African-American Life and Culture, provided insight into not only this important black civic leader, but a host of racial issues not always reported in the white newspapers. The Amon Carter Papers, located at the Amon Carter Museum in Fort Worth, likewise offered a different perspective of Dallas not found in that city's newspapers. It gave balance to my understanding of the nature of the Dallas–Fort Worth Airport rivalry.

Although fewer in number, some good secondary sources on the city's twentieth-century history do exist. I especially benefited from two dissertations. William Neil Black's "Empire of Consensus: City Planning, Zoning, and Annexation In Dallas, 1900–1960" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982) provides groundbreaking coverage of the city's planning history. Black relies heavily on the City Plan Commission minutes for his study, which traces how city leaders used planning to unite a fragmented urban population. Although I do not always agree with his conclusions, his dissertation made my book a lot easier to write. Patricia Hill's "The Origin of Modern Dallas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Dallas, 1989) looks at alternative visions of Dallas, and introduced me to rich archival sources of nonbusiness participants in Dallas civic life. Her portrayal of Dallas labor problems is particularly compelling. Hill's revised dissertation has recently been published as *Dallas: The Making of a Modern City* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996). Another dissertation that discusses a different city but describes a similar story is Robert Burnham, "Pulling Together for Pluralism: Politics, Planning and Government in Cincinnati, 1924–1959" (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1990). I borrowed heavily from his analysis of council-manager government in Cincinnati. This study also drew from numerous master theses. The most helpful were Robert Gary Peacock, "The Origins of Commission Government in Dallas, 1902–1907" (master's thesis, North Texas State, 1975); Suzanne K. Shepard, "A Design for Dallas: G. B. Dealey and City Planning, 1900–1920" (master's thesis, University of Texas at Arlington, 1978); and Carolyn Jenkins Barta, "*The Dallas News* and Council-Manager Government" (master's thesis, University of Texas, 1970).

Darwin Payne's recently published *Big D: Triumphs and Troubles of an American Supercity in the 20th Century* (Dallas: Three Forks Press, 1994) is the best overview of

modern Dallas yet published. Had it been available when I started my project I would have been done much earlier. Payne, a former newspaperman for the *Dallas Times-Herald* and now a journalism professor at SMU, relies heavily on newspaper sources as well as his own experiences. Another recent publication that proves critical to the early-twentieth-century history of Dallas is Maxine Holmes and Gerald D. Saxon, eds., *The WPA Dallas Guide and History* (Denton, Tex.: University of North Texas Press, 1992). This work had remained in manuscript form only at DPL until that institution and the Texas Center for the Book subsidized its publication. Most of my citations are from the WPA manuscript rather than the published form. This work is useful as not only a secondary but a primary source, since it reflects a special way of approaching the city. Another publication that served as a critical primary and secondary source was Harold A. Stone et al., *City Manager Government in Dallas (Texas)* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1939). This book clearly demonstrates how council-manager government reflected a different kind of comprehensive approach to city government than did the city commission government.

One other scholar of Dallas as well as planning, William H. Wilson, deserves mention. Wilson's impressive *The City Beautiful Movement* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) includes a chapter on early Dallas planning and, of course, provides a broad interpretation of the City Beautiful movement. Although I dispute that interpretation, I have benefited greatly from Wilson's scholarly examination of the city's planning movement found here and in other published articles.

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